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Operation Epic Fury, Report to Congress, April 1, 2026-June 30, 2026
Lead Inspector General for Operation Epic Fury · 2026-09-14
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LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
OPERATION
EPIC FURY
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
Pursuant to Executive Order 14347, “Restoring the United States Department
of War,” September 5, 2025, the Department of Defense Inspector General
(DoD IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) use the secondary titles
of the Department of War Inspector General (DoW IG) and Office of Inspector
General (DoW OIG), respectively. The use of these secondary titles does not in
any way affect the primary statutory title or authorities of the DoD IG under
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Chapter 4, Inspectors
General), or the authorities or responsibilities of the DoD IG or DoD OIG
pursuant to any laws, regulations, or policies.
On the cover: U.S. Marines board Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the
U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port, on May 20, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo)
We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG)
report to Congress on Operation Epic Fury (OEF). This is our first
report on OEF, following the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency’s designation of the Department
of War Inspector General as the Lead IG for OEF on May 12, 2026.
This report fulfills our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant
to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support
of OEF as well as the work of the Department of War (DoW), the
Department of State (State), and other U.S. Government agencies
to further the U.S. Government’s policy goals with respect to Iran.
It also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight
work conducted by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight
agencies. This report covers the period through June 30, 2026.
Platte B. Moring, III Arne B. Baker Van Nguyen
Lead Inspector General for OEF Associate Inspector General for OEF Acting Deputy Inspector General
Inspector General Acting Inspector General Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General
U.S. Department of War U.S. Department of State
U.S. Agency for International
Development
OPERATION EPIC FURY
IN THIS REPORT
Arleigh Burke-class
guided-missile
destroyer USS
Bulkeley fires a
Mission and Resources pp. 4–15 Tomahawk Land
Attack Missile
• U.S. forces launched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) on February 28 to dismantle the Iranian during operations
regime’s security apparatus, including its missile production and naval capabilities, and in support of OEF on
to ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons. February 28, 2026.
(U.S. Navy Photo)
• The DoW estimated the cost of OEF to be $33.4 billion as of June 29. The estimate
includes $7.4 billion of cumulative obligations (incremental costs) for OEF, $22.3 billion
for expended munitions, and $3.7 billion in equipment losses, but does not include costs
for infrastructure repairs.
• State reported that as of June 2, it had incurred $113 million in costs related to the
conflict with Iran. This includes $79.2 million to respond to contingencies stemming
from the Iran conflict, such as evacuation-related expenses for State personnel and their
family members, U.S. citizens, and eligible third-country nationals.
• More than 50,000 U.S. Service members were deployed throughout the U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in support of OEF.
• USCENTCOM dispersed U.S. forces across the AOR, often to new basing locations, with
the intent to reduce vulnerability of forces and sustain combat power.
• The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) conducted more than 1,500 air
missions, surging to 30 to 40 daily missions directly into the USCENTCOM AOR.
2 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
IN THIS REPORT
U.S. Losses and Sustainment pp. 16–20
• The DoW reported that from February 28 to June 30, seven U.S. Service members
were killed in action and seven were killed in non-hostile events during OEF combat
operations. During the same period, 417 service members were wounded in action.
• U.S. diplomatic facilities in four countries—Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United
CONTENTS
Arab Emirates—suffered physical damage from Iranian strikes. The estimated cost of the 4 MISSION AND
damages is approximately $184 million. RESOURCES
4 Introduction
• Between February 23 and June 30, approximately 3,500 diplomatic personnel in the
8 Funding
region were either on authorized or ordered departure, or already out of the country.
11 Personnel and Force
Structure
U.S. Diplomatic and Economic Activity pp. 5–7, 21–26
• State directly arranged for the departure of approximately 9,000 Americans in the 16 U.S. LOSSES
region, and offered security information, travel assistance, and chartered buses. AND
This included arranging 56 flights to evacuate thousands of private U.S. citizens from SUSTAINMENT
the Middle East. 16 U.S. Military
Personnel
• Between January 1 and June 30, State and Treasury took actions against Iran and its
16 Expended Munitions
proxies, including designating or blocking more than a thousand individuals, entities,
18 U.S. Military Facilities
and vessels, as well as identifying hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of blocked and Equipment
assets.
19 U.S. Diplomatic
• The United States made three emergency declarations under the Arms Export Control Facilities
Act to expedite urgently needed defense systems to regional partners, totaling 20 U.S. Diplomatic
$25.32 billion. Personnel
• The United States reached a ceasefire with Iran on April 7 and jointly signed a 21 U.S.
Memorandum of Understanding on June 17. As of the end of the reporting period, DIPLOMATIC
negotiations on outstanding issues had reached a stalemate and hostilities continued. AND ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY
21 Assistance to
U.S. Citizens
23 Economic Fury
24 Foreign Military Sales
26 Impact on
U.S. Foreign
Assistance
27 APPENDIXES
33 ACRONYMS
34 MAPS
34 Map of Iran
35 Map of Strait
of Hormuz
36 ENDNOTES
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 3
OPERATION EPIC FURY
MISSION AND RESOURCES
Aircraft staged for
flight operations on
the flight deck of the
USS Abraham Lincoln
INTRODUCTION
in support of OEF,
on March 3, 2026.
(U.S. Navy photo)
On February 28, 2026, U.S. forces launched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) as a U.S.-Israeli
partnered campaign to “destroy Iran’s ability to project military power” in the region by
striking Iranian nuclear, missile, naval, and regime security targets.1
According to State, Iran poses the greatest threat to the United States from the Middle East,
both directly, in the form of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and indirectly, in
its funding of terror proxies.2 Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that for decades, Iran has
waged an ongoing conflict with the United States that has included lethal attacks against
U.S. forces in the Middle East, threats and attacks against regional countries, and support
to terrorist proxy organizations.3 After U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites in June 2025,
Iran expanded its ballistic missile production to protect its nuclear weapons development
program.4
MISSION OBJECTIVES
Secretary Hegseth said that through OEF, the United States seeks to destroy Iran’s offensive
missiles, missile production, navy, and other security infrastructure, and ensure that Iran
never has nuclear weapons.5 General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
that more broadly, the OEF mission is to defend the United States and “disrupt, degrade,
deny, and destroy Iran’s ability to conduct and sustain combat operations.”6 The full OEF
mission statement is classified.
4 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MISSION AND RESOURCES
The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported that it continued to refine and adjust
the OEF mission after it began.7 U.S. naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH),
including those that occurred after the April 7 ceasefire, were part of the OEF mission,
USCENTCOM said.8
USCENTCOM, with support from multiple U.S. combatant commands, is responsible for
executing the OEF campaign. OEF has involved the integration of air, land, sea, cyber, and
space components; an extensive, rapid deployment of forces and assets; expansion of basing
access; and regionally integrated air defense networks to protect the forces.9
EVOLUTION OF THE OEF MISSION
USCENTCOM reported that prior to the start of OEF, the United States had built a regional
network of partner access and air defense networks that laid the groundwork for major
combat operations.10 In February 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued National Security
Presidential Memorandum-2, directing the Departments of State and the Treasury to exert
maximum pressure through sanctions and other financial targeting to disrupt Iran’s nuclear
ambitions and malign activities.11 In June 2025, the United States executed Operation
Midnight Hammer, a series of military strikes that targeted Iran’s nuclear capabilities.12
The nature of U.S. military activity under the OEF mission evolved over the course of the
reporting period in response to the Iranian threat and U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the
conflict.
Preparation: In the months leading up to the launch of OEF, the DoW systematically
repositioned personnel and key assets to enhance regional deterrence and prepare for a
potential contingency operation.13 Thousands of Service members from all branches were
deployed, along with hundreds of advanced fighter jets, dozens of refueling tankers, the
USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Groups and their embarked air
wings, and a sustained flow of munitions, fuel, and supplies—all supported with command-
and-control networks and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.14
Figure 1.
Evolution of the OEF Mission
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 5
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Major combat operations: Between February 28 and April 7, U.S. forces launched air and
ground-based strikes against a wide set of military targets in Iran.15 Admiral Brad Cooper,
the USCENTCOM Commander, testified in May that U.S. forces struck approximately USCENTCOM
13,500 targets. USCENTCOM reported that it conducted approximately 36,000 combat reported that
sorties and more than 1,800 fire missions.16 it conducted
approximately
Strikes during the major combat operations period targeted Iranian ballistic missile garrisons, 36,000 combat
Iranian air defense sites, storage sites for Iranian cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft sorties and
systems (UAS), command-and-control centers, naval and naval mining assets, and Iran’s more than
defense industrial base.17 1,800 fire
USCENTCOM operations also targeted Iranian assets threatening the SoH with strikes on missions.
Iranian naval and coastal-defense targets. USCENTCOM conducted defensive counter-air
strikes against hostile air threats along the SoH, demonstration transits through the SoH, and
unmanned underwater vessel-based mine hunting operations.18
Mine countermeasure operations: U.S. mine countermeasures operations throughout the
reporting period sought to preserve freedom of navigation, protect international commercial
shipping, and deter adversary mining while enabling rapid response to suspected or
confirmed mine threats.19
April 7 ceasefire: The United States announced a ceasefire with Iran on April 7 to allow
for negotiations, while U.S. forces in the region remained postured to resume combat
operations.20 Vice President J.D. Vance led the U.S. delegation. Between April and June,
senior Pakistani leaders visited Iran to engage Iranian leadership to advance negotiations,
de-escalate hostilities, and reopen the SoH.21 As of June 30, the Pakistani government
continued its mediation role in U.S.-Iran negotiations.22
U.S. blockade of Iranian ports: On April 12, USCENTCOM announced a U.S. blockade,
beginning on April 13, of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal
areas.23 The blockade line stretched from Oman to Iran’s southern coast near its border with
Pakistan. USCENTCOM said that from April 13 to June 18, U.S. forces redirected more than
140 compliant vessels, disabled 10 non-compliant ships through kinetic action, and allowed
more than 50 commercial vessels supporting humanitarian aid to pass through the blockade.24
Maritime interdiction operations: Operating as part of the blockade of Iranian ports and
under separate maritime interdiction authorities, U.S. forces intercepted, boarded, or disabled
vessels suspected of smuggling military contraband or evading sanctions outside the SoH
and Persian Gulf.25
Project Freedom: On May 4, three U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers—the USS Truxtun,
USS Rafael Peralta, and USS Mason—transited the SoH to the Persian Gulf as part of
Project Freedom, designed to protect commercial vessels traveling through the SoH.26
On May 5, President Trump paused Project Freedom at the request of Pakistan and other
countries, saying at the time that the United States was close to an agreement with Iran to
cease hostilities.27
6 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MISSION AND RESOURCES
President Donald J.
Trump signs a
Memorandum of
Understanding
between the Islamic
republic of Iran
and the United
States, with French
President Emmanuel
Macron observing,
at the Palace of
Versailles, France, on
June 17, 2026.
(State photo)
Memorandum of Understanding: On June 17, President Trump and Iranian President
Masoud Pezeshkian signed the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU).
Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, signed the MoU as the primary mediator between
the United States and Iran, State reported.28
The MoU outlined terms between the United States and Iran related to safe navigation in the
SoH and proposed an initial 60-day window to negotiate a final deal, State said.29 The text
specified that Iran would make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels to
transit the SoH “with no charge, for 60 days only.”30 According to State, the United States
and Iran also decided, outside of the MoU, to create a hotline between the United States and
Iranian militaries to coordinate traffic in and around the SoH.31
The United States ended its blockade of Iranian ports on June 18 following the signing of
the MoU, only to reinstate it on July 14 following Iranian strikes on commercial ships in
the SoH.32
Negotiations reach a stalemate: After the MoU was signed, Vice President Vance and
negotiators from Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar resumed negotiations in Switzerland that focused
on outstanding issues, including Iran’s nuclear program.33 Tensions rose in late June, when
Iran objected to a temporary proposal by Oman and the International Maritime Organization
to set up transit with no tolls or fees through the SoH near Oman’s coast to help ships depart
safely in accord with the MoU and international law.34 On June 25, Iran struck a Singapore-
flagged cargo vessel off the coast of Oman. USCENTCOM retaliated with strikes against Iran,
and the International Maritime Organization paused vessel evacuation plans for the Strait.35
U.S. commences defensive strikes: On July 7, Iran attacked three ships in the SoH, stating
they had not followed Iranian rules of transit. The attack prompted heavy U.S. counterstrikes.36
The same day, Treasury revoked a general license that had temporarily authorized the
production, delivery, and sale of Iranian petroleum products.37 On July 8, President Trump
declared the MoU was “over.”38 Within days, USCENTCOM resumed daily strike operations
against Iran.39
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 7
OPERATION EPIC FURY
FUNDING U.S. Navy Sailors
conduct at-sea
refueling on the
DEPARTMENT OF WAR flight deck of the
USS Abraham Lincoln
The Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSW[C]) during OEF, on
March 10, 2026.
estimated the cost of OEF to be $33.4 billion as of June 29. The estimate includes $7.4 billion
(U.S. Navy photo)
of cumulative obligations for OEF, $22.3 billion for expended munitions, and $3.7 billion
in equipment losses. According to the OUSW(C), the estimate for expended munitions and
equipment losses were based on replacement cost.40 The OUSW(C) estimate did not include
costs for infrastructure repairs.41
Obligations: The $7.4 billion cumulative obligations for OEF represents incremental costs—
the expenses incurred for the contingency operation that exceed USCENTCOM’s normal
operations.42 Obligations are legally binding agreements or actions that will result in outlays,
immediately or in the future.43 Approximately 90 percent of obligations were categorized
as Operations and Maintenance, the appropriation category that funds day-to-day military
operations, troop support, and equipment upkeep.44 (See Figure 2.)
Disbursements: As of June 30, the DoW had disbursed $4.9 billion or 65 percent of obligated
funds. Of the disbursements, the five largest budget line items were for airlift operations
($929.6 million), the Flying Hour Program ($691.1 million), mission and other ship operations
($647.7 million), base support ($405.0 million), and maneuver units ($385.3 million).45
Open commitments: In addition, the DoW had $365.1 million in open commitments,
as of June 30.46 A “commitment” is an administrative reservation of allotted funds, or of
8 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MISSION AND RESOURCES
Figure 2.
OEF Obligations by Component and Appropriation Category, as of June 30, 2026
other funds, in anticipation of an obligation. Officials can commit funds only to acquire
goods, supplies, and services that meet the time, purpose, and amount for which Congress
appropriated funds, or bona fide needs of the period to replace stock used during that
period.47 On July 13, the DoW OIG announced an audit to a) determine whether DoW
Components are validating and managing open FY 2026 funding commitments supporting
OEF; and b) identify stale, invalid, or excess commitments eligible for immediate
cancellation and use for other critical, unfunded warfighter priorities.48
Challenges in calculating costs: Congress did not appropriate funds specifically for OEF
in FY 2026.49 Instead, the DoW Components have used base budget funds that otherwise
would be used for standard operational activities, such as planned training and maintenance
The absence activities.50 The absence of a dedicated appropriation for OEF means that it can be difficult
to calculate the total “cost” of OEF. Speaking before Congress on May 12, the Acting DoW
of a dedicated
Comptroller stated that he was most confident about the cost of expended munitions.51 Costs
appropriation
of repairing damaged equipment, on the other hand, could change based on when and if assets
for OEF means
are replaced and contract pricing. In addition, he stated that an accurate estimate for repairs
that it can be
requires a full diagnostic review of aircraft and other damaged assets to understand the extent
difficult to of damage.52
calculate the
total “cost” The DoW did not include the cost of military construction for damaged infrastructure in its
of OEF. estimate because the DoW has not determined what its future posture will be in the region,
how it will construct its bases, and what percentage of the construction costs Allies and
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 9
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Table 1.
Department of War Supplemental Request, in $ Millions
Category Amount
Munitions $21,000
Operational Costs $17,300
Other Classified Programs $12,100
Cybersecurity and Autonomy $5,100
Airborne Moving Target Indication and Space Data Network $4,000
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) $2,400
Readiness $1,700
Fuel $1,500
Administration Priorities $1,200
National Guard Support $800
TOTAL $67,100
Source: White House, letter to the Honorable Mike Johnson, 6/24/2026.
partners will contribute.53 The OUSW(C) stated that the estimate also does not account for
broader economic impacts, such as increased fuel prices, due to Iran’s closure of the SoH.
Supplemental funding request: During Congressional testimony on July 21, Secretary
Hegseth stated that without supplemental funds, the DoW could face critical shortfalls
that would threaten the DoW’s ability to pay Service members, replenish some of the
equipment and munitions consumed during contingency operations, and sustain vital global
operations.54
On June 24, the White House submitted to Congress a request for $87.6 billion in
State reported
supplemental funding. This emergency supplemental funding request included $67.1 billion
that as of
for the DoW, mostly to support needs for OEF.55 (See Table 1.)
June 2, it had
incurred
DEPARTMENT OF STATE $113 million in
State reported that as of June 2, it had incurred $113 million in costs related to OEF and costs related
stated that as it continues to assess damage, costs are likely to rise.56 to OEF and
stated that as
Emergency American citizen support: As of June 2, State charged $79.2 million to the it continues to
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service Fund to respond to contingencies assess damage,
stemming from OEF, depleting the fund. The fund covered evacuation-related expenses for costs are likely
State personnel and their family members, U.S. citizens, and eligible third-country nationals.
to rise.
In addition, $1.3 million in Diplomatic Programs Ongoing Operations funds were used for
lodging and transportation costs.57
10 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MISSION AND RESOURCES
Table 2.
Department of State Supplemental Request, in $ Millions
Category Amount
Diplomatic Programs $1,522
International Humanitarian Assistance $800
Global Health Programs $550
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance $300
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service $190
TOTAL $3,362
Source: White House, letter to the Honorable Mike Johnson, 6/24/2026.
Diplomatic mission damage: As of June 30, State estimated the damage to U.S. embassies,
consulates, and other diplomatic facilities resulting from the conflict to be about
$184 million.58 (See Table 6.)
State supplemental funding request: On June 24, State submitted an OEF supplemental
request that includes $100 million for emergency aid provided by the Diplomatic and
Consular Support Fund account.59 (See Table 2.)
The supplemental request also includes $300 million for State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations. Although State’s Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account has
sufficient liquidity to cover damages to facilities and contract delay costs, State will need to
redirect funds from other projects unless the requested supplemental is enacted.60
State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have sufficient funding to absorb costs
related to OEF. The supplemental request includes $1.4 billion for the Worldwide Security
Protection Program, including $850 million for airspace awareness and protection.61 State
also requested supplemental funding for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Post
Assignment Travel account to cover operational costs related to OEF.62
As of June 30,
State estimated
the damage to PERSONNEL AND FORCE STRUCTURE
U.S. embassies,
consulates, and U.S. FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OEF
other diplomatic More than 50,000 U.S. Service Members were deployed throughout the USCENTCOM area
facilities of responsibility (AOR) in support of OEF.63 Force flows continued into the region in the
resulting from days after major combat operations began.64 USCENTCOM reported that force presence and
the conflict to disposition have changed throughout the conflict.65
be about
USCENTCOM postured forces to deter an Iranian attempt to close the SoH, a key access
$184 million.
point for global oil and commercial shipping that Iran has historically threatened as leverage
against countries or parties that have disrupted its interests.66
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 11
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Assets: At the height of conflict, U.S. forces supporting OEF included more than a dozen each
of fighter squadrons, destroyers, and air defense batteries, as well as Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense batteries, High Mobility Artillery Rocket At the height
System (HIMARS), and a partial deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division. Additional of conflict,
counter-UAS systems and air defense teams also deployed to bases throughout the region.67 U.S. forces
supporting OEF
USCENTCOM positioned air and maritime assets to create a layered operational framework included more
that included carrier strike group forces, escort combatants, submarines, persistent ISR, than a dozen
defensive counter-air, and staged mine countermeasure assets.68 each of fighter
U.S. maritime forces: Two carrier strike groups supported OEF throughout the quarter,
squadrons,
along with their embarked carrier air wings and accompanying destroyer squadrons.69 destroyers,
USS Abraham Lincoln provided the initial carrier presence, and the USS Gerald R. Ford and air defense
arrived in late February.70 The USS George H.W. Bush arrived in late April, briefly overlapping batteries,
with the USS Gerald R. Ford in theater, but only to support turnover and maintain continuous as well as
two-carrier coverage without a gap in combat power, USCENTCOM said.71 The USS Gerald Terminal High
R. Ford returned to its home port in Norfolk, Virginia, on May 16, after a 326-day deployment Altitude Area
that saw service in the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and the Red Sea.72 Defense ballistic
missile defense
Two Marine Expeditionary Units also supported OEF, along with their embarked forces, and batteries,
associated air and other combat support teams and equipment.73 High Mobility
Medical support: USCENTCOM developed an integrated healthcare system for U.S. forces
Artillery Rocket
supporting OEF that leveraged host nation capabilities. Every U.S. military basing location in System, and
the region had at least Role 1 care (initial emergency and trauma treatment). Role 2 surgical a partial
capable units (more advanced emergency care) were established at bases in Jordan, Iraq, deployment
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with additional units afloat of the 82nd
in the Red Sea and North Arabian Sea. For all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, Role 3 Airborne
care (advanced, hospital level care) was only available through host nation hospitals.74 Division.
U.S. forces relied on host nation hospitals for Role 3 care due to the resource and force
protection challenges of establishing deployable hospitals in the region that would require
a 6.5- to 11-acre footprint. USCENTCOM asserted that it was impractical to establish these
largely immobile facilities across the USCENTCOM AOR when host nation hospitals were
readily available near U.S. bases.75
Army rotary wing medical evacuation coverage was available in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and
Kuwait at the beginning of OEF, but these assets moved out of Kuwait and Iraq due to force
protection considerations after Iranian strikes. Due to the nature of operations during OEF,
most medical evacuations have been carried out by ground, including local ambulances, to
local treatment facilities as well as fixed-wing aeromedical evacuation out of theater for higher
levels of care.76
U.S. BASING AND DISPOSITION
USCENTCOM reported that it designed its force distribution for OEF to sustain combat
power while considering taking into account Iranian ballistic missiles, one-way unmanned
aircraft systems (OWUAS), and maritime threats.77 During OEF, USCENTCOM shifted
personnel, assets, and storage facilities as locations came under Iranian and proxy attacks.78
12 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MISSION AND RESOURCES
USCENTCOM said that it constantly evaluated the threat to base and force locations as
the threat level evolved throughout the campaign, and adjusted counter-UAS and other air
U.S. Forces flew defense assets’ location, placement, and posture based on that assessment. USCENTCOM
as many as convened decision boards to provide recommendations to the air defense commander for the
5,000 sorties in appropriate adjustments.79
support of OEF
from European The Office for the Undersecretary of War for Policy (OUSW[P]) said that partners in the
bases, according Middle East and Europe provided significant access, basing, and overflight permission to
to the NATO execute OEF.80 U.S. Forces flew as many as 5,000 sorties in support of OEF from European
Secretary- bases, according to the NATO Secretary-General.81
General.
LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT
Moving assets to the USCENTCOM AOR: The U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) was responsible for global lift and logistics support to theater, as well as
aircraft flushing—the rapid removal of air assets from an area under attack or threat.82
To support OEF, USTRANSCOM projected and sustained combat power by executing
continuous worldwide deployment, sustainment, and maneuver of joint military forces and
resources, the movement of heavy equipment and large numbers of personnel, and secure
distribution capabilities. (See Table 3.) Key tasks included tracking movement requirements
for general cargo, personnel, and munitions, and phasing capabilities to align with
USCENTCOM posture requirements.83
Additionally, USTRANSCOM executed tactical lane realignments for force protection.
This included restructuring cargo channels to consolidate and expand throughput to
Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and redirecting personnel traffic through the
USCENTCOM AOR.84
As of June 30, Transportation Working Capital Fund obligations in support of OEF totaled
$2.36 billion. While these obligations have been largely reimbursed by the Military Services
to date, USTRANSCOM reported that it anticipates delayed payments moving forward as
Service funding is depleted without a supplemental appropriation.85
Table 3.
USTRANSCOM Volume and Movements during OEF
Air Movements • Conducted more than 1,500 air missions.
• During peak OEF times, airlift surged to 30 to 40 daily missions directly into the USCENTCOM AOR, with
an additional 20 to 30 daily aircraft pushing into the USEUCOM AOR for transload operations.
Surface • Transported approximately 300,000 square feet of cargo across a number of vessels to support
Movements regional operations.
Commercial • The volume of commercial cargo during OEF surged from 9,000 to 74,000 cases—or 2 million pounds—
Cargo monthly, a 722 percent surge.
• USTRANSCOM made rapid operational adjustments to preserve handling efficiency and maintain
security, including the adjustment of established transport routes.
Source: USTRANSCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF 014, 7/27/2026.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 13
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Regional logistics: Prior to OEF, Bahrain had been U.S. Navy Central’s (USNAVCENT)
main logistics hub to sustain operations in the Persian Gulf region, USCENTCOM said.
During major combat operations, Iran targeted Bahrain with OWUAS and ballistic missile At least six
strikes.86 USCENTCOM stated that it initially shifted naval sustainment resources from U.S. warships
Bahrain to alternate hubs. were re-tasked
from the
USCENTCOM reported that it selected new logistics support hubs in places where it Pacific to the
could expand capacity to support fuel, munitions, the repair of parts, and access to the Middle East to
necessary sea and aerial ports of debarkation necessary to transfer the goods to meet support OEF.
fleet requirements.87 USCENTCOM coordinated with the Defense Logistics Agency
and other combatant commands for sustainment enablers such as additional commercial
or government-chartered tankers and oiler vessels outfitted for consolidated cargo
replenishment-at-sea, as well as air transportation and support crew.88
The establishment of adequate naval bases and support ports posed significant challenges
before and during OEF, arising from complexities and due to uncertainties with host nation
access permissions to utilize ports for fleet resupply, USCENTCOM said.89
An issue with shifting logistics support and infrastructure to Diego Garcia has been distance,
with extended sea transit requiring 14- to 18-day logistics cycles, USCENTCOM said.90
COMBATANT COMMAND SUPPORT TO OEF
Multiple U.S. combatant commands provided support to OEF.91
The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM): USEUCOM served as a principal enabler
for USCENTCOM operations and the European AOR served as the launch platform and
sustainment backbone for OEF.92 USEUCOM basing, logistics, and access networks also
enabled rapid employment of forces into the USCENTCOM AOR. USEUCOM reported that
it transferred munitions, equipment, aircraft and personnel, and requisitioned and distributed
fuel, food, and medical supplies.93 The Command enabled the storage and distribution of
munitions, ensured operational readiness by maintaining warfighting assets, and served
as a reception and staging area for forward deploying personnel and evacuating civilians
and military families.94 USEUCOM also provided basing, global lift support (heavy cargo
and personnel transport), and was responsible for a contingency plan for noncombatant
evacuation operations from Lebanon, should that become necessary.95
In addition, USEUCOM secured key bases as well as sea and air lines of communications
critical to deployment and sustainment operations in support of OEF. Forward-deployed
joint USEUCOM capabilities operating in the European theater—including advanced fighter
aircraft, ballistic missile defense destroyers, and forward-deployed air and missile defense
and counter-UAS systems—protected the joint force from threats emanating from Iran and
its proxies.96
The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM): USPACOM provided support to OEF maritime
interdiction operations and blockade support and maritime ship tracking.97 At least six
U.S. warships were re-tasked from the Pacific to the Middle East to support OEF. This
included the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and components of the Japan-based
14 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MISSION AND RESOURCES
Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit.98
Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean provided sustainment resources for
USCYBERCOM the U.S. Navy as the conflict unfolded.99
and
USSPACECOM The U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM):
provided non- USCYBERCOM and USSPACECOM provided non-kinetic effects on selected targets, as
kinetic effects well as monitoring electromagnetic warfare interference and jamming sources over Iran.100
on selected Speaking during a press conference on March 2, General Caine said that coordinated space
targets, as well and cyber operations against Iran, beginning on the first days of combat operations, disrupted
as monitoring communications and sensor networks, leaving Iran “without the ability to see, coordinate, or
electromagnetic respond effectively.”101
warfare The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM): USSTRATCOM provided global strike
interference capabilities from the continental United States and other forward basing as required.102 This
and jamming included dozens of 2,000-pound penetrating guided bombs, which were dropped on deeply
sources buried missile launchers across Iran’s southern flank in the first 11 days of combat, according
over Iran. to General Caine.103
REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
Israel: During OEF, the United States partnered with Israeli forces, coordinating OEF
activities with Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion, which had similar objectives.104 The
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, said that the United States cooperated
with Israel to take “necessary and appropriate” actions in support of Israel’s self-defense as
reflected in Article 51 of the UN charter.105
Coordinated air and missile defense with Israel was also substantial, with U.S. Patriot
and THAAD systems operating alongside Israeli Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome
systems. The United States and Israel maintained shared awareness and recurring reporting
on readiness and intercept activity via embedded liaison officers in the Israeli military
headquarters in Tel Aviv, known as HaKirya.106
Regional self-defense: As Iran targeted its neighbors in response to OEF, impacting
numerous military and civilian targets.107 The OUSW(P) said that the United States has been
helping grow the sovereign military defense of Gulf partners for decades to counter Iranian
attacks and safeguard regional stability. This has included the provision of military sales,
training, and information-sharing to Gulf partners.108
The OUSW(P) said that Gulf partners demonstrated significant air defense capabilities in
response to Iranian attacks, collectively intercepting thousands of Iranian missiles and UASs.
U.S. forces embedded in partner air operations centers across the region, which supported
coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization of air defense efforts.109 The Middle East
Defense network—an integrated missile defense architecture in the region—intercepted
more than 6,000 OWUAS and more than 1,500 ballistic missiles that targeted U.S. and
partner forces.110
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 15
OPERATION EPIC FURY
U.S. LOSSES AND
U.S. Army Soldiers
conduct operations
in the U.S. Central
SUSTAINMENT
Command area of
responsibility during
OEF, on March 27,
2026. (U.S. Army
During major combat operations, Iran and its proxies launched thousands of missiles and photo)
one-way UAS (OWUAS) against regional states, commercial shipping, and U.S. military
bases and ships.111
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
The DoW reported that from February 28 to June 30, seven U.S. Service members were killed
in action and seven were killed in non-hostile events during OEF combat operations. During
the same period, 417 service members were wounded in action. Four additional Service
members were killed in action in July.112 (See Table 4.)
EXPENDED MUNITIONS
The Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSW[A&S]) said
that the munitions expenditure in OEF has resulted in strategic inventory shortfalls and
revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply. To mitigate these constraints,
the OUSW(A&S) said that the DoW is working to streamline procurement processes and
production lead times, and to stockpile critical materials, components, and selected munitions
to respond rapidly to a contingency.113
16 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
U.S. LOSSES AND SUSTAINMENT
Table 4.
U.S. Forces Deaths during OEF
Killed in Non-hostile
Incident Action Deaths TOTAL
Port Shuaiba, Kuwait (March 1) 6 ― 6
Saudi Arabia (March 1) 1 ― 1
KC-135 Crash, Iraq (March 12) ― 6 6
MH-60S Helicopter Crash, Arabian Sea (July 1) ― 1 1
Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan (July 17) 3 ― 3
Erbil Air Base, Iraq (July 19) 1 ― 1
TOTAL 11 7 18
Note: The Defense Casualty Analysis System lists all casualties before July 7 as part of OEF, while casualties after this date are
identified as having occurred during “overseas operations.” Data as of August 26, 2026.
Source: Defense Casualty Analysis System, “Operation Epic Fury (OEFU)” and “Overseas Operations,” accessed 8/27/2026.
DoW efforts prioritize accelerating active production lines, leveraging statutory authorities
to expand industrial base facility capacity, securing critical supply chains, and integrating
with allied partners to offset U.S. inventory drawdowns, the OUSW(A&S) said.114 While
the DoW has begun to implement mitigation strategies, the defense industrial base requires
“significant lead time” to expand production capacities, the OUSW(A&S) said.115 The most
persistent bottlenecks remain in the production of solid rocket motors, the availability of
U.S. Sailors conduct
a routine ordnance
inspection on the
flight deck of the
USS Gerald R. Ford,
on March 17, 2026.
(U.S. Navy photo)
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 17
OPERATION EPIC FURY
high-grade explosives and propellants, and the recruitment of skilled manufacturing labor. The
OUSW(A&S) said that the DoW is working on reallocating funding to alleviate constraints
and chokepoints as they arise.116
The Congressional Research Service noted that the volume and financial cost of
U.S. munitions expended during OEF directly illustrate the magnitude and complexity of the
target set posed by Iran. Iran has the largest armed forces in the region and spent decades of
intense focus developing and expanding its own domestic defense industry.117 Iran has also
focused heavily on passive defense measures to protect its military capabilities, including
extensive underground facilities, dispersal of munitions inventories, concealment and
deception to mask equipment, and mobile launch platforms.118
U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
USCENTCOM reported that Iranian strikes damaged and destroyed hundreds of buildings and
structures at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and
Jordan during the conflict.119 In addition, dozens of U.S. aircraft were destroyed or damaged
during OEF.120 (See Table 5.)
Table 5.
U.S. Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed During OEF
Platform Damage
F-15E 4 destroyed (3 from friendly fire and 1 from enemy fire)
F-35A 1 damaged due to enemy fire over Iran
A-10 1 destroyed, jettisoned due to damage on return from CSAR mission
KC-135 refueling aircraft 7 damaged or destroyed (1 damaged and 1 destroyed in collision over Iraq,
5 damaged or destroyed on the ground in Saudi Arabia by Iranian munitions)
E-3 airborne early-warning-and-control 1 damaged on the ground in Saudi Arabia by Iranian strikes
system
HH-60W helicopter 1 damaged during CSAR operations
MQ-4C high-altitude long-endurance 1 reported crashed
uncrewed aircraft
AH-6 helicopter 4 destroyed by U.S. forces as unrecoverable during CSAR operations
AH-64 helicopter 1 shot down over the SoH
MH-60 helicopter 1 crashed over the Arabian Sea
MQ-9 ISR As many as 30 destroyed in various circumstances.
Source: Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury: Considerations for Congress,” 5/13/2026; USCENTCOM, vetting
comment, 8/24/2026.
18 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
U.S. LOSSES AND SUSTAINMENT
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES
U.S. diplomatic U.S. diplomatic facilities in four countries suffered physical damage from Iranian strikes,
facilities in with an estimated total cost of about $184 million.121 (See Table 6.) In addition, State reported
four countries an estimated $24.5 million per month in construction project delays due to ordered departures
suffered and travel restrictions in Baghdad, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Kuwait City, and
physical damage Muscat.122
from Iranian
strikes, with an Iraq: Mission Iraq experienced more than 600 attacks during the reporting period. The
estimated total U.S. Consulate General in Erbil’s new consulate compound suffered damage to multiple
cost of about buildings. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad suffered damage but to a lesser extent. The Baghdad
$184 million. Diplomatic Support Compound, located near Baghdad International Airport, suffered
extensive damage, but the facility was already in the process of closing due to a decision that
was made before the current conflict began.123
Kuwait: On March 5, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City suspended operations due to
“regional tensions,” strikes, and damage to embassy facilities. Attacks forced the embassy’s
immediate closure and personnel departures.124 On June 24, Secretary of State Marco Rubio
traveled to Kuwait and reopened the embassy, which resumed providing limited emergency
services for U.S. citizens as well as consular support. However, as of June 30, the majority of
embassy staff remained on ordered departure, State reported.125
Saudi Arabia: On March 3, two Iranian OWUAS struck the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh,
causing material damage. After the attack, the embassy issued an order to “shelter-in-place”
to staff in Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dhahran and warned the public to “avoid the Embassy until
further notice due to an attack on the facility.” Embassy guidance noted threats against
locations where American citizens gather and advised U.S. citizens that hotels and other
gathering points, including U.S. educational institutions, may be potential targets.126
UAE: The U.S. Consulate General in Dubai sustained damage to a utility building, State
reported.127
Table 6. Host Country Support: State said that most host country
Estimated Damage to Diplomatic governments in the Middle East provided support for State
Missions Since the Start of OEF, in diplomatic facilities. Support included additional host country
$ Millions, as of June 30 personnel assigned to State’s diplomatic facilities and protection
programs.128 In late March, Mission Iraq criticized the Iraqi
Country Cost government for failing to take action to prevent Iran-aligned militia
attacks against diplomatic facilities since the start of OEF.129 Since
Iraq $157.35 then, the Iraqi government has shown stronger support for Mission
Kuwait $14.75 Iraq, State said.130
Saudi Arabia $11.50
UAE $0.125
Note: U.S. diplomatic facilities in Bahrain, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Oman did not sustain any damage.
Source: State, response to State OIG request for
information, 7/27/2026.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 19
OPERATION EPIC FURY
U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL
Iranian strikes in the Middle East resulted in the departure of U.S. diplomatic personnel and Between
family members, evacuations of U.S. citizens, and damage to and closure of some February 23
U.S. diplomatic facilities during the reporting period, State reported.131 and June 30,
the maximum
Between February 23 and March 3, 12 U.S. missions in the Middle East and Europe initiated number of
requests for staff to go on authorized departure or ordered departure. By June 30, nine diplomatic
missions remained on ordered departure—with personnel and families returning to post only personnel who
at the U.S. Consulate General in Adana, Türkiye, and the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus. were either
The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City, which suspended operations on March 5, reopened in on authorized
June. However, most of the embassy staff remained on ordered departure.132 or ordered
Between February 23 and June 30, the maximum number of diplomatic personnel who were departure, or
either on authorized or ordered departure, or already out of the country was approximately already out of
3,500. Those numbers varied from 51 in Lebanon to 976 in the UAE.133 In most the country was
circumstances, the departure orders did not apply to third-party contractors.134 approximately
3,500.
All embassy services in the region were affected during OEF, depending on the severity of
hostility directed toward particular posts, State reported. In all cases, posts maintained a
minimum of emergency services for American citizens, including support provided remotely
and by neighboring posts. Some posts were also able to maintain limited immigrant visa and
non-immigrant visa services throughout the period of reduced operations.135 However, several
facilities closed or suspended operations in March, including the U.S. embassies in Baghdad,
Beirut, Kuwait City, and Riyadh, and the consulates in Erbil and Peshawar. 136
20 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
State reported
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND
after major
combat ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
operations
began, it directly
arranged for the
ASSISTANCE TO U.S. CITIZENS
departure of On March 2, Secretary Rubio urged Americans to “depart now” from 14 countries in the
approximately Middle East using available commercial transportation, due to “serious safety risks.”137
9,000 Americans State reported after major combat operations began, it directly arranged for the departure of
abroad, offering approximately 9,000 Americans abroad, offering security information, travel assistance, and
security chartering 56 flights in addition to buses to safely evacuate thousands of U.S. citizens from
information, the Middle East.138
travel As of June 30, State travel advisories for Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
assistance, Arabia, and the UAE remained at Level 3 (Reconsider Travel) and State travel advisories for
and chartering Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen remained at Level 4 (Do Not Travel).139
56 flights in
addition to Consular outreach and coordination: State’s Middle East Task Force, which operated 24/7
buses to safely through the end of March, coordinated crisis-related support to U.S. citizens and consular
evacuate messaging.140 Separately, State’s Consular Coordination group prepared boarding lists for
thousands of assisted departure flights, urged U.S. citizens to depart on their own and provided updated
U.S. citizens information on border crossing regulations and availability.141 State’s 24/7 call center handled
from the public inquiries and remained in place as of June 30.142
Middle East. Logistics: On February 28, State established a Middle East Task Force Logistics Cell
to secure aviation capabilities across DoW aircraft and commercial charters and deliver
evacuation services for Chief of Mission personnel and U.S. citizens. The logistics cell
included senior officials from State, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Logistics
Agency, DoW’s Air Mobility Liaison Officers, State Diplomatic Security’s Air Evacuation
Unit, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The cell also tracked commercial flight
availability to facilitate dedicated seats and monitored airspace closures to sustain
uninterrupted access for U.S. operations.143
State said that it used commercial charter companies to facilitate departures from affected
countries where environments were permissive for commercial operations.144 In non-
permissive environments, such as Baghdad, Iraq, the U.S. Government used military aircraft
for departures of Chief of Mission personnel, U.S. citizens, and third-country nationals.145
In addition to air transportation, State reported that it worked closely with regional partners to
arrange charter buses to facilitate departures from affected areas. These included movements
from Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar to Saudi Arabia, as well as from Israel to Egypt and
Jordan.146
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 21
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Table 7.
Approximate Number of U.S. Citizens Evacuated Due to OEF
Number of
Country U.S. Citizens Destination(s) Cost
Armenia 3 USA $2,000
Bahrain 16 Riyadh N/A
Cyprus 0 N/A $39,500
Iraq N/A Amman, Cyprus, Athens $3,453,518
Israel 6,500 Sofia, Athens, Amman, Taba, Miami, New York, Los Angeles $158,026
Jordan 50 Athens, Washington $2,412,000
Kuwait 157 Riyadh N/A
Oman 200 Washington, Athens $675,000
Qatar 850 Sofia, Athens, Riyadh N/A
Saudi Arabia 100 Istanbul, Athens, Washington $675,000
Türkiye 0 Türkiye assisted evacuations from other countries $85,300
UAE 1,200 Istanbul, Athens, Washington $4,107,988
Note: All evacuations for Bahrain and Kuwait were carried out from Saudi Arabia the costs are included in the Saudi Arabia evacuation cost.
Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
Consular flyaway teams of additional State consular officers deployed to the region to assist
with consular operations and flights. Flyaway team members were equipped with mobile
technology to assist in areas with low connectivity and brought additional consular supplies,
such as blank emergency passport books and documents, to the region.147
U.S. citizen evacuations: State said that it evacuated approximately 9,000 private
U.S. citizens from countries in the Middle East and Europe, at a total cost of $11.6 million
during the reporting period.148 (See Table 7.) While some flights evacuated private
U.S. citizens directly to the United States, others arrived in third countries for transit onward
to the United States if that was their preference.149 State determined that consular officers
would not be able to fully document travel itineraries required to seek reimbursement from
evacuees and therefore it would be impracticable to seek reimbursement from them.150
State noted that several citizens did not take evacuation flights because of ineligibility of
non‑U.S. citizen immediate family members, difficult or inconvenient flight times, and
luggage and pet restrictions.151 State said that given the large number of no-show passengers,
more seats were available than the number of U.S. citizens who ultimately arrived for
each flight.152
22 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC FURY
Economic Fury (or “Operation Economic Fury”) refers to economic-related actions that
complement U.S. actions in OEF.153 Economic Fury targets Iran’s ability to generate, move,
and repatriate funds.154 This includes specific Iranian individuals and institutions that support
the regime, as well as organizations, companies, individuals, and vessels that support Iran’s
economy through the sale and purchase of crude oil and petrochemical industry, including
Iran’s vast “shadow fleet” of tankers that transport illicit oil and shadow banking networks.
Economic Fury also targeted Iranian weapons procurement networks, as well as satellite
imagery providers responsible for enabling Iran’s military strikes against U.S. forces.155
U.S. diplomatic actions: Between January 1 and June 30, the United States engaged in a
sustained diplomatic campaign across multiple United Nations (UN) forums to promote
compliance with reinstated sanctions on Iran and counter obstruction by some UN Security
U.S. forces patrol
Council Member States, State reported.156
the Arabian Sea
near M/V Touska, on Sanctions and designations: Between January 1 and June 30, State and Treasury took
April 20, 2026, after actions against Iran and its proxies, including designating or blocking more than a thousand
the Iranian-flagged individuals, entities, and vessels, as well as identifying hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth
vessel attempted to
of blocked assets.157 Since February, State sanctioned 111 entities, 13 individuals, and
violate the U.S. naval
blockade. (U.S. Navy 68 vessels for engagement in the Iranian energy and financial sectors.158 (See Table 9
photo) on page 29.)
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 23
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Exceptions to sanctions: In response to global market conditions and at the Administration’s
direction, Treasury issued General Licenses U and X in March and June, respectively. General
License X, which temporarily authorized the sale of Iranian-origin oil, petroleum, and in the
case of General License X, petrochemical products.159 General License X would have been valid
through August 21, though on July 7, Treasury replaced General License X with General License
X1, which revoked and superseded General License X in its entirety, but allowed parties to only
conduct transactions necessary to “wind down” activities related to the sale, delivery, or offloading
of crude oil, petrochemical products, or petroleum products of Iranian origin until July 17.160
Payments on those transactions were made into a blocked account in the United States.161
Countering Iranian Proxies: State said that it used all tools at its disposal to counter Iranian
support of its proxies, including sanctions, coordinating through multilateral fora—like the
Countering Transnational Terrorism Forum and the Law Enforcement Coordination Group—
and working bilaterally with partners and allies.162 On April 17, State announced terrorist
designations against seven commanders of Iran-aligned militia groups involved in attacks
threatening U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq.163 (See Table 8.)
Rewards for Justice: State offered a reward of up to $10 million for information on the
whereabouts of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and other Iranian leaders.164 As of the
end of the reporting period, State reported that it had paused any upcoming Rewards for Justice
actions due to the implementation of the MoU and the 60-day negotiating period.165
Financial intelligence: Treasury said that it continued to provide ongoing support to interagency
law enforcement and national security partners, including analyzing Bank Secrecy Act data to
identify potential Iran-related activity (for example, funding streams and procurement networks
supporting Iran’s military and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and financial activity potentially
benefiting Iran proxy groups).166
Treasury also worked to identify and outline risks associated with Iranian illicit activity to private
sector stakeholders to ensure they are providing high-quality reporting on this topic.167 Treasury
routinely engages foreign counterparts to increase awareness and advise them of illicit Iranian
finance, sanctions evasion, and secondary sanctions exposure. These efforts include engaging
with foreign jurisdictions to encourage stronger anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism
controls and targeted disruptions against Iranian illicit finance or sanctions evasion networks.168
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
State reported that Secretary Rubio made three emergency determinations under the Arms
Export Control Act to expedite urgently needed defense systems to regional partners, totaling
$25.32 billion.169 As part of State’s certification process, State’s Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs confirmed “no adverse impact” on U.S. defense readiness as a result of the sales State
approved.170
In addition to emergency arms sales (that bypass standard congressional review), State reported
its intent to sell an additional $19.19 billion in non-emergency arms to regional partners.
(See Table 8.) In some cases, because of OEF requirements, the U.S. Government held or
postponed delivery of defense articles purchased by other partners or allies, which led to some
domestic political friction, State reported.171
24 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Table 8.
Emergency and Non-Emergency Arms Sales for Allies and Partners in the Middle East, January-June 2026
Total Cost
Country Date of Sale Weapon(s) ($ Billions)
January 30 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)172 $1.98
January 30 AH-64E Apache Helicopters173 3.80
January 30 Namer Armored Personnel Carrier Power Packs174 0.74
Israel
January 30 AW119Kx Light Utility Helicopters175 0.15
March 6 *Munitions and Munitions Support176 0.15
May 1 *Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System to buy 10,000 APKWS-II All 0.99
Up Round177
ISRAEL TOTAL $7.81
February 26 Ku Band Multi- Function Radio Frequency System Radar178 $0.28
Jordan
March 19 *Aircraft repair, return, and spares179 0.07
JORDAN TOTAL $0.35
March 19 *Air and Missile Defense Radars180 8.00
May 1 *Integrated Battle Command System181 2.50
Kuwait
June 5 Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Platforms and related equipment182 0.002
June 15 KC-130J Aircraft Follow-on Sustainment Support183 0.24
KUWAIT TOTAL $10.74
May 1 *Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System184 0.99
Qatar
May 1 *Patriot Missile Replenishment185 4.01
QATAR TOTAL $5.00
January 30 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement Missiles186 9.00
Saudi Arabia
February 3 F-15 Sustainment187 3.00
SAUDI ARABIA TOTAL $12.00
March 19 *Long-Range Discrimination Radar with Terminal High Altitude Defense $4.50
Integration188
March 19 *Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMS)189 1.22
UAE March 19 *Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat 2.10
System190
March 19 *F-16 Munitions and Upgrades191 0.64
May 1 *Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System192 0.15
UAE TOTAL $8.61
TOTAL SALES $44.51
*Emergency sales that bypass congressional review. Table total may differ from the narrative due to rounding.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 25
OPERATION EPIC FURY
IMPACT ON U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Security threats associated with OEF had an immediate negative impact on U.S. assistance
awards across the Middle East in the areas of agriculture, food, livelihood, health, nutrition,
protection, shelter, infrastructure, and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance.193 Across
the region, the ordered departure of embassy staff made coordination and cooperation with
implementers more challenging.194 The United States did not have any active assistance
programs inside Iran, though it funds programs that target Iran from outside its borders,
including through broadcasting.195
State reported that its implementers continued to provide emergency assistance, pivoting
as needed to meet humanitarian needs driven by emerging crises.196 According to State,
OEF significantly disrupted award timelines and operational capacity, halted fieldwork,
monitoring, activities, and limited participant engagement due to regional instability.197
Disruptions primarily occurred in Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon. Program staff worked
to reschedule events, including those that target American business opportunities, with the
potential to move events to countries less affected by the conflict, such as Morocco and
Tunisia. In some cases, new Middle East Regional Cooperation projects were impacted by
institution-level sensitivities associated with regional cooperation with Israel.198
U.S. Broadcasting into Iran
The U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) reported that its FY 2026 program plan budgeted
$18.6 million for Iran-related programs: $10.9 million for Voice of America (VOA) Persian
programs, $4.2 million for Radio Farda, and $3.4 million for a transmitting station in Kuwait.199
VOA Persian: Programming includes a 24/7 satellite TV channel, radio simulcast, a multimedia
website, and six branded social media platforms. VOA Persian consistently ranks among the top
three Iran broadcasters, with digital platforms showing strong growth, according to USAGM.200
During the reporting period, VOA Persian’s social media audience reached 10.2 million followers,
adding 480,000 new followers—a 5.1 percent increase over the previous period, USAGM stated.201
Radio Farda: Radio Farda, a Persian-language service, has operated continuously since 2002.
USAGM ended terrestrial broadcast support in March 2025.202 However, USAGM distribution
support resumed in February, with shortwave transmissions and leased AM frequencies
added.203 In June, Radio Farda sites received 368 million video views from inside of Iran,
333 percent more than the previous month when Internet service was suspended in Iran.204
26 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
APPENDIXES
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
Classified Appendix to this Report
A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Epic Fury
(OEF). The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
APPENDIX B
About the Lead Inspector General
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424),
established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of
overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General
(OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to
appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the
commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas
contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.
The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the
DoW IG as the Lead IG for OEF. The Lead IG appointed the State IG to be the Associate IG for OEF.
Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunsets” at the end of the first fiscal year after
commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is
less than $100,000,000.
The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:
• Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to
make that report available to the public.
• Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
• Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the
U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits,
inspections, investigations, and evaluations.
The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue
to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities
supporting overseas contingency operations.
The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as
contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide
consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 27
OPERATION EPIC FURY
APPENDIX C
Methodology for Preparing this
Lead IG Report
To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OEF, the Lead IG agencies gather data and
information from their respective agencies and other Federal agencies about activities related
to the operation. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes
or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and
evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the
information collected from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the
view of the source cited in each instance.
The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this
report. The DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG drafted the sections of the report related to the
activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled,
each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During
the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment,
correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate
agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second
review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW OIG, State
OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.
28 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX D
Table 9.
State and Treasury Sanctions, Designations, and other Actions Against Iran ,February–June 2026
Date Target
February 6 Sanctioned illicit traders of Iranian oil and shadow fleet to support terrorism abroad.205
February 10 Sanctioned Iran-backed Hezbollah operatives exploiting Lebanon’s informal financial sector.206
February 25 Sanctioned actors involved in weapons procurement network in Iraq, Türkiye, and UAE supporting Iran’s
missile and weapons development and shadow fleet.207
April 15 Sanctioned designated Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani’s oil smuggling empire and oil-for-gold network
financing designated Hezbollah and IRGC-Qods Force.208
April 17 Designated seven commanders of IAMGs who planned and directed attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities,
and interests in Iraq.209
April 21 Sanctioned eight individuals, entities, and aircraft based in Iran Türkiye, and the UAE for their involvement in
procurement networks supporting Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile programs.210
April 24 Sanctioned a Chinese-based independent teapot refinery, one of Iran’s largest customers for crude oil
and other petroleum products. Also sanctioned 40 shipping firms and vessels that operate as part of Iran’s
shadow fleet.211
April 28 Action against 35 actors who operate Iran’s covert financial network that supports the IRGC to access the
international financial system.212 Treasury alerted financial institutions to sanctions risks associated with
independent teapot oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, given their continued role in
importing and refining Iranian crude oil.213
May 1 Sanctioned Chinese petroleum operator and actors for importing sanctioned Iranian petroleum and
petroleum and petrochemical products.214 Sanctioned three Iranian foreign currency exchange houses
and their associated front companies.215
May 7 Sanctioned Iran-aligned actors who exploit Iraq’s oil wealth to fund Iranian terrorist activities.216
May 8 Sanctioned satellite imagery providers enabling Iran’s military strikes against U.S. forces.217 Also sanctioned
10 individuals and companies in the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe enabling Iran’s military
procurement networks.218
May 11 Sanctioned financial networks enabling illegal Iranian oil sales on behalf of IRGC.219
May 19 Sanctioned Iranian financial and shipping networks that enable Iran to evade international sanctions.220
May 21 Sanctioned nine individuals who enable Hezbollah to undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty.221
May 27 Sanctioned the Iranian-run Persian Gulf Strait Authority, associated with the IRGC.222
May 28 Sanctioned actors that make up Iran’s illicit oil economy that supports the IRGC and Iran’s military apparatus.223
May 29 Sanctioned Iranian-affiliated fraud network targeting American companies.224
June 2 Sanctioned Iran’s largest digital asset exchanges and leadership for supporting Iran’s terrorist activities.225
June 5 Sanctioned a network of individuals, entities, and vessels involved in shipping Iranian liquid petroleum gas
and evading U.S. sanctions.226
June 10 Designated four Iran- and Belarus-based entities for procurement of arms for Iran’s military and weapons
programs.227
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 29
OPERATION EPIC FURY
APPENDIX E
Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies
From the start of OEF to June 30, 2026, there were no oversight reports completed related to OEF. Reports issued by the
DoW, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites.
APPENDIX F
Ongoing Oversight Projects
Table 10 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies’ ongoing oversight projects related to OEF.
Table 10.
Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OEF by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026
DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of the Interoperability of DoW Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) (Project no. D2026-DEV0SR-0085.000)
To determine the gaps in DoW C-UAS interoperability, and the corrective actions needed to standardize C-UAS
interoperability.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Inspection of Embassy Yerevan, Armenia (Project no. 26ISP021.00)
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia.
Classified Inspection of Embassy Yerevan, Armenia (Project no. 26ISP021.01)
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia.
30 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX G
Planned Oversight Projects
Table 11 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies’ planned oversight projects related to OEF.
Table 11.
Planned Projects Related to OEF by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026
DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of DoW Efforts to Collect and Integrate Signals Intelligence Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from
the Iran Conflict
To determine the effectiveness of selected DoW Service cryptologic components’ collection and sharing of observations,
insights, and lessons learned from the Iran conflict’s signal intelligence operations to inform future DoW doctrine, planning,
training, and equipping.
Audit of U.S. Navy’s Ability to Sustain Maritime Security Capabilities for Naval Forces Operating in the U.S. Central
Command Area of Responsibility
To determine whether the U.S. Navy has established adequate theater sustainment capability to execute emergent ship
maintenance and battle-damage repairs for naval forces supporting maritime security operations in the U.S. Central Command
area of responsibility.
Evaluation of the U.S. Air Force’s Sustainment Efforts for the KC-135 Aerial Refueling Fleet to Meet Global Requirements
To determine the effectiveness of the Department of the Air Force’s KC-135 Stratotanker sustainment efforts in supporting fleet
mission capability, by assessing the administration of required maintenance processes, parts procurement, and infrastructure
needed to meet current and projected global aerial refueling demands.
Audit of Base Operations Support for U.S. Special Operations Forces
To determine the adequacy of base operating support for U.S. special operations forces operating in support of geographic
combatant commands.
Evaluation of the Defense Health Agency’s Deployment of the Joint Operational Medicine Information System (JOMIS)
To determine how effectively the Defense Health Agency is fielding Joint Operational Medicine Information System (JOMIS) as
an effective and timely joint medical information system that meets the longstanding needs for interoperability across Military
Services and Combatant Commands.
Audit of Open Commitments for Operation Epic Fury
To determine whether DoW Components are validating and managing open FY 2026 funding commitments supporting
Operation Epic Fury, and to identify stale, invalid, or excess commitments eligible for immediate cancellation and use for other
critical, unfunded warfighter priorities.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 31
OPERATION EPIC FURY
APPENDIX H
Hotline and Investigations
Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency.
The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law,
rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.
During the quarter, the DoW OIG Hotline received nine allegations related to OEF and referred
five cases related to OEF to Lead IG agencies and other investigative organizations. In some
instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations. State OIG received one
allegation related to OEF and referred that allegation for investigation. USAID OIG received
88 allegations related to OEF.
The DoW OIG’s criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative
Service (DCIS), worked on cases related to OEF from offices in Europe and the United States.
State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OEF from Washington, D.C.,
El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.
During this quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies
ended with eleven open investigations, while four investigations were closed; three referrals
were made to the Department of Justice, there were three convictions, one arrest, and one
suspension from government contracts.
The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential
or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner
agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal
Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
32 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
ACRONYMS
ACRONYMS
Acronym Acronym
AOR area of responsibility OWUAS one-way UAS
CSAR combat search and rescue State Department of State
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency SoH Strait of Hormuz
DoW Department of War THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
FY fiscal year UAE United Arab Emirates
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System UAS unmanned aircraft systems
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and UN United Nations
reconnaissance
U.S. United States
Lead IG Lead Inspector General
USAGM U.S. Agency for Global Media
Lead IG DoW, State, and USAID OIGs
agencies USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
MEU Marine Expeditionary Units USCENTCOM The U.S. Central Command
MIO maritime interdiction operations USCYBERCOM The U.S. Cyber Command
MOU memorandum of understanding USEUCOM The U.S. European Command
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization USNAVCENT U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
OEF Operation Epic Fury USPACOM The U.S. Pacific Command
OIG Office of Inspector General USS United States Ship
OUSW(A&S) Office of the Under Secretary for USSPACECOM The U.S. Space Command
Acquisition and Sustainment USTRANSCOM The U.S. Transportation Command
OUSW(C) Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief VOA Voice of America
Financial Officer Financial Officer
OUSW(P) Office of the Under Secretary of War for
Policy
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 33
OPERATION EPIC FURY
Map of Iran
MAP OF IRAN
34 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
MAPS
Map of Strait of Hormuz
Map of Strait of Hormuz
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 35
OPERATION EPIC FURY
ENDNOTES 24. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
26.3 OEF FOL077A, 8/11/2026; USCENTCOM, press release,
“U.S. to Blockade Ships Entering or Exiting Iranian Ports,”
1. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 4/12/2026; USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces to Resume
26.3 OEF 001, 7/22/2026; USCENTCOM, press release, Naval Blockade Against Iran,” 7/13/2026.
“U.S. Forces Launch Operation Epic Fury,” 2/28/2026; 25. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
USCENTCOM, “CENTCOM Commander Provides Update on 26.3 OEF 001, 7/22/2026; DoW (@DeptofWar), X post,
Operation Epic Fury,” 4/9/2026; DoW, transcript, “Secretary of 4/23/2026, 0714 ET; Tucker Reals and Frank Andrews,
War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “U.S. Forces Board Another Iran-linked Vessel in Tit-for-tat Series
Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 3/2/2026. of Ship Interdictions,” CBS News, 4/23/2026.
2. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 26. USCENTCOM, press release, “CENTCOM Protects U.S. Warships
3. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of Transiting Strait of Hormuz,” 5/7/2026; DoW, press release,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” “‘Project Freedom’ Aims to Get Thousands of Commercial Ships
3/2/2026. Safely Through Strait of Hormuz,” 5/5/2026; Kathleen Lundy,
4. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of “Norfolk-based USS Truxtun Protecting Ships near Iran in Strait
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” of Hormuz,” 5/5/2026, 13NEWSNOW.
3/2/2026. 27. CRS, “The Strait of Hormuz: Security Developments and Impacts on
5. DoW, website, as of 7/30/2026. Oil, Gas, and Other Commodities,” 8/7/2026.
6. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of 28. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/2/2026; State,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
3/2/2026. 29. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
7. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 30. State, press release, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to the
26.3 OEF 001, 7/22/2026. Press,” 6/25/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/24/2026.
8. USCENTCOM, vetting comment, 8/24/2026. 31. State, press release, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to the
9. USCENTCOM, responses to DoW OIG request for information, Press,” 6/25/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
26.3 OEF 003, 7/22/2026 and 26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026. 32. USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces to Resume Naval
10. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, Blockade Against Iran,” 7/13/2026; Jon Gambrell, Collin
26.3 OEF 003, 7/22/2026. Binkley, and Konstantin Toropin, “US Reimposes its Blockade
11. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. on Iran After Tehran’s Attacks on Ships in the Strait of Hormuz,”
12. DoW, news release, “Hegseth, Caine Laud Success of U.S. Strike Associated Press, 7/14/2026.
on Iran Nuke Sites,” 6/22/2026; The White House, “United States 33. State EUR, response to State OIG request for information, 7/2026;
Counterterrorism Strategy,” 5/6/2026. State, press release, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to
13. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Press,” 6/25/2026.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 34. Reuters, “Oman Opens Temporary Strait of Hormuz Shipping
3/2/2026. Routes, Says No Tolls Will be Charged,” 6/24/2026.
14. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of 35. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/2/2026.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 36. USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces Complete New Round
3/2/2026. of Retaliatory Strikes Against Iran,” 7/7/2026; Jenny Gross, “Oil
15. DoW, “Operation Epic Fury Fact Sheet,” 4/6/2026. Shipments in Strait of Hormuz in Jeopardy After Day of Attacks
16. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, and Retaliation,” New York Times, 7/7/2026.
26.3 OEF FOL031, 8/12/2026; USCENTCOM, “Statement for 37. Treasury, “GENERAL LICENSE X1: Revocation and Wind Down of
the Record, Admiral Charles Bradford Cooper II, Commander, June 21, 2026, Authorization for the Production, Delivery and Sale
U.S. Central Command, Before the Senate Committee on Armed of Crude Oil, Petrochemical Products, and Petroleum Products of
Services on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,” 5/14/2026. Iranian Origin,” 7/7/2026.
17. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 38. ABC News, “Trump says MOU is ‘Over’, Calls Iranian Leaders
26.3 OEF 036, 7/22/2026; USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG ‘Scum’ Following Latest Strikes,” 7/8/2026; White House, video
request for information, 26.3 OEF 037, 7/22/2026; USCENTCOM, release, “President Trump Participates in a Greeting with the
response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF 034, Secretary General of NATO,” 7/8/2026; USCENTCOM, press
7/22/2026. release, “U.S. Forces Complete Another Round of Strikes Against
18. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, Iran,” 7/8/2026; USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces Finish
26.3 OEF 072, 7/22/2026. Latest Round of Strikes Against Iran,” 7/11/2026.
19. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 39. USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces Complete Another
26.3 OEF 081, 7/22/2026. Round of Strikes Against Iran,” 7/8/2026; USCENTCOM, press
20. DoW, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint release, “U.S. Forces Finish Latest Round of Strikes Against
Chiefs Air Force Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 4/8/2026. Iran,” 7/11/2026; USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Concludes
21. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/2/2026. 13th Night of Strikes on Iranian Military Targets,” 7/23/2026;
22. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/2/2026. USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces to Resume Naval
23. USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. to Blockade Ships Entering or Blockade Against Iran,” 7/13/2026.
Exiting Iranian Ports,” 4/12/2026.
36 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
ENDNOTES
40. House Appropriations Committee, Hearing, “Budget Hearing–The 66. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
Department of Defense,” 5/12/2026; Senate Appropriations 26.3 OEF 072, 7/22/2026; DIA, response to DoW OIG request for
Committee, Hearing, “POTUS Supplemental Funding Request,” information, 26.3 OEF 083, 7/21/2026.
7/21/2026. 67. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
41. OUSW(C), response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF 020, 7/22/2026.
26.3 OEF 028, 8/4/2026; War Data Platform, Contingency 68. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
Reporting Application, undated; OUSW(C), memorandum, 26.3 OEF 072, 7/22/2026.
“Department of War Cost Reporting Guidance for Operation Epic 69. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
Fury,” 3/5/2026. 26.3 OEF FOL022A, 8/12/2026.
42. War Data Platform, Contingency Reporting Application, undated. 70. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
43. DoD 7000.14-R, “Financial Management Regulation,” Volume 3, 26.3 OEF 022, 7/22/2026; USCENTCOM, response to DoW OEF
Chapter 8, 8/2023. request for information, 26.3 OEF FOL022A, 8/12/2026.
44. War Data Platform, Contingency Reporting Application, undated; 71. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OEF request for information,
DoD 7000.14-R, “Financial Management Regulation,” 26.3 OEF FOL022A, 8/12/2026.
Volume 2A, 1/2011. 72. U.S. Navy, press release, “World’s Largest Aircraft Carrier, Strike
45. War Data Platform, Contingency Reporting Application, undated. Group Return from Historic 11-Month Deployment,” 5/16/2026;
46. War Data Platform, Contingency Reporting Application, undated. Caitlyn Burchett, “USS Gerald R. Ford Comes Home,” USNI
47. DoD 7000.14-R, “Financial Management Regulation,” Volume 3, News, 5/16/2026.
Chapter 8, 8/2023. 73. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
48. DoW OIG, announcement memorandum, “Project Announcement: 26.3 OEF 022, 7/22/2026; USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG
Audit of Open Commitments for Operation Epic Fury request for information, 26.3 OEF CLAR022C, 8/12/2026.
(Project No. D2026-D000FI-0112.000),” 7/13/2026. 74. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
49. House Appropriations Committee, hearing, “Budget Hearing–The 26.3 OEF 071, 7/22/2026.
Department of Defense,” 5/12/2026. 75. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
50. OUSW(C), memorandum, “Department of War Cost Reporting 26.3 OEF 071, 7/22/2026.
Guidance for Operation Epic Fury,” 3/5/2026. 76. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
51. Senate Appropriations Committee, hearing, “A Review of the 26.3 OEF 071, 7/22/2026.
President’s Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request for the Department of 77. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
Defense,”5/12/2026. 26.3 OEF 016, 7/22/2026.
52. House Appropriations Committee, hearing, “Budget Hearing–The 78. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
Department of Defense,” 5/12/2026; Senate Appropriations 26.3 OEF 049, 7/22/2026; USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG
Committee, Hearing, “A Review of the President’s Fiscal Year request for information, FOL017, 8/12/2026.
2027 Budget Request for the Department of Defense,”5/12/2026. 79. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
53. House Appropriations Committee, hearing, “Budget Hearing–The 26.3 OEF 049, 7/22/2026.
Department of Defense,” 5/12/2026. 80. ODASW(NECA), response to DoW OIG request for information,
54. Senate Appropriations Committee, hearing, “POTUS Supplemental 26.3 OEF 018, 7/23/2026.
Funding Request,” 7/21/2026. 81. NATO, transcript, “Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General
55. White House, letter to the Honorable Mike Johnson, 6/24/2026. Mark Rutte Ahead of the 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara,”
56. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 7/8/2026.
57. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 82. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
58. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026.
59. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 83. USTRANSCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
60. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 26.3 OEF 014, 7/27/2026.
61. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026; 84. USTRANSCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
State, Letter to the Honorable Mike Johnson, 6/26/2026. 26.3 OEF 014, 7/27/2026.
62. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 85. USTRANSCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
63. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Admiral Brad 26.3 OEF 014, 7/27/2026.
Cooper, Commander of U.S. Central Command, Hold a Press 86. USCENTCOM, vetting comment, 8/24/2026; USCENTCOM,
Briefing at Central Command Headquarters on U.S. Military response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF 048 and
Operations in the Middle East,” 5/5/2026; DoW, transcript, 26.3 OEF FOL049A, 8/12/2026; Lara Korte, “Iran War Reveals
“Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Vulnerabilities of U.S. Middle East Bases,” Stars and Stripes,
of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 4/16/2026; 4/29/2026.
USCENTCOM, press release, “U.S. Forces Complete New Strikes 87. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
on Iranian Military Targets,” 7/13/2026. 26.3 OEF 067, 7/22/2026.
64. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of 88. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 26.3 OEF 067, 7/22/2026; U.S. Navy, press release, “Tanker Ships
3/2/2026. Deliver Fuel to MSC Ships Via CONSOL in Support of RIMPAC
65. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 2022,” 7/25/2022; U.S. Air Force, press release, “Expeditionary
26.3 OEF 020, 7/22/2026. Center’s Air Transportation Instructors Give Their Definition of
‘Aerial Porter’,” 7/21/2008.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 37
OPERATION EPIC FURY
89. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 113. OUSW(A&S), response to DoW OIG request for information,
26.3 OEF 067, 7/22/2026. 26.3 OEF 025, 8/26/2026.
90. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 114. OUSW(A&S), response to DoW OIG request for information,
26.3 OEF 067, 7/22/2026. 26.3 OEF 025, 8/26/2026.
91. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 115. OUSW(A&S), response to DoW OIG request for information,
26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026. 26.3 OEF 025, 8/26/2026.
92. USEUCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 116. OUSW(A&S), response to DoW OIG request for information,
26.3 OEF FOL012, 8/14/2026. 26.3 OEF 025, 8/26/2026.
93. USEUCOM, response to Dow OIG request for information, 117. CRS, “U.S. Military Operations Against Iran: Munitions and
26.3 OEF FOL012, 8/14/2026; USEUCOM, response to DoW Missile Defense,” 3/12/2026.
OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF 013, 7/22/2026. 118. Marine Corps University, “MES Insights–Passive Defense
94. USEUCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, Measures in Saving Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal,” 7/2024.
26.3 OEF 012, 7/22/2026. 119. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information,
95. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF FOL049A, 8/12/2026.
26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026. 120. CRS, “U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury:
96. USEUCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, Considerations for Congress,” 5/13/2026.
26.3 OEF FOL012, 8/14/2026: USEUCOM, vetting comment, 121. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
8/24/2026. 122. State, response to State OIG request for information, 8/6/2026.
97. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 123. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026;
26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026. State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
98. Patricia Kime, “Iran Conflict Holds Lessons for U.S., Adversaries, 124. State, media note, “Status of U.S. Embassy Kuwait City,”
INDOPACOM Commander Says,” U.S. Naval Institute, 3/5/2025; Jennifer Hansler, “U.S. Embassies in the Middle East
4/22/2026. Prepare for Extended Period with Reduced Staff Amid Iran War,”
99. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, CNN, 8/12/2026; Embassy Kuwait, report, “Security Alert:
26.3 OEF 067, 7/22/2026. Kuwait, Resumption of Limited Operations at U.S. Embassy
100. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, Kuwait,” 6/24/2026.
26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026; DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete 125. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026;
Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine State vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
Hold a Press Briefing,” 3/2/2026. 126. Embassy Riyadh, “Security Alert – U.S. Embassy Riyadh, Saudi
101. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of Arabia–March 31, 2026,” 3/31/2026.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 127. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
3/2/2026. 128. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
102. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 129. Embassy Baghdad, cable, “Iraq Overnight: Tuesday,
26.3 OEF 010, 7/22/2026. March 24,” 26 MDA 10824, 3/24/2026; Embassy Baghdad, cable,
103. DoW, transcript, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of “TF-NEA2026-01: U.S. Mission Iraq Situation Report #34,”
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” 26 BAGHDAD 280, 3/30/2026.
3/10/2026. 130. State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
104. ODASW(NECA), response to DoW OIG request for information, 131. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
26.3 OEF 008, 7/23/2026. 132. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026;
105. UNSC, “Letter Dated 10 March 2026 from the Permanent State vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
Representative of the United States of America to the United 133. State, response to State OIG, vetting comments, 8/27/2026.
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 134. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
S/2026/161, 3/11/2026. 135. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
106. USCENTCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 136. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
26.3 OEF 009, 7/22/2026. 137. Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Mora Namdar
107. ODASW(NECA), response to DoW OIG request for information, (@AsstSecStateCA), X post, 3/2/2026, 4:49PM.
26.3 OEF 018, 7/23/2026. 138. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026;
108. ODASW(NECA), response to DoW OIG request for information, State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
26.3 OEF 018, 7/23/2026. 139. Mission Saudi Arabia, “Security Alert: Exercise Increased Caution
109. ODASW(NECA), response to DoW OIG request for information, in the Middle East–June 4, 2026,” 6/4/2026.
26.3 OEF 018, 7/23/2026. 140. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
110. Admiral Brad Cooper, “Statement for the Record, Admiral Charles 141. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
Bradford Cooper II, Commander, U.S. Central Command,” before 142. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 5/14/2026. 143. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
111. DIA, response to DoW OIG request for information, 144. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
26.3 OEF 048, 7/22/2026. 145. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
112. Defense Casualty Analysis System, “Operation Epic Fury 146. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
(OEFU),” accessed 8/27/2026. 147. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
148. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
38 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
ENDNOTES
149. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 178. State, congressional notification, “Jordan-Ku Band Multi-Function
150. State, response to State OIG request for information, vetting Radio Frequency System (KuMRFS) Radars,” 2/26/2026.
comments, 8/27/2026. 179. State, congressional notification, “Government of Jordan–Aircraft
151. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. Repair, Return, and Spares,” 3/19/2026.
152. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026; 180. State, congressional notification, “Kuwait–Lower Tier Air and
State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026. Missile Defense Sensor Radars,” 3/19/2026.
153. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 181. State, congressional notification, “Kuwait–Integrated Battle
154. Treasury, response to DoW OIG request for information, Command System,” 5/1/2026.
26.3 OEF 090, 8/3/2026. 182. State, congressional notification, “Kuwait–Counter-Unmanned
155. OASW(NECA), vetting comment, 8/25/2026. Aerial Systems Platforms,” 6/5/2026.
156. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 183. State, congressional notification, “Kuwait–KC-130J Aircraft
157. Treasury, response to DoW OIG request for information, Follow-on Sustainment Support,” 6/15/2026.
26.3 OEF 090, 8/3/2026; State, response to State OIG request for 184. State, congressional notification, “Qatar–Advanced Precision Kill
information, 7/27/2026. Weapons System,” 5/1/2026.
158. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 185. State, congressional notification, “Qatar–Patriot Missile
159. Treasury, response to DoW OIG request for information, Replenishment,” 5/1/2026.
26.3 OEF 090, 8/3/2026. 186. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, “Kingdom of
160. Treasury, “General License X: Authorizing the Production, Saudi Arabia–PATRIOT Advanced Capability–3 Missile Segment
Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil, Petrochemical Products, and Enhancement Missiles,” 1/30/2026.
Petroleum Products of Iranian-Origin through August 21, 2026,” 187. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, “Kingdom of
6/20/2026; Treasury, “GENERAL LICENSE X1: Revocation and Saudi Arabia–F-15 Sustainment,” 2/3/2026.
Wind Down of June 21, 2026, Authorization for the Production, 188. State, congressional notification, “United Arab Emirates–Long-
Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil, Petrochemical Products, and Range Discrimination Radar with Terminal High Altitude Area
Petroleum Products of Iranian Origin,” 7/7/2026. Defense Integration,” 3/19/2026.
161. Treasury, “GENERAL LICENSE X1: Revocation and Wind Down 189. State, congressional notification, “United Arab Emirates–
of June 21, 2026, Authorization for the Production, Delivery Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs)”
and Sale of Crude Oil, Petrochemical Products, and Petroleum 3/19/2026.
Products of Iranian Origin,” 7/7/2026; State, vetting comment, 190. State, congressional notification, “United Arab Emirates–Fixed
8/17/26. Site–Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat
162. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. System,” 3/19/2026.
163. State, press release, “Taking Action Against Iran-Backed Militia 191 State, congressional notification, “United Arab Emirates–F-16
Commanders Threatening U.S. Personnel,” 4/17/2026. Munitions and Upgrades,” 3/19/2026.
164. State, website, “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Key 192. State, congressional notification, “United Arab Emirates–
Leaders,” undated. Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System,” 5/1/2026
165. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 193. State, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/26/2026.
166. Treasury, response to DoW OIG request for information, 194. State, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/26/2026.
26.3 OEF 090, 8/3/2026. 195. State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.
167. Treasury, response to DoW OIG request for information, 196. State, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/26/2026.
26.3 OEF 090, 8/3/2026. 197. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026;
168. Treasury, response to DoW OIG request for information, State, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/26/2026.
26.3 OEF 090, 8/3/2026. 198. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.
169. State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026. 199. USAGM, response to State OIG request for information,
170. State, congressional notification, “Israel–Munitions and Munitions 7/27/2026.
Support,” 3/6/2026. 200. USAGM, response to State OIG request for information,
171. State EUR, response to State OIG request for information, 7/29/2026.
7/27/2026. 201. USAGM, response to State OIG request for information,
172. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, 7/29/2026.
“Israel–Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,” 1/30/2026. 202. USAGM, response to State OIG request for information,
173. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, 7/29/2026.
“Israel–AH-64E Apache Helicopters,” 1/30/2026. 203. USAGM, response to State OIG request for information,
174. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, 7/29/2026; USAGM, vetting comment, 8/20/2026.
“Israel–Namer Armored Personnel Carrier Power Packs Less 204. USAGM, response to State OIG request for information,
Transmissions and Integrated Logistics Support,” 1/30/2026. 7/29/2026; USAGM, vetting comment, 8/20/2026.
175. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, press release, 205. State, fact sheet, “Sanctions to Combat Illicit Traders of Iranian
“Israel–AW119Kx Light Utility Helicopters,” 1/30/2026. Oil and the Shadow Fleet,” 2/6/2026; OFAC, “Iran-related
176. State, congressional notification, “Israel–Munitions and Munitions Designations,” 2/6/2026.
Support,” 3/6/2026. 206. State, press release, “Sanctioning Hizballah Finance Operatives,”
177. State, congressional notification, “Israel–Advanced Precision Kill 5/10/2026.
Weapons System,” 5/1/2026.
APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I 39
OPERATION EPIC FURY
207. State, press release, “Sanctions to Disrupt Iran’s Weapons 218. Treasury, press release, “Economic Fury Disrupts Networks
Procurement Networks and shadow fleet,” 2/25/2026; Supplying Weapons and UAV Components to Iran,” 5/8/2026;
Treasury, press release, “Treasury Targets Iran’s Shadow Fleet, OFAC, “Non-Proliferation and Iran-related Designations and
Networks Supplying Ballistic Missile and ACW Programs,” Designations Updates,” 5/8/2026.
2/25/2026; OFAC, “Iran-related Designations; Non-proliferation 219. State, press release, “New Round of Economic Fury Sanctions
Designations,” 2/25/2026. Targets IRGC Oil Operations,” 5/11/2026; Treasury, press
208. State, press release, “U.S. Upends Iranian Shadow Fleet and Oil- release, “Economic Fury Ramps Up Pressure on Iran’s Islamic
for-Gold Terror Financing Network,” 4/15/2026; Treasury, press Revolutionary Guard Corps Oil Operations,” 5/11/2026; OFAC,
release, “Economic Fury Targets Illicit Oil Smuggling Network “Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations,”
Run by Iranian Regime Elite,” 4/15/2026; OFAC, “Iran-Related 5/11/2026.
Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations,” 4/15/2026. 220. State, press release, “United States Sanctions Iranian Financial
209. State, press release, “Taking Action Against Iran-backed Militia and Shipping Networks,” 5/19/2026; OFAC, “Counter Terrorism
Commanders Threatening U.S. Personnel,” 4/17/2026. Designations; Iran-related Designations,” 5/19/2026.
210. State, press release, “Disrupting Procurement Networks 221. State, press release, “U.S. Sanctioning Hizballah’s Enablers in
Supporting Iran’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Ballistic Lebanon,” 5/21/2026; Treasury, press release, “Treasury Targets
Missile Programs and Mahan Air,” 4/21/2026; Treasury, press Hizballah-Aligned Officials Obstructing Peace and Disarmament.”
release, “Economic Fury Targets Iranian Missile and UAV 5/21/2026; OFAC, “Counter Terrorism Designations,” 5/21/2026.
Procurement Networks,” 4/21/2026; OFAC, “Counter Terrorism 222. OFAC, “Iran-related Designation; Counter Terrorism
Designations; Non-Proliferation Designations,” 4/21/2026. Designation,” 5/27/2026.
211. Treasury, press release, “Economic Fury Targets Global Network 223. State, press release, “U.S. Continues Maximum Pressure with
Fueling Iran’s Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet,” 4/24/2026; OFAC, Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Shadow Oil Economy,” 5/28/2026;
“Iran-related Designations; Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Treasury, press release, “Economic Fury Targets Illicit Oil
Designation Update; Issuance of Iran-related General License,” Revenue Fueling Iran’s Military,” 5/28/2026; OFAC, “Iran-related
4/24/2026. Designations; Issuance of Russia-related General License and
212. State, press release, “United States Cuts Off Billions in Illicit Amended Frequently Asked Questions,” 5/28/2026.
funding to Iranian Regime,” 4/28/2026; Treasury, press release, 224. State, press release, “Sanctioning Iranian-Affiliated Fraud Network
“Economic Fury Targets Iran Shadow Banking Facilitators,” Targeting American Companies,” 5/29/2026; Treasury, press
4/28/2026; OFAC, “Counter Terrorism Designation; Iran-related release, “Economic Fury Targets Iranian Network Defrauding
Designations; Issuance of Frequently Asked Question; Publication U.S. Firms to Supply Tehran’s Military,” 5/29/2026; OFAC,
of Iran-related OFAC Alert,” 4/28/2026. “Counter Terrorism Designations; Issuance of Amended Iran-
213. Treasury, press release, “Treasury Warns of Sanctions Risks related Frequently Asked Question,” 5/29/2026.
Linked to China-Based Independent “Teapot” Oil Refineries,” 225. State, press release, “Targeting Iraan’s Digital Asset Exchanges
4/28/2026; OFAC, “Counter Terrorism Designation; Iran-related for Terror Finance and Sanctions Evasion,” 6/2/2026; Treasury,
Designations; Issuance of Frequently Asked Question; Publication press release, “Economic Fury Targets Iran’s Largest Digital Asset
of Iran-related OFAC Alert,” 4/28/2026. Exchange for Terror Finance and Sanctions Evasion,” 6/2/2026;
214. State, press release, “U.S. Sanctions Tighten Grip on Iran-China OFAC, “Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations;
Oil Trade,” 5/1/2026; State, fact sheet, “United States Sanctions Democratic Republic of the Congo-related Designations; Issuance
Network Facilitating Iran’s Illicit Oil Trade,” 5/1/2026. of Iran-related Frequently Asked Question,” 6/2/2026.
215. Treasury, press release, “Economic Fury Targets Iranian Shadow 226. State, press release, “Sanctions to Strangle Iran’s Energy
Banking Networks Moving Billions in Foreign Currency,” Smuggling and Illicit Financial Networks,” 6/5/2026; Treasury,
5/1/2026; OFAC, “Iran-related Designations; Issuance of press release, “Economic Fury Targets Iranian LPG Smuggling
Iran-related General License and Frequently Asked Question; and Shadow Banking Networks,” 6/5/2026; OFAC, “Iran-Related
Publication of Iran-related OFAC Alert,” 5/1/2026. Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations Updates,” 6/5/2026.
216. State, press release, “Sanctioning Iran-Aligned Actors 227. State, fact sheet, “Disrupting Iran’s Weapons Procurement,”
Undermining Iraq’s Sovereignty and Exploiting its Revenue.” 6/10/2026; Treasury, press release, “Economic Fury Disrupts
5/7/2026; Treasury, press release, “Economic Fury Targets Iraqi Foreign Networks Supporting Iran’s Military and Weapons
Oil Official, Iran-Backed Terrorist Militias in Iraq,” 5/7/2026; Programs,” 6/10/2026; OFAC, “Non-Proliferation Designations;
OFAC, “Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations; Cuba Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Venezuela-related Amended
Designation and Designations Updates; Issuance of Cuba-related General Licenses and Frequently Asked Questions,” 6/10/2026.
General License and Frequently Asked Questions,” 5/7/2026.
217. State, fact sheet, “Disrupting Iran’s Overseas Military Procurement
Networks,” 5/8/2026.
40 I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS I APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026
TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
AND PROGRAMS, CONTACT:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE
www.dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098
DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE
www.stateoig.gov/hotline
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE
oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud
1-202-985-1764