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Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Nago, No. 24-6629, opinion

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2026-04-28

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL No. 24-6629
FOUNDATION, INC.,
D.C. No.
1:23-cv-00389Plaintiff - Appellant,
LEK-WRP
v.
OPINION
SCOTT T. NAGO, in his official
capacity as the Chief Election Officer
for the State of Hawaii,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 6, 2025
Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed April 28, 2026

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Michelle T. Friedland, and
Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

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2 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

SUMMARY*

National Voter Registration Act

The panel affirmed on different grounds the district
court’s dismissal of an action brought by Public Interest
Legal Foundation, Inc. (“PILF”), a non-profit organization
focused on election integrity, alleging that Hawaii’s State
Elections Office’s refusal to provide statewide voter
registration data violated the public inspection provision of
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), 52
U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1).
Section 20507(i)(1) of the NVRA requires each state to,
upon request, disclose records relating to the implementation
of certain voter list maintenance activities.
In response to PILF’s request for a statewide list of
registered voters, Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined
to provide a list and recommended that PILF request
separate county-level lists from each of Hawaii’s four
County Clerks. PILF then filed suit in district court seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief requiring Hawaii to provide
a statewide voter list. The district court dismissed PILF’s suit
for lack of Article III jurisdiction.
The panel held that PILF had standing because the bare
denial of a request for information under the NVRA causes
an injury in fact sufficient to support Article III standing.
PILF was not required to show that the denial of information
interfered with its core business activities.

*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 3

The panel next held that PILF’s claim became
constitutionally ripe when Hawaii’s State Elections Office
made it clear that it would not provide the information PILF
requested. PILF’s claim was prudentially ripe because it
was fit for judicial review and there was no judicial interest
in delaying review of PILF’s challenge.
Turning to the merits of PILF’s claim, the panel held that
the NVRA does not give PILF a right to the information it
seeks from the State because a statewide voter list is not a
“record[] concerning the implementation of programs and
activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy
and currency of official lists of eligible voters” within the
meaning of § 20507(i)(1) of the NVRA. Covered “records”
are those about the implementation of efforts to ensure the
accuracy of voter lists, not voter lists themselves.
Because the panel concluded that there was jurisdiction
but that PILF’s claim failed on the merits, the panel
remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss
PILF’s claim with prejudice.

COUNSEL

Joseph M. Nixon (argued), Maureen Riordan, and Noel H.
Johnson, Public Interest Legal Foundation Inc., Alexandria,
Virginia; William A. Harrison, Harrison Law Center A Law
Corporation, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Aaron Schulaner (argued), General Counsel, Office of
Elections, Pearl City, Hawaii; Jennifer H. Crum, Reese R.
Nakamura, and Randall Nishiyama, Deputy Attorneys
General; Anne E. Lopez, Hawaiʻi Attorney General; Office

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4 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

of the Hawaii Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawaii; for
Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. (“PILF”), a nonprofit organization focused on election integrity, asked
Hawaii for a statewide list of registered voters, citing the
public inspection provision of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C.
§ 20507(i)(1). Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined to
provide a list and recommended that PILF request separate
county-level lists from each of Hawaii’s four County Clerks.
PILF filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
requiring Hawaii to provide a statewide voter list. The
district court dismissed the suit for lack of Article III
jurisdiction.
We hold that PILF has standing and that PILF’s claim is
ripe, so there is jurisdiction under Article III. But we affirm
dismissal because PILF’s claim fails on the merits.
I.
A.
Congress enacted the NVRA in 1993.1 Pub. L. No. 10331, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 205011
Because the NVRA requires each state to allow individuals to register
to vote when applying for or renewing a driver’s license, the statute is
often called the “Motor Voter” bill. Helen Dewar, Senate Approves

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 5

20511). The NVRA imposes on states programmatic
requirements that balance maintaining the integrity of voter
rolls with protecting the fundamental right to vote. 52
U.S.C. § 20507; compare id. § 20501(b)(1) (expressing in
the NVRA’s Preamble a purpose to “increase the number of
eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal
office”), with id. § 20501(b)(4) (expressing in the NVRA’s
Preamble a purpose to “ensure that accurate and current
voter registration rolls are maintained”). For example, it
requires states to “conduct a general program that makes a
reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters
from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of” a death
or change in residence of the registrant. Id. § 20507(a)(4).
But it prevents a state from removing names from voter rolls
“on the ground that the registrant has changed residence,”
unless certain confirmation procedures are followed. Id.
§ 20507(d)(1). The NVRA also specifies, more generally,
that any state “program or activity to protect the integrity of
the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an
accurate and current voter registration roll” shall be
“uniform [and] nondiscriminatory.” Id. § 20507(b), (b)(1).
The NVRA further requires each state to, upon request,
disclose records relating to the implementation of certain
voter list maintenance activities. Id. § 20507(i)(1).
Specifically, the NVRA’s public disclosure provision states:

(1) Each State shall maintain for at
least 2 years and shall make available for
public inspection and, where available,
photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records

‘Motor Voter’ Bill: GOP Forces Deletion of Key Provision, Wash. Post,
Mar. 18, 1993, at A1.

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6 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

concerning the implementation of programs
and activities conducted for the purpose of
ensuring the accuracy and currency of
official lists of eligible voters, except to the
extent that such records relate to a declination
to register to vote or to the identity of a voter
registration agency through which any
particular voter is registered.

(2) The records maintained pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall include lists of the names
and addresses of all persons to whom notices
[of removal from voting rolls] are sent, and
information concerning whether or not each
such person has responded to the notice as of
the date that inspection of the records is
made.

Id. § 20507(i).
The public disclosure provision serves a transparency
function, ensuring that the public may verify that listmaintenance activities are implemented lawfully and not in
a manner that causes “poor and illiterate voters [to be] caught
in a purge system which will require them to needlessly reregister.” S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18 (1993); see also id. at 32
(“The [Senate Committee on Rules and Administration] is
mindful of the need to keep accurate and current voter rolls.
The Committee is concerned that . . . programs [to ensure
their accuracy] can be abused and may result in the
elimination of names of voters from the rolls solely due to
their failure to respond to a mailing. Abuses may be found

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 7

in the design of a program as well as in its
implementation.”).
Although the Department of Justice may enforce the
NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20510(a), the statute also creates a
private right of action allowing any person “aggrieved by a
violation” of the NVRA to seek declaratory or injunctive
relief, id. § 20510(b).
The Help America Vote Act, enacted in 2002, also
regulates states’ maintenance of voter registration records.
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended at
52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145). That law specifies that each
state “shall implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory
manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive
computerized statewide voter registration list defined,
maintained, and administered at the State level.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 21083(a)(1)(A). The voter registration list “shall serve as
the single system for storing and managing the official list of
registered voters throughout the State,” and it must contain
“the name and registration information of every legally
registered voter.” Id. § 21083(a)(1)(A), (A)(i).
B.
Hawaii law divides responsibility for election
administration between the State Elections Office and the
County Clerks. The State Elections Office, which is led by
Chief Election Officer Scott T. Nago, promulgates voter
registration regulations. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-1.5, 114; Haw. Code R. § 3-177-50.2 But Hawaii’s four County

2
Throughout this opinion, we reference the current versions of Hawaii
statutes and regulations. The statutes and regulations relevant here have
been substantively the same since this dispute began.

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8 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

Clerks are responsible for carrying out voter registration.3
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-11. The Clerks maintain each county’s
general register—a list that includes the identity and address
of each registered voter. Id. § 11-14(a). They update the
general register regularly by processing new voter
registration requests and determining who is eligible to vote.
Id. § 11-11; Haw. Code R. § 3-177-155. In addition, the
Clerks are tasked with conducting a general program to
remove ineligible voters, as required by the NVRA. Haw.
Code R. § 3-177-157.
Under Hawaii law, the County Clerks also handle public
requests for voter lists. Basic voter information—a
registered voter’s name, district or precinct, and whether a
voter is active or inactive—is publicly available for any
reason. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-97(a). But personal details like
driver’s license numbers, birth dates, addresses, and social
security numbers are not available, except for official
“election or government” purposes. Id.; Haw. Code R. § 3177-160(c).
Although Nago generally supervises state elections, his
office does not directly oversee the County Clerks. See Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 11-2(a) (“The chief election officer shall
supervise all state elections.”). Instead, the County Clerks
are appointed by and removable only by their respective
elected county councils. See, e.g., Charter of the County of
Hawaii art. III, § 3-6(b) (“The council shall appoint the

3
Hawaii functionally has four counties (the City and County of
Honolulu, the County of Maui, the County of Hawaiʻi, and the County
of Kauaʻi). Hawaii law recognizes a fifth quasi-county, Kalawao, which
consists of a small portion of the island of Molokai. See Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 326-34. But for purposes of election administration, “the county of
Kalawao shall be deemed to be included in the county of Maui.” Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 11-1.

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 9

county clerk . . . . The council, by a two-thirds vote of its
membership, may remove the county clerk from office at any
time.”); Charter of the County of Maui art. V, § 5-2 (“The
county clerk is appointed by the council . . . . The council
may remove the county clerk from office at any time for
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance.”).
C.
Plaintiff-Appellant PILF is a non-profit organization that
“seeks to promote the integrity of elections nationwide
through research, education, remedial programs, and
litigation.” 4 PILF’s advocacy focuses on ensuring that
election officials act lawfully.
In 2023, PILF requested from the Hawaii Office of
Elections an opportunity to inspect or receive a copy of the
State’s full list of registered voters. The office did not
provide a list, instead responding: “For a list of registered
voters, please contact the County Elections Divisions. Any
further related questions may be directed to the County
Elections Divisions.” After PILF requested clarification as
to whether the Office of Elections maintains a master file
combining all county voter lists, the Office of Elections
repeated the same instruction that PILF should contact the
County Elections Divisions.
D.
PILF filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii against Nago in his official capacity as
Hawaii’s Chief Election Officer. As relevant here, PILF

4
Because this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we draw the facts
from the allegations in the Complaint and construe the allegations in
favor of PILF. Southcentral Found. v. Alaska Native Tribal Health
Consortium, 983 F.3d 411, 416-17 (9th Cir. 2020).

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10 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

alleged that Nago’s office’s refusal to provide statewide
voter registration data violated the NVRA’s public
disclosure requirement. PILF requested declaratory and
injunctive relief requiring Nago’s office to disclose a
statewide voter list.
Nago moved to dismiss. He argued that PILF lacked
Article III standing or that its claim failed for lack of ripeness
because it had not properly requested the records from the
County Clerks so had not suffered any final denial. He
further argued that the Complaint failed to state a claim
because his office’s responses complied with federal law.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, holding that PILF’s NVRA claim was unripe.
The court reasoned that PILF could still request the records
from the counties, and, if denied, then bring a ripe challenge
to that denial. The district court gave PILF four months to
amend its Complaint, if its claims became ripe. Believing
that the NVRA mandated disclosure from the State itself,
PILF declined to amend, so the district court proceeded to
enter final judgment. PILF timely appealed.
II.
We evaluate issues of Article III jurisdiction de novo.
Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem, 148 F.4th 656, 673 (9th Cir.
2025) (“Standing is jurisdictional; we consider it de novo
and sua sponte.”). We also review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. Saloojas, Inc. v. Aetna Health of
Cal., Inc., 80 F.4th 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2023). We “can
affirm . . . dismissal on any ground supported by the record,
even if the district court did not rely on the ground.” Arakaki
v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1057 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007).

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 11

III.
“Whether the question is viewed as one of standing or
ripeness, the Constitution mandates that prior to our exercise
of jurisdiction there exist a constitutional ‘case or
controversy.’” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n,
220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Ry.
Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)). The issues
presented must be “definite and concrete, not hypothetical or
abstract.” Ry. Mail Ass’n, 326 U.S. at 93. The parties and
the district court focused their jurisdictional analysis on
whether PILF’s claims were ripe for adjudication. But we
must also decide whether PILF has standing. We conclude
that PILF has standing because the bare denial of a request
for information under the NVRA causes an injury in fact
sufficient to support Article III standing. Further, PILF is
not required to show injury to a core business activity just
because it is an organizational plaintiff—interference with
an organization’s core business activity is a cognizable
injury in fact, but it is not the only type of injury an
organization can suffer. 5 We also conclude that PILF’s
claim is ripe.
A.
To establish Article III standing, a litigant must show
that it “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
We focus only on the first prong, because if PILF suffered

5
We ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on whether PILF
suffered a cognizable injury in fact and whether it had organizational
standing.

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12 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

an injury in fact, it is clear that Nago’s office caused the
injury and that a favorable ruling would provide redress.
1.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that if a statute
creates a broad public right to obtain information about the
government, the denial of a request for information made
pursuant to that statute causes an injury in fact.
In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,
491 U.S. 440 (1989), advocacy organizations requested
access to the records of an American Bar Association
(“ABA”) Committee related to its evaluations of potential
judicial nominees that the Committee had provided to the
President. Id. at 443-47. After the ABA Committee denied
the request, the organizations brought suit under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), seeking a declaration
that the ABA committee was an “advisory committee”—a
group used to give advice to the President, agencies, or
officers of the United States that is subject to FACA’s
disclosure requirements. Id. at 446-47; 5 U.S.C. § 1001(2)
(defining “advisory committee”). FACA requires that
“records, reports, transcripts, minutes, . . . or other
documents which were made available to or prepared for or
by each advisory committee shall be available for public
inspection and copying.” 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b). Under FACA,
the plaintiffs argued, the ABA Committee had an obligation
to “make its minutes, records, and reports available for
public inspection and copying.” Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at
447.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff organizations
had standing to challenge the denial of access to the records,
writing that the “refusal to permit [them] to scrutinize the
ABA Committee’s activities to the extent FACA allows

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 13

constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing
to sue.” Id. at 449. That the plaintiff organizations had
“sought and were denied specific agency records” was
enough to satisfy Article III’s injury in fact requirement. Id.
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11
(1998), reaffirmed that principle. Id. at 21. There, plaintiff
voters had invoked the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 to request information about, among other things, the
lobbying of federal elected officials by the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”). Id. at 16. The
Federal Election Commission determined that AIPAC was
not subject to the statute’s disclosure requirements. Id. at 13.
The plaintiffs challenged that determination, and the
Supreme Court ultimately held that they had standing
because they had been denied the requested information.
The Supreme Court explained that the “‘injury in fact’ that
[the plaintiffs] have suffered consists of their inability to
obtain information . . . that, on [the plaintiffs’] view of the
law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public.” Id. at 21;
see also id. (“[A] plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the
plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly
disclosed pursuant to a statute.” (quoting Pub. Citizen, 491
U.S. at 449)).
Such “[i]nformational injuries remain firmly embedded
in both Supreme Court and circuit cases.” Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 935 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir.
2019). For example, our court has cited Public Citizen for
the proposition that the “inability to obtain information
subject to disclosure laws is sufficient” to establish an injury
in fact. Inland Empire Waterkeeper v. Corona Clay Co., 17

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14 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

F.4th 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Public Citizen, 491
U.S. at 449).6
Nago asserts that under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594
U.S. 413 (2021), PILF must do more than allege the denial
of information to satisfy Article III’s injury in fact
requirement. But his reliance is misplaced, because
TransUnion does not govern here. In TransUnion, a class of
plaintiffs sued a credit reporting company after receiving
notifications under the Fair Credit Reporting Act in two
letters instead of all at once as that statute required. Id. at
420-21. In response to arguments that those “formatting
defects” amounted to an informational injury sufficient for
Article III standing under Akins and Public Citizen, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not suffered an
injury in fact. Id. at 418; see also id. at 441-42.
In doing so, the Supreme Court expressly explained why
the plaintiffs in TransUnion had not demonstrated standing
under the doctrine established by Akins and Public Citizen.
First, unlike the plaintiffs in Akins and Public Citizen, the
plaintiffs in TransUnion “did not allege that they failed to

6
Our decision in Wilderness Society, Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir.
2010), does not deviate from that understanding of informational injury.
In Rey, the plaintiffs had sued to compel the U.S. Forest Service to follow
a set of notice and comment (and appeal) procedures. Id. at 1253. They
alleged that they were deprived of notice of certain proposed actions by
the U.S. Forest Service due to its failure to follow those procedures. Id.
at 1257-58. Although we recognized that “notice, of course, is a form of
information,” id. at 1259, we understood the plaintiffs’ injury as merely
procedural in nature and held that the plaintiffs had not suffered a
cognizable informational injury, id. at 1259-60, as required by a thenrecent Supreme Court decision interpreting the same statute. Id. at 1260
(citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496-97 (2009)).
Importantly, we distinguished that procedural injury from the substantive
informational injuries at issue in Public Citizen and Akins. Id. at 1258.

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 15

receive any required information.” Id. at 441. The Court
emphasized that the plaintiffs had received the information,
just not in the format the statute required. Id.; see also
Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, 60 F.4th 156, 170 (4th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that “the informational injuries in Public Citizen
and Akins (the ‘fail[ure] to receive any required
information’)” are distinguishable “from the purported
informational injury [in TransUnion] (receipt of the required
information ‘in the wrong format’)” (quoting TransUnion,
594 U.S. at 441)).7
Second, TransUnion did not involve a sunshine law—a
statute that entitles all members of the public to information
about government activities, like the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) and the public disclosure statutes
at issue in Akins and Public Citizen. TransUnion, 594 U.S.
at 441 (distinguishing Akins and Public Citizen by
explaining that “[t]his case does not involve such a publicdisclosure law”). Rather, TransUnion involved a right of
action against private entities under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. That statute mandates certain disclosures by
credit reporting companies about private consumer
information, not about the government, and it gives a right

7
PILF alleges an outright denial by Nago’s office of its request for
information. As a result, the standing analysis here is controlled by Akins
and Public Citizen, not by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Department of
Agriculture, 935 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2019). In Animal Legal Defense
Fund, there was no indication that the plaintiffs were not receiving the
requested information; they just did not receive the information precisely
how or when they wanted it. Id. at 867. That Nago’s office suggested
that PILF file its request with the counties does not change that
conclusion, because the County Clerks are not under Nago’s control. Cf.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-14.5(c) (describing that County Clerks have the
final decision-making power over making certain voter records
confidential).

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16 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

to that information only to the relevant consumers, not to the
general public. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 418-19; 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681g(a) (outlining the private consumer information that
credit reporting companies must “disclose to the consumer”
(emphasis added)).
Nago points to subsequent language in TransUnion to
argue that PILF lacks standing here. After the Supreme
Court explained in TransUnion that Akins and Public Citizen
did not control the standing analysis there, it went on to
write:

Moreover, the plaintiffs have identified no
downstream consequences from failing to
receive the required information. They did
not demonstrate, for example, that the alleged
information deficit hindered their ability to
correct erroneous information before it was
later sent to third parties. An asserted
informational injury that causes no adverse
effects cannot satisfy Article III.

TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 442 (citation modified). In the
view of Nago and some of our sister circuits, that
“moreover” passage shows that TransUnion established an
“adverse effects” or “downstream consequences”
requirement for all informational injuries. See, e.g.,
Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, 49 F.4th 931, 935-37 (5th Cir.
2022); id. at 938 (“[E]ven in public disclosure-based cases,
plaintiffs must and can assert ‘downstream consequences,’
which is another way of identifying concrete harm from
governmental failures to disclose.”); Grae v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 57 F.4th 567, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2023) (opining that “in
TransUnion, the Supreme Court adopted [the] principle”

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 17

that “a plaintiff claiming an informational injury must have
suffered adverse effects,” a requirement that “applies across
all cases”).
We are not persuaded, however, because the “moreover”
passage in TransUnion discussed why the plaintiffs did not
have standing under an alternate theory, apart from the
informational injury doctrine established by Akins and
Public Citizen. Although the plaintiffs in TransUnion had
obtained all of the information required by the statute, they
still would have had standing if the “formatting violations”
had caused real “adverse effects.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at
440-41. The Supreme Court emphasized that there were no
such adverse effects, explaining that the plaintiffs had
presented “no evidence” that they “so much as opened the
dual mailings, nor that they were confused, distressed, or
relied on the information in any way.” Id. at 440 (citation
modified). The plaintiffs also failed to show that they
“would have tried to correct their credit files—and thereby
prevented dissemination of a misleading report—had they
been sent the information in the proper format.” Id. The
Supreme Court accordingly concluded that, “[w]ithout any
evidence of harm caused by the format of the mailings, these
[we]re ‘bare procedural violation[s],’” insufficient for
Article III standing. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting
Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). And, again, the “moreover”
passage came only after the Court had concluded that Akins
and Public Citizen did not control. We agree with the Fourth
Circuit that this conveyed that the adverse effects
requirement “does not extend to the type of informational
injury presented in Public Citizen and Akins.” Naranda
Hotels, 60 F.4th at 170.
Adverse effects are needed to turn many forms of legal
injury into an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing.

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18 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

But total denial of information under a sunshine statute, as
in Akins and Public Citizen, is itself already a concrete injury
in fact. Neither Akins nor Public Citizen required a showing
of adverse effects. Although the Supreme Court in Public
Citizen mentioned that the plaintiffs had identified intended
uses for the requested information, it emphasized that its
“decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act have
never suggested that those requesting information under it
need show more than that they sought and were denied
specific agency records. There is no reason for a different
rule here.” 491 U.S. at 449 (citations omitted); see also
Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Srvs., 811 F.3d 1086,
1105 (9th Cir. 2016) (“To be injured under FOIA, [a
plaintiff] does not need to have a personal connection to the
information he is requesting.”). Likewise, in Akins, the
Court mentioned the plaintiff’s intended uses for the
information but articulated a broad rule that “a plaintiff
suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain
information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a
statute.” 524 U.S. at 21; see also Carello v. Aurora
Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2019)
(Barrett, J.) (citing Akins and Public Citizen to explain that
“an informational injury occurs when the defendant refuses
to provide the plaintiff with information that a law—
typically, a sunshine law—entitles him to obtain and review
for some substantive purpose” and that “[i]n such cases, a
plaintiff need not allege any additional harm beyond his
failure to receive information” (citation modified)).
The Supreme Court’s indication that adverse effects are
required for standing premised on “formatting defects” in the
conveyance of information does not disrupt its prior holding
that no such showing is required for standing based on the
denial of requests for information under public disclosure

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 19

statutes. For us to conclude otherwise would be to treat
TransUnion as having abrogated Akins and Public Citizen
sub silentio, which we are not permitted to do. Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in
a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”); Grae, 57
F.4th at 574 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“Rather than assume
that the Supreme Court silently overruled Public
Citizen . . . , I would adopt the reading of TransUnion that
avoids conflict with the Supreme Court’s longstanding
precedent: Public Citizen and Akins govern when plaintiffs
seek information pursuant to a public right of access, while
TransUnion governs certain other theories of informational
injury.”).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has elsewhere emphasized
that Akins and Public Citizen remain good law. In Spokeo,
the Court stated that Akins and Public Citizen reflected that
the denial of a request for information under a public
disclosure statute was “sufficient . . . to constitute injury in
fact” and that “a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”
578 U.S. at 342. Even more recently, in FDA v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), the Supreme
Court again acknowledged that Akins continues to govern
the standing analysis when a plaintiff alleges informational
injury under a “federal law [that] requires [an agency] to
disseminate . . . information upon request by members of the
public.” Id. at 396.
Because Akins and Public Citizen remain binding, a
denial of access to information that a plaintiff alleges must

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20 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

be disclosed pursuant to a public disclosure or sunshine
provision causes a concrete injury sufficient for standing.
No additional adverse effects need be shown.
2.
Section 20507(i)(1) of the NVRA is such a sunshine
provision. The NVRA creates a broad public right to
information about government activities, similar in many
ways to the archetypical public disclosure statute, FOIA, as
well as to the disclosure provisions in the statutes at issue in
Akins and Public Citizen. The NVRA requires states to
“make available for public inspection” all records
concerning the implementation of certain voter list
maintenance programs. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). That text
parallels FOIA’s requirement that, subject to certain
exceptions, agencies “shall make [records] available for
public inspection” or, upon request, “make the [requested]
records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(2)-(3). It is also similar to the wording of the
Federal Election Campaign Act at issue in Akins, and of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act at issue in Public Citizen.
See Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30104
(a)(11)(B) (“The Commission shall make a designation,
statement, report, or notification that is filed with the
Commission under this Act available for inspection by the
public.”); FACA, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (“[T]he records . . .
which were made available to or prepared for or by each
advisory committee shall be available for public
inspection.”). These statutes all share common
characteristics—they make disclosure mandatory through
the use of imperatives such as the word “shall”; they describe
specific kinds of information that must be disclosed (records,
statements, reports, and the like); they confer the right of
access to the general public at large; and they provide

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 21

information about the workings of the government. The
NVRA shares each of those traits and is thus a “publicdisclosure or sunshine law[] that entitle[s] all members of the
public to certain information.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 441.
The Third Circuit recently concluded otherwise,
reasoning that public disclosure is not the “essence” of the
NVRA, so a denial of a request for information under the
NVRA is not the type of sunshine statute denial that supports
standing under Akins or Public Citizen. See Pub. Int. Legal
Found. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th 456,
464 (3d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, – U.S. –, 2026 WL 568366
(Mar. 2, 2026). Specifically, the Third Circuit held that “it
is insufficient for Article III standing purposes for a plaintiff
asserting an informational injury from a violation of a statute
that contains a public disclosure aspect as part of [a larger]
overall scheme to allege only that he has been denied
information.” Id. at 465 (emphasis added). We respectfully
disagree. Regardless of whether a disclosure provision
appears within a larger statutory scheme or as a stand-alone
law, the provision reflects that Congress chose to create a
right to information. Indeed, Akins and Public Citizen both
involved statutes with provisions and purposes that went
beyond pure disclosure of information. See, e.g., FACA, 5
U.S.C. § 1002(a)-(b) (describing an overarching purpose of
increasing the standardization and efficacy of advisory
committees); Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C.
§ 30116 (establishing substantive limitations on campaign
contributions and expenditures, unrelated to public
disclosure of campaign finances).
B.
PILF argues that Hawaii’s denial of access to the
requested information is an informational injury under Akins

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22 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

and Public Citizen, and therefore that PILF need not allege
any additional harm or diversion of organizational resources
to establish Article III standing. Nago counters that
something more is required because PILF is an organization
rather than an individual. Specifically, Nago argues that
under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982), and FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602
U.S. 367 (2024), an organization must also allege harm to its
“core business activities,” and that PILF has failed to do so.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. We disagree that
PILF is required to make such an additional showing here.
Havens addressed one path for an organization to
establish standing based on interference with one of its core
business activities, but it did not foreclose other paths for
organizations to establish standing. In Havens, the plaintiff,
a housing advocacy and direct services organization, alleged
that it had been impeded by the “defendants’ racial steering
practices in its efforts to assist equal access to housing
through counseling and other referral services,” and that the
organization “had to devote significant resources to identify
and counteract the . . . racially discriminatory steering
practices.” Id. at 379. In concluding that the organization
had standing, the Supreme Court held that the “demonstrable
injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent
drain on the organization’s resources” was sufficient to
satisfy Article III. Id.
Here, by contrast, PILF does not seek to establish
standing based on interference with a core business activity.
Rather, PILF seeks to vindicate its own right to receive
information under a sunshine provision in the NVRA.
Organizations may “seek judicial relief from injury to
[themselves] and to vindicate whatever rights and
immunities [they] may enjoy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 23

490, 511 (1975). Just as organizations may directly
vindicate their own First Amendment rights, see ACLU of
Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2004), so too
may they directly invoke their statutory rights to
information, see Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989,
991-92 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing informational injury
under Akins and Public Citizen as the type of injury an
organization could use to establish standing to sue in its own
right).
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in FDA v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine makes clear that Havens and Akins
establish different paths for organizations to demonstrate
standing. 602 U.S. at 393-96. In Alliance for Hippocratic
Medicine, several medical associations challenged the Food
and Drug Administration’s policies related to mifepristone,
an abortion drug. Id. at 372-73. The medical associations
argued that they “themselves ha[d] organizational standing”
under Havens because the challenged FDA policies had
“forced the associations to expend considerable time,
energy, and resources drafting citizen petitions to FDA, as
well as engaging in public advocacy and public education.”
Id. at 393-94 (citation modified). The Supreme Court
rejected that argument, holding that Havens did not allow a
plaintiff organization to “spend its way into standing simply
by expending money to gather information and advocate
against the defendant’s action” but instead required a
showing that the defendant’s actions “directly affected and
interfered” with the organization’s “core business
activities.” Id. at 394-95. After doing so, the Court
separately analyzed the possibility of standing under Akins.
The Court distinguished injuries based on interference with
core business activities from “informational injur[ies].” Id.
at 395. To explain why the medical association plaintiffs

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24 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

had not established standing under Akins, the Court
suggested that the government did not possess any of the
information that the plaintiffs sought and stated that “in any
event the associations ha[d] not suggested that federal law
requires FDA to disseminate such information upon request
by members of the public.” Id. at 395-96; see also
Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v. Noem, 145 F.4th 972, 1003
(9th Cir. 2025) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“Hippocratic
Medicine also leaves open the possibility that an
organization could establish standing without relying on
Havens. . . . [T]he Court suggested that the medical
associations may have had standing if they adequately
alleged an informational injury apart from Havens’ ‘core
business activities’ test.” (emphasis added)).
Because an organization that has established standing
under Akins is not required to also establish standing under
Havens, and because PILF has demonstrated standing under
Akins, see supra Section III.A, PILF is not required to show
that the denial of information interfered with its core
business activities.
C.
We turn now to evaluating the ripeness of PILF’s
challenge to Hawaii’s denial of its request for a voter list.
“The ripeness doctrine precludes federal courts from
exercising their jurisdiction over an action that is filed before
a real dispute exists between the parties.” Haw. Newspaper
Agency v. Bronster, 103 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1996).
Ripeness has constitutional and prudential components. We
conclude that both components are satisfied here.

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 25

1.
Constitutional ripeness requires that a case “present
issues that are definite and concrete, not hypothetical or
abstract.” Skyline Wesleyan Church v. Cal. Dep’t of
Managed Health Care, 968 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bishop Paiute
Tribe v. Inyo County, 863 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017)).
PILF’s alleged informational injury occurred when
Nago’s office made the final determination that it would not
provide the requested information. Nago’s office clearly
communicated to PILF the State’s position that it had no
obligation to provide a voter list, leaving PILF with no way
to obtain the information from the State.
The fact that Nago’s office advised PILF to make a
request of the counties instead does not make PILF’s injury
speculative, because PILF was still left without the
information it claims the State itself is statutorily required to
provide. As the parties agree, the State and the counties
function as separate entities for the purpose of requests for
voter information. State regulations instruct that the County
Clerks—not the State Elections Office—are ultimately
responsible for handling such requests. See Haw. Code R.
§ 3-177-160(c); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-14(b). And Nago’s
office never ordered the counties to produce any
information, nor would the counties have had the obligation
to obey such an order. The County Clerks are not
accountable to Nago’s office, given that they are removable
only by their elected county councils. Indeed, at oral
argument, Nago represented that his office had no control
over the counties’ decisions regarding the production of
voter lists.

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26 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

The alleged invasion of a legally protected interest
occurred, and the alleged informational injury therefore
became “definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract,”
when Nago’s office made it clear that it would not provide
the requested information. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts.
Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(quoting Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)).
Nothing more is required for PILF’s claim to be
constitutionally ripe. Id. (holding that an injury is ripe when
it is no longer “imaginary” or “speculative” (quoting Babbitt
v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)).
2.
Prudential ripeness is a two-part inquiry that considers
“the fitness of the issues for judicial review and the hardship
to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Pizzuto
v. Tewalt, 997 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Alaska
Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840,
849 (9th Cir. 2007)).8
As to the first prong, fitness for judicial review, “[a]
claim is fit for decision if the issues raised are primarily
legal, do not require further factual development, and the
challenged action is final.” Skyline, 968 F.3d at 752
(alteration in original) (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,

8
Although the Supreme Court has stated that prudential ripeness is in
“some tension” with federal courts’ obligation to exercise jurisdiction
where that jurisdiction exists, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573
U.S. 149, 167 (2014) (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014)), the Supreme Court has not
overruled the prudential ripeness doctrine, and our court has continued
to apply that doctrine, see, e.g., Skyline Wesleyan Church v. Cal. Dep’t
of Managed Health Care, 968 F.3d 738, 751-52 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2020).

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 27

586 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009)). PILF’s challenge to
the State’s denial is primarily legal and can be decided by
interpreting federal law. Further factual development about
whether PILF could successfully request voter data from the
County Clerks would not help resolve PILF’s claim that
Nago’s office must itself grant PILF’s request. And the
State’s denial was definitive and final.
The second prong, hardship to the parties, “serves as a
counterbalance to any interest the judiciary has in delaying
consideration of a case.” Oklevueha Native Am. Church of
Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2012).
Because there is no judicial interest in delaying review of
PILF’s challenge, the hardship analysis is “not relevant”
here. Id. at 839.
Accordingly, PILF’s claim is prudentially ripe.
IV.
Having assured ourselves that we have jurisdiction, we
now turn to the merits of PILF’s claim.9
PILF’s request invoked the section of the NVRA that
states:

9
We generally refrain from deciding issues that the district court did not
resolve. Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020). But we
may exercise our discretion to reach an issue in the first instance, id.,
where, as here, the issue “is purely one of statutory interpretation that
would not ‘benefit from further factual development of the issues
presented,’” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001)
(quoting Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733
(1998)); see also Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).

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28 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

(1) Each State shall maintain for at least 2
years and shall make available for public
inspection and, where available,
photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records
concerning the implementation of programs
and activities conducted for the purpose of
ensuring the accuracy and currency of
official lists of eligible voters, except to the
extent that such records relate to a declination
to register to vote or to the identity of a voter
registration agency through which any
particular voter is registered.

52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). The specific question here is
whether a statewide voter list is a “record[] concerning the
implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official
lists of eligible voters” within the meaning of the NVRA. Id.
We hold based on the text and statutory structure of the
NVRA that the answer is no, because covered “records” are
those about efforts to ensure the accuracy of voter lists, not
voter lists themselves. Therefore, the NVRA does not give
PILF a right to the information it seeks from the State.10

10
Our conclusion that PILF has standing is not undermined by our
conclusion that the information PILF seeks is not covered by the
NVRA’s public disclosure provision, because “standing in no way
depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s [claim].” Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 500 (1975). Indeed, in Public Citizen, the Supreme Court
determined that the plaintiffs had standing to assert an informational
injury under FACA, but it ultimately held on the merits that FACA did
not give the plaintiffs a right to the requested records. Pub. Citizen v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989); see also Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25-29 (1998) (holding that plaintiffs had
standing to assert an informational injury under the Federal Election

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 29

1.
“[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.” Olympic Forest Coal. v.
Coast Seafoods Co., 884 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987)). “[W]e should usually
give words their plain, natural, ordinary and commonly
understood meanings.” United States v. Romo-Romo, 246
F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, we are
guided by the “superfluity canon,” which instructs that
“Congress did not intend to make any portion of a statute
superfluous, and [that] therefore ‘we must give effect to
every word of a statute wherever possible.’” In re Pangang
Grp. Co., 901 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)).
In PILF’s view, section 20507(i)(1) requires disclosure
of “records concerning . . . official lists of eligible voters,”
which includes voter lists. But PILF’s interpretation
disregards the limiting phrase that comes between
“concerning” and “official lists”: section 20507(i)(1)
requires disclosure only of records “concerning the
implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official
lists.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). That intervening phrase
narrows the scope of materials subject to public disclosure.
We “must give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404
(2000) (citation modified), so we need to consider whether
the statewide voting list is a record “concerning the

Campaign Act, but, on the merits, remanding for a determination of
whether the Act created a right to the information in question).

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30 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official
lists.” The phrase “concerning the implementation of”
provides an initial limitation. Contemporaneous dictionaries
state that “implement” connotes execution or
administration—“to give practical effect to.” See
Implement, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1993); see also Implement, Webster’s Dictionary of English
Usage (1989) (stating that “implement” “typically describes
the taking of concrete measures to carry out an official policy
or program”). The inclusion of that word suggests that
covered records are those that describe measures to maintain
the accuracy and currency of voter lists, not the lists
themselves. See United States v. Benson, – F. Supp. 3d –,
2026 WL 362789, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026) (“[A]
natural reading of § 20507(i) suggests that it requires states
to disclose information regarding the process by which they
maintain their voter registration list but not the list itself.”).
“Concerning” does have a “broadening effect,” see Patel v.
Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 339 (2022), but its sole object here
is the word “implementation,” not “all records.” The
category of “records concerning . . . implementation”
therefore encompasses materials documenting each step a
state undertakes when actively implementing relevant
programs. Examples of records that would “concern[]
implementation” might include duplicate-removal reports,
procedural manuals about list maintenance tasks, or
correspondence with voters, but not the very voterregistration lists that the implemented efforts seek to update
and maintain. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)-(2) (requiring
states to send confirmation notices before removing voters
for changing their residence); id. at § 20507(c)(2)(A).

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 31

The next clause—“programs and activities conducted for
the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official
lists of eligible voters”—further cabins the disclosure
requirement. A “program” is “a proposed project or
scheme,” Program, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, and an “activity” is a “natural or normal function
or operation,” Activity, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary. Both terms relate to active processes or the plan
for carrying them out, not the outcome of those processes.
Moreover, the phrase requiring that each state maintain
covered records “for at least 2 years,” makes even clearer
that statewide voter lists are not themselves “records” that
must be disclosed. That requirement reinforces that
Congress was focused on historical documentation of how
states conduct list maintenance, not on the voter lists
themselves, which constantly evolve as voters are added or
removed, or as their data are updated. Were any “official
list[] of eligible voters” itself a “record” subject to section
20507(i)(1), states would be obliged to preserve every
interim version of the ever-changing lists for two years—a
plainly unworkable and implausible result that we must
avoid. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[S]tatutory interpretations which would produce absurd
results are to be avoided.”). Section 20507(i)(1) of the
NVRA is not a sprawling voter-data-preservation mandate;
it is a transparency provision targeted at list-maintenance
activities.
PILF places much weight on the provision’s use of the
phrase “all records.” It is true that the modifier “all”
broadens the scope of records subject disclosure. See Nat’l
Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund
v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he use of the
word ‘all’ . . . suggests an expansive meaning because ‘all’

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32 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

is a term of great breadth.”). But we construe statutory
language in context and “limit otherwise capacious terms
when that context ‘tug[s] . . . in favor of a narrower
reading.’” Arconic, Inc. v. APC Inv. Co., 969 F.3d 945, 953
(9th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Mellouli v.
Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 812 (2015)). Here, Congress drafted a
nuanced disclosure provision that includes qualifying
language. If Congress had wanted to require that states make
a statewide voter list public, it could have just said so. See
Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 798 (2022) (“If Congress had
wanted the provision to have that effect, it could have said
so in words far simpler than those that it wrote.”).
The final clause of section 20507(i)(1) does not cast
doubt on that interpretation. It exempts from disclosure any
information “relate[d] to a declination to register to vote or
to the identity of a voter registration agency through which
any particular voter is registered.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1).
One might initially think that clause, which exempts certain
voter registration information, suggests that registration
details in general—and thus voter lists—are otherwise
covered records. As we read it, however, that clause merely
reinforces a separate programmatic restriction on the use of
registration-related data. The NVRA requires that
government agencies and offices that provide public
assistance or services to people with disabilities be
designated as Voter Registration Agencies (“VRAs”). Id.
§ 20506(a). When an agency is designated as a VRA, it must
provide its clients a form that includes the question: “If you
are not registered to vote where you live now, would you like
to apply to register to vote here today?” Id.
§ 20506(a)(6)(B)(i). That form must have “boxes for the
applicant to check to indicate whether the applicant would
like to register or declines to register to vote.” Id.

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 33

§ 20506(a)(6)(B)(iii). Importantly, NVRA section
20506(a)(7) instructs that “[n]o information relating to a
declination to register to vote in connection with an
application made at an office described in paragraph (6) may
be used for any purpose other than voter registration.” Id.
§ 20506(a)(7). The final clause of section 20507(i)(1)
merely reinforces that limitation. As the House Report on
the Act discussed, Congress wanted to ensure that
“information not be made public as to [which] voters” were
interacting with which “agency, such as a welfare or
unemployment office.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 19 (1993).
Section 20507(i)(2), the final paragraph of the NVRA’s
public disclosure provision, also reinforces our textual
analysis. Section 20507(i)(2) states that covered records
“shall include lists of the names and addresses of all persons
to whom notices [of removal from voting rolls] are sent, and
information concerning whether or not each such person has
responded to the notice as of the date that inspection of the
records is made.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(2). Those are
administrative records relating to a discrete program for
“ensuring the accuracy and currency” of the voter lists, id.
§ 20507(i)(1), which suggests that other covered records
would also concern the active implementation of such
programs.
Another reason not to read voter lists as records subject
to disclosure under the NVRA is that voter lists are governed
by a later-enacted, separate statute—the Help America Vote
Act. The Help America Vote Act mandates that each State
maintain a single, uniform, computerized statewide voterregistration list for use by election officials. Id.
§ 21083(a)(1). The Help America Vote Act does not have a
public disclosure provision, nor does it create a private right
of action for enforcement. We decline to read the NVRA to

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34 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

provide a right for the public to access statewide voter lists
when Congress chose not to establish that right in the statute
specifically addressing the creation of statewide voter lists.
2.
We are not persuaded by PILF’s remaining arguments
that the NVRA’s disclosure provision covers a statewide
voter list.
PILF invokes the First Circuit’s decision in Public
Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Bellows, 92 F.4th 36
(1st Cir. 2024), where the court concluded that a statewide
voter registration list was subject to disclosure under section
20507(i)(1).11 There, the First Circuit reasoned that because
such lists record the “end result of [list maintenance]
activities,” which are conducted to ensure accuracy of the
lists, the lists necessarily “concern[]” the “implementation”
of those activities. Id. at 47. Respectfully, that reading
seems inconsistent with the statutory text and structure to
such an extent that we must reach a different outcome,
though we do not do so lightly. See United States v.
Anderson, 46 F.4th 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining
that in “cases requiring statutory interpretation, . . . [o]ur
analysis is informed by decisions from other circuit courts

11
The Tenth Circuit recently expressed its agreement with Bellows but
did not address the argument we address here: whether a voter file
concerns the implementation of programs and activities conducted for
the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists. See
Voter Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez, 160 F.4th 1068, 1084 (10th Cir.
2025) (“[T]he parties focus their arguments not on whether the requested
voter data in fact concerns the implementation of relevant program and
activities but on whether ‘record’ includes dynamic, electronic
documents and whether they encompass data that is allegedly ‘newly
created.’” (footnote omitted)).

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 35

that have interpreted the statute, and we will not create a
circuit split unnecessarily”).
The First Circuit’s approach treats a statewide voter list
as inherently a record concerning list-maintenance
programs. To the contrary, as we explain above, the best
reading of the statute is that such lists are not records
concerning the implementation of those programs, which are
covered by section 20507(i)(1), but rather the objects of the
implemented programs, which are not. The First Circuit’s
interpretation collapses the textual distinction between
administrative records reflecting implementation of listmaintenance activities and the lists those programs maintain.
Its interpretation gives too much weight to the words “all”
and “concerning,” failing to take account of the surrounding
limiting context. Bellows, 92 F.4th at 47-49.12
PILF also relies on Project Vote/Voting for America, Inc.
v. Long, 682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012), but that decision is
not inconsistent with ours. There, the Fourth Circuit held
that voters’ registration applications were covered by the
public disclosure provision because they were direct
evidence of the implementation of registration procedures.
Id. at 336-37. Importantly, though, the court did not hold
that entire statewide voter lists fall within section 20507(i).

12
PILF also points to several district court decisions reaching its
preferred outcome, none of which persuade us. See, e.g., Voter
Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez, 727 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1212 (D.N.M.
2024), aff’d, 160 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2025); Pub. Int. Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Knapp, 749 F. Supp. 3d. 563, 568-69 (D.S.C. 2024); Pub. Int.
Legal Found., Inc. v. Matthews, 589 F. Supp. 3d 932, 941 (C.D. Ill.
2022). Similar to Bellows, the cases fail to address the key textual
distinction Congress drew between records documenting how a state
implements its programs for ensuring accuracy and the lists ultimately
modified or updated by those programs.

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36 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO

That distinction is crucial: an application and its processing
relate to the implementation of a program to ensure currency
and accuracy of voter lists, whereas a statewide list of
registered voters is a continuously updated product of those
activities.13
We are also not persuaded that our interpretation will
frustrate public oversight. Section 20507(i) ensures access
to the records necessary to verify whether states conduct
confirmation mailings, removals, and list updates lawfully.
Effective oversight does not require disclosure of every
registrant’s personal information; it requires transparency
about how list-maintenance programs are implemented.14
Indeed, other policy concerns underlying the balance
struck by the NVRA caution against an expansive reading.
As described above, section 20507(i)(1) explicitly prohibits
disclosure of “the identity of a voter registration agency
through which any particular voter is registered.” Congress
thereby recognized the need to protect the privacy of

13
The Fourth Circuit has since recognized that “the [NVRA’s]
disclosure provision does not encompass any relevant record from any
source whatsoever, but must be read in conjunction with the various
statutes enacted by Congress to protect the privacy of individuals and
confidential information held by certain governmental agencies.” Pub.
Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 996 F.3d 257, 264
(4th Cir. 2021).
14
For PILF’s purposes, Hawaii state law appears to provide an avenue
for requesting the voter information that PILF states it needs to ensure
Hawaii complies with the NVRA’s requirements. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1197(a); see also United States v. Benson, – F. Supp. 3d –, 2026 WL
362789, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026) (recognizing that “state voter
registration lists were often already subject to public disclosure under
state law when the NVRA was enacted” so there was “no need for the
NVRA to require disclosure of voter registration lists”).

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PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION V. NAGO 37

personal information even while mandating oversight of
maintenance procedures. Especially given that Congress
wrote a provision making private where certain voters
registered, it is unlikely that Congress would have required
states to publicly disclose information that could include
every voter’s name, address, partial social security numbers,
and voting history—information that could be used for
harassment, intimidation, or commercial exploitation—
without so much as a word about redaction, security, or
permitted use. The better inference is that section
20507(i)(1) was aimed at transparency regarding processes,
not at disclosure of the personal data of millions of voters.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm dismissal of PILF’s
claim. But the district court dismissed without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847
F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction is generally without prejudice). Because we
conclude that there is jurisdiction but that PILF’s claim fails
on the merits, we remand with instructions to dismiss the
claim with prejudice. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Final
judgment on the merits is synonymous with dismissal with
prejudice.” (citation modified)).15
AFFIRMED and REMANDED for judgment to be
entered with prejudice.

15
Because we hold that the scope of section 20507(i)(1) presents lawful
grounds for Nago’s office to decline PILF’s request, we do not address
PILF’s other arguments about the NVRA’s effects.