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Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission · 2023-06-29
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This report by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission is the result of a contract to
collect and analyze data for the 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey
and Election Administration Policy Survey. The contract was carried out by Fors Marsh,
an applied research company based in Arlington, VA.
Published June 2023
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001
www.eac.gov
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Executive Summary
Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The EAVS asks
all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories—American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,1 and the U.S. Virgin Islands—to provide data about the
ways Americans vote and how elections are administered. Since 2008, this project has included a
separate survey, the Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), that collects
information about state election laws, policies, and practices.
The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state and local jurisdiction-level data about
election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election
officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to
changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter
experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to
examine the details of the U.S. election infrastructure and to produce a generalizable
understanding of core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by
election officials. The survey data provide policymakers and the public with crucial information
every two years about how federal elections are conducted and help the EAC fulfill its
congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials
who use the data to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning,
and create training and promotional materials. The EAC also uses EAVS data to create
clearinghouse resources to advance the agency’s mission and to better support election officials
and voters as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of
federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections.
In many ways, the 2022 general election represented a return to normal election operations, after
the 2020 general election was heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic
necessitated that state and local election offices adjust their election practices and navigate
changing state policies, including the modes of registration used by voters, how poll workers were
recruited to assist with the election, which populations could cast their ballots before Election Day
or by mail, and procedures for tabulating ballots once voting had concluded. As the most
comprehensive source of election administration data in the United States, the 2022 EAVS
provides a unique insight into how election dynamics have and have not changed as the
pandemic recedes. To this end, the EAC is pleased to present to the 118th Congress its report on
the 2022 EAVS.
This report describes in detail how the 2022 federal general election was administered and how
voters cast their ballots. Data from the EAVS and the accompanying Election Administration Policy
Survey (Policy Survey) are used to provide an overview of each of the following aspects of the
election process:
1 Puerto Rico completed the 2022 Policy Survey but was not required to complete the 2022 EAVS because
it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022.
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o Turnout, voting methods, polling places, drop boxes, ballot curing, poll workers, and
election technology are covered in Chapter 1, “Overview of Election Administration and
Voting in the 2022 General Election”;
o Key laws, rules, policies, and procedures that govern U.S. elections are covered in
Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey”;
o Voter registration and list maintenance are covered in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The
NVRA and Beyond”;
o Voting by individuals covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting
Act (UOCAVA) is described in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in 2022: UOCAVA”;
and
o Finally, the methodological procedures that the EAC followed in collecting the EAVS and
Policy Survey data and a description of the survey questions are discussed in Chapter 5,
“Survey Methodology.”
Voting and Election Administration Findings
Data from the 2022 EAVS show that 46.8% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) in the
United States voted in the 2022 general election, including more than 112 million ballots that
were cast by voters and counted. Turnout for this election decreased by approximately 5
percentage points compared to the last midterm election held in November 2018, with only nine
states showing turnout increases between these two elections.
The EAVS also tracks data on how voters cast their ballots—in person on Election Day, in person
before Election Day (which is known in many states as early voting), by mail, or by another mode
of voting. In-person voting levels dropped for the 2020 general election (as many states expanded
early voting and mail voting opportunities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic) but largely
rebounded for the 2022 general election. In-person voting on Election Day returned to being the
most common method for voters to cast their ballots, with just under half of voters using this
mode. The use of mail voting decreased from 2020 to 2022. Nonetheless, the nearly one-third of
voters who cast their ballots by mail in 2022 represents an increase over the one-quarter of
voters who voted by mail for the 2018 general election. In-person early voting saw an increase for
the 2020 general election, but decreased in 2022 to just over one-fifth of voters.
The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of drop boxes and ballot curing for the first time. Nearly
13,000 drop boxes were reported as being available for voters to return their mail ballots; among
states able to track these data, approximately 40% of mail ballots returned by voters were
returned at a drop box. Nearly 170,000 mail ballots were successfully cured by voters for this
election.
Data on the ages of the poll workers who assisted with in-person voting show that after changes
in the poll worker population for the 2020 general election, the age distribution of poll workers in
2022 was very similar to that of 2018. For the 2022 general election, a majority of poll workers
were older than 60 years old. However, the 2022 general election continued a trend toward
election officials having an easier time recruiting poll workers; this trend began with the 2020
general election. More than 80,000 individuals served as poll workers for the first time during the
2022 general election, comprising 16.7% of the poll worker population for this election.
Executive Summary | ii
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States reported that the use of electronic poll books to assist checking in voters at in-person
voting sites and the use of ballot-marking devices (BMD) and scanners to assist with casting and
counting ballots increased from the 2020 to the 2022 elections. The use of direct-recording
electronic (DRE) voting equipment with and without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT)
declined overall between these elections, despite a slight uptick in the percentage of jurisdictions
that used DRE equipment without VVPAT. For the 2022 general election, only four jurisdictions in
the country reported relying solely on DRE without VVPAT machines.
Election Administration Policy Survey Findings
The EAC collected data through the 2022 Policy Survey to provide context to the data that states
reported in the EAVS and to track changes in election policy over time in areas that include voter
registration and list maintenance, voting by mail, UOCAVA voting, in-person voting, voter
identification, provisional voting, election technology, recounts, audits, and election certification.
Some of the notable findings from the 2022 Policy Survey include that a strong majority of states
reported having voter registration databases that functioned in a top-down manner; 80% of states
that used a bottom-up or hybrid system transmitted data from local jurisdictions to the central
database in real time. The most common government agencies for states to electronically receive
registration data from were agencies that handle driver’s licenses, agencies that maintain death
records, and agencies that maintain felony or prison records. Nearly all states allow individuals to
pre-register to vote before they turn 18 years old, about three-quarters of states allow individuals
to register to vote and/or update their voter registration information online, and half of states
allow individuals to register to vote on the same day they cast a ballot.
The number of states that conduct an all-mail election either statewide or in certain jurisdictions—
that is, automatically mailing a ballot to all registered voters or to all active registered voters
without the voter having to file a mail ballot application—increased in 2020 in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic and remained fairly consistent at 12 states for the 2022 general election.
The 2022 Policy Survey also collected data on state policies on the use of drop boxes and mail
ballot curing for the first time; 39 states allowed the use of drop boxes for this election and 41
states allowed voters to cure their ballots and correct missing information or errors on their mail
ballots in order for them to be counted for this election.
States also reported information on the auditing and review activities they conduct. Audits are
conducted to ensure that voting systems operate accurately, election officials comply with
regulations, procedures, or internal policies, and discrepancies are identified and resolved so that
voters can be confident in the election administration process. The most commonly reported
auditing activities were logic and accuracy testing (used in more than 90% of states) and post-
election tabulation audits (used in three-quarters of states).
The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings
EAVS data on voter registration and list maintenance show that the percentage of the U.S.
population that is registered to vote continues to grow. More than 203 million individuals were
active registered voters for the 2022 general election, representing 85.4% of the CVAP and an
increase of 2.8 percentage points since the 2018 general election. More than two-thirds of states
reported that the active registration rate in their state increased from the 2018 to 2022 general
elections.
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More than 80 million registration forms were processed in the period between the close of
registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general
election. For the first time in EAVS history, a majority of those registration forms were submitted
through state motor vehicle offices. The use of online registration declined by about half between
the 2020 and 2022 EAVS, and the use of mail, fax, and email to submit registration forms also
decreased. Nearly half of the registration forms reported in the 2022 EAVS were updates to
existing voter registration records and more than a quarter were new valid registrations.
The NVRA also requires states to review their voter registration rolls periodically and to remove
the records of individuals who no longer meet eligibility requirements (e.g., have moved from the
jurisdiction in which they are registered, have died, have failed to respond to a confirmation
notice mailing and vote in two subsequent federal general elections, or, depending on state law,
have been convicted of or incarcerated for a crime or have become mentally incapacitated). In
the 2022 EAVS, states reported sending more than 26 million confirmation notices to keep their
registration rolls up to date; more than half of those confirmation notices were not returned to the
election office by the voter or by the U.S. Postal Service, a decrease from previous years’ EAVS
data. More than 19 million voter registration records were removed between 2020 and 2022,
most commonly because the registrant moved out of their jurisdiction, died, or failed to respond
to a confirmation notice and failed to vote in subsequent federal general elections.
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA) Findings
UOCAVA outlines special voting procedures for two categories of voters: members of the
uniformed services absent from their voting residence and their eligible family members, and U.S.
citizens living overseas. The 2022 EAVS data show that the voting residences of UOCAVA voters
tend to be highly concentrated: 57.5% of these voters held legal voting residence in just three
states, and more than 60% of EAVS jurisdictions had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters.
Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, 2022 data show that overseas citizens made
up a larger share of the UOCAVA voting population than did uniformed services voters.
Of the more than 650,000 ballots that election offices transmitted to UOCAVA voters for the 2022
general election, about one-third were transmitted to uniformed services members and two-thirds
were transmitted to overseas citizens. Email was the most common method election offices used
to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters, although a majority of uniformed services ballots were
transmitted by postal mail. Slightly more than 40% of transmitted UOCAVA ballots were returned
by voters, representing a decrease of almost 25% in the number of returned UOCAVA ballots
compared to the 2018 general election. Nationwide, more than 96% of returned UOCAVA ballots
were counted and less than 4% were rejected, most commonly because the ballot was received
after the state’s deadline for returning ballots.
UOCAVA voters can use Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) as a backup ballot in case their
regular absentee ballot cannot be received and returned in time. States reported that more than
4,000 FWABs were submitted by voters for the 2022 general election. This represents a decrease
of more than 25% from the number of FWABs received for the 2018 general election. The FWAB
allowed nearly 3,500 additional UOCAVA voters to have their ballots counted for the 2022 general
election; more than three-quarters of counted FWABs were received from overseas citizens and
less than one-quarter were from uniformed services voters.
Executive Summary | iv
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ i
Voting and Election Administration Findings .................................................................................... ii
Election Administration Policy Survey Findings ............................................................................... iii
The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings ...................................................................... iii
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) Findings ........................... iv
Chapter 1. Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2022 General Election .............. 1
Key Findings ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Election Administration in the United States .................................................................................... 2
The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) .................................................................... 4
EAVS Response Rates .................................................................................................................... 6
Turnout in the 2022 General Election............................................................................................... 6
In-Person Voting ........................................................................................................................... 10
Voting by Mail ............................................................................................................................... 11
Provisional Voting ........................................................................................................................ 16
UOCAVA and Other Methods of Voting ....................................................................................... 18
Polling Places and Poll Workers...................................................................................................... 20
Election Technology ......................................................................................................................... 24
Voting Equipment......................................................................................................................... 24
Electronic Poll Books ................................................................................................................... 26
Appendix A: Descriptive Tables ....................................................................................................... 28
Overview Table 1: 2022 EAVS at a Glance ................................................................................ 28
Overview Table 2: Mail Voting in the 2022 General Election.................................................... 33
Overview Table 3: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting............................................... 39
Overview Table 4: Polling Places and Poll Workers ................................................................... 45
Overview Table 5: Election Technology and Voting Methods .................................................... 51
Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey ........................................................... 57
Key Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 57
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 57
Responding to the 2022 EAVS ....................................................................................................... 58
Policies on Voter Registration and List Maintenance.................................................................... 59
Database Systems ....................................................................................................................... 60
Data Linkages .............................................................................................................................. 61
Automatic and Automated Voter Registration ........................................................................... 63
Pre-Registration ........................................................................................................................... 63
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State Election Office Websites .................................................................................................... 64
Online Voter Registration............................................................................................................. 65
Same-Day Registration ................................................................................................................ 65
List Maintenance ......................................................................................................................... 66
Criminal Convictions and Voting ..................................................................................................... 70
Voting by Mail ................................................................................................................................... 72
Mail Ballot Tracking and Deadlines ............................................................................................ 74
Drop Boxes ................................................................................................................................... 75
Ballot Curing ................................................................................................................................. 76
UOCAVA Voting ................................................................................................................................. 77
UOCAVA Voting Deadlines............................................................................................................ 78
In-Person Voting ............................................................................................................................... 79
Vote Centers ................................................................................................................................. 79
In-Person Voting Before Election Day ......................................................................................... 79
Voter Identification........................................................................................................................... 81
Provisional Voting............................................................................................................................. 82
Election Technology ......................................................................................................................... 84
Recounts, Audits, and Election Certification .................................................................................. 86
Audits ............................................................................................................................................ 87
Election Certification .................................................................................................................... 90
Appendix A: Descriptive Tables ....................................................................................................... 91
Policy Survey Table 1: State Voter Registration Databases ...................................................... 91
Policy Survey Table 2: Voter Registration Policies ..................................................................... 96
Policy Survey Table 3: State Mail Voting Policies ..................................................................... 100
Policy Survey Table 4: UOCAVA Voting ...................................................................................... 109
Policy Survey Table 5: Electronic Ballot Transmission ............................................................ 114
Policy Survey Table 6: In-Person Voting Before Election Day .................................................. 119
Policy Survey Table 7: Election Certification and Recounts .................................................... 123
Policy Survey Table 8: Election Audits ...................................................................................... 130
Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond ................................................................. 135
Key Findings ................................................................................................................................... 135
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 135
Federal Laws Regulating Voter Registration ............................................................................ 136
State Voter Registration Policies ............................................................................................... 138
The Registration Process ........................................................................................................... 138
Voter Registration Rates for the 2022 General Election............................................................. 140
Executive Summary | vi
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How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2022 General Election ........................................... 144
The Rise in Motor Vehicle Office Registrations ........................................................................ 147
Automatic Voter Registration .................................................................................................... 149
Same-Day Registration .............................................................................................................. 151
Other Modes of Registration ......................................................................................................... 152
Types of Registrations Received for the 2022 General Election ................................................ 153
Valid Registrations ..................................................................................................................... 153
Rejected and Duplicate Registrations ...................................................................................... 155
Registration List Maintenance ...................................................................................................... 156
Confirmation Notices Processed............................................................................................... 158
Voters Removed From the Voter Registration Rolls ................................................................ 159
Upcoming Changes to Section A for the 2024 EAVS ................................................................... 161
Appendix A: Descriptive Tables ..................................................................................................... 162
Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History ...................................................................... 162
Voter Registration Table 2: Application Sources—Total Forms Received ............................... 168
Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Applications Processed........................................... 176
Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance—Confirmation Notices ......................... 182
Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance—Removal Actions................................. 188
Chapter 4. Military and Overseas Voting in 2022: UOCAVA ......................................................... 193
Key Findings ................................................................................................................................... 193
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 194
Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting .............................................................. 194
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) ................... 194
The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 ................................... 195
The UOCAVA Voting Process.......................................................................................................... 196
UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests .................................................................................. 198
UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted ......................................................................................................... 201
Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission .................................................................................... 204
UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting .............................................................. 206
Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) ................................................................................... 209
Appendix A: Descriptive Tables ..................................................................................................... 211
UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters ...................................................... 211
UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA) ........................................................ 214
UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted, and Rejected .............. 219
UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB) .................................................. 222
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Chapter 5. Survey Methodology ................................................................................................... 227
Survey Questions ........................................................................................................................... 228
Policy Survey............................................................................................................................... 228
Section A: Voter Registration ..................................................................................................... 232
Section B: UOCAVA ..................................................................................................................... 232
Section C: Mail Voting ................................................................................................................ 233
Section D: In-Person Polling Operations ................................................................................... 233
Section E: Provisional Ballots .................................................................................................... 234
Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies ....................................................... 234
Data Collection Procedures ........................................................................................................... 234
Needs Assessment .................................................................................................................... 234
Collecting the Policy Survey Data .............................................................................................. 235
Collecting the EAVS Data ........................................................................................................... 236
Technical Assistance ................................................................................................................. 239
Resources for EAVS Respondents ............................................................................................ 239
Data Reporting and Calculations .................................................................................................. 240
Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data ............................................. 241
Methodology Appendix A: Survey Response Rates ...................................................................... 243
Methodology Appendix B: Data Collection Template Validation Rules ....................................... 246
Table 1: Math Validation Rules ................................................................................................. 246
Table 2: Logic Validation Rules ................................................................................................. 251
Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules .................................................................................... 255
Table 4: Policy Survey Pre-Fills .................................................................................................. 260
Table 5: EAVS Rates Validations ............................................................................................... 261
Table 6: Valid Skips.................................................................................................................... 264
Table 7: Special Conditions and Data Missingness ................................................................. 265
Methodology Appendix C: Post-Submission Validations and Sample Rates .............................. 272
Table 1: Sample Rates and Outlier Thresholds........................................................................ 272
Table 2: Comparisons to the 2018 EAVS Data ........................................................................ 275
Methodology Appendix D: How to Calculate Selected EAVS Rates............................................. 276
Executive Summary | viii
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Chapter 1. Overview of Election
Administration and Voting in the 2022
General Election
Key Findings
The 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on ballots cast, voter
registration, overseas and military voting, voting technology, and other important issues related to
voting and election administration. Notable findings from the 2022 EAVS include:
o More than 203 million individuals were active registered voters for the 2022 general
election.
o Voter turnout for the 2022 general election was 46.8% of the citizen voting age population
(CVAP) nationwide, a decrease of 5.1 percentage points from the 2018 general election.
Only nine states saw their turnout levels increase from the 2018 to 2022 general
elections. More than 112 million voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2022
general election.
o Although the use of mail voting decreased in 2022 compared to the 2020 general
election, mail voting rates remained higher than pre-pandemic levels, at 31.9% of voters
participating in the 2022 election who cast their ballots by mail. Almost half of all voters
voted in person on Election Day. More than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person
(either on or before Election Day) for the 2022 general election.
o The 2022 EAVS collected data on drop boxes and ballot curing for the first time. Among
states that reported data on drop boxes, nearly 40% of mail ballots were returned at drop
boxes. Among states that reported this data, less than 1% of mail ballots that were
returned by voters and counted in the election were cured (meaning they were rejected for
an error, but the voter corrected the error and the ballot was ultimately counted).
o The age distribution of poll workers skewed younger in 2020, but 2022 EAVS data show
that this distribution has returned to pre-pandemic levels. States reported that 16.7% of
the poll workers who assisted with the 2022 general election were new poll workers who
had not served in previous elections. In the 2020 and 2022 EAVS, election officials
reported that recruiting poll workers was less difficult compared to what was reported by
election officials in the 2018 EAVS.
o The most common types of voting equipment reported for the 2022 general election were
ballot-marking devices (BMD) and scanners, which were used in nearly 90% of EAVS
jurisdictions. Ballot scanners often process both hand marked ballots and ballots that
have been marked by a BMD. These devices are often used together, even in jurisdictions
where a majority of voters are marking ballots by hand. The use of direct-recording
electronic (DRE) voting machines continues to decline overall.
o The use of electronic poll books increased from 2020 to 2022, with more than one-third of
EAVS jurisdictions reporting having used an e-poll book for the 2022 general election.
1 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting
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Election Administration in the United States
The United States holds elections for many different levels of government, including federal,
state, and local offices. However, responsibility for administering these elections and tabulating,
reporting, and certifying election results is largely exercised by local jurisdictions, with oversight
from states and in accordance with federal law. The U.S. Constitution and various federal laws
govern specific aspects of federal elections and a small number of federal agencies—such as the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)—
play a supportive role in election administration. Broad legal and procedural authority rests with
the states,1 territories, the District of Columbia, and local jurisdictions. As a result, wide variation
exists among and within state election policies and practices, and the policies and practices for
conducting elections are constantly changing. Nevertheless, U.S. elections generally follow a
standard process. As shown in Figure 1, the election process can be viewed as a cycle.
1. The legal and procedural framework for elections is generally established in advance of a
general election. This legal framework determines which individuals are eligible to vote in
an election; how, when, and where voters may cast their ballots for the election; and what
technology will be used to support elections. Supported by state election offices, most of
these policies and procedures are implemented by election officials at the local level (e.g.,
county, township, or municipality).
2. To participate in elections, eligible citizens typically must register to vote pursuant to the
eligibility rules established by federal law and by their state.2 In many states, voters must
register in advance of a set registration deadline; in others, eligible individuals may
register on the same day they cast their ballot, whether during an early voting period or on
Election Day. Depending on state policy, eligible citizens may have multiple avenues for
submitting their registration applications, including by mail, fax, or email; online
registration websites; in person at an election office, at a motor vehicle office, at other
state government agency offices, or at an armed forces recruitment office; or through a
registration drive. States are also required to periodically examine their voter registration
rolls and remove the records of voters who are no longer eligible; for instance, because
the voter no longer resides in the state or jurisdiction in which they are registered, the
voter has failed to respond to a notice sent to them by mail and has not voted in the two
most recent federal general elections, the voter is deceased, or the voter is incarcerated
or has received a criminal conviction that disqualifies them from voting. The process of
updating voter registration rolls and removing ineligible voters is referred to as list
maintenance.
1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the
50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey
and EAVS data.
2 North Dakota is the only state that does not require citizens to register before casting a ballot in an
election.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 2
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Figure 1. The U.S. Election Process
1. When a federal general election is approaching, voting begins well in advance of Election
Day for many voters, including eligible military voters and overseas citizens who are
absent from their voting residence, for whom the right to participate in federal elections is
protected under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). In
addition, all states provide avenues for voters to cast ballots before Election Day. This
may include voting by using a ballot that is mailed to them by an election office, casting a
ballot in person at a dedicated voting site before Election Day (often called early voting),
or receiving and casting a ballot at an election office. Some states allow any eligible voter
to cast their ballot before Election Day, whereas others limit it only to certain segments of
the population, such as voters who are absent from their home jurisdiction on Election
Day, voters with illnesses or disabilities, voters over a certain age, or voters who provide a
statutorily valid excuse. The voting options that are available to voters and the timelines
for mail voting and in-person voting vary by state and by local jurisdiction.
3 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting
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2. Voters who do not cast ballots beforehand may vote on Election Day at in-person voting
sites. In most states, individuals whose eligibility to vote cannot be verified at the time of
voting may cast a provisional ballot. Election officials then investigate the eligibility of
individuals who cast provisional ballots to determine whether their ballots should be
counted, either in full or in part, or rejected.
3. After the polls close on Election Day, the process of counting ballots to determine the final
election results begins. This may also be referred to as tabulation or canvassing. State
policies vary on when counting may begin—some states may begin pre-processing mail
ballots (e.g., verifying the mail voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, opening envelopes,
removing the ballots from secrecy envelopes to prepare them for counting) before
Election Day, whereas other states require that in-person polls must be closed before any
mail ballots can be processed. Some states also accept mail ballots, particularly those
cast by UOCAVA voters, if they are received after Election Day, so long as they were
postmarked on or before Election Day. Depending on state law and on what equipment is
used to process the ballots, ballot counting may take several days to weeks to complete.
4. Once the unofficial results of an election are known, state and local election officials
review the results for accuracy and certify them as final. Many states conduct audits of
their election results and voting equipment to ensure that the established election
procedures were followed and that the equipment functioned correctly. Certain election
races may also be recounted if the margin of victory is close; if a candidate, party, or other
authorized group requests a recount; if a court orders a recount to be conducted; or for
other reasons specified by state law.
The election process can be viewed as a cycle in the sense that the experiences from previous
elections are used to inform decision-making for the legal and procedural framework for
subsequent elections. Often, the successful approaches and innovations implemented in one
state or local jurisdiction during an election are adopted by other states or localities in
subsequent elections. As this process begins anew with each federal election cycle, policymakers
and administrators at every level benefit from the insights available in the state and local election
data the EAC publishes in the EAVS.
The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)
Since 2004, the EAC has conducted the EAVS following each federal general election.3 The EAVS
collects data from all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S. territories—
American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,4 and the U.S. Virgin Islands—
on the ways in which Americans vote and how elections are administered. Data are provided at
the jurisdiction level.5
3 The EAVS does not collect data on primary elections, run-off elections, or special elections. The data
provided by states were only for the November 8, 2022 federal general election.
4 For 2022, Puerto Rico provided only a Policy Survey submission because the territory does not hold
elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016
EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.
5 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chooses to provide data.
For the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes
for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction.
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to
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The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state- and local jurisdiction-level data
about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election
officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to
changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter
experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to
examine the details of the U.S. elections infrastructure and to produce a generalizable
understanding of the core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced
by election officials at the state and local level. The survey provides policymakers and the public
with crucial information every two years about how federal elections are conducted, and it helps
the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to
election officials themselves. These officials use the EAVS to manage election oversight, conduct
issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and outreach materials.
The EAC also uses the EAVS data to create research and clearinghouse resources to advance the
agency’s mission and to better support election officials and voters, as well as to inform
lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the
changing landscape of U.S. elections. The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of
information and to review procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections. The
EAVS sections related to voter registration and UOCAVA voting allow states to satisfy their data
reporting requirements established, respectively, by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
and UOCAVA. The EAVS also helps FVAP fulfill its obligations under UOCAVA to reduce obstacles to
ensure military and overseas voting success by collecting data about how UOCAVA voters
participate in elections.
Collectively, the EAVS project consists of two separately administered surveys. The Policy Survey,
which is administered to each state or territory election office in advance of each federal general
election, collects data on the election laws and policies in the states and territories. These data
are used to provide context for states’ EAVS submissions and to reduce the response burden
associated with the EAVS. The EAVS, which is due after each federal general election is complete,
collects data at the jurisdiction level. The data collected include information on voter registration,
UOCAVA voters, mail voting, in-person voting operations, provisional ballots, voter participation,
and election technology. Although the EAVS collects data at the jurisdiction level, providing these
data is frequently a joint task undertaken by state and local election officials. Twenty-five states
were able to provide all EAVS data from the state’s centralized election database, whereas 31
states relied on local jurisdictions to provide data for some or all of the EAVS questions. The full
scope of the data collection procedures for both the Policy Survey and EAVS are detailed in
Chapter 5 of this report.
Chapter 1 of this report covers turnout and modes of voting in the 2022 general election, polling
places and poll workers, and election technology. This chapter also comprises a non-exhaustive
counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city,
town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data
on the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction,
because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but
most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state.
Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as
a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.
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overview of the data provided by states and jurisdictions in the EAVS. State election policies and
practices are featured in Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey.” Voter
registration is covered in greater detail in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond.”
UOCAVA voting is discussed further in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in the 2022
General Election: UOCAVA.”
EAVS Response Rates
The analysis in this report is based on information and data submitted and certified by the 50
U.S. states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. These 56 entities comprise 6,460
jurisdictions. Because Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in November 2022, the
territory provided data for the Policy Survey only. The state-level response rate for the EAVS was
100% (55 of 55 states, territories, and districts provided data) and the jurisdiction-level response
rate was 100% (6,460 of 6,460 jurisdictions provided data).6 During the data collection period,
efforts were made to maximize the completeness and accuracy of the data reported. These
efforts are outlined in the methodology of this report (Chapter 5). Instances when a state’s data
were not included in a calculation because of missing data or data quality issues are described in
the footnotes and source notes that accompany the analysis in this report.
Turnout in the 2022 General Election
According to the EAVS data submitted by states, there were 226,339,980 individuals who were
registered to vote in the United States as of November 8, 2022. Of this number, 203,660,564
individuals were classified as active registered voters, meaning they had no additional processing
requirements to fulfill before voting, and 22,794,555 were considered inactive voters, meaning
they required address verification under the provisions of the NVRA before they would be
permitted to vote.7 As a percentage of the 2021 CVAP estimate calculated by the U.S. Census
Bureau, 85.4% of voting age citizens were registered as active voters for the 2022 general
election.8 This represents an increase of 2.8 percentage points over the active voter registration
rate for the 2018 general election (82.5%).9 Further details about voter registration, including
how voters registered to vote, the use of same-day voter registration (SDR), and list maintenance,
can be found in Chapter 3 of this report.
6 Appendix A of Chapter 5 of this report contains an analysis of state-level response rates to each section of
the EAVS. Although 100% of EAVS jurisdictions provided a response, there is variance in the completeness
of those responses to each section and to specific questions of the survey.
7 The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a of the EAVS. Data on active registered
voters were collected in A1b and data on inactive registered voters were collected in A1c. The number of
active and inactive registered voters did not sum exactly to the total number of registered voters in all
jurisdictions that reported these data. According to Q10 of the 2022 Policy Survey, six states (American
Samoa, Guam, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming) did not distinguish between active and
inactive voters in their registration records. These states were not required to provide data in item A1c of
the EAVS.
8 This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2021 instead of
the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were
not available by the time this report was finalized.
9 The active CVAP registration rate for 2018 and 2022 was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in this
calculation because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate a CVAP for these territories. North Dakota
was not included in this calculation because this state does not have voter registration. Casewise deletion
at the state level was used in these calculations.
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Calculating Turnout Rates
There are several valid ways of calculating turnout, or the percentage of a population that voted in
an election. The EAVS provides a measure of the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was
counted for a general election in F1a, but there are multiple possible denominators.
o Number of registered voters or active voters. States report the number of individuals in their
state who are registered and eligible to vote in A1a, and some states separately report the
number of active voters (who have no additional processing requirements to fulfill before
voting) in A1b. This number is available for states and sub-state EAVS jurisdictions.
o Citizen voting age population (CVAP). The U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey
(ACS) estimates the estimate of the total number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older.
This number is available for states and most sub-state EAVS jurisdictions but not for U.S.
territories, except for Puerto Rico.
o Voting-eligible population (VEP). This measure uses the CVAP but excludes those who are
ineligible to vote (such as individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and individuals
who are in the military or who are citizens living overseas. This number is available for states,
but not territories or for sub-state jurisdictions.
Relying on the number of registered or active voters can be problematic for calculating turnout
because it is often challenging for states to keep voter registration rolls fully up to date (see
Chapter 3 of this report for a discussion of list maintenance practices). Using VEP as the
denominator in turnout calculations would overrepresent voter turnout—since EAVS data explicitly
include individuals covered by UOCAVA—and would restrict the ability to estimate turnout for sub-
state jurisdictions. Using the CVAP as a denominator provides greater coverage of sub-state
jurisdictions but also includes citizens over the age of 18 who are ineligible to vote due to certain
state laws. Although each denominator has its limitations, the EAC uses CVAP to calculate turnout in
this report because of its availability for the majority of jurisdictions that report EAVS data and
because it provides a more accurate picture of the population covered by the EAVS. Appendix D of
Chapter 5 of this report includes recommendations on how to calculate additional EAVS rates.
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Figure 2. Turnout Decreased in Most States from 2018 to 2022
Source: CVAP turnout was calculated as F1a/CVAP x 100 for 2018 and 2022. American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not shown as CVAP is not available for these
territories. Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in 2018 or 2022. Casewise deletion was used
at the state level in calculating the national turnout level. Turnout change between 2018 and 2022 is
measured in percentage points.
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States also reported that 112,054,124 voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2022
general election. This represents a CVAP turnout rate of 46.8% nationwide, which is the second
highest turnout for a midterm election since the EAVS began collecting these data following the
2006 midterm election.10 Turnout for the 2022 general election decreased by 5.1 percentage
points from the 2018 CVAP turnout rate of 52%,11 but increased by 8.4 percentage points from
the 2014 CVAP turnout of 38.4%.12
Figure 2 shows the change in CVAP turnout among states between the 2018 and 2022 general
elections. The majority of states saw their turnout decrease between these elections. The largest
decreases were in California, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Tennessee—all
of which saw double-digit turnout decreases. However, nine states—Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii,
Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Vermont—saw turnout
increases that ranged between 0.5 percentage points and 4.3 percentage points. In addition,
15 states had more than half of their citizen voting age population vote in the 2022 general
election.
EAVS data also show that the ways American voters cast their general election ballots have
changed significantly in the last three election cycles. Figure 3 shows the percentage of voters
who cast their ballots in person on Election Day, by mail, in person during early voting, and by
other modes of voting (including UOCAVA voting and provisional voting). Prior to the 2020 general
election, a majority of voters tended to cast their votes at an in-person polling place on Election
Day; 58.2% of voters chose this mode of voting for the 2018 general election. However, the
COVID-19 pandemic that affected the 2020 general election appears to have had lasting effects
on how voters cast their general election ballots. For the 2020 general election, the most
common mode of voting was casting a ballot by mail (43% of voters), with in-person voting on
Election Day and early voting each comprising 30.5% of the population of voters. The use of mail
voting decreased for the 2022 general election, at 31.9% of voters, but remains higher than the
25.6% of voters who voted by mail in the 2018 general election. Although use of in-person early
voting increased in the 2020 general election to 30.5%, it decreased to 22.2% in the 2022
general election, similar to the level of in-person early voting seen for the 2018 general election.
10 The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was reported in item F1a of the EAVS. The
CVAP turnout rate for 2018 and 2022 was calculated as F1a/CVAP x 100. American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in these calculations because the
U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate CVAP for these territories. Casewise deletion at the state level was
used in these calculations.
11 Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the question about voter participation was reworded. In 2018, this
question collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2022, it collected data on
ballots cast and counted. Thus, it is likely that the 2018 turnout calculation was higher than it would have
been if the 2022 question wording had been used, thus underestimating the true turnout change from
2018 to 2022.
12 The CVAP turnout rate for 2014 was calculated as item F1a divided by the 2013 CVAP from the 5-year
ACS. Although turnout calculations for other years use the 1-year ACS, a comparable statistic for 2014
could not be found. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation; Illinois’ data were
excluded from the turnout rate because the state did not report F1a in the 2014 EAVS.
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Figure 3. In-Person Voting Rebounded in 2022 After Decreasing in 2020
Source: Election Day turnout was calculated as F1b/F1a x 100 for all years. Mail turnout was calculated as
(F1d+F1g)/F1a x 100 for all years. In-person early turnout was calculated as F1f/F1a x 100 for all years.
UOCAVA, provisional, and other turnout was calculated as (F1c+F1e+F1h)/F1a x 100 for all years.
Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout levels for each mode, and
because of this, percentages for each year do not sum to 100%. Early voting includes all modes of casting a
ballot in person at a polling site or election office before Election Day; see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the
types of early voting available in states.
In-Person Voting
More than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person for the 2022 general election, either on
Election Day at a polling place or before Election Day at a polling place, election office, or other
designated site. All states except Pennsylvania allowed voters to cast ballots in person before
Election Day.13 In-person early voting generally falls into two categories:
o A voter may go to a polling place or an election office before Election Day, receive a ballot,
cast their ballot, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.
13 Information on early voting was collected in Q25 of the Policy Survey. Although this report primarily uses
the terminology “early voting,” there are a variety of terms that states use to refer to the process of allowing
individuals to cast their ballots in person at a polling location, vote center, or election office before Election
Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a full discussion of states’ policies on early voting.
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o A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the
voter may be able to take their ballot home with them. In other states, however, the ballot
must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated
along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.
Some states and territories offer both of these types of voting. Nine states require voters to
provide a valid excuse to be permitted to vote early, whereas 46 states have no-excuse early
voting that is open to any registered voter.14 For a complete discussion on state policies on in-
person voting, including the length of time in-person early voting was available and the use of
vote centers, see Chapter 2 of this report.
States reported that 21,322,200 ballots were cast through in-person early voting and counted for
the 2022 general election, a slight increase over the 20,854,871 early voting ballots cast for the
2018 general election.15 The number of ballots cast in person on Election Day 2022 was
50,860,863, a decrease of 24.2% from the 67,133,886 ballots cast on Election Day for the 2018
general election.16
Voting by Mail
All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer their registered voters the opportunity
to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections, although the number of citizens who cast
their ballots using this method and the circumstances under which citizens can vote by mail vary
widely among states. Some states use the term “absentee voting” instead of “mail voting.”17 For
purposes of this report, mail voting refers to the process by which:
1. An individual receives a ballot in the mail before an election. In some states or
jurisdictions, election offices automatically send a mail ballot to all registered voters
(often referred to as “all-mail elections”), whereas others automatically send mail ballots
only to individuals on a permanent mail voting list. In other states, individuals must file an
application to request a ballot for each election for which they wish to vote using a mail
ballot. Some states require an individual to provide a valid excuse to be able to receive a
mail ballot.
2. The individual marks the mail ballot with their preferences at home instead of at an
election office or polling location.
3. The individual returns the voted ballot to election officials, typically by sending the voted
ballot through the mail, by returning the voted ballot to an in-person voting site or election
office, or by depositing the voted ballot in a secure designated drop box. The options that
voters have for returning their voted mail ballots are dictated by state policy.
14 Information on whether an excuse was required for early voting was collected in Q25a of the Policy
Survey.
15 Data on early voting ballots were collected in item F1f of the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. For 2018, the
definition of this question included only ballots cast, whereas the 2022 definition included ballots cast and
counted.
16 Data on ballots cast in person on Election Day were collected in item F1b of the 2018 and 2022 EAVS.
For 2018, the definition of this question included only ballots cast, whereas the 2022 definition included
ballots cast and counted.
17 In recognition of the fact that many states no longer require a person to be absent from their election
jurisdiction in order to be permitted to cast a ballot by mail, the EAVS uses the term “mail voting.”
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Chapter 2 of this report describes a full analysis of the laws that states had in place regarding
mail voting for the 2022 general election. In total, 17 states required an excuse to vote by mail,
whereas 38 states did not.18 Twelve states conducted all-mail elections for the 2022 general
election—nine of these states did so statewide and three in certain jurisdictions only.19 In 23
states, voters could be placed on a permanent absentee voting list.20
The number of voters in the United States who have participated in federal general elections
using mail voting has changed significantly in the past three election cycles. In the 2018 EAVS,
states reported 30,700,831 ballots cast by mail. That number more than doubled to 69,337,349
in the 2020 EAVS, as many states expanded opportunities to vote by mail in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. For the 2022 EAVS, states reported that 35,316,617 ballots were cast by
mail and counted.21
The EAVS also collected data on mail ballots transmitted to voters (excluding military and
overseas voters covered by UOCAVA) from election offices, returned by voters, counted, and
rejected. States reported transmitting 61,460,139 mail ballots for the 2022 general election, of
which 36,683,450 were returned by voters, for a rate of 59.7% of transmitted mail ballots being
returned by voters.22 Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 35,718,700 were reported
as being counted and 549,824 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 97.4% of the
mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.5% of the mail ballots that were
returned.23 The mail ballot return rate for the 2022 EAVS was statistically significantly lower
compared to what was reported in the 2018 and 2020 EAVS (71.6% and 77.8%, respectively).
Although there was no statistically significant difference in the mail ballot count and rejection rate
between the 2022 and 2020 EAVS, comparisons show that the mail ballot count rate for the
2022 EAVS was significantly higher than what was reported for the 2018 EAVS (92.4%). However,
the percentage of mail ballots that were counted and rejected was not significantly different
18 Data on requiring an excuse to vote by mail were collected in item Q16 of the 2022 Policy Survey. Puerto
Rico was excluded from this analysis because it did not conduct a general election in November 2022.
19 Data on all-mail elections were collected in items Q17 and Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey. All-mail
elections are defined as elections for which all registered voters or all active registered voters are
automatically sent a mail ballot without having to file a mail ballot request. Some in-person voting may take
place in an all-mail election.
20 Data on permanent absentee voting policies were collected in item Q18 of the 2022 Policy Survey.
Voters who received a mail ballot because they resided in a state or jurisdiction that automatically sent mail
ballots to all registered voters (or to all active registered voters) were excluded from being considered
permanent absentee voters.
21 The number of ballots cast by mail and counted was the sum of F1d and F1g for all years. For the 2018
EAVS, these items collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2020 and 2022,
they collected data on ballots cast and counted.
22 Data on the number of mail ballots transmitted were collected in item C1a and data on mail ballots
returned were collected in item C1b of the 2022 EAVS. The return rate was calculated as C1b/C1a x 100.
Casewise deletion was used at the state level. American Samoa did not report data in C1a, and American
Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data in C1b for the 2022 EAVS.
23 Data on the number of mail ballots counted were collected in item C8a and data on mail ballots rejected
were collected in item C9a of the 2022 EAVS. The count rate was calculated as C8a/C1b x 100 and the
rejection rate was calculated as C9a/C1b x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. For the 2018 and 2020 EAVS, the
count rate was calculated as C3a/C1b x 100, and the rejection rate was calculated as C4a/C1b x 100.
Casewise deletion was used at the state level; the count and rejection rate may not sum to 100% because
of the casewise deletion and due to rounding. American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana
Islands did not report data for C8a, and Alabama, American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana
Islands did not report data for C9a for the 2022 EAVS.
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between states that conducted an all-mail election statewide in the 2022 general election and
states that did not.24
Table 1. Most Common Reason for Mail Ballot Rejection was “Other”
Percentage of Rejected
Reason
Mail Ballots
Other reason not listed 32.7%
Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature 26.9%
Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline 23.1%
Ballot did not have a voter signature 9.8%
Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope 8.3%
Ballot did not have a witness signature 5.6%
Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted (by mail or in
3.6%
person)
Voter did not provide the required documentation (such as
identification, affidavit, or statement) or documentation was 2.7%
incomplete
Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction 2.5%
Voter was deceased 1.1%
Ballot was missing from the envelope 0.7%
Envelope was not sealed 0.6%
No resident address was on the envelope 0.4%
Returned ballot did not have required postmark 0.3%
Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope 0.3%
Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope 0.1%
No ballot application on record 0.1%
Source: Other reasons not listed was calculated as (C9r+C9s+C9t)/C9a x 100. Ballot had a non-matching
or incomplete signature was calculated as C9e/C9a x 100. Ballot was received late was calculated as
C9b/C9a x 100. Ballot did not have a voter signature was calculated as C9c/C9a x 100. Ballot was not
placed in a required secrecy envelope was calculated as C9h/C9a x 100. Ballot did not have a witness
signature was calculated as C9d/C9a x 100. Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted was
calculated as C9n/C9a x 100. Voter did not provide or provided incomplete documentation was calculated
as C9o/C9a x 100. Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction was calculated as C9p/C9a x
100. Voter was deceased was calculated as C9m/C9a x 100. Ballot was missing from the envelope was
calculated as C9g/C9a x 100. Envelope was not sealed was calculated as C9j/C9a x 100. No resident
address was on the envelope was calculated as C9l/C9a x 100. Returned ballot did not have required
postmark was calculated as C9k/C9a x 100. Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope was calculated
as C9f/C9a x 100. Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope was calculated as C9i/C9a x 100. No
ballot application on record was calculated as C9q/C9a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state
level in calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.
24 T tests that were noted as being statistically significant were significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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Table 1 shows the most common reasons that states reported for rejecting mail ballots for the
2022 general election. Although states were asked to report data on 16 different reasons why
mail ballots were rejected, the most common reason for rejecting mail ballots was for reasons not
listed in the survey question. The states with the largest number of ballots rejected for other
reasons were California (118,490 ballots), Oregon (26,942 ballots), Delaware (2,480 ballots),
Wisconsin (2,125 ballots), and Florida (1,870 ballots);25 the states with the highest percentages
of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (93.4%), Delaware (85.6%), Maine (60.3%),
Wisconsin (53.3%), and California (48.7%).26 The most common other reasons reported were
”Undeliverable/Void/Final Not Counted“ (comprising approximately half of mail ballots rejected
for other reasons) and “All Signature Issues” (comprising approximately one-quarter of mail
ballots rejected for other reasons).
The next most common reason states reported for rejecting a mail ballot was that the ballot
returned by the voter had a signature that did not match what was on file or was incomplete,
followed by the ballot not being received by the deadline to be considered for counting. Together,
these three reasons accounted for nearly seven out of 10 of the ballots rejected for the 2022
general election.
Drop Boxes
The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of drop boxes for the first time in 2022. Drop boxes are
locked containers (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters’ authorized
representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. Drop
boxes are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate from ballot boxes,
which are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots immediately after
voting in person. Some states use other terminology for what the EAVS survey questions call drop
boxes, including “place of deposit” or “secure ballot intake station.”
Of the 39 states that reported using drop boxes for this election,27 seven states (Georgia, Indiana,
Iowa, Montana, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin) did not track or were otherwise unable to
report data on the number of drop boxes that were in use for the 2022 general election. The
32 remaining states reported deploying a total of 12,917 drop boxes throughout the voting period
for the 2022 general election, with 11,858 drop boxes being available on Election Day and 8,386
available during the early voting period.28 States also reported whether drop boxes were located
at election offices or at other sites such as at non-election office polling places, county
government buildings, or other locations that are conveniently accessible to voters. States
reported that 28.2% of Election Day drop boxes were located at election offices and 71.8% were
25 The number of mail ballots rejected for other reasons by state was calculated as the sum of C9r, C9s,
and C9t.
26 Idaho and West Virginia were excluded from the list of states with the highest reported percentages of
mail ballots rejected for other reasons because of erroneous data reporting.
27 Data on whether states allowed the use of drop boxes were collected in item Q19 of the 2022 Policy
Survey.
28 The total number of drop boxes was reported in item C3a. The number of Election Day drop boxes was
reported in item C4a. The number of early voting drop boxes was reported in C5a. The question instructions
specified that each drop box should be reported only once in C3a, regardless of the number of days of
voting during which it was available. Thus, because some drop boxes were available both during early
voting and on Election Day, the sum of C4a and C5a often does not match C3a on a state or a jurisdiction
level.
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located at other sites. For early voting drop boxes, 40.1% were located at election offices and
59.8% were located at other sites.29
The 2022 EAVS also collected data on the number of mail ballots that were returned by drop box.
Fifteen of the states that use drop boxes did not track these data or were otherwise unable to
report how many of the mail ballots returned by voters were returned by drop box (Alaska,
Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin). The 24 states that were able to
report these data reported that 11,473,653 mail ballots were returned by drop box, comprising
39.7% of the mail ballots returned by voters in these states and 20.9% of all ballots cast in those
states.30 States that conducted their elections entirely by mail at the state or jurisdiction level,
including Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Utah, California, the District of Columbia, and
Nebraska, tended to have the highest average number of mail ballots returned by drop box.
Ballot Curing
The 2022 EAVS also collected for the first time data on the ballot curing process. When voters
return their mail ballots to election offices, election workers verify that the envelope has all the
required voter information and that the ballot is eligible to be counted. This process varies by
state, but can include comparing the voter’s signature with the one on file at the election office
and verifying the date the ballot envelope was signed as well as other information. If this
information is missing, if it does not match the records on file in the election office, or if it is
otherwise incomplete, then each state and territory has laws and procedures on how to treat
these ballots. A certain percentage of those ballots may initially be rejected for counting—for
instance, because the voter forgot to sign the ballot envelope so the election office was unable to
verify their identity; or because the voter’s signature does not match the signature that the
election office has on file; or because the voter neglected to include a required affidavit,
statement, or copy of their identification to assist in verifying their identity and ability to cast a
mail ballot. According to the 2022 Policy Survey, 41 states31 allowed voters to cure their mail
ballots for the 2022 general election—that is, making their ballot eligible to be counted for the
election by correcting missing information or signature errors. Fourteen other states did not allow
mail ballots to be cured by voters for this election.32
Of the 41 states that allowed voters to cure their mail ballots, 16 states (Colorado, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) did not track information on the
number of ballots that were successfully cured (i.e., the voter corrected the error or supplied the
required information and their ballot was ultimately counted for the election). The 2022 EAVS only
29 For Election Day drop boxes, the percentage located at election offices was calculated as C4b/C4a x 100
and the percentage located at other sites was calculated as C4c/C4a x 100. For early voting drop boxes,
the percentage located at election offices was calculated as C5b/C5a x 100 and the percentage located at
other sites was calculated as C5c/C5a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; percentages
may not sum to 100% because of this casewise deletion or because of rounding.
30 The number of mail ballots returned by drop box was reported in item C6a of the 2022 EAVS. The
percentage of mail ballots returned by drop box was calculated as C6a/C1b x 100. The percentage of all
ballots cast that were returned by drop box was calculated as C6a/F1a x 100. Casewise deletion was used
at the state level in calculating the national percentages.
31 Information on state ballot curing policy was collected in item Q20 of the 2022 Policy Survey.
32 Puerto Rico is not included in this analysis because this territory did not conduct a federal general
election in November 2022.
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collected data on the number of ballots that were successfully cured and not the number that
were eligible for curing or were rejected because they were not cured. The 25 states that tracked
information on successfully cured mail ballots reported curing a total of 169,540 mail ballots for
the 2022 general election.33 Nationally, this number comprised 0.7% of both mail ballots
returned and mail ballots counted.34
Additional information about mail voting in the 2022 general election, including statistics by state,
can be found in Appendix A of this chapter.
Provisional Voting
HAVA expanded and standardized the use of provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot
when their registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some
indication that the voter may have already cast another ballot (e.g., by mail), or when the voter’s
eligibility to vote in an election is challenged. Provisional ballots are kept separate from other
election ballots and are later fully counted, partially counted, or rejected depending on whether
the provisional voter’s eligibility can be verified in the days following the election according to the
state’s rules for this process. The provisional ballot process helps ensure each qualified voter
casts only one ballot that is counted and allows the voter additional time to prove their eligibility
to vote if necessary. Five states—Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—
are exempt from HAVA’s provisional ballot requirements because they allowed for SDR (i.e., the
ability to register to vote and cast a ballot on the same day) at the time the law was enacted,
although Wisconsin and Wyoming do issue provisional ballots. North Dakota is exempt from this
HAVA provision because it does not require citizens to register to vote. In addition, some states
that are subject to HAVA use provisional ballots as an SDR method, including California, Nevada,
and Virginia.
In the 2022 Policy Survey, most states and territories reported offering provisional ballots to
voters. Only six states and territories—Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and Vermont—did not.35 Chapter 2 of this report includes a detailed
analysis of additional policies on provisional voting, including under which circumstances a state
may offer a provisional ballot to a voter, the deadline for election officials to adjudicate
provisional ballots for the 2022 general election, how states handle provisional ballots cast by a
voter who is in the wrong precinct, and how states review provisional ballots for eligibility and to
determine whether they should be counted.
The percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters has been steadily declining over the
past three election cycles; 2018 EAVS data show that 1.3% of voters who cast a ballot did so by
provisional ballot, and that percentage declined to 0.8% of the electorate in the 2020 EAVS and
0.5% for the 2022 EAVS.36 The total number of provisional ballots cast has declined
33 The number of successfully cured mail ballots was collected in item C7a of the 2022 EAVS.
34 The percentage of mail ballots returned by voters that were successfully cured was calculated as
C7a/C1b x 100. The percentage of mail ballots counted that were successfully cured was calculated as
C7a/C8a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.
35 Information on states’ use of provisional voting was collected in item Q33 of the 2022 Policy Survey.
36 The percentage of provisional voters is calculated as F1e/F1a x 100 for all years. Casewise deletion was
used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. For the 2018 EAVS, F1 collected data on all
ballots cast, regardless of outcome, whereas the 2020 and 2022 versions of F1 collected data on ballots
cast and counted.
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correspondingly, from 1,852,476 in the 2018 EAVS to 1,712,857 in the 2020 EAVS to 702,042
in the 2022 EAVS.37 Data from the 2022 EAVS show that 78.6% of provisional ballots cast were
counted (either fully or partially), whereas 21.3% were rejected and 0.4% reached some other
adjudication;38 analysis showed that these percentages have not changed significantly compared
to the 2018 or 2020 EAVS.39
Table 2. Most Common Reason for Voters to Cast
Provisional Ballots Was Not Being on Eligible Voter List
Percentage of Provisional
Reason
Ballots Cast
Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters 30.9%
Other reasons not listed 20.8%
Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to
17.9%
poll workers when they came to vote in person
Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were
16.9%
attempting to vote
Voter’s registration was not updated with their current name or
7.9%
address
Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law) 2.0%
Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote 1.7%
A federal or state judge extended the polling place hours for the
0.6%
election
Another person (not an election official) challenged the voter’s
qualifications and poll workers were not able to resolve the 0.1%
challenge
Source: Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters was calculated as E2a/E1a x 100. Other reasons
not listed was calculated as (E2i+E2j+E2k)/E1a x 100. Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender
the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person was calculated as E2g/E1a x 100. Voter was
not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote was calculated as E2e/E1a x 100.
Voter’s registration was not updated with their current name or address was calculated as E2f/E1a x 100.
Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law) was calculated as E2b/ E1a x 100.
Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote was calculated as E2c/E1a x 100. A federal
or state judge extended the polling place hours for the election was calculated as E2h/E1a x 100. Another
person (not an election official) challenged the voter’s qualifications and poll workers were not able to
resolve the challenge was calculated as E2d/E1a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in
calculating the national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.
37 The total number of provisional ballots cast by voters was collected in item E1a for all years.
38 The percentage of counted provisional ballots was calculated as (E1b+E1c)/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) x 100.
The percentage of rejected provisional ballots was calculated as E1d/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) x 100. The
percentage of provisional ballots that reached another adjudication was calculated as
E1e/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national
percentage.
39 T tests were statistically insignificant at p > 0.05.
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For the first time, the EAVS collected data on the reasons why provisional ballots were cast for the
2022 general election. These data are shown in Table 2. Eight states that use provisional voting
were unable to track data on the reasons why provisional ballots were cast (Alaska, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and New Mexico). Of the states that did report
these data, the most common reason for a voter being invited to cast a provisional ballot was that
the voter was not on the list of eligible voters at their voting site. The next most common reason
was a reason not listed in the survey question,40 followed by the voter having received a mail
ballot but then deciding to vote in person and not surrendering the mail ballot at the voting site,
followed by the voter not being a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote.
The additional reasons that EAVS collects data on—including the voter’s registration not being up
to date, the voter not having an acceptable identification for their state, an election official or
other person asserting the voter was not eligible to vote, or a federal or state judge extending
polling place hours for the election—were comparatively rare.
The EAVS also collects data on the reasons why provisional ballots are rejected. By far, the most
common reason states reported for rejecting provisional ballots was that the voter who cast the
provisional ballot was not registered in the state; this reason alone accounted for 45.4% of the
provisional ballots that were reported as rejected by states. The next most common reason was a
reason that was not listed in the survey question. These ballots comprised 16.7% of rejected
provisional ballots. Other common reasons for rejecting provisional ballots included the voter
being registered in the state but attempting to vote in the wrong jurisdiction (14.8% of rejections),
the voter being registered in the state but attempting to vote in the wrong precinct (6.8% of
rejections), and the voter failing to provide sufficient identification (6.2% of rejections). Additional
reasons for rejecting provisional ballots that the EAVS collects data on—the voter already having
voted, the envelope and/or ballot being incomplete and/or illegible, the ballot envelope not
having a signature, the ballot envelope having a non-matching signature, and the ballot being
missing from the envelope—each comprised 5.0% of provisional ballot rejections or less for the
2022 general election.41
UOCAVA and Other Methods of Voting
Absentee and mail voting have long been used to facilitate participation in federal elections for
individuals in the military, eligible family members of service members, and U.S. citizens who live
overseas. The distinct needs of members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens remain
an area of focus in election administration, and these individuals are given special voting
40 The most common other reasons for casting provisional ballots were because of SDR (24% of these
ballots) and because the voter was marked in the poll book as having requested an absentee ballot but
was attempting to vote in person (14.7%).
41 Voter was not registered in the state was calculated as E3b/E3a x 100. Other reasons not listed was
calculated as (E3k+E3l+E3m)/E3a x 100. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the
wrong jurisdiction was calculated as E3c/E3a x 100. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to
vote in the wrong precinct was calculated as E3d/E3a x 100. Voter failed to provide sufficient identification
was calculated as E3e/E3a x 100. Voter already voted was calculated as E3j/E3a x 100. Envelope and/or
ballot was incomplete and/or illegible was calculated as E3f/E3a x 100. Ballot did not have a signature was
calculated as E3h/E3a x 100. Ballot had a non-matching signature was calculated as E3i/E3a x 100. Ballot
was missing from the envelope was calculated as E3g/E3a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state
level in calculating the national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100% for this reason.
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protections under UOCAVA and its amendments.42 UOCAVA voters are provided certain rights to
fully participate in federal elections and are given special considerations as to when their ballots
are sent, how their blank ballots can be transmitted, and how and when they may return their
voted ballots.
Both the number of UOCAVA ballots that were cast and counted and the percentage of the
electorate who cast their ballots through UOCAVA decreased for the 2022 general election
compared to 2018. Data from the 2018 EAVS show that 358,137 UOCAVA ballots were cast,
comprising 0.3% of the electorate. For the 2022 general election, 254,721 UOCAVA ballots were
cast and counted, comprising 0.2% of the voting population. The number of UOCAVA ballots cast
and percentage of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots both surged for the 2020 general election, to
938,297 and 0.6%, respectively, but for 2022 they declined below pre-pandemic levels.43
Nationwide, for the 2022 general election, states reported transmitting 654,786 ballots, of which
267,403 were returned by voters for a return rate of 40.9%.44 Of the ballots that were returned,
257,657 were counted and 10,456 were rejected, yielding a count rate of 96.4% and a rejection
rate of 3.9%.45 This is in addition to 4,089 Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) that were
sent to election offices by UOCAVA voters, of which 3,447 were counted.46
Chapter 4 of this report contains a complete discussion of the EAC’s history of collecting data on
voters covered by UOCAVA; a full analysis of the data collected about these voters and their
ballots in 2022, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and the use of the
FWAB. Chapter 2 of this report contains a complete discussion of state policies regarding UOCAVA
voting.
In addition to ballots that were cast at a physical polling place either on Election Day or during the
early voting period, by mail, by provisional voting, and by UOCAVA voters, states reported data on
any other modes of voting that were offered in the state in 2022. Just over 5% of the ballots that
were cast and counted in 2022 were reported as another mode of voting, an increase from the
2.5% that was reported for the 2020 general election and the 0.2% that was reported for the
42 The uniformed services are the armed forces—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space
Force), and Coast Guard—and the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Officer Corps, and the U.S. Merchant
Marine. Uniformed services members, their spouses, and their eligible dependents are, together, referred
to as uniformed services voters. Overseas citizens are U.S. citizens living outside of the United States who
are not uniformed services voters but who are also protected by UOCAVA.
43 The number of UOCAVA ballots cast and counted was collected in item F1c for all years; the percentage
of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots was calculated as F1c/F1a x 100. For 2018, this item collected data on
ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and counted.
44 The number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted was collected in B5a and the number of UOCAVA ballots
returned was collected in item B9a. The UOCAVA ballot return rate was calculated as B9a/B5a x 100.
Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.
45 The number of UOCAVA ballots counted was collected in B14a and the number of UOCAVA ballots
rejected was collected in B18a. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots counted was calculated as B14a/B9a
x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100. Casewise deletion
was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.
46 The number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters was collected in item B23a. The number of counted
FWABs was collected in item B24a.
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2018 general election.47 This is primarily due to New Jersey reporting 75.4% of its voters in this
item, which the state said comprised Election Day and early voting location ballots counted. Other
states that reported significant turnout in this item included Mississippi (6.5% of turnout,
comprising absentee ballots counted), North Carolina (2.2% of turnout, comprising “other”), the
U.S. Virgin Islands (1.9% of turnout, comprising walk-in absentee voters), and Delaware (1.1% of
voters, comprising “all other methods”).48 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin also reported other modes of voting
that comprised less than 1% of the turnout in each state.
Polling Places and Poll Workers
To organize elections, registered voters are assigned to precincts according to the residential
addresses listed in their voter registration records. These precincts are contiguous, bounded
geographic areas that form the basis for determining the contests and issues on which the voters
legally residing in that area are eligible to vote.49 Precincts are then assigned to polling locations,
which are physical locations where in-person voting takes place. One precinct may be assigned to
a polling place, or multiple precincts may vote together at a single polling place. Some states use
a vote center model, which allows people to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction
rather than at a specifically assigned polling place.
For the 2022 general election, states reported having 181,790 precincts in use and operating
94,793 physical polling places.50 A total of 80,124 polling places were reported as being
operated on Election Day 2022 and 15,309 were reported as being in use during in-person early
voting before Election Day.51 Among Election Day polling places, 2.6% were reported by states as
being located at an election office and 97.8% were reported as being located at another site,
such as a library, school, or a mobile voting location. For early voting polling places, 44.9% were
located at election offices and 66.6% were located at other sites.52
47 The percentage of ballots cast by another mode and counted was calculated as F1h/F1a x 100 for all
years. Casewise deletion was used in calculating the national percentage. For 2018, this item collected
data on ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and
counted.
48 The description of states’ other mode of voting was based on what the state submitted in item F1h_Other
of the 2022 EAVS.
49 Some states use the terms “ward” or “voting district” to describe their voting precincts.
50 The number of precincts was collected in item D1a, and the total number of polling places was collected
in D2a. The instructions for D2a stated that each polling place was to be counted only once, regardless of
the number of voting days it was open for.
51 The total number of Election Day polling places was collected in D3a, and the total number of early voting
polling places was collected in D4a. Illinois and Virginia were excluded from the reported total number of
Election Day polling places due to erroneous data reporting. Washington did not report data in D3a because
the state has no polling places—only vote centers and voting by mail. Three states did not report data in
D4a: Missouri because it was unavailable, New Hampshire because in-person absentee is only permitted at
town or city clerk’s offices over the counter, and Pennsylvania because in-person early voting was not
available for this election. The EAC cautions against doing a year-over-year analysis of polling places as
reported in the EAVS because these items have been underreported in previous years.
52 The percentage of Election Day polling places at election offices was calculated as D3c/(D3b+D3c) x
100. The percentage of Election Day polling places at other sites was calculated as D3b/(D3b+D3c) x 100.
The percentage of early voting polling places at election offices was calculated as D4c/(D4b+D4c) x 100.
The percentage of early voting polling places at other sites was calculated as D4b/(D4b+D4c) x 100.
Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; the percentages for
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In-person voters who vote at polling places are often assisted by poll workers. These poll workers
are typically not full-time election workers or employees of election offices; rather, they are
recruited and trained to assist temporarily during election periods. Typical activities that poll
workers perform include checking in voters, setting up voting equipment and providing ballots to
voters, and performing other functions as dictated by the state or local election authority.53 States
reported that 645,219 poll workers assisted with in-person voting for the 2022 general election,
with 608,758 poll workers assisting with voting on Election Day and 98,140 assisting with early
voting.54
Thirty-six states also reported data on the age breakdown of the poll workers who assisted with
the 2022 general election.55 Among these states, a majority of poll workers were reported as
being age 61 or older. The age distribution of poll workers in the 2018, 2020, and 2022 general
elections is shown in Figure 4. This figure shows a clear increase in poll workers between the
ages of 18 and 40 for the 2020 general election and a decrease in poll workers over the age of
61. However, the age distribution of poll workers for the 2022 general election is remarkably
similar to that of the 2018 general election. In comparing 2020 to 2022, the proportion of poll
workers ages 18 and under, 26 to 40, and 41 to 60 decreased, while the proportion of poll
workers ages 61 to 70 and 71 and older increased.56 The 2022 EAVS also collected data on poll
workers who served for the first time in the 2022 general election; states reported 80,708 new
poll workers, comprising 16.7% of the poll workers who assisted with this election.57
each election period may not sum to 100% because of this. Georgia and Missouri did not report data on
where Election Day polling sites were located; Georgia and Wisconsin did not report data on where early
voting polling sites were located. “Early voting” refers to any in-person voting that took place before Election
Day.
53 Some states and jurisdictions use other titles for poll workers, such as election judges, booth workers,
wardens, or commissioners. The EAVS instructions stated that observers stationed at polling places, regular
office staff who did not fulfill poll worker functions during the election, or temporary election staff who were
not hired specifically to serve voters in either early or Election Day voting should not be counted as poll
workers for purposes of the EAVS. However, regular office staff who performed poll worker duties during
early voting or on Election Day were to be counted as poll workers in these survey items.
54 The total number of poll workers was collected in item D7a. The total number of Election Day poll workers
was collected in item D5a. The total number of early voting poll workers was collected in item D6a. D7a was
not intended to match the sum of D5a and D6a because the instructions in D7 were to count each poll
worker only once, regardless of the number of days of voting the poll worker assisted with. Oregon,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin were unable to report data on poll workers in any of these three
items. Colorado and North Dakota reported data in D7a but not in D5a or D6a; Alabama, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania reported
data in D5a and D7a but not in D6a.
55 Data on poll workers’ ages were collected in items D7b–D7g of the 2022 EAVS. Connecticut, the District
of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin were not able to report age data.
56 Comparisons for age categories between 2020 and 2022 were significant at the p < 0.05 level. The
comparison for poll workers ages 18 to 25 was insignificant at p > 0.05.
57 Data on new poll workers were collected in item D9a of the 2022 EAVS; the percentage of new poll
workers was calculated as D9a/D7a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the
national percentage. Twenty-three states (Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Guam, Idaho,
Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin) were unable to track data on new poll workers.
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Figure 4. Age Distribution of 2022 Poll Workers Was Very Similar to 2018
Source: Percentage of poll workers under age 18 was calculated as D7b/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x
100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8b/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of poll
workers ages 18–25 was calculated as D7c/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022
and as D8c/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 26–40 was
calculated as D7d/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8d/(D8b+D8c+
D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 41–60 was calculated as D7e/
(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8e/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+ D8f+D8g) x
100 for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 61–70 was calculated as D7f/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+
D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8f/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of
poll workers ages 71 or older was calculated as D7g/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and
2022 and as D8g/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Data for Alaska and South Carolina
have been excluded from these calculations because these states only track data on poll workers under 18
years of age. Casewise deletion was used at the state level for calculating national percentages, and
because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.
The EAVS also collected data on how easy or difficult it was for jurisdictions to obtain a sufficient
number of poll workers for the 2022 general election. These data show that poll worker
recruitment remains a challenge for many election officials, with more than half of jurisdictions
that responded to this question reporting that it was very or somewhat difficult and just under
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one-quarter of jurisdictions reporting it was somewhat or very easy.58 However, historical
comparisons show that recruitment has become somewhat easier in the past two election cycles,
as shown in Figure 5. For the 2018 EAVS, more than two-thirds of jurisdictions reported that poll
worker recruitment was very or somewhat difficult and only 15.3% reported that recruitment was
somewhat or very easy. Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the percentage of jurisdictions that found
recruitment to be difficult began to decrease and the percentage that found it easy began to
increase, a trend that continued with the 2022 EAVS. Analysis shows that although the ease of
poll worker recruitment fell in 2022 compared to 2020, recruitment was still easier in 2022 than
it was in 2018.59 Ease of poll worker recruitment is also highly correlated with the size of the
jurisdiction, with jurisdictions having 10,000 or fewer total registered voters reporting that
recruitment was easier compared to jurisdictions with more than 10,000 total registered voters.60
Figure 5. Poll Worker Recruitment Was Less Difficult in 2020 and 2022 Than in 2018
Source: Ease of recruiting poll workers was collected in item D8 in the 2020 and 2022 EAVS and D9 in the
2018 EAVS. For all years, jurisdictions that responded “Not enough information to answer,” “Data not
available,” “Does not apply,” or left this item blank were excluded from this analysis.
58 Data on the ease of recruiting poll workers were collected in item D8 of the 2020 and 2022 EAVS and
item D9 of the 2018 EAVS. In 2022, 3,164 of 6,460 jurisdictions (49%) responded “Not enough
information to answer,” “Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or left this item blank; these responses
have been excluded from the analysis.
59 T tests comparing D8 for 2022 and 2020 and D8 for 2022 and D9 for 2018 were statistically significant
at p < 0.01.
60 For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as
reported in item A1a of the 2022 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at p < 0.001.
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Approximately half of EAVS jurisdictions provided comments that explained their experiences with
recruiting poll workers for the 2022 general election.61 Overall, some of the most significant
challenges jurisdictions experienced in recruiting poll workers included lingering concerns about
COVID (especially among older poll workers), long work hours and relatively low pay for poll
workers, issues obtaining a sufficient political party balance of poll workers (in states and
jurisdictions where this is a requirement), concerns about safety and the general political climate
toward elections, and last-minute cancellations causing difficulties with filling those slots. Among
jurisdictions reporting that poll worker recruitment was somewhat or very easy, the most
commonly cited strategies included relying on local networks—such as high schools or colleges,
political parties, and local government offices or organizations—or current poll workers to recruit
additional workers. Some jurisdictions found success in switching to a vote center model, thereby
reducing the number of poll workers necessary to administer an election. Other successful
strategies included relying on election staff to fill vacant poll worker positions and holding
multiple poll worker orientation and training sessions to accommodate different schedules.
Election Technology
The use of technology in polling places and vote tally locations varies widely across and within
states. The 2022 EAVS collected data on the type of voting equipment that is used and the type
of voting that the equipment is used for, the specific makes and models of the equipment and
how many were deployed for the election, and whether electronic poll books (or e-poll books)
were used to assist at polling places. The voting equipment landscape continues to evolve with
each election.
Voting Equipment
The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of four types of voting equipment that voters use to
mark or cast their ballots in elections or that can be used to tabulate ballots cast by voters:
o Direct-recording electronic (DRE) devices that are not equipped with a voter-verified paper
audit trail (VVPAT);
o DRE voting devices that are equipped with a VVPAT;
o Electronic systems that produce a paper record but do not tabulate votes, often referred to
as ballot-marking devices (BMD); and
o Scanners (either optical or digital) that tabulate paper records that voters mark by hand or
via a BMD.
The EAVS also collected information on whether jurisdictions counted ballots by hand without the
use of any optical or digital scanning system.62
61 Open-ended comments on poll worker recruitment experiences were provided in the D8 Comment item
of the 2022 EAVS. Responses that did not include substantive comments—such as “No information to
share” or “Data not available”—were excluded from the analysis.
62 Information on DREs without VVPAT was collected in F5 of the 2022 EAVS. Information on DREs with
VVPAT was collected in F6. Information on BMDs was collected in F7. Information on scanners was
collected in F8. Information on hand counting was collected in F9. Eight jurisdictions in Kansas, two
jurisdictions in Kentucky, four jurisdictions in Missouri, and two jurisdictions in West Virginia did not
respond to questions on the use of scanners in F8. No jurisdiction in Kansas responded to questions on the
use of hand counting in F9. Previously, the EAVS also collected information on the use of punch card and
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Nationally, states reported deploying 334,382 voting machines to assist with the 2022 general
election.63 Figure 6 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that reported using each type of voting
equipment in the 2020 and 2022 EAVS. The most commonly used types of voting equipment in
EAVS jurisdictions were BMDs and scanners, which were used in 88.4% and 86.2% of
jurisdictions, respectively. The use of both types of equipment increased from the 2020 election
to the 2022 election: the use of BMDs increased by 18.6 percentage points and the use of
scanners increased by 7.8 percentage points. Hand counting, on the other hand, was used by
17.8% of jurisdictions for the 2022 general election, a slight decrease from 2020. Use of hand
counting to tabulate ballots for the 2022 general election was highly correlated with jurisdiction
size. Among jurisdictions with 10,000 or fewer registered voters, 20.6% reported hand counting
ballots, whereas only 13.3% of jurisdictions with more than 10,000 registered voters reported
hand counting ballots.64 DREs continue to be the least-used type of voting equipment in the
United States, with only 6.7% of jurisdictions using DREs without VVPAT and 5.5% using DREs
with VVPAT.
DREs without VVPAT are of special concern to some experts, because these machines do not
include a paper record of the votes that are cast, which raises security concerns and can make it
difficult to conduct certain types of post-election audits. The percentage of jurisdictions that used
these machines increased slightly overall between 2020 and 2022 due to 217 jurisdictions (four
in Illinois, 14 in Indiana, seven in Kentucky, 18 in Texas, and 174 in Vermont) that reported using
this equipment in 2022 but not in 2020. However, there were another 193 jurisdictions (five in
Arkansas, 14 in Indiana, one in Kansas, 43 in Kentucky, 50 in Mississippi, 11 in New Jersey, 12
in Tennessee, and 57 in Texas) that reported phasing out DREs without VVPAT between the 2020
and 2022 general elections.
lever voting machines; for the 2022 EAVS, these questions were eliminated because no jurisdiction in the
United States had reported using either of these types of equipment since the 2016 EAVS, marking three
election cycles in which no jurisdiction reported using this equipment.
63 The number of voting machines deployed was calculated as the sum of F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1,
F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3 in the 2022 EAVS.
64 For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as
reported in item A1a of the 2022 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at p < 0.001.
Jurisdictions that did not provide a response in F9a of the 2022 EAVS were excluded from this analysis. The
vast majority of jurisdictions that used hand counting reported using some other form of voting equipment
to assist with ballot casting or tabulation. Only 30 jurisdictions used only hand counting; these jurisdictions
were in American Samoa, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Texas.
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Figure 6. Percentage of EAVS Jurisdictions Using BMDs and Scanners Increased
from 2020 to 2022; Use of DREs Decreased
Source: Data on use of BMDs were collected in item F7a for both years. Data on use of scanners were
collected in item F8a for both years. Data on use of hand counting were collected in item F11a for 2020
and F9a for 2022. Data on use of DRE without VVPAT were collected in item F5a for both years. Data
on use of DRE with VVPAT were collected in item F6a for both years. Percentages were calculated as
the number of jurisdictions responding “Yes” to the listed item divided by the total number of
EAVS jurisdictions.
In addition, the number of jurisdictions that use DRE without VVPAT only, without any other
equipment available for voters to cast their ballots, decreased significantly. For the 2020 general
election, 32 jurisdictions (12 in Indiana, one in Tennessee, and 19 in Texas) used only DRE
without VVPAT; for the 2022 general election, that number decreased to only four jurisdictions
(one in Tennessee and three in Texas).
Electronic Poll Books
When voters go into polling places to cast ballots in person, their identity is checked against voter
registration information that is contained in poll books to ensure the voters are registered to vote
and did not already cast a ballot (either in person or by mail). These poll books can be paper
based and printed before the election, or they can be electronic. The use of e-poll books has
steadily increased in recent elections. For the 2020 general election, 38 states reported that at
least one jurisdiction in their state used e-poll books; this number increased to 40 for the 2022
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general election, comprising 35.1% of all EAVS jurisdictions (an increase of 4.3 percentage points
compared to the 2020 general election).65 Colorado, Hawaii, and New Jersey reported adopting e-
poll books between the 2020 and 2022 elections.
Jurisdictions also provided data on how the e-poll books in their jurisdictions were used—to sign
voters in, to update voter history, to look up polling places, to assist with same-day registration, to
check a voter’s mail ballot status, or for other uses (see Table 3). The most commonly reported
usages of e-poll books were to sign voters in, update voter history, look up polling places, and
check voters’ mail ballot status. Of the jurisdictions that used e-poll books, approximately three-
quarters or more of jurisdictions used the e-poll books for these purposes. Less-common uses of
e-poll books included to assist with same-day voter registration and for other uses. Compared to
how jurisdictions use paper poll books, it was more common for a jurisdiction to use an e-poll
book to look up polling places and for other uses. It was also more common for jurisdictions to
use a paper poll book to update voter history, check voters’ mail ballot status, and assist with
same-day registration than it was for jurisdictions to use e-poll books to assist with these tasks.66
Table 3. E-Poll Books Most Commonly Used to Sign Voters In, Update History,
Look Up Polling Places, and Check Mail Ballot Status
Percentage of E-Poll Book Percentage of Paper Poll Book
Poll Book Use Jurisdictions That Used Them Jurisdictions That Used Them
To… To…
Sign voters in 96.0% 96.1%
Update voter history 89.3% 93.0%
Look up polling places 84.7% 23.1%
Check voters’ mail ballot
74.4% 87.7%
status
Assist with same-day
33.7% 70.3%
registration
Other uses 27.3% 12.4%
Source: Data on use of poll books to sign voters in were collected in items F3a and F4a. Data on use of poll
books to update voter history were collected in items F3b and F4b. Data on use of poll books to look up
polling places were collected in items F3c and F4c. Data on use of poll books to check voter’s mail ballot
status were collected in items F3e and F4e. Data on use of poll books to assist with same-day registration
were collected in items F3d and F4d. Data on other uses of poll books were collected in items F3f and F4f.
Percentages are calculated as the percentage of jurisdictions that used each type of poll book that reported
using the poll book to assist with the stated election task divided by the number of jurisdictions that
reported using each type of poll book.
65 Data on the use of e-poll books were collected in items F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, and F3f of the 2022
EAVS and items F3a, F3b, F3c, and F3d of the 2020 EAVS. A jurisdiction was considered to have used an e-
poll book if it answered “Yes” to at least one of those questions. Puerto Rico reported using e-pollbooks in
the 2020 EAVS but was excluded from the count of states using them in 2022 because it was not required
to respond to the 2022 EAVS.
66 Differences for all poll book uses for the 2022 general election except for signing voters in were
statistically significant at p < 0.01.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Tables
Overview Table 1: 2022 EAVS at a Glance
Total Active Turnout as %
Total EAVS Total Voter Turnout as %
State Registered Total CVAP of Active
Jurisdictions Turnout of CVAP
Voters Registration
Alabama [1] 67 3,283,842 3,829,788 1,424,087 43.4% 37.2%
Alaska 1 601,795 533,852 267,047 44.4% 50.0%
American Samoa 1 14,314 -- 7,460 52.1% --
Arizona [2] 15 4,143,929 5,216,518 2,592,375 62.6% 49.7%
Arkansas 75 1,475,838 2,237,649 896,423 60.7% 40.1%
California 58 21,958,218 26,028,290 11,146,561 50.8% 42.8%
Colorado 64 3,839,814 4,303,604 2,539,897 66.1% 59.0%
Connecticut [3] 169 2,259,575 2,659,979 1,297,811 57.4% 48.8%
Delaware 3 702,029 754,114 325,828 46.4% 43.2%
District of
1 508,855 502,670 205,774 40.4% 40.9%
Columbia [4]
Florida 67 14,497,121 15,855,982 7,798,866 53.8% 49.2%
Georgia 159 6,955,386 7,786,111 3,963,152 57.0% 50.9%
Guam 1 60,463 -- 34,074 56.4% --
Hawaii 5 764,102 1,044,019 423,443 55.4% 40.6%
Idaho 44 1,004,608 1,373,714 595,350 59.3% 43.3%
Illinois [5] 108 7,899,591 9,087,338 4,175,767 52.9% 46.0%
Indiana 92 4,197,437 5,030,200 1,893,022 45.1% 37.6%
Iowa [6] 99 1,880,415 2,379,570 1,230,143 65.4% 51.7%
Kansas 105 1,830,216 2,128,111 997,607 54.5% 46.9%
Kentucky 120 3,137,031 3,405,618 1,500,419 47.8% 44.1%
Louisiana 64 2,830,594 3,439,830 1,410,597 49.8% 41.0%
Maine 497 929,124 1,100,974 680,909 73.3% 61.8%
Maryland 24 4,149,909 4,417,293 2,028,850 48.9% 45.9%
Massachusetts 351 4,173,942 5,121,488 2,511,460 60.2% 49.0%
Michigan 83 7,297,900 7,640,514 4,500,400 61.7% 58.9%
Minnesota 87 3,624,200 4,221,515 2,526,646 69.7% 59.9%
Mississippi [7] 82 1,922,707 2,226,474 708,585 36.9% 31.8%
Missouri 116 3,816,663 4,675,531 2,304,250 60.4% 49.3%
Montana 56 661,320 857,649 468,326 70.8% 54.6%
Nebraska [8] 93 1,141,470 1,411,320 682,741 59.8% 48.4%
Nevada 17 1,840,748 2,193,360 1,021,780 55.5% 46.6%
New Hampshire
320 909,067 1,103,239 626,931 69.0% 56.8%
[9]
New Jersey [10] 21 5,934,029 6,433,068 2,658,149 44.8% 41.3%
New Mexico 33 1,198,896 1,545,938 709,556 59.2% 45.9%
New York 62 12,125,966 14,109,037 5,886,371 48.5% 41.7%
North Carolina 100 6,488,756 7,808,186 3,789,932 58.4% 48.5%
North Dakota 53 -- 576,588 242,566 -- 42.1%
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Total Active Turnout as %
Total EAVS Total Voter Turnout as %
State Registered Total CVAP of Active
Jurisdictions Turnout of CVAP
Voters Registration
Northern
1 19,272 -- 13,376 69.4% --
Mariana Islands
Ohio 88 8,029,950 8,943,128 4,201,368 52.3% 47.0%
Oklahoma 77 2,021,787 2,903,864 1,153,203 57.0% 39.7%
Oregon 36 2,985,820 3,200,314 1,968,717 65.9% 61.5%
Pennsylvania 67 8,033,385 9,918,163 5,410,022 67.3% 54.5%
Rhode Island 39 722,684 827,415 361,275 50.0% 43.7%
South Carolina 46 3,376,917 3,940,745 1,718,519 50.9% 43.6%
South Dakota 66 599,919 659,768 354,605 59.1% 53.7%
Tennessee 95 4,218,165 5,248,512 1,756,397 41.6% 33.5%
Texas 254 15,847,341 19,375,866 8,151,590 51.4% 42.1%
U.S. Virgin
1 39,910 -- 22,557 56.5% --
Islands [11]
Utah 29 1,690,442 2,251,328 1,074,344 63.6% 47.7%
Vermont 247 446,098 518,387 286,300 64.2% 55.2%
Virginia 133 5,736,016 6,354,439 3,074,762 53.6% 48.4%
Washington [12] 39 4,805,394 5,529,508 3,067,686 63.8% 55.5%
West Virginia 55 1,055,475 1,408,767 493,581 46.8% 35.0%
Wisconsin [13] 1,851 3,670,188 4,480,576 2,673,154 72.8% 59.7%
Wyoming 23 301,931 436,049 199,513 66.1% 45.8%
U.S. Total 6,460 203,660,564 239,035,960 112,054,124 54.9% 46.8%
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Total Mail Total In-Person
Total In-Person
Ballots Cast Ballots Cast
Election Day Total Polling Total Poll
State and Counted Before Election
Ballots Cast Places Workers
(Excluding Day and
and Counted
UOCAVA) Counted
Alabama [1] 1,373,247 32,577 -- 2,014 5,564
Alaska 167,829 38,889 47,298 555 2,447
American
6,583 15 845 42 225
Samoa
Arizona [2] 473,550 2,075,970 27,705 767 7,156
Arkansas 378,667 15,949 501,915 1,005 5,200
California 1,059,250 9,743,427 216,732 3,876 35,053
Colorado 93,149 2,406,246 27,022 370 5,367
Connecticut [3] 1,134,493 150,284 -- 718 3,590
Delaware 247,043 19,027 55,639 273 2,884
District of
59,538 130,287 15,438 90 2,025
Columbia [4]
Florida 2,727,051 2,759,432 2,271,845 4,134 37,099
Georgia 1,420,392 248,487 2,290,459 2,763 18,439
Guam 25,687 163 7,995 21 358
Hawaii 5,789 402,243 10,879 11 44
Idaho 401,184 128,723 65,129 734 4,071
Illinois [5] 1,926,270 568,728 605,992 6,293 28,785
Indiana 1,196,206 154,882 538,699 1,674 13,950
Iowa [6] 859,562 368,907 -- 1,653 7,330
Kansas 577,607 131,633 273,287 1,110 7,653
Kentucky 1,150,303 72,663 269,572 1,540 11,478
Louisiana 1,034,781 102,618 272,260 2,052 15,314
Maine 438,658 171,940 68,458 521 5,170
Maryland 1,046,153 536,285 380,874 1,588 18,311
Massachusetts 1,386,373 922,559 197,288 1,524 9,540
Michigan 2,614,123 1,656,814 223,644 3,287 33,331
Minnesota 1,853,310 339,396 330,809 2,655 31,307
Mississippi [7] 656,874 -- -- 1,765 5,295
Missouri 1,834,916 278,539 184,687 2,281 15,759
Montana -- -- -- 409 3,906
Nebraska [8] 412,213 242,009 21,944 1,072 6,909
Nevada 210,325 518,398 281,760 271 3,698
New Hampshire
568,276 56,971 -- 308 --
[9]
New Jersey [10] -- 581,955 -- 5,111 12,454
New Mexico 256,438 97,746 353,476 760 2,999
New York 4,250,739 382,926 1,158,391 5,258 65,103
North Carolina 1,578,581 179,280 1,929,870 3,204 23,221
North Dakota 136,304 69,399 36,513 181 1,481
Northern
6,408 -- 6,968 16 32
Mariana Islands
Ohio 2,654,497 911,517 550,092 3,637 39,888
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Total Mail Total In-Person
Total In-Person
Ballots Cast Ballots Cast
Election Day Total Polling Total Poll
State and Counted Before Election
Ballots Cast Places Workers
(Excluding Day and
and Counted
UOCAVA) Counted
Oklahoma 949,235 68,697 132,591 1,842 6,258
Oregon -- 1,961,760 -- 36 --
Pennsylvania 4,126,903 1,234,943 -- 9,154 48,340
Rhode Island 254,334 33,556 71,737 383 2,700
South Carolina 1,096,154 54,911 561,597 1,993 12,117
South Dakota 183,663 97,472 72,705 497 2,596
Tennessee 864,965 44,097 844,429 1,925 13,978
Texas 2,590,664 356,987 5,176,910 6,286 35,936
U.S. Virgin
9,671 532 11,851 11 225
Islands [11]
Utah 56,264 970,274 12,942 116 751
Vermont 91,637 193,618 -- 262 --
Virginia 2,033,530 289,428 711,206 2,535 19,922
Washington [12] -- 3,037,023 3,079 65 --
West Virginia 350,187 12,301 128,799 1,395 7,871
Wisconsin [13] 1,909,173 425,970 332,001 2,541 --
Wyoming 122,114 38,164 38,868 209 2,089
U.S. Total 50,860,863 35,316,617 21,322,200 94,793 645,219
Overview Table 1 Calculation Notes:
Total EAVS Jurisdictions uses a count of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code by state.
Total Active Registered Voters uses question A1b.
Total CVAP uses the 2021 1-year estimate of the CVAP from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Total Voter Turnout uses question F1a.
Turnout as % of Active Registration uses F1a/A1b x 100.
Turnout as % of CVAP uses F1a/CVAP x 100.
Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted uses question F1b.
Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.
Total In-Person Ballots Cast Before Election Day and Counted uses question F1f.
Total Polling Places uses question D2a.
Total Poll Workers uses question D7a.
Overview Table 1 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation. For example, since there
was no CVAP estimate for most U.S. territories, their turnout data (F1a) were not used for the
calculation of “Turnout as % of CVAP” at the national level.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
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• The CVAP is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older in the state.
This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2021 instead
of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the
year 2022 was not available by the time this report was finalized. Some states may have
reported more active registered voters than CVAP because the 2021 CVAP is being compared
to 2022 data.
• The Total Voter Turnout column includes voters who cast a ballot that was counted.
[1] Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 Election Administration and Voting
Survey (EAVS), which resulted in a discrepancy in the data reported in question F1.
[2] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1
of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.
[3] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.
[4] The District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) sent a ballot to every registered voter for the
November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was
passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction.
[5] The data reported in the 2022 EAVS was obtained from the individual jurisdictions within the state
of Illinois. For questions on this numerical information, please contact the jurisdictions themselves or
the state board of elections for further information.
[6] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are
reported with mail ballots that are cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the
actual vote tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration
system. Not all jurisdictions reported data on poll workers in the 2022 EAVS.
[7] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could
only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and
mail-in ballots. The information entered into the Statewide Election Management System (SEMS)
does not distinguish between the two.
[8] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.
[9] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.
[10] Data on in-person Election Day voters and in-person early voters is not recorded separately.
[11] In the U.S. Virgin Islands, absentee ballots are classified as walk in or mail in, but are all counted
and accepted as regular absentee ballots.
[12] In-person ballots cast consist of county reports of voters who voted in centers with accessible
voting units. Accessible voting unit ballots are not tracked separately from mail ballots. Washington is
a vote-by-mail state. Data reported on in-person voters before Election Day consists of county reports
of voters who voted in voting centers with accessible voting units (AVU). Ballots cast at AVUs are not
tracked separately from mail ballots.
[13] The number of jurisdictions in Wisconsin changed over the two-year period covered by the 2022
EAVS due to incorporations, mergers, and similar mechanisms. Wisconsin is not subject to the
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and does not have inactive registered voters. The reported
registration totals include military voters, even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin
because they still have a voter record created. Wisconsin is not a vote-by-mail state but does allow
voters to request that an absentee ballot be mailed to them. Poll worker data are no longer tracked
by the state. Wisconsin canvass-required data tracks individual contests, and therefore, the total
ballots cast in any election is highly unlikely to match the total votes cast in any one contest.
Wisconsin voters are not required to vote in each contest on the ballot and undervotes are the likely
cause of data on the total ballots cast being higher than the number of votes in a contest.
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Overview Table 2: Mail Voting in the 2022 General Election
Total Mail Mail Ballots Counted
% Total Mail Total Mail % Mail
Voters
State Turnout Ballots Ballots Ballots % of
(Excluding Total
by Mail Transmitted Returned Returned Returned
UOCAVA)
Alabama [1] 32,577 2.3% 28,646 24,676 86.1% 24,286 98.4%
Alaska [2] 38,889 14.6% 50,824 41,453 81.6% 40,887 98.6%
American
15 0.2% -- -- -- -- --
Samoa [3]
Arizona [4] 2,075,970 80.1% 3,272,421 2,099,724 64.2% 2,090,789 99.6%
Arkansas 15,949 1.8% 20,325 16,934 83.3% 15,372 90.8%
California 9,743,427 87.4% 22,491,229 9,986,701 44.4% 9,743,427 97.6%
Colorado 2,406,246 94.7% 3,890,522 2,431,292 62.5% 2,406,246 99.0%
Connecticut [5] 150,284 11.6% 204,840 152,803 74.6% 150,284 98.4%
Delaware [6] 19,027 5.8% 30,725 21,923 71.4% 19,027 86.8%
District of
130,287 63.3% 506,456 132,829 26.2% 130,287 98.1%
Columbia [7]
Florida 2,759,432 35.4% 4,383,461 2,754,324 62.8% 2,732,621 99.2%
Georgia 248,487 6.3% 280,897 252,272 89.8% 248,487 98.5%
Guam 163 0.5% 327 191 58.4% 163 85.3%
Hawaii 402,243 95.0% 733,360 408,612 55.7% 402,233 98.4%
Idaho [8] 128,723 21.6% 144,960 128,658 88.8% 128,723 100.1%
Illinois 568,728 13.6% 1,302,195 1,013,842 77.9% 583,371 57.5%
Indiana [9] 154,882 8.2% 158,998 157,542 99.1% 154,882 98.3%
Iowa [10] 368,907 30.0% 379,302 369,801 97.5% 368,907 99.8%
Kansas 131,633 13.2% 152,208 130,720 85.9% 126,002 96.4%
Kentucky 72,663 4.8% 83,454 75,120 90.0% 72,663 96.7%
Louisiana [11] 102,618 7.3% 164,156 105,332 64.2% 102,632 97.4%
Maine 171,940 25.3% 181,719 172,990 95.2% 171,940 99.4%
Maryland 536,285 26.4% 647,747 538,558 83.1% 536,285 99.6%
Massachusetts
922,559 36.7% 1,114,849 933,946 83.8% 922,559 98.8%
[12]
Michigan 1,656,814 36.8% 1,800,770 1,680,955 93.3% 1,656,814 98.6%
Minnesota 339,396 13.4% 450,413 346,772 77.0% 339,396 97.9%
Mississippi [13] -- -- 11,722 -- -- -- --
Missouri 278,539 12.1% 290,428 281,555 96.9% 278,539 98.9%
Montana [14] -- -- 505,618 377,108 74.6% 374,911 99.4%
Nebraska [15] 242,009 35.4% 269,285 243,042 90.3% 242,009 99.6%
Nevada 518,398 50.7% 1,873,813 528,753 28.2% 518,398 98.0%
New Hampshire
56,971 9.1% 60,535 58,131 96.0% 56,971 98.0%
[16]
New Jersey 581,955 21.9% 947,150 588,258 62.1% 581,955 98.9%
New Mexico 97,746 13.8% 110,577 98,458 89.0% 97,746 99.3%
New York [17] 382,926 6.5% 536,171 392,942 73.3% 382,926 97.5%
North Carolina 179,280 4.7% 248,794 183,243 73.7% 179,280 97.8%
North Dakota 69,399 28.6% 76,019 69,697 91.7% 69,399 99.6%
Northern
Mariana Islands -- -- 2,046 -- -- -- --
[18]
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Total Mail Mail Ballots Counted
% Total Mail Total Mail % Mail
Voters
State Turnout Ballots Ballots Ballots % of
(Excluding Total
by Mail Transmitted Returned Returned Returned
UOCAVA)
Ohio 911,517 21.7% 996,093 914,127 91.8% 911,517 99.7%
Oklahoma 68,697 6.0% 92,576 69,956 75.6% 68,697 98.2%
Oregon [19] 1,961,760 99.6% 2,969,563 1,990,727 67.0% 1,968,717 98.9%
Pennsylvania 1,234,943 22.8% 1,433,665 1,258,336 87.8% 1,234,943 98.1%
Rhode Island
33,556 9.3% 34,361 33,850 98.5% 33,556 99.1%
[20]
South Carolina 54,911 3.2% 61,033 56,605 92.7% 54,787 96.8%
South Dakota 97,472 27.5% 99,905 97,820 97.9% 97,472 99.6%
Tennessee 44,097 2.5% 48,683 44,817 92.1% 44,097 98.4%
Texas 356,987 4.4% 444,150 369,562 83.2% 356,987 96.6%
U.S. Virgin
532 2.4% 532 463 87.0% 532 114.9%
Islands [21]
Utah 970,274 90.3% 1,703,702 1,004,614 59.0% 997,442 99.3%
Vermont 193,618 67.6% 422,603 193,830 45.9% 193,583 99.9%
Virginia 289,428 9.4% 360,659 292,077 81.0% 289,428 99.1%
Washington [22] 3,037,023 99.0% 4,850,083 3,077,400 63.5% 3,040,297 98.8%
West Virginia
12,301 2.5% 12,598 10,541 83.7% 10,818 102.6%
[23]
Wisconsin [24] 425,970 15.9% 478,260 431,232 90.2% 427,246 99.1%
Wyoming 38,164 19.1% 44,711 38,336 85.7% 38,164 99.6%
U.S. Total 35,316,617 31.9% 61,460,139 36,683,450 59.7% 35,718,700 97.4%
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 34
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Ballots Returned by Drop
Mail Ballots Rejected Mail Ballots Cured
Total Drop Box
State % of Boxes % of % of
Total Total Total
Returned Returned Returned
Alabama [1] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Alaska [2] 566 1.4% 5 -- -- -- --
American
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Samoa [3]
Arizona [4] 8,935 0.4% 391 289,431 13.8% 3,323 0.2%
Arkansas 1,144 6.8% 6 457 2.7% 851 5.0%
California 243,274 2.4% 2,035 3,592,536 36.0% 48,597 0.5%
Colorado 25,046 1.0% 411 2,111,353 86.8% -- --
Connecticut [5] 2,519 1.6% 214 -- -- -- --
Delaware [6] 2,896 13.2% -- -- -- 12 0.1%
District of
2,542 1.9% 56 74,102 55.8% 982 0.7%
Columbia [7]
Florida 22,005 0.8% 487 573,013 20.8% 13,556 0.5%
Georgia 3,785 1.5% -- -- -- -- --
Guam 28 14.7% -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii 5,078 1.2% 51 133,389 32.6% 521 0.1%
Idaho [8] 1 0.0% 6 -- -- -- --
Illinois 8,818 0.9% 527 104,168 10.3% 4,598 0.5%
Indiana [9] 2,660 1.7% -- -- -- -- --
Iowa [10] 894 0.2% -- 13,881 3.8% -- --
Kansas 1,382 1.1% 173 34,217 26.2% 7,398 5.7%
Kentucky 2,457 3.3% 163 24,094 32.1% -- --
Louisiana [11] 2,700 2.6% -- -- -- 1,309 1.2%
Maine 1,050 0.6% 366 -- -- -- --
Maryland 2,273 0.4% 282 273,484 50.8% 419 0.1%
Massachusetts
11,387 1.2% 500 -- -- -- --
[12]
Michigan 24,141 1.4% 1,178 -- -- -- --
Minnesota 7,376 2.1% 37 -- -- -- --
Mississippi [13] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Missouri 3,016 1.1% -- -- -- -- --
Montana [14] 2,197 0.6% -- -- -- -- --
Nebraska [15] 1,033 0.4% 118 152,951 62.9% 702 0.3%
Nevada 10,355 2.0% 511 145,179 27.5% 12,553 2.4%
New Hampshire
1,160 2.0% -- -- -- -- --
[16]
New Jersey 5,901 1.0% 432 235,606 40.1% 3,640 0.6%
New Mexico 712 0.7% 72 9,059 9.2% 1,082 1.1%
New York [17] 7,240 1.8% -- -- -- 3,367 0.9%
North Carolina 3,963 2.2% -- -- -- 573 0.3%
North Dakota 298 0.4% 64 -- -- -- --
Northern
Mariana Islands -- -- -- 30 -- -- --
[18]
Ohio 2,610 0.3% 102 70,306 7.7% 4,449 0.5%
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Ballots Returned by Drop
Mail Ballots Rejected Mail Ballots Cured
Total Drop Box
State % of Boxes % of % of
Total Total Total
Returned Returned Returned
Oklahoma 1,259 1.8% -- -- -- -- --
Oregon [19] 28,840 1.4% 318 1,135,725 57.1% -- --
Pennsylvania 23,393 1.9% 137 -- -- -- --
Rhode Island
294 0.9% 415 12,582 37.2% -- --
[20]
South Carolina 1,818 3.2% -- -- -- -- --
South Dakota 356 0.4% 0 0 0.0% -- --
Tennessee 720 1.6% -- -- -- 82 0.2%
Texas 12,575 3.4% -- -- -- 14,889 4.0%
U.S. Virgin
0 0.0% -- -- -- -- --
Islands [21]
Utah 14,859 1.5% 312 571,551 56.9% 6,555 0.7%
Vermont 247 0.1% -- -- -- 320 0.2%
Virginia 2,649 0.9% 2,992 41,142 14.1% 4,339 1.5%
Washington
37,103 1.2% 548 1,871,228 60.8% 35,337 1.1%
[22]
West Virginia
109 1.0% -- -- -- 86 0.8%
[23]
Wisconsin [24] 3,986 0.9% -- -- -- -- --
Wyoming 174 0.5% 8 4,169 10.9% -- --
U.S. Total 549,824 1.5% 12,917 11,473,653 39.7% 169,540 0.7%
Overview Table 2 Calculation Notes:
Total Mail Voters (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.
% Turnout by Mail uses (F1d+F1g)/F1a x 100.
Total Mail Ballots Transmitted uses question C1a.
Total Mail Ballots Returned uses question C1b.
% Mail Ballots Returned uses C1b/C1a x 100.
Mail Ballots Counted, Total uses question C8a.
Mail Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses C8a/C1b x 100.
Mail Ballots Rejected, Total uses question C9a.
Mail Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses C9a/C1b x 100.
Total Drop Boxes uses question C3a.
Ballots Returned by Drop Box, Total uses question C6a.
Ballots Returned by Drop Box, % of Returned uses C6a/C1b x 100.
Mail Ballots Cured, Total uses question C7a.
Mail Ballots Cured, % of Returned uses C7a/C1b x 100.
Overview Table 2 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 36
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• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of mail ballots
counted and rejected may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
• The Total Mail Ballots Transmitted column captures the total number of mailed ballots that
states reported transmitting, regardless of whether the ballot was returned or not. The number
of ballots transmitted typically exceeds the number of ballots returned because some voters
who were transmitted a mailed ballot choose to vote by another mode or to not vote at all.
Total Mail Ballots Returned typically exceeds Total Mail Voters because some returned mailed
ballots are rejected for not meeting state requirements. Mail Ballots Counted may not match
Total Mail Voters because states may have different methodologies for calculating these
numbers.
• The Total Mail Ballots Returned column includes both counted and rejected ballots that were
returned to election offices.
[1] Alabama has absentee voting by mail. A voter may pick up a ballot in person and return it via mail or
receive a ballot in the mail and return it in person. This may cause a discrepancy. Data on absentee
in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 EAVS, which resulted in a discrepancy in the data
reported in question F1. The state of Alabama does not track data on the reasons that mail ballots
are rejected.
[2] Alaska does not track data on the number of ballots returned in person to division office ballot
boxes. Data reported in Section C of the 2022 EAVS include ballots sent by mail and through
electronic transmission (online and fax).
[3] American Samoa does not mail ballots locally. If a voter is on the island, they either vote in person
or at home with the special needs assistance program.
[4] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1
of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.
[5] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.
[6] In an October 7, 2022 order, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Delaware statute
authorizing vote by mail in the general election violated the Delaware constitution, and therefore,
voting by mail and using drop boxes was not permitted for the 2022 general election. Absentee
voting (which, per Delaware law, is provided for prescribed reasons) remained available and was not
impacted by the Delaware Supreme Court rulings.
[7] The DCBOE sent a ballot to every registered voter for the November 2022 general election. Since
the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was passed to permanently make the District of
Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction. Voters were also able to deposit mail ballots in drop boxes
located in early vote centers and Election Day vote centers. These boxes were also used to deposit
provisional ballots.
[8] Idaho was not able to track data on mail ballots that were cured or the reasons why mail ballots
were rejected. One county in Idaho reported counting more mail ballots in C8a than were returned in
C1b.
[9] The data in C9a was obtained from the statewide voter registration system. The data in C9b was
pulled from an ad hoc report, and the data in C9c–t was pulled from the CEB-9 Section 2, a county
election report compiled after each primary, general, and special election. Counties do not always
track the data requested in C9c–C9t.
[10] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are
reported with mail ballots cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote
tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system.
[11] Data reported in F1 include voters who were given credit for voting but whose ballots may have
been blank or otherwise invalid for acceptance.
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[12] Vote by mail was made available to all voters, and applications to vote by mail were mailed to all
voters as a result of legislation in 2022. This led to a dramatic increase in the number of voters who
voted by mail in the 2022 general election.
[13] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi
could only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person
and mail-in ballots. The information entered into the SEMS does not distinguish between the two.
[14] Data on ballots cast and counted in items F1b–F1f of the 2022 EAVS is properly marked as “Data
not available” despite being included in previous reports. The state office is now aware that the
“voter credit” data extract by the voter registration and election management system included in
previous reports does not accurately reflect the number of ballots counted at the state canvass. For
example, the report fails to account for various situations, such as if an empty absentee voter
secrecy envelope is returned without a ballot. Montana’s 2022 submission contains the official
canvass number as the most accurate number of total ballots counted. As such, Montana does not
have the data available for the remaining categories. The F1a data for the 2022 EAVS uses the vote
counts from the Official 2022 General Election State Canvass. Montana does not track data on drop
boxes and does not track data on ballots cured in a way that can be easily extracted.
[15] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.
[16] All absentee ballots are handled locally, and any absentee ballots cured are not tracked. In-person
absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.
[17] Although absentee ballots could be dropped off at polling places and/or Boards of Election, drop
boxes as typically defined were not used.
[18] As of the time of the Northern Mariana Islands’ EAVS submission, the election office was still
receiving returned mailed ballots through the office mailbox.
[19] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state. All ballots, including provisional and Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots, are considered mail ballots.
[20] Rhode Island allows voters to cure mail ballots, but does not collect data on cured ballots.
[21] In the U.S. Virgin Islands, absentee ballots are classified as walk in or mail in, but are all counted
and accepted as regular absentee ballots. The reported number of counted mail ballots includes
walk ins.
[22] Data reported on cured ballots includes ballots cured for non-matching and missing signatures
only. Data reported on in-person voters before Election Day consists of county reports of voters who
voted in voting centers with AVUs. Ballots cast at AVUs are not tracked separately from mail ballots.
[23] Two counties in West Virginia reported counting more mail ballots in C8a than were returned in
C1b.
[24] Due to a recent court challenge, the use of drop boxes “is not permitted under Wisconsin law
unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly
designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court, and the subsequent ambiguity created by the decision means that most drop boxes were
either closed or moved into the clerk’s office, and reporting would be unlikely or unnecessary given
the added layer of security and placement. (see Teigen v. WEC, 403 Wis.2d 607). Wisconsin does not
gather data on if or how absentee ballots may have been returned to the clerk with missing data or if
this missing data were cured.
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Overview Table 3: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting
In-Person Election Day In-Person Voters Before
Provisional Voters
State Voters Election Day
Total % Total % Total %
Alabama [1] 1,373,247 96.4% -- -- 2,796 0.2%
Alaska [2] 167,829 62.8% 47,298 17.7% 7,216 2.7%
American
6,583 88.2% 845 11.3% 0 0.0%
Samoa
Arizona [3] 473,550 18.3% 27,705 1.1% 8,026 0.3%
Arkansas [4] 378,667 42.2% 501,915 56.0% 1,021 0.1%
California 1,059,250 9.5% 216,732 1.9% 66,887 0.6%
Colorado 93,149 3.7% 27,022 1.1% 54 0.0%
Connecticut [5] 1,134,493 87.4% -- -- 14 0.0%
Delaware 247,043 75.8% 55,639 17.1% 10 0.0%
District of
59,538 28.9% 15,438 7.5% 37 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 2,727,051 35.0% 2,271,845 29.1% 2,809 0.0%
Georgia 1,420,392 35.8% 2,290,459 57.8% 3,814 0.1%
Guam 25,687 75.4% 7,995 23.5% 150 0.4%
Hawaii 5,789 1.4% 10,879 2.6% 1 0.0%
Idaho 401,184 67.4% 65,129 10.9% -- --
Illinois 1,926,270 46.1% 605,992 14.5% 3,596 0.1%
Indiana 1,196,206 63.2% 538,699 28.5% 1,075 0.1%
Iowa [6] 859,562 69.9% -- -- 273 0.0%
Kansas 577,607 57.9% 273,287 27.4% 13,390 1.3%
Kentucky [7] 1,150,303 76.7% 269,572 18.0% 27 0.0%
Louisiana 1,034,781 73.4% 272,260 19.3% 173 0.0%
Maine [8] 438,658 64.4% 68,458 10.1% 90 0.0%
Maryland 1,046,153 51.6% 380,874 18.8% 60,952 3.0%
Massachusetts 1,386,373 55.2% 197,288 7.9% 889 0.0%
Michigan 2,614,123 58.1% 223,644 5.0% 8 0.0%
Minnesota 1,853,310 73.4% 330,809 13.1% -- --
Mississippi [9] 656,874 92.7% -- -- 5,710 0.8%
Missouri 1,834,916 79.6% 184,687 8.0% 4,182 0.2%
Montana [10] -- -- -- -- -- --
Nebraska [11] 412,213 60.4% 21,944 3.2% 6,027 0.9%
Nevada 210,325 20.6% 281,760 27.6% 7,890 0.8%
New
Hampshire 568,276 90.6% -- -- -- --
[12]
New Jersey
-- -- -- -- 67,894 2.6%
[13]
New Mexico 256,438 36.1% 353,476 49.8% 338 0.0%
New York 4,250,739 72.2% 1,158,391 19.7% 71,756 1.2%
North Carolina
1,578,581 41.7% 1,929,870 50.9% 11,808 0.3%
[14]
North Dakota 136,304 56.2% 36,513 15.1% -- --
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In-Person Election Day In-Person Voters Before
Provisional Voters
State Voters Election Day
Total % Total % Total %
Northern
Mariana 6,408 47.9% 6,968 52.1% -- --
Islands
Ohio 2,654,497 63.2% 550,092 13.1% 79,830 1.9%
Oklahoma 949,235 82.3% 132,591 11.5% 1,126 0.1%
Oregon -- -- -- -- 127 0.0%
Pennsylvania 4,126,903 76.3% -- -- 40,018 0.7%
Rhode Island 254,334 70.4% 71,737 19.9% 1,074 0.3%
South Carolina 1,096,154 63.8% 561,597 32.7% 3,866 0.2%
South Dakota 183,663 51.8% 72,705 20.5% 47 0.0%
Tennessee 864,965 49.2% 844,429 48.1% 969 0.1%
Texas 2,590,664 31.8% 5,176,910 63.5% 13,750 0.2%
U.S. Virgin
9,671 42.9% 11,851 52.5% 79 0.4%
Islands [15]
Utah 56,264 5.2% 12,942 1.2% 10,680 1.0%
Vermont [16] 91,637 32.0% -- -- -- --
Virginia 2,033,530 66.1% 711,206 23.1% 33,778 1.1%
Washington
-- -- 3,079 0.1% 19 0.0%
[17]
West Virginia 350,187 70.9% 128,799 26.1% 2,141 0.4%
Wisconsin [18] 1,909,173 71.4% 332,001 12.4% 58 0.0%
Wyoming 122,114 61.2% 38,868 19.5% 15 0.0%
U.S. Total 50,860,863 49.0% 21,322,200 22.2% 536,490 0.5%
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 40
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UOCAVA Voters Other Voters
State
Total % Total %
Alabama [1] 714 0.1% -- --
Alaska [2] 3,817 1.4% 1,998 0.7%
American Samoa 17 0.2% -- --
Arizona [3] 7,121 0.3% 3 0.0%
Arkansas [4] 652 0.1% 182 0.0%
California 31,632 0.3% 28,539 0.3%
Colorado 13,426 0.5% -- --
Connecticut [5] 1,016 0.1% 12,004 0.9%
Delaware 539 0.2% 3,570 1.1%
District of
474 0.2% -- --
Columbia
Florida 38,638 0.5% 195 0.0%
Georgia -- -- -- --
Guam 79 0.2% -- --
Hawaii 491 0.1% 0 0.0%
Idaho 314 0.1% -- --
Illinois 1,601 0.0% 159 0.0%
Indiana 2,160 0.1% -- --
Iowa [6] 1,401 0.1% -- --
Kansas 1,683 0.2% -- --
Kentucky [7] 838 0.1% 7,016 0.5%
Louisiana 764 0.1% -- --
Maine [8] 1,749 0.3% 14 0.0%
Maryland 4,586 0.2% -- --
Massachusetts 4,351 0.2% -- --
Michigan 5,811 0.1% -- --
Minnesota 3,131 0.1% -- --
Mississippi [9] 211 0.0% 45,790 6.5%
Missouri 1,926 0.1% -- --
Montana [10] -- -- -- --
Nebraska [11] 548 0.1% -- --
Nevada 3,407 0.3% -- --
New Hampshire
1,684 0.3% -- --
[12]
New Jersey [13] 4,278 0.2% 2,004,022 75.4%
New Mexico 1,558 0.2% -- --
New York 22,560 0.4% -- --
North Carolina
8,509 0.2% 81,884 2.2%
[14]
North Dakota 350 0.1% -- --
Northern Mariana
-- -- -- --
Islands
Ohio 5,432 0.1% -- --
Oklahoma 1,554 0.1% -- --
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UOCAVA Voters Other Voters
State
Total % Total %
Oregon 6,830 0.3% -- --
Pennsylvania 8,158 0.2% -- --
Rhode Island 574 0.2% -- --
South Carolina 1,991 0.1% -- --
South Dakota 718 0.2% -- --
Tennessee 1,937 0.1% -- --
Texas 13,279 0.2% -- --
U.S. Virgin Islands
0 0.0% 424 1.9%
[15]
Utah 1,959 0.2% -- --
Vermont [16] 1,008 0.4% 33 0.0%
Virginia 6,820 0.2% -- --
Washington [17] 27,565 0.9% -- --
West Virginia 482 0.1% -- --
Wisconsin [18] 4,031 0.2% 1,921 0.1%
Wyoming 347 0.2% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 254,721 0.2% 2,187,754 5.3%
Overview Table 3 Calculation Notes:
In-Person Election Day Voters, Total uses question F1b.
In-Person Election Day Voters, % uses F1b/F1a x 100.
In-Person Voters Before Election Day, Total uses question F1f.
In-Person Voters Before Election Day, % uses F1f/F1a x 100.
Provisional Voters, Total uses question F1e.
Provisional Voters, % uses F1e/F1a x 100.
UOCAVA Voters, Total uses question F1c.
UOCAVA Voters, % uses F1c/F1a x 100.
Other Voters, Total uses question F1h.
Other Voters, % uses F1h/F1a x 100.
Overview Table 3 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Question F1f includes all voters who participated in the election in person prior to Election Day.
This includes in-person early voting, in-person absentee voting, and any other terminology the
state used to refer to in-person early voting (as reported in question Q25 of the 2022 Policy
Survey).
• Question F1h was not mandatory. States only reported data in this item if they offered another
mode of voting aside from those listed in questions F1b–F1g or if there were counted ballots
that could not be categorized in questions F1b–F1g.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 42
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• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of turnout by mode
in this table and the previous table may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national
level.
[1] Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 EAVS, which resulted in a
discrepancy in the data reported in question F1.
[2] The “Other Voters” category includes ballots that were sent by electronic transmission (online and
fax).
[3] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1
of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.
[4] Two counties reported data for other modes of voting.
[5] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.
Other modes of voting included Election Day registration (EDR) locations.
[6] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are
reported with mail ballots cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote
tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system.
[7] Other modes of voting were reported as “supplemental.”
[8] The “Other Voters” category includes ballots that were not properly designated as UOCAVA voters.
[9] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could
only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and
mail-in ballots. The information entered into the SEMS does not distinguish between the two. Other
modes of voting included absentee ballots counted.
[10] Data on ballots cast and counted in items F1b–F1f of the 2022 EAVS is properly marked as “Data
not available” despite being included in previous reports. The state office is now aware that the
“voter credit” data extract by the voter registration and election management system included in
previous reports does not accurately reflect the number of ballots counted at the state canvass. For
example, the report fails to account for various situations, such as if an empty absentee voter
secrecy envelope is returned without a ballot. Montana’s 2022 submission contains the official
canvass number as the most accurate number of total ballots counted. As such, Montana does not
have the data available for the remaining categories. The F1a data for the 2022 EAVS uses the vote
counts from the Official 2022 General Election State Canvass.
[11] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.
[12] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.
[13] Data on in-person Election Day voters and in-person early voters is not recorded separately. Other
modes of voting included ballots counted from Election Day and early voting locations.
[14] Other modes of voting were described as “Other.”
[15] Other modes of voting included walk-in absentee voters.
[16] Other modes of voting included ballots delivered by a justice of the peace.
[17] The number of in-person voters consists of county reports of voters who voted in voting centers
with accessible voting units. Accessible voting unit ballots are not tracked separately from mail
ballots. Washington is a vote-by-mail state.
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[18] In Wisconsin, if a UOCAVA voter is in the local area on Election Day or during in-person absentee
voting, they may choose to vote through one of those methods instead of an absentee ballot by mail.
In those cases, the voter is not recorded in the UOCAVA section of the EAVS but instead under the
sections that apply to voting at the polls or in-person absentee. In Wisconsin, provisional ballot data
has to be recorded into the database on election night, but any voters who register on Election Day
are usually not entered until after Election Day; these two records then cannot be linked in the
state’s voter registration database. Therefore, data in the section about provisional ballots
specifically will show more provisional ballots counted than the section which shows participations
received by having a provisional counted. Other modes of voting included voters who voted absentee
with incomplete data.
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Overview Table 4: Polling Places and Poll Workers
Total Polling Places Total Poll Workers
State Total Precincts
Election Day Early Voting Election Day Early Voting
Alabama [1] 2,308 2,014 67 1,749 --
Alaska [2] 401 429 165 2,210 307
American
42 41 1 223 2
Samoa
Arizona [3] 1,732 717 200 6,960 1,527
Arkansas 2,627 898 177 4,839 2,084
California [4] 25,554 3,876 1,515 33,935 16,760
Colorado 3,260 366 325 -- --
Connecticut 718 169 169 3,590 845
Delaware 512 273 14 2,847 37
District of
144 90 25 940 1,085
Columbia [5]
Florida 6,063 3,995 430 35,129 10,751
Georgia 2,700 2,430 333 15,248 3,191
Guam 67 21 1 335 23
Hawaii 248 8 11 79 74
Idaho 999 734 32 3,972 127
Illinois 10,835 12,342 3,817 36,017 2,895
Indiana [6] 5,146 1,660 292 12,124 1,826
Iowa [7] 1,657 1,653 99 6,976 535
Kansas 4,015 1,080 196 7,239 1,622
Kentucky 3,546 1,469 186 10,958 1,704
Louisiana [8] 3,937 1,976 109 15,314 --
Maine 533 521 488 5,170 --
Maryland 2,074 1,532 96 17,912 5,547
Massachusetts
2,385 1,226 424 9,540 --
[9]
Michigan [10] 4,672 3,286 1,544 33,331 --
Minnesota 4,103 2,562 237 29,102 2,205
Mississippi 1,765 1,765 92 5,295 --
Missouri 4,334 2,281 -- 15,759 --
Montana [11] 663 409 58 3,906 --
Nebraska 1,323 998 93 6,742 248
Nevada 1,685 239 82 3,319 1,964
New Hampshire
340 308 -- 3,564 --
[12]
New Jersey 6,386 3,200 140 12,387 1,042
New Mexico 2,163 760 252 2,806 809
New York [13] 14,158 4,855 403 50,951 15,520
North Carolina 2,656 2,845 359 20,632 7,241
North Dakota 454 166 12 -- --
Northern
7 13 3 32 7
Mariana Islands
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Total Polling Places Total Poll Workers
State Total Precincts
Election Day Early Voting Election Day Early Voting
Ohio 8,933 3,637 88 39,888 0
Oklahoma 1,986 1,757 85 6,008 513
Oregon [14] 1,288 36 36 -- --
Pennsylvania
9,155 9,154 -- 48,340 --
[15]
Rhode Island
414 383 39 2,700 90
[16]
South Carolina 2,305 1,955 112 13,003 1,122
South Dakota 691 488 68 2,558 155
Tennessee 1,849 1,781 222 13,611 2,448
Texas 9,541 5,627 1,227 30,581 10,781
U.S. Virgin
25 11 4 185 40
Islands
Utah 2,651 108 54 734 259
Vermont 262 262 247 -- --
Virginia [17] 2,545 2,545 185 19,922 2,169
Washington
8,021 -- 65 -- --
[18]
West Virginia 1,701 1,326 93 8,043 491
Wisconsin [19] 3,628 2,538 318 -- --
Wyoming 583 196 19 2,053 94
U.S. Total 181,790 95,011 15,309 608,758 98,140
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Poll Workers’ Ages % of New
State Poll
% Age % Age % Age % Age % Age % Age
Workers
<18 18–25 26–40 41–60 61–70 71+
Alabama [1] 0.3% 1.5% 4.8% 23.0% 35.9% 34.5% 0.1%
Alaska [2] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
American
0.0% 48.0% 39.6% 8.4% 4.0% 0.0% 32.4%
Samoa
Arizona [3] 0.7% 2.5% 6.9% 24.7% 35.1% 30.0% 26.5%
Arkansas 0.3% 1.9% 5.1% 20.2% 36.2% 36.3% 12.0%
California [4] 9.8% 5.5% 13.3% 27.7% 24.3% 19.4% 31.5%
Colorado 1.4% 2.1% 5.5% 22.5% 46.4% 22.1% 40.2%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Delaware 1.3% 3.1% 7.1% 27.4% 35.0% 26.0% 36.8%
District of
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Columbia [5]
Florida 0.2% 1.7% 6.3% 26.2% 34.3% 31.2% 13.6%
Georgia -- -- -- -- -- -- 12.2%
Guam 0.0% 28.8% 28.5% 31.3% 9.5% 2.0% --
Hawaii -- -- -- -- -- -- 61.4%
Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 5.5% 3.0% 5.2% 27.1% 33.9% 25.2% 9.3%
Indiana [6] 2.2% 4.7% 10.9% 24.7% 32.6% 24.9% --
Iowa [7] 0.2% 0.8% 5.4% 18.2% 38.1% 37.4% 16.7%
Kansas 2.0% 2.0% 6.0% 20.1% 33.7% 36.1% 14.0%
Kentucky 0.1% 3.7% 10.8% 30.9% 31.5% 23.0% 8.0%
Louisiana [8] -- -- -- -- -- -- 13.0%
Maine 0.9% 1.7% 7.9% 26.0% 36.8% 26.6% --
Maryland 2.6% 2.8% 10.7% 27.9% 35.1% 20.9% 33.0%
Massachusetts
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
[9]
Michigan [10] 0.0% 3.3% 8.1% 24.8% 35.0% 28.8% 25.2%
Minnesota -- -- -- -- -- -- 8.5%
Mississippi -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Missouri 2.3% 2.5% 6.8% 17.2% 35.7% 35.5% --
Montana [11] 0.0% 0.7% 4.9% 22.6% 40.0% 31.8% --
Nebraska 0.4% 1.3% 9.3% 25.4% 34.3% 29.3% 12.0%
Nevada 1.3% 3.4% 9.7% 26.6% 31.5% 27.6% 25.8%
New
Hampshire -- -- -- -- -- -- --
[12]
New Jersey -- -- -- -- -- -- --
New Mexico 1.6% 3.6% 6.9% 21.1% 34.9% 31.8% 29.0%
New York [13] 0.1% 7.1% 16.3% 30.3% 25.8% 20.4% 12.9%
North Carolina 1.1% 2.1% 6.6% 26.4% 35.5% 28.2% 16.0%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Poll Workers’ Ages % of New
State Poll
% Age % Age % Age % Age % Age % Age
Workers
<18 18–25 26–40 41–60 61–70 71+
Northern
Mariana -- 100.0% -- -- -- -- 31.3%
Islands
Ohio 1.4% 2.4% 7.6% 24.7% 35.1% 28.8% 16.9%
Oklahoma 0.0% 0.6% 3.9% 16.0% 34.0% 45.5% 4.2%
Oregon [14] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Pennsylvania
1.0% 7.5% 11.6% 29.8% 29.6% 20.4% --
[15]
Rhode Island
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
[16]
South Carolina -- -- -- -- -- -- --
South Dakota 0.4% 0.8% 4.8% 22.5% 36.3% 35.2% 8.6%
Tennessee 2.3% 2.1% 5.2% 19.7% 35.7% 35.0% 11.1%
Texas 3.6% 7.0% 10.9% 24.0% 30.4% 24.0% 19.7%
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Islands
Utah 0.6% 3.8% 16.2% 37.7% 30.6% 11.1% 16.2%
Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Virginia [17] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Washington
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
[18]
West Virginia 0.5% 5.1% 9.2% 29.7% 31.6% 24.0% 6.9%
Wisconsin [19] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wyoming 1.2% 1.2% 6.1% 23.8% 37.9% 29.8% 11.3%
U.S. Total 1.7% 4.2% 10.2% 26.2% 31.7% 26.1% 16.7%
Overview Table 4 Calculation Notes:
Total Precincts uses question D1a.
Total Polling Places, Election Day uses question D3a.
Total Polling Places, Early Voting uses question D4a.
Total Poll Workers, Election Day uses question D5a.
Total Poll Workers, Early Voting uses question D6a.
Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age <18 uses D7b/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.
Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 18–25 uses D7c/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.
Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 26–40 uses D7d/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.
Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 41–60 uses D7e/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.
Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 61–70 uses D7f/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.
Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 71+ uses D7g/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.
% of New Poll Workers uses D9a/D7a x 100.
Overview Table 4 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
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• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• The sum of the number of Election Day poll workers (D5a) and the number of early voting poll
workers (D6a) may not equal the total number of poll workers reported (D7a) because the
instructions for D7a instructed respondents to count poll workers in D7a only once regardless
of how many days of voting the poll worker assisted with.
• Because percentages for each age category were calculated independently, the percentages
for each age category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
• In calculating percentages for poll worker age categories, the sum of questions D7b–D7g was
used instead of D7a because some states did not report data in all age categories.
• States that only track data for poll workers who are under age 18 do not have data on poll
worker ages displayed in this table.
[1] Alabama offers absentee in-person voting at absentee offices before Election Day. Provisional
voting is done at each polling place. Both are considered separate precincts for canvassing results.
[2] Alaska only tracks age data for poll workers who are under 18 years old.
[3] Several counties in Arizona do not track the ages of their poll workers.
[4] Some California counties use vote centers only.
[5] The 90 Election Day vote centers reported include the 25 early vote centers.
[6] Data on poll worker ages is reported in the CEB-9 Section 2.
[7] Satellite polling locations before Election Day are allowed in Iowa by petition, but data are not
readily available to the state from each county on if or how many satellites were operated. Not all
jurisdictions reported data on poll workers in the 2022 EAVS.
[8] The Department of State cannot distinguish between poll workers who worked on Election Day and
those who worked during early voting. The total in D5a includes both Election Day and early voting
poll workers. The Department of State does not track data on the ages of poll workers.
[9] Only those who worked at the polls on Election Day are referred to as “poll workers.” The reported
number of poll workers is only the number of Election Day workers because staff requirements vary
for early voting. There is no statutory term for individuals who assist with early voting, but they were
generally referred to as “election workers.” The number of “election workers” varied for each day of
early voting and was not reported by jurisdictions. Data on poll worker ages were not reported.
[10] Early voting takes place at a clerk’s office or their satellite offices for in-person absentee voting
only. Ballots are not tabulated until Election Day.
[11] Montana does not collect information on the number of poll workers before Election Day and does
not track the number of new poll workers.
[12] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter. The town
or city clerk’s office is not a polling place. The information provided on the number of poll workers is
the minimum required. Actual totals vary by location.
[13] Data on poll worker ages reflects only Election Day poll workers. Demographics on early voting poll
workers were not provided.
[14] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional poll workers. Counties may hire
temporary staff as necessary to conduct an election. The number of temporary staff is not tracked.
[15] The data were gathered via a survey from counties and the total number may not include counties
who did not submit the data. Poll worker data are not tracked systematically in Pennsylvania.
[16] Rhode Island does not collect data on the ages of poll workers.
[17] Virginia does not track age data for poll workers or data on new poll workers.
[18] Washington is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional polling places. Washington has
voting centers that are open for the entire voting period.
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[19] Physical Election Day polling places cannot be located in election offices. Municipalities may
provide information about in-person absentee voting locations with the state, but they are not
required to. Therefore, data cannot be provided for all municipalities. Where these data were
provided, the data cannot distinguish whether the in-person absentee voting locations are an
election office or another location. Wisconsin no longer tracks data on poll workers.
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Overview Table 5: Election Technology and Voting Methods
Total Number DRE without VVPAT DRE with VVPAT
of Voting
State Machines Total Machines % of Total Machines % of
Deployed Deployed Jurisdictions Deployed Jurisdictions
Alabama 4,862 -- -- -- --
Alaska 680 -- -- 148 100.0%
American
-- -- -- -- --
Samoa
Arizona 1,746 -- -- -- --
Arkansas 5,327 -- -- 824 25.3%
California 23,150 -- -- -- --
Colorado 1,632 -- -- -- --
Connecticut 2,154 -- -- -- --
Delaware 1,185 -- -- 1,176 100.0%
District of
735 -- -- -- --
Columbia
Florida 12,731 -- -- -- --
Georgia 24,055 -- -- -- --
Guam 6 -- -- -- --
Hawaii 106 -- -- -- --
Idaho 1,125 -- -- -- --
Illinois 6,806 49 3.7% 661 23.1%
Indiana 12,012 5,016 52.2% 1,443 59.8%
Iowa 1,234 -- -- -- --
Kansas 8,046 -- -- -- --
Kentucky 5,596 159 9.2% 654 29.2%
Louisiana 9,656 9,582 100.0% -- --
Maine [1] 1,065 -- -- -- --
Maryland 6,451 -- -- -- --
Massachusetts
4,714 -- -- -- --
[2]
Michigan 9,344 -- -- -- --
Minnesota 5,885 -- -- -- --
Mississippi 3,183 1,418 19.5% -- --
Missouri 4,821 -- -- 209 1.7%
Montana 483 -- -- -- --
Nebraska 1,441 -- -- -- --
Nevada 4,610 -- -- 4,479 88.2%
New Hampshire 609 -- -- -- --
New Jersey 11,131 3,143 23.8% -- --
New Mexico [3] 1,461 -- -- -- --
New York 18,895 -- -- -- --
North Carolina 8,566 -- -- -- --
North Dakota 524 -- -- -- --
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Total Number DRE without VVPAT DRE with VVPAT
of Voting
State Machines Total Machines % of Total Machines % of
Deployed Deployed Jurisdictions Deployed Jurisdictions
Northern
6 -- -- -- --
Mariana Islands
Ohio 23,571 -- -- 5,819 13.6%
Oklahoma 2,072 -- -- -- --
Oregon -- -- -- -- --
Pennsylvania 15,608 -- -- -- --
Rhode Island
893 -- -- -- --
[4]
South Carolina 13,271 -- -- -- --
South Dakota 642 -- -- -- --
Tennessee 8,400 3,499 60.0% 19 1.1%
Texas 49,591 5,725 21.3% -- --
U.S. Virgin
117 -- -- -- --
Islands
Utah 806 -- -- 610 24.1%
Vermont 522 260 70.9% -- --
Virginia 6,473 -- -- -- --
Washington 185 -- -- -- --
West Virginia 5,438 -- -- 872 29.1%
Wisconsin [5] -- -- -- -- 8.8%
Wyoming 760 -- -- -- 4.3%
U.S. Total 334,382 28,851 6.7% 16,914 5.5%
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Ballot-Marking Devices Scanners Hand Counting
State Total Total
% of % of Total % of
Machines Machines
Jurisdictions Jurisdictions Jurisdictions Jurisdictions
Deployed Deployed
Alabama 2,044 100.0% 2,818 100.0% 0 --
Alaska 265 100.0% 267 100.0% 1 100.0%
American
-- -- -- -- 1 100.0%
Samoa
Arizona 1,208 100.0% 538 100.0% 0 --
Arkansas 3,582 100.0% 921 100.0% 7 9.3%
California 22,009 100.0% 1,141 100.0% 0 --
Colorado 1,454 100.0% 178 98.4% 1 1.6%
Connecticut 718 100.0% 1,436 100.0% 0 --
Delaware -- -- 9 100.0% 0 --
District of
620 100.0% 115 100.0% 0 --
Columbia
Florida 5,380 89.6% 7,351 98.5% 0 --
Georgia 21,297 100.0% 2,758 100.0% 0 --
Guam 6 100.0% -- -- 0 --
Hawaii 62 80.0% 44 80.0% 0 --
Idaho 606 88.6% 519 75.0% 11 25.0%
Illinois 3,213 77.8% 2,883 68.5% 0 --
Indiana 5,192 39.1% 361 100.0% 2 2.2%
Iowa -- 100.0% 1,234 100.0% 0 --
Kansas 4,887 100.0% 3,159 92.4% -- --
Kentucky 2,240 70.8% 2,543 95.8% 6 5.0%
Louisiana -- -- 74 100.0% 64 100.0%
Maine [1] 525 99.0% 540 66.4% 163 32.8%
Maryland 3,575 100.0% 2,876 100.0% 0 --
Massachusetts
2,385 100.0% 2,329 84.0% 351 100.0%
[2]
Michigan 4,672 100.0% 4,672 100.0% 0 --
Minnesota 2,898 100.0% 2,987 100.0% 4 4.6%
Mississippi -- 80.5% 1,765 100.0% 0 --
Missouri 2,291 94.8% 2,321 93.1% 1 0.9%
Montana 361 100.0% 122 82.1% 10 17.9%
Nebraska 1,284 100.0% 157 100.0% 0 --
Nevada 100 11.8% 31 100.0% 0 --
New Hampshire 308 92.8% 301 60.9% 125 39.1%
New Jersey 6,809 100.0% 1,179 100.0% 0 --
New Mexico [3] -- -- 1,461 100.0% 33 100.0%
New York 7,871 100.0% 11,024 100.0% 62 100.0%
North Carolina 5,386 100.0% 3,180 100.0% 0 --
North Dakota 260 100.0% 264 100.0% 0 --
Northern
-- -- 6 100.0% 1 100.0%
Mariana Islands
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Ballot-Marking Devices Scanners Hand Counting
State Total Total
% of % of Total % of
Machines Machines
Jurisdictions Jurisdictions Jurisdictions Jurisdictions
Deployed Deployed
Ohio 12,080 77.3% 5,672 100.0% 0 --
Oklahoma -- -- 2,072 100.0% 0 --
Oregon -- -- -- 100.0% 0 --
Pennsylvania 7,795 100.0% 7,813 100.0% 0 --
Rhode Island [4] 414 100.0% 479 100.0% 0 --
South Carolina 10,989 100.0% 2,282 100.0% 0 --
South Dakota 539 100.0% 103 98.5% 31 47.0%
Tennessee 3,552 38.9% 1,330 98.9% 9 9.5%
Texas 37,494 62.6% 6,372 94.1% 14 5.5%
U.S. Virgin
68 100.0% 49 100.0% 0 --
Islands
Utah 112 75.9% 84 96.6% 0 --
Vermont 262 100.0% -- -- 73 29.6%
Virginia 3,061 100.0% 3,412 100.0% 0 --
Washington 108 100.0% 77 100.0% 0 --
West Virginia 3,619 76.4% 947 74.5% 0 --
Wisconsin [5] -- 91.8% -- 90.1% 180 9.7%
Wyoming 432 100.0% 328 91.3% 0 --
U.S. Total 194,033 88.4% 94,584 86.2% 1,150 17.8%
Overview Table 5 Calculation Notes:
Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1,
F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3.
DRE without VVPAT, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F5c_1, F5c_2, and F5c_3.
DRE without VVPAT, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes”
to F5a/number of FIPS by state x 100.
DRE with VVPAT, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F6c_1, F6c_2, and F6c_3
DRE with VVPAT, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to
F6a/number of FIPS by state x 100.
Ballot Marking Devices, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F7c_1, F7c_2, and F7c_3.
Ballot Marking Devices, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded
“Yes” to F7a/number of FIPS by state x 100.
Scanners, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3.
Scanners, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to
F8a/number of FIPS by state x 100.
Hand Counting, Total Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to
F9a.
Hand Counting, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to
F9a/number of FIPS by state x 100.
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Overview Table 5 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Although other descriptive tables in this chapter used casewise deletion at the state level in
calculating percentages, this table did not. When a state reported not using a type of
equipment, the number of devices of that type was filled with zero to better capture at the
national level the prevalence of each type of voting technology or counting method in the 2022
general election.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
[1] Maine reports all data on UOCAVA voting at the statewide level in a separate jurisdiction in the
EAVS. This UOCAVA-only jurisdiction does not have in-person voters; thus, no ballot marking device
(BMD) is required.
[2] Ballot marking devices were used for voters with disabilities. Jurisdictions that used scanners hand
counted any provisional ballots.
[3] Hand counting is possible for counting mail ballots, ballots cast during early voting, and ballots cast
on Election Day if a tabulator is unable to read a ballot.
[4] In addition to the number of machines reported, there are three machines used for counting all mail
ballots at a central location.
[5] Wisconsin does not track the number of pieces of voting equipment each municipality has, just
what type they use. Wisconsin does not allow for direct-recording electronic (DRE) without a voter-
verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) for any municipalities.
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Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure:
The Policy Survey
Key Findings
The 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) provides information about the
policy context in which states and territories conducted the 2022 general election. The questions
in this survey asked states to identify the election laws and procedures that govern voter
registration, election technology, voter eligibility, modes of voting, and election audits in their
state. Notable findings from this survey include:
o In 2022, the number of states that provided Election Administration and Voting Survey
(EAVS) responses at the state level for each EAVS section was generally consistent with
2020 except for Section F, which saw fewer states reporting at the state level in 2022
compared to 2020.
o There has not been a significant decrease in the number of states that reported conducting
all-mail elections for the 2022 general election compared to the 2020 general election.
o Forty-two states reported requiring a post-election tabulation audit that verifies that
election voting equipment properly counts a sample of voted ballots after an election.
o Thirty-nine states reported that drop boxes were used, either statewide or in certain
jurisdictions, to allow voters to return their voted mail ballots.
o Forty-one states reported allowing voters to cure their voted mail ballots; the most reported
types of mail ballot errors that voters were allowed to correct were cases where a voter
signature was missing.
Introduction
Although quantitative data from state1 and local election officials provide an important window
into how the 2022 general election was conducted, these data must be understood in the context
of state laws and policies. In 2008, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) introduced a
component of the EAVS that collects information on state election laws. Since 2018, these data
have been collected through the Policy Survey,2 which uses closed-ended questions to capture
states’ broad policies. This report provides an overview and summary of the Policy Survey’s
findings. Additional information about state responses is available in Appendix A of this chapter.
The 2022 Policy Survey included updates to some of the 2020 items to better capture state
policy nuances.
1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50
U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey
and EAVS data.
2 Prior to 2018, the Policy Survey was known as the Statutory Overview and required states to submit text
descriptions of their election laws and policies.
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The 2022 Policy Survey collected data on states’ election laws, policies, and practices that would
be in place for the November 2022 general election. Most states submitted this information
before the election. The Policy Survey was also used to validate 2022 EAVS data prior to states
certifying their data as final. The goal of the 2022 Policy Survey was to create comparisons
between states across broad policy categories and to provide context to understand the EAVS
data submitted by states. Because of the nature of the closed-ended survey questions, some of
the nuances in state election policies could not be accounted for. It is important to remember that
state election laws are nuanced, and this report simplifies them for the purpose of providing an
overview of election policies that offers important context to understanding the EAVS data. States
were encouraged to forward additional information and context for their Policy Survey responses
to allow their data to be interpreted as accurately as possible.
The information that states and territories submitted for the 2022 Policy Survey explained the
election laws and practices that applied to the federal general election that was conducted on
November 8, 2022. Some states may have changed some of their policies since that election was
conducted; the Policy Survey does not collect information about when an election policy change
occurs or why. In addition, states may have different policies for midterm and presidential
elections, for primary elections and general elections, or for elections for federal, state, or local
office. Because Puerto Rico did not conduct a federal general election on November 8, 2022, the
territory was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly
to that election.
For further information about how the Policy Survey data were collected and used to validate
EAVS data, please see Chapter 5 of this report.
Responding to the 2022 EAVS
The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to describe who provides the data for questions in each
section of the EAVS: the state election office, local election offices, or both the state and local
offices. In total, 25 states provided data for all six sections of the EAVS solely at the state level,
whereas 31 states relied on local jurisdictions to provide some or all of a state’s EAVS
submission.3
For Sections B, C, E, and F, roughly half of the states provided responses at the state level, and
about one-quarter of states reported that responses are provided by local officials for Sections C
through E.4 For Section A, 59% of states reported providing responses at the state level, and
46.4% of states reported providing responses at the state level for Section D. Roughly one-quarter
to one-third of the responses for each section were provided by both state and local officials,
except for Section E (about one-fifth). In 2022, five fewer states provided EAVS responses at the
state level for Section F, one more for Section E, and one fewer for Section A compared to 2020
(see Table 1).
3 Information on how states answer Section A of the EAVS was collected in item Q1_1 of the Policy Survey.
Information on how states answer Section B of the EAVS was collected in Q1_2. Information on how states
answer Section C of the EAVS was collected in Q1_3. Information on how states answer Section D of the
EAVS was collected in Q1_4. Information on how states answer Section E of the EAVS was collected in
Q1_5. Information on how states answer Section F of the EAVS was collected in Q1_6.
4 A lower proportion of states responded to Section F entirely at the local level, at 14.3%.
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The findings from this question illustrate the complexities that state and local election officials
face when answering the EAVS. Many states with a large number of jurisdictions reported
providing EAVS data entirely at the local level. Furthermore, some states reported providing EAVS
data for some sections at the state level while relying on local officials for other sections.
Table 1. States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level
Number of States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level
Number of Number of Number of
EAVS Section
States in 2018 States in 2020 States in 2022
Section A 31 34 33
Section B 26 28 28
Section C 27 29 29
Section D 23 26 26
Section E 25 28 29
Section F 25 33 28
Source: Information on answering the EAVS was collected in Q1 of the Policy Survey.
In almost all states, no new local jurisdictions have been created or consolidated for the purposes
of EAVS reporting since the 2020 EAVS was conducted.5 The exceptions are New Hampshire and
New Jersey, where jurisdictions were both consolidated and created, as well as Vermont and
Wisconsin, where new local jurisdictions were created.
Policies on Voter Registration and List Maintenance
The primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States is the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA), which became effective after the 1994 general election. The NVRA
expands voter registration opportunities for voters by creating more standardized registration
processes and by designating more places as voter registration agencies. It also requires that
states conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove from their lists the
records of individuals who are no longer eligible to vote; this program is often referred to as “voter
registration list maintenance.”
Congress also passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, requiring each state to adopt a
computerized statewide voter registration list. States use these registration lists to determine who
is eligible to participate in elections. States also face the challenge of keeping these lists up to
date, as voters commonly move to different jurisdictions or states, die, or become otherwise
ineligible to vote.6
5 North Carolina detailed some other changes (e.g., one municipality dissolved while others were annexed
across county lines).
6 North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration. According to the North Dakota
Office of the Secretary of State, “Precincts in North Dakota maintain a list of voters who have voted in
previous elections. When a voter approaches a polling place they are asked to provide an acceptable form
of identification. Then the election board will attempt to locate the voter’s name on the voting list. If the
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Database Systems
States responded to the HAVA voter registration requirements in different ways. Some states
adopted a single, central platform at the state level that connects to terminals in local
jurisdictions. This type of system is typically referred to as a “top-down” voter registration system.
Other states implemented a state voter registration database that gathers and aggregates
information from their local jurisdictions’ voter registration databases. This type of system is
typically referred to as a “bottom-up” system.7 If a system has a mix of top-down and bottom-up
characteristics, then it is referred to as a “hybrid” system. The specific characteristics of hybrid
systems vary state by state.
Figure 1. Over Two-Thirds of States Have Top-Down Voter Registration Systems
Source: Information on voter registration database system type was collected in Q3 of the Policy Survey.
This graph shows the number of states that reported having each type of voter registration database.
voter’s name is on the list, the voter’s name and address are verified and the voter is then allowed to vote.”
(https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/votereg.pdf). Individuals who wish to vote in North Dakota must meet
federal and state eligibility requirements.
7 For a bottom-up voter registration system to be considered a statewide system, the state database, the
data, and the data flow must be defined, maintained, and administered by the state. U.S. Election
Assistance Commission (2005, July). Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter
Registration Lists. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/Implementing%20
Statewide%20Voter%20Registration%20Lists.pdf.
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The Policy Survey asked states to report the type of voter registration database they have and
how often information is shared between states and local jurisdictions. Figure 1 shows that over a
majority of states (72.7%) reported having voter registration databases that function in a top-
down manner. Seven states (12.7%, a decrease from 2020) reported having a bottom-up
registration system that uploads jurisdiction-level information at regular intervals to form the
statewide voter registration list, and 14.6% of states reported having a hybrid system that
combines elements of both.8 In practice, these state registration system categories can be fluid.
Some top-down registration systems may implement features of a bottom-up registration system
and vice versa.
States that reported having either a bottom-up or hybrid system were asked to report how often
their jurisdictions transmit voter registration information to the statewide database. For these two
systems, real-time data transmissions were most common (reported in 80% of the states with
bottom-up or hybrid systems), whereas 33.3% of the states reported that voter registration
information is transmitted daily.9
Data Linkages
Election officials must accomplish two primary activities related to voter registration: adding
individuals to the database who are eligible to vote and maintaining the accuracy of the
database.10 A state accomplishes these goals by accessing or “linking” to other databases to
verify the voter registration information in its database. The NVRA and HAVA outline steps that
states are required to take to keep voter registration information current and to remove ineligible
voters and duplicate registrations from the voter lists. This task requires comparing voter lists to
records in other databases to prevent duplicate registration records and to avoid adding
individuals who are ineligible to register.11
HAVA requires the chief election official in each state to attempt to verify the information for first-
time voter registration applications against driver’s license numbers in that state’s motor vehicle
licensing agency’s database or against the Social Security Administration’s database of social
security numbers. If no match is found, election officials in most states attempt to contact the
applicant for additional information, but they manage this process in various ways. HAVA requires
that applicants who cannot be matched against one of these databases be allowed to vote on
Election Day, provided they present appropriate identification.12
The Policy Survey asks state election offices how they share information electronically with other
state and federal government entities.13 These linkages are illustrated in Figure 2. Most states
reported that they link their voter registration data with the agency that handles their state’s
driver’s licenses (91.1%) and with entities that maintain the death records (73.2%). The other
most commonly reported linkages were with entities that maintain felony or prison records, such
8 Information on the type of voter registration system that states use was collected in item Q3 of the Policy
Survey.
9 Texas noted that most jurisdictions transmit information in real time, but larger jurisdictions transmit
overnight.
10 National Research Council. 2010. Improving State Voter Registration Databases: Final Report.
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12788
11 Ibid.
12 52 U.S.C. § 21083.
13 Although North Dakota does not have voter registration, the state does share information electronically
with other government entities and is included in these analyses.
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as state courts and parole agencies (64.3%). States that reported linking with the agency that
handles driver’s licenses most often reported transferring voter registration data daily (64.7%),
followed by in real time (17.7%) and by some other measure of time that is neither weekly nor
monthly (7.8%). Of the states that reported linking with entities that maintain death records, the
most common type of data transfer was monthly (56.1%), followed by weekly and other (17.1%).
States that reported linking registration data with entities that maintain felony records most often
reported transferring data monthly (44.4%).%).14
Less commonly reported linkages included with entities that maintain records of individuals who
are declared mentally incompetent, state public assistance agencies, agencies for people with
disabilities, other state agencies that are not required by the NVRA, federal agencies, and military
recruiting offices.
Figure 2. States Most Commonly Link Voter Registration Databases with
Government Agencies That Maintain Driver’s Licenses and Death Records
Source: Information on the entities that are linked to state voter registration databases was collected in Q4
of the Policy Survey. This graph shows the number of states that reported linking their voter registration
databases with the specified government agency.
14 Information on which entities states link their voter registration databases with and how often data
transfers occur was collected in item Q4 of the Policy Survey.
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Automatic and Automated Voter Registration
Beginning in 2016, states started implementing laws allowing for automatic voter registration.
Automatic voter registration is a process by which eligible voters are automatically registered to
vote when they interact with a government agency (e.g., a state motor vehicles agency) with an
option to opt out. Another process available in some states is registration with automated
features, which requires the individual to make a choice or affirmative decision to register to vote
during their interaction with a government agency, rather than deciding to opt out of registration.
In 2022, about two-thirds of states reported some method of registering to vote via an automated
process, whether online or in person, during a transaction with a state government agency.15
Commonly reported examples of these automated processes were processes where the option to
register to vote is preselected and a person needs to deselect it during the transaction to opt out
of registering to vote (39.3%) and those that authorize the potential registrant to opt in or choose
to register, such as when an individual cannot proceed with a transaction without selecting
whether or not they wish to be registered to vote (35.7%).
All states that have some kind of automatic or automated voter registration process linked to a
state agency transaction reported that their state motor vehicles agency participates in this
program, and about one-third of the states indicated that public assistance agencies also
participate. Less common program participants included agencies for people with disabilities,
those specifically designated by the state’s chief election official or governor, and others.16, 17
Pre-Registration
In the 2022 Policy Survey, most states (94.6%) reported allowing individuals under the age of 18
to pre-register to vote and become automatically registered once they turn 18 years old.18 Twenty-
six states that had a pre-registration program reported that they allow individuals to pre-register
at age 17, whereas 20 states reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 16. Six states
reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 17 and a half.19 Some states have additional
rules that apply to pre-registrations; for example, states like Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia,
and the Northern Mariana Islands allow a person to register to vote before the age of 18 as long
as they will be 18 at the time of the next general election.
Most pre-registration applications are processed immediately, although the individual cannot vote
before they turn 18 years old. In Minnesota and South Dakota, the pre-registration application is
held and is not processed until the individual turns 18. Several states specified additional
procedures for processing pre-registrations. For example, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Vermont,
and West Virginia process pre-registration applications upon receipt, and the individual may vote
in a primary election if they will be 18 years old by the date of the next general election. Kansas
15 Information on automatic and automated voter registration was collected in item Q5 of the Policy Survey.
16 Information on which state agencies participate in automatic voter registration was collected in item Q5a
of the Policy Survey.
17 States specified other agencies: the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend; the Colorado Department of
Health Care Policy and Financing; the Delaware Department of Labor Division of Vocational Rehabilitation;
Florida offices that issue driver’s licenses or state ID cards in coordination with the Florida Department of
Motor Vehicles; the Illinois Department of Natural Resources; and other state agencies as designated by
Maryland legislation.
18 Information on whether states allow individuals to preregister before they are 18 years old and become
automatically registered to vote once they turn 18 was collected in item Q9 of the Policy Survey.
19 Puerto Rico reported that an individual may pre-register to vote at age 14.
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processes the pre-registration application and places a pending status on it until the day the
individual turns 18 years old, after which they are automatically added to the list of registered
voters; a similar process is done in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.20
State Election Office Websites
The 2022 Policy Survey also asked states which voter information search tools and other tools
are available on each state’s election office website. Nearly every state indicated that voters
could check their registration status and check their polling site location on the state election
office website. Most states reported having tools that track ballot status, including the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots (89.3%), mail ballots (85.7%), and
provisional ballots (53.6%), and that check voter-specific ballot information (80.4%). Additionally,
most states reported that their website allows voters to request a mail or absentee ballot (58.9%),
and nine states reported some other functionality available on their state’s election office website
that was not listed in the survey.21
Figure 3. About Three-Quarters of States Offer Both Registration and
Registration Updates Through a Web-Based Online System
Source: Information on online registration policy was collected in items Q6 and Q6a of the Policy Survey.
20 Information on whether a preregistration application is processed immediately or held until a certain date
was collected in item Q9a of the Policy Survey.
21 Information on state election office website lookup tools was collected in item Q7 of the Policy Survey.
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Online Voter Registration
Arizona became the first state to adopt online voter registration in 2002, and by 2016, the
number of states that offered online voter registration jumped to 32.22 Now, most states have a
public-facing, web-based online system that interfaces with the state voter registration system.
About three-quarters of states reported that through this system, voters can both register to vote
and update their registration, whereas a smaller number of states (5.4%) reported that
individuals can only use this online system to update their registration (see Figure 3). In most
states (79.6%), a person needs to have a driver’s license or other state-issued identification to
register to vote or update a voter registration in this system.23
Same-Day Registration
Instead of requiring voters to register prior to an election, some states allow individuals to register
to vote and to cast a ballot on the same day. Almost half of the states reported allowing
individuals to register on the same day that they cast a ballot in person or request a mail ballot
(see Figure 4). This process is known as same-day registration (SDR).24 Among states with SDR,
about 85% reported having both SDR on Election Day and SDR during in-person early voting.25
Fourteen states reported having SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the
close of voter registration. Two states reported specific cases in which a voter may register on the
same day that they cast a ballot: in North Carolina, an individual who has become eligible to vote
between the close of books26 and Election Day—either by being naturalized as a citizen or having
citizenship rights restored after conviction of a felony—may be a same-day registrant; in
Wisconsin, individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an
appointed agent on the same day from the Tuesday prior to Election Day up through 5:00 p.m. on
Election Day.
22 ”EAVS Deep Dive: Registering to Vote, “U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, September 20).
https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/09/20/eavs-deep-dive-registering-to-vote.
23 Information on states’ online voter registration policies was collected in item Q6 of the Policy Survey.
Information on whether a driver’s license or state-issued ID card is needed to register to vote online was
collected in item Q6a of the Policy Survey.
24 The timeline does not include an overlap between the mail balloting period and the close of voter
registration.
25 Eighteen states reporting having SDR on Election Day and during in-person early voting. Two states
(Connecticut and New Hampshire) reported having SDR only on Election Day and two states (American
Samoa and North Carolina) reported having SDR only during in-person early voting. Information on state
SDR policies was collected in item Q8 of the Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances of SDR was
collected in item Q8a of the Policy Survey.
26 North Carolina did not provide clarification on what was meant by “close of books.”
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Figure 4. Almost Half of States Offer Some Form of Same-Day Registration
Source: Information on SDR policy was collected in items Q8 and Q8a of the Policy Survey. “ED” stands for
“Election Day.” “Other Cases” includes instances in which states may allow for SDR during in-person early
voting only, during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, and other
specific cases.
List Maintenance
The NVRA establishes a process for states to keep their voter registration lists accurate by adding
newly registered voters, updating voter records, and removing ineligible voters. Under this law, a
registrant can be removed from a state’s list under the following circumstances:
o Upon the death of the registrant;
o Upon the registrant’s written confirmation that their address has changed to a location
outside of the registrar’s jurisdiction;
o On the request of the registrant;
o For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
o On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
o On the registrant’s failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to
appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.27
Under the process established by the NVRA, when a registrant appears to have moved outside of
their jurisdiction, the state must follow a specific process to verify that the individual is no longer
27 52 U.S.C. § 20507.
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eligible to vote. An address confirmation procedure must be followed before removing the voter
from the registration list. Chapter 3 of this report includes more detail about the list maintenance
process as outlined in the NVRA.
Table 2. Examples of State Definitions of Active and Inactive Voters
State Description of Active and Inactive Voters
Active voter: qualified registered voter;
Alaska Inactive voter: those who are not eligible to vote in an election or those
who may be eligible to vote a provisional ballot in an election but whose
registration was inactivated during Alaska's list maintenance process
Active voter: a registered voter who meets California voter registration
eligibility requirements, who is legally entitled to vote pursuant to state
law, and who is not currently deemed an “inactive voter” or a
“canceled voter;”
California
Inactive voter: a registered voter whose status has been changed to
“inactive” in accordance with California law; an inactive voter is legally
entitled to vote pursuant to California law
Active voter: a voter who is registered to vote in Maryland and is not in
“pending” or “inactive” status under the provisions of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993;
Maryland 28
Inactive voter: a voter who is registered to vote in Maryland but has not
responded to a confirmation notice
Active voter: has supplied the information legally required to register to
vote and the county clerk has not received evidence of a change in the
information the voter used to register to vote;
Oregon
Inactive voter: the county clerk receives evidence of a change in the
information the voter used to register to vote and who has been mailed
a voter confirmation card
Active voter: a registered voter who has not been classified as an
inactive voter by the county clerk (i.e., someone who has fulfilled the
residency requirements and has turned in a complete voter registration
form);
Utah
Inactive voter: a voter who has all the privileges of an active voter, but
the county clerk's office is unclear whether the voter still maintains a
residency at an address
Source: Information on state definitions of “active” and “inactive” voters was collected in item Q10a of the
Policy Survey.
28 While this term is not defined in Maryland state statute, §3-503 of the Election Law Article, Annotated
Code of Maryland, specifies when a voter is placed into inactive status, how a voter is restored to active
status, and when a voter is removed from the voter registration list.
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The 2022 Policy Survey asked states whether they differentiate between active and inactive
voters in their voter registration records. Active voters are individuals who require no additional
processing before they can vote, whereas inactive voters will require address verification before
being permitted to vote. Fifty states, including three territories and the District of Columbia,
indicated that they differentiate between the two types of voters, although according to state
comments, the definitions for an active and inactive voter vary widely.29 American Samoa, Guam,
Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming reported not distinguishing between active
and inactive voters. Twenty states reported specific terminology, qualifications, and/or conditions
for active and inactive voters (see Table 2). According to the NVRA, voters marked as inactive may
be restored to the active voter list if they vote in one of the two federal general elections following
their inactive designation or take other action to confirm to the election office that they continue
to be a valid registered voter. If a voter does not cast a ballot in either of the two federal general
elections following their inactive designation, the voter may be removed from their state’s voter
registration roll.
Thirty-five states indicated that only local officials are responsible for modifying or removing voter
registration records, and 13 states reported that modifying voter registration records is done by
both state and local officials.30, 31 Alaska, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Delaware,
Guam, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all indicated that they only modify
or remove records at the state level.32 Table 3 illustrates the data sources states use to identify
potentially ineligible voters. Across states, the most common data sources were the state vital
statistics office, reports from other states indicating a former resident registered to vote, a voter
request for removal, entities that maintain prison records, and any mail (not including ballots)
sent from an election office that was returned as undeliverable.33
29 Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10
of the Policy Survey. Information on whether states use the EAC’s definition of active and inactive voters
was collected in item Q10a of the Policy Survey.
30 North Dakota does not have voter registration and was not included in these counts.
31 In Georgia and Texas, all modifications are done by local officials except for deceased voters that have
been systematically removed from the state voter registration system; in Maryland and North Carolina, local
officials process voter registration record updates and the state assists as needed; in Maine, although only
local officials modify voter registration records, state officials may conduct statewide list maintenance
activities that designate certain records as inactive based on response or lack of response to the NVRA list
maintenance mailing; in Michigan, both local clerks and state staff modify and correct voter registration
information; in New Mexico, local officials are responsible for all but those voters who are part of the state’s
confidential address program, whose records are maintained by the Secretary of State; similarly, in
Oklahoma, most records are handled at the local level but the state manages registrations for participants
in the address confidentiality program as well as list maintenance for address confirmation deletions; in
Wisconsin, local officials are responsible for all records except for when a voter does not respond to a 4-
year state list maintenance confirmation notice and for when the state receives information from another
state voter registration authority or through the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) that a
voter has registered there.
32 Information on who is responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records was collected in
item Q11 of the Policy Survey.
33 Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q13 of
the Policy Survey.
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Table 3. States Most Often Use State Vital Statistics Office and Reports from
Other States to Identify Ineligible Voters
Percentage of States That
Source of Data on Potentially Ineligible Voters Report Using Data from the
Data Source
State vital statistics office death records 96.4%
Reports or notices from other states that a former resident has
92.9%
registered to vote
Entities that maintain felony or prison records (e.g., state
courts, state police, federal courts, pardons or paroles 83.9%
agencies)
Other mail from the election office (not ballots) that is returned
83.9%
as undeliverable
Requests from voters for removal from the voter registration
83.9%
roll
Newspaper death notices or obituaries 73.2%
Mail ballots that are returned as undeliverable 67.9%
National Change of Address (NCOA) reports 67.9%
Motor vehicles agencies (e.g., DMV) 60.7%
Social Security Administration (SSA) death records 60.7%
Data from an interstate data-sharing compact (e.g., the
55.4%
Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC])
Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally
48.2%
incompetent
Applications for mail ballots 26.8%
Jury questionnaires 26.8%
Returned jury summons 19.6%
State public assistance agencies 17.9%
State agencies that serve individuals with disabilities 16.1%
Canvassing (door-to-door verification) 7.1%
Other (e.g., military recruitment offices) 7.1%
State agencies that are not specified in NVRA 3.6%
State tax filings 1.8%
Source: Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item
Q13 of the Policy Survey.
Fifty-three states reported sending confirmation notices to voters to help identify individuals who
may be ineligible to vote in that jurisdiction, but the reasons for sending confirmation notices
differ by state. Of the states that send confirmation notices, 43 (76.8%) reported sending
confirmation notices pursuant to Section 8 (d) (1) (B) and Section 8 (d) (2) of the NVRA, 37 states
(66.1%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a state statute, and eight states
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(14.3%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a formal administrative rule or
guidance. Three states reported that they do not send confirmation notices.34
States most commonly reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose mail from an
election office was returned as undeliverable (86.8%), to voters whose addresses may have
changed (79.3%), to voters who have not voted in a specified number of consecutive general
elections (45.3%),%),35 and to voters who have been convicted of a disqualifying felony
(37.7%).%). Less than one-third of states reported sending confirmation notices to voters who
have surrendered their driver’s license to obtain a new license in a different state, for not having
contacted the state election division for a specified number of years, for having requested
removal from the voter registration list, and for having been incarcerated.
Six states (11.3%) reported that all registered voters routinely receive a non-forwardable notice
during a specified increment of time; this time frame ranges from 1 to 4 years. Thirteen states
reported sending confirmation notices for some other reason.36 For example, some states or
certain jurisdictions within states indicated that they routinely send confirmation notices as part
of their specific list maintenance procedures. Delaware, which is a member of ERIC, sends
confirmation notices to individuals who have been identified as having potentially moved via ERIC
reports. Washington, a state in which nearly all voters cast their ballots by mail, reported that the
mailing information provided by a returned or forwarded ballot serves as the start of the
confirmation process.
Criminal Convictions and Voting
The NVRA allows states to remove voters from their registration lists if the registered voter
receives a disqualifying criminal conviction or is incarcerated. The Policy Survey asks four
questions about removing voters from registration lists due to disqualifying criminal convictions
and/or incarcerations and about the restoration of voting rights:
o Which populations have their voting eligibility suspended due to a criminal conviction or
incarceration?
o For how long does a person with a criminal conviction lose their right to vote?
o What happens to the removed individual’s registration record in the state’s voter
registration database?
o How can a person whose voting rights have been affected by a conviction or incarceration
become an eligible voter again?
The District of Columbia, Maine, Puerto Rico, and Vermont reported in the 2022 Policy Survey
that they do not limit a person’s right to vote based on a criminal conviction or incarceration. Most
states (60.7%) reported that the conviction of any felony will limit a person’s right to vote,
whereas five states indicated that they limit the voting rights of individuals convicted only of
certain felonies. Six states reported that they limit the voting rights of individuals who are
34 Information on whether and how states send confirmation notices to help identify ineligible voters was
collected in item Q12 of the Policy Survey.
35 Most states specified either one or two consecutive federal general elections, with the exception of South
Dakota, which specified four.
36 Information on which voters states send confirmation notices to was collected in item Q12a of the
Policy Survey.
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convicted of other crimes that are not felonies (e.g., election-related crimes). Additionally, 21
states limit the right to vote for individuals who are incarcerated.37
There is variation in the disqualification time periods and in the processes for restoring voting
rights. Of the states that limit voting rights for these reasons, most reported revoking the right to
vote during the period of incarceration (73.1%) followed by any period of probation and parole
(40.4%). Some states reported revoking voting rights until the payment of outstanding fines,
restitution, or penalties (19.2%), and/or during an additional length of time (9.6%) such as a
statutorily mandated waiting period.38
The EAVS asked states to report the number of voters removed from registration rolls due to
disqualifying felony convictions between the close of registration for the November 2020 general
election and the close of registration for the November 2022 general election. To provide context
for this EAVS item, the 2022 Policy Survey asked what happens to registration records when the
voting rights of a person in one of the populations specified above are affected. Over a third of
states reported that the registration record becomes inactive, which prevents the person from
voting. One-fifth of states reported that the registration record is removed from the database, and
some (9.1%) reported that a hold or suspension is placed on the record, which also prevents the
person from voting. Sixteen states specified some other process;39 10 of these states reported
that the voter registration record is placed in “cancelled,” “removed,” or “rejected” status, and
differ on the follow-up procedures. Michigan noted that if a person is incarcerated but has not yet
been sentenced, then they are still able to vote.40
The Policy Survey also asks states to indicate how disenfranchised individuals can become
eligible voters again after they are permitted to under state law. Missouri and Rhode Island
reported automatically restoring the previous voter registration of individuals with convictions
and/or incarcerations once the period of disenfranchisement has passed, requiring no further
action by the voter. Of the states that indicated requiring some type of action, 71.2% reported
that a person is immediately eligible to vote and must re-register through the same process as the
general public. Some states reported having other conditions, such as presenting documentation
during the registration process that shows that the person has completed the voter registration
requirements (17.3%) and having voting rights restored through a formal administrative process
(17.3%). Eight states provided survey comments that further explained their policies.41 In
Louisiana, for example, if a person is under an order of imprisonment for a felony conviction but
“has not been incarcerated pursuant to the order within the last five years,” then that person is
eligible to register. Iowa reported that the current process allows automatic restoration for most
convictions that affect registrations, except for a specific class of homicide crimes that require an
37 Information on state policies for suspending or revoking voting rights due to criminal convictions was
collected in item Q38 of the Policy Survey. This item does not distinguish a felony conviction from the
subsequent period of incarceration.
38 Information on the length of time a disqualifying felony conviction will restrict voting rights was collected
in item Q38a of the Policy Survey.
39 North Dakota does not have voter registration and is not included in these counts.
40 Information on what happens to the registration records of populations whose voting rights are affected
due to criminal conviction and/or incarceration was collected in item Q38b of the Policy Survey.
41 Information on state policies for restoring voting rights to individuals with disqualifying felony convictions
was collected in item Q38c of the Policy Survey.
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application to the governor for registration. Maryland indicated that individuals convicted of
buying or selling votes are not eligible to register to vote again in the state.
Voting by Mail
All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer at least some of their citizens the
opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections.42 Some states use the term
“absentee voting” to refer to mail voting. The 2022 Policy Survey demonstrates that there were
wide variations among the states regarding which voters are eligible to vote by mail, what
documentation voters must provide to receive a mail ballot, how mail ballots may be returned to
election officials, and the deadlines for mail ballots to be postmarked and received by election
offices in order to be counted for the 2022 general election.
In 2022, 38 states reported that they do not require voters to provide a reason for requesting a
mail ballot and for why they cannot vote in person on Election Day. Conversely, about one-third of
states reported requiring voters to provide an excuse.43 Twenty-three states reported that voters
can request to be on a permanent absentee list from which they will automatically receive ballots
for all future elections. Either any registrant can request to be a permanent absentee voter
(16.4% of all states) or only individuals who meet specific criteria can request to be a permanent
absentee voter (25.5% of all states).44
Some states have special criteria for individuals who request permanent absentee status.45
Among these states, the most common requirement was that the requester must have a disability
(85.7%); Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin reported that they will
also grant permanent absentee status to those who are infirm, have a permanent illness, or can
provide a note from a medical professional. West Virginia indicated allowing address
confidentiality program participants to be permanent absentee voters, and Louisiana indicated
requiring individuals to be over a specified age. Despite conducting all-mail elections, Oregon
uses the term “absentee voter” for individuals who may be away from their residences when
ballots are transmitted.
With the 2020 election’s overall shift toward mail voting, the number of states that conducted all-
mail elections, in which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a
mail ballot, doubled between the 2018 and 2020 Policy Surveys. These numbers have stayed
fairly consistent into 2022. As shown in Figure 5, twelve states have some type of vote-by-mail
system; three states reported having some vote-by-mail jurisdictions, and nine states reported
having statewide vote-by-mail systems.46
42 Some states use the term “in-person absentee voting” to refer to the process by which a voter visits an
election office to request a mail ballot, completes the ballot, and returns the ballot in one trip. However,
EAVS considers this to be a form of in-person early voting and asks states to report their data as such.
43 Information on whether states require an excuse for mail voting was collected in item Q16 of the Policy
Survey.
44 Information on whether states have permanent absentee voting was collected in item Q18 of the Policy
Survey.
45 Information on who can become a permanent absentee voter was collected in item Q18a of the Policy
Survey.
46 Information on which states have an all-mail or all-vote-by-mail system was collected in item Q17 of the
2022 Policy Survey, item Q18 of the 2020 Policy Survey, and item Q9 of the 2018 Policy Survey.
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Figure 5. Number of States Offering All-Mail Elections in 2022 Consistent with 2020
Source: Information on the policy of all-mail elections was collected in items Q17 and Q17a of the 2022
Policy Survey.
The Policy Survey also collected data on the circumstances under which voters could receive
ballots through electronic means. Voters who are members of the uniformed services or who are
overseas citizens who wish to receive ballots electronically are covered under UOCAVA, so this
question applies specifically to non-UOCAVA voters. About one-third of states reported that
domestic civilian voters cannot receive electronic ballots under any circumstances. States that do
allow non-UOCAVA voters residing in the United States to receive their ballots through an
electronic format do so via methods such as email, fax, an online voter registration portal, or a
mobile phone app. Alaska, California,47 Guam, Maryland, South Dakota, and Washington reported
that voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance. Other states reported having
special circumstances.48 For example, 27 states indicated allowing voters with disabilities to
Information on whether the state’s all-vote-by-mail system is used only in certain jurisdictions or is
statewide was collected in item Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q18a in the 2020 Policy Survey, and
item Q9a of the 2018 Policy Survey. In most cases, some limited in-person voting occurs when a state or
jurisdiction conducts an election entirely by mail.
47 California allows any voter to cast a ballot using a certified remote-accessible vote-by-mail system,
regardless of whether the individual is a voter with disabilities or a military or overseas voter.
48 Information on the circumstances under which voters may receive their ballots electronically was
collected in item Q24 of the Policy Survey.
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receive ballots electronically, including 11 states where voters must have specific disabilities and
16 states where voters with any disability may do so.49
Six states reported that they allow electronic ballot transmission during emergency situations that
hinder in-person voting, such as a natural disaster. Nine states reported that they allowed
electronic transmission for other reasons. For example, Nebraska extended requirements to
emergency responders, Hawaii allows for the receipt of ballots through an electronic format when
a replacement ballot is needed and is requested within five days of the election, and in the U.S.
Virgin Islands, voters may receive an electronic ballot if they did not receive an absentee ballot up
to two days before the election.
In states where voters with a disability may receive their ballots electronically, the process
whereby the voter may access a ballot online, mark it privately and independently, and then
return it to election officials is known as accessible absentee voting in 10 states and remote
ballot marking in five states. Twelve states reported using specific terminology, such as
accessible vote by mail, accessible ballot delivery, electronic absentee, and others. Just over
three-quarters of these states allow voters with a disability to access their electronic ballot
through an online portal, while 40.7% allow access through email.50 Indiana and Louisiana
specified that delivery may be via fax. Michigan and Pennsylvania voters with disabilities may
receive their ballot via email and receive either a link to a secure online portal, as in the case of
Michigan,51 or receive an access code for the ballot, as in the case of Pennsylvania. Most states
(88.9%) that have some form of remotely accessible absentee voting process for voters with
disabilities do not require a witness to be present while a voter marks their ballot in this process.
Mail Ballot Tracking and Deadlines
States reported on their deadlines for mail ballots from non-military voters residing in the United
States. Ballot deadlines for voters covered by UOCAVA were reported in separate questions, as
UOCAVA ballot deadlines are typically different from those for other mail ballots. The postmark
deadline is Election Day for just over one-third (35.7%) of states, which is somewhat lower than in
2020;52 Connecticut, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah reported having a postmark deadline one day
before Election Day. In 56.4% of states, mail ballots must be received by Election Day, and in
41.8% of states, mail ballots must be received by a specified number of calendar days or
business days after Election Day.53 Louisiana reported that mail ballots must be received by one
day before Election Day.
States vary in what satisfies postmark requirements for mail ballots. In states that require
postmarks, the most commonly reported required feature was a physical postmark (84.6%),
49 New Mexico did not select response options for voters with disabilities but specified that voters with
visual impairments can request a ballot that they may receive and mark electronically using screen reader
software; the voter must then print and mail the ballot back.
50 Information on the terminology states use to describe the process whereby a voter with a disability may
access a ballot online, mark it privately and independently, and return it to election officials was collected in
item Q24a of the Policy Survey. Information on how voters with a disability can access their ballots under
that process was collected in item Q24b of the Policy Survey.
51 This ballot is then printed and returned.
52 Information on deadlines for returning mail ballots was collected in item Q21 of the Policy Survey.
53 Eighteen states reported a specified number of calendar days after Election Day, ranging from three to
20, and five states reported a specified number of business days after Election Day, ranging from one to
10.
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followed by postal processing markings (65.4%), and hand cancellation or a private express
delivery service date stamp (both 57.7% respectively). Less commonly required features were
intelligent barcodes (30.8%) and a date on a voter affidavit (15.4%). Some states specified other
ways of satisfying postmark requirements.54 Ohio indicated accepting an ID tag date, and Kansas
and Oregon indicated accepting any other indicia from the U.S. Postal Service. In Virginia, if the
intelligent mail barcode does not show that the ballot was mailed on or before Election Day, the
date provided on the signed voter oath may be used to satisfy postmark requirements.
Drop Boxes
In a new series of questions, the 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report their usage of drop
boxes. For the purposes of the Policy Survey, a drop box was defined as a locked container where
voters or their authorized representatives may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. They
are different from ballot boxes that are located at in-person polling places, where voters may
place their ballots immediately after in-person voting. Drop boxes may be located either indoors
or outdoors.
Figure 6. More than Two-Thirds of States Used Drop Boxes in 2022 General Election
Source: Information on whether voters were permitted to return their voted mail ballots at drop boxes was
collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey.
Thirty-nine states reported allowing drop boxes for the November 2022 general election (see
Figure 6). For these states, the most commonly reported location for drop boxes was election
54 Information on mail ballot postmark requirements was collected in item Q23 of the Policy Survey.
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offices (64.1%), followed by early voting polling locations (35.9%), and Election Day polling
locations (28.2%). Other sites reported by states included libraries, recreation centers, satellite
county offices, tribal reservations, and college student centers. Additionally, 22 states indicated
that drop box locations varied by locality, with several of them noting that drop box locations can
be placed at any site at the discretion of the local jurisdiction.55
In one-third of states that used drop boxes, drop box collections occurred once per day, whereas
in three states, the collections occurred multiple times per day. Eight states listed another
frequency, citing some examples where the number of collections can depend on the date and
the volume of ballots. Fifteen states reported that the number of collections varies by
jurisdiction.56
Voters were able to use drop boxes at various times. The earliest date drop boxes were available
for voters was September 1, 2022, in Indiana, whereas the latest dates tended to be Election
Day, with the exception of North Dakota, Georgia, and South Dakota, which listed dates before
Election Day. About 41% of states that used drop boxes allowed their voters to start using them
sometime in September.57
Ballot Curing
Another new set of questions in the 2022 Policy Survey asked states about ballot curing; under
this process, returned mail ballots that have been rejected for containing an error or for missing
required information may have the mistake corrected by the voter so that their ballot is ultimately
counted. Three-quarters of states reported having this process during the 2022 general election,
and among those states, the most commonly reported types of mail ballot errors that voters were
allowed to correct were missing voter signatures (reported in 90.2% of these states) and non-
matching voter signatures (reported in 70.7% of these states). Just over half of states reported
that ballots that had a missing or incomplete required document (e.g., an affidavit, ballot
statement, or copy of the voter’s identification) could be cured, whereas just under one-third
allowed for ballots to be cured if they were missing a witness signature.58 Eleven states reported
that there were other reasons a mail ballot may be cured; missing identification was cited by
three states, and other reasons included missing statement of residence and missing witness
address.59, 60
Thirteen states reported that ballots needed to be cured by Election Day in order to be counted in
the 2022 general election. One state, Louisiana, had a deadline that fell before Election Day, and
55 Information on whether states, or any jurisdictions within states, allow voters to return their voted mailed
ballots at drop boxes was collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey. Information on where drop boxes were
located was collected in item Q19a of the Policy Survey.
56 Information on how often ballots will be collected from drop boxes was collected in item Q19b of the
Policy Survey.
57 Information on the dates and times voters may use drop boxes to return their ballots was collected in
item Q19c of the Policy Survey.
58 Information on whether states allow voters to cure ballots was collected in item Q20 of the Policy Survey.
Information on the types of mail ballot errors that may be cured was collected in item Q20a of the Policy
Survey.
59 New Mexico treats any rejected mail ballot as a rejected provisional ballot that allows a voter to pursue a
hearing to review the determination.
60 Pennsylvania noted that the decision to allow voters to correct errors or supply missing information is
currently the subject of ongoing litigation. A preliminary ruling in October permitted voters to do so in the
2022 general election.
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the latest ballot curing deadlines were in December 2022 in New York and California. Some
states specified that deadlines are set based on a number of business or calendar days after an
action is taken.61 For example, Arizona voters must cure a missing signature by Election Day but
must cure a non-matching signature within 5 business days, whereas Kansas voters must cure
provisional ballots prior to the meeting of the county board of canvassers, which occurs between
seven and 13 days after Election Day, and each jurisdiction sets its own date within this window.
Utah also noted that the deadline varies based on the county canvass date.
UOCAVA Voting
The legal framework established by the UOCAVA law requires that all states offer uniformed
services members, their eligible family members, and overseas citizens the ability to vote
absentee in all federal elections. UOCAVA-protected citizens have the option of using the Federal
Post Card Application (FPCA), a form that serves as both a registration and ballot request
application and is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. All states accept FPCAs submitted by
postal mail. In addition, the 2009 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act
amended UOCAVA, requiring that all states offer an electronic means for FPCA submission.
UOCAVA voters may submit their FPCA by fax, online (either by email or through the state’s online
voter registration portal), or by other modes as allowed by state law.
States are required to allow ballot transmission and return by postal mail for UOCAVA ballots. In
2022, the most common additional methods for transmitting UOCAVA ballots were email and fax.
Email was allowed in 85.7% of states, and fax was allowed in 69.6% of states. Twenty-nine states
reported accepting UOCAVA ballots submitted through the state’s online ballot delivery portal.
Some states reported that UOCAVA ballots can be submitted by some other method; for example,
Washington and Wisconsin specified in comments that they allow in-person ballot submission,
whereas Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Virginia commented that they allow some other
commercial or private delivery service. After postal mail, email62 and fax were the two most
common methods that states allowed UOCAVA voters to return their ballots (50% and 53.6%
respectively), followed by the state’s online voter registration portal (21.4%).63
States differ in the length of time voters remain eligible to receive UOCAVA ballots after submitting
an FPCA; that is, the period of time or number of elections for which a voter can retain their
UOCAVA status and have an absentee ballot transmitted to them.64 Over one-third of states
reported that the length of time the FPCA will serve as a ballot request mechanism is a specified
number of calendar years. In most of those states, the length of time is one year, although in
North Dakota, it is two years. In other states, the length of time is measured by the number of
general election cycles (12.5%); Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, and Kentucky specified a length of
one general election cycle, and Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Utah specified two general election
61 Information on the deadline by which voters must cure errors or missing information on their mailed
ballots was collected in item Q20b of the Policy Survey.
62 Louisiana and Texas only allow email in certain special circumstances.
63 Information on the methods by which a state transmits blank UOCAVA ballots was collected in item Q27
of the Policy Survey. Information on the methods a state allows UOCAVA voters to return their voted UOCAVA
ballots was collected in item Q28 of the Policy Survey.
64 Information on how long UOCAVA voters remain eligible to receive absentee ballots was collected in item
Q29 of the Policy Survey.
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cycles. Some states (8.9%) reported that they will use the FPCA as a ballot request mechanism
until the voter moves from their residence.65
Almost 40% of states provided a description of another length of time that was unlisted in the
Policy Survey question, with some states reporting a time linked with either a specific election
timeline or a length of time tied to the submission of the FPCA. Nevada reported that voters retain
their status until the end of the following calendar year, and Maine reported that the status
remains eligible for 18 months. American Samoa and Washington specified a timeline based on
changes to a voter’s registration record. California and North Carolina reported that eligibility
remains permanent. Voters remain eligible to request absentee ballots for every election in Idaho
until they move but must make a separate request for every election. The U.S. Virgin Islands also
reported that they require absentee ballots to be requested each election cycle, and Puerto Rico
indicated that voters must file absentee voting requests for each voting event.
UOCAVA Voting Deadlines
In addition to reporting deadlines for mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters, the 2022 Policy
Survey asked states to report deadlines for ballots submitted by both uniformed services voters
residing in the United States and overseas UOCAVA voters. States provided information on both
postmark deadlines and ballot receipt deadlines as applicable. In 2022, the postmark deadline
for domestic uniformed services voters was Election Day in 42.9% of states, a slight drop from
2020; however, in Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah, the postmark deadline was one day before
Election Day. Just under half of the states (45.5%) reported that ballots had to have been
received by Election Day. Additionally, 43.6% of the states indicated that the ballots must have
been received by a specified number of calendar days after Election Day (with responses ranging
from two to 20 days after Election Day), and 10.9% of states indicated that the ballots must have
been received by a specified number of business days after Election Day (with responses ranging
from three to 10 days after Election Day).66
For overseas UOCAVA voters, Election Day was the postmark deadline in about half of the states
(48.2%). Like above, Iowa and North Dakota also reported having a postmark deadline one day
before Election Day for these voters. Ballots in 43.6% of the states were required to be received
by Election Day. Additionally, 43.6% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received
by a specified number of calendar days after Election Day (ranging from two to 20 days), and
12.7% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of
business days after Election Day (ranging from three to 10 days). Eighteen states reported that
they have the same postmark requirements for UOCAVA ballots and mail ballots from non-
UOCAVA voters. Seven states indicated that the requirements are different.67, 68
65 This information is provided by the U.S. Postal Service or the voter.
66 Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by uniformed services members residing in the United
States was collected in item Q30 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q29 of the 2020 Policy Survey.
67 Thirty-one states did not provide a response to this item; 32 states indicated in Q21 that they did not
require a postmark for returning a non-UOCAVA mail ballot.
68 Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by overseas UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q31 in
the Policy Survey. Information on the differences between postmark requirements for UOCAVA and non-
UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q32 in the Policy Survey.
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For more information about how UOCAVA voters participated in the 2022 general election,
including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected, and the use of the Federal Write-In
Absentee Ballot (FWAB), see Chapter 4 of this report.
In-Person Voting
In the traditional image of voting in America, voters physically travel to their local polling place or
election office and cast their ballots in person on Election Day. Voters may cast their ballots in
person at a polling location to which they are assigned based on the address on their voter
registration records, or, if state law allows, may have the option to vote at any polling location
within their jurisdiction. Although other methods of voting have become common in recent years,
in-person voting is still used by a majority of voters in federal general elections.
Vote Centers
Vote centers are physical locations where voters from multiple precincts may cast their ballots
(i.e., voters are not assigned to one location). Jurisdictions that use vote centers allow voters to
cast their ballots at any vote center in their jurisdiction rather than needing to vote at a
specifically assigned polling place. The 2022 Policy Survey asked whether any of the state’s
jurisdictions allow voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote center in their jurisdiction and
to describe how vote centers operate.
Over one-half of states (58.2%) reported allowing voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote
center in the voter’s jurisdiction, an increase from just over one-third in 2020. Fourteen of those
states (43.8%) indicated that they require the use of vote centers statewide, a significant increase
from 2020. Kansas, Tennessee, and Texas reported having vote centers, but only in jurisdictions
that meet certain requirements, whereas another 15 of those states (46.9%) reported having vote
centers, but jurisdictions have the option not to implement them.69
In-Person Voting Before Election Day
Almost all states70 reported that they allow individuals to vote in person before Election Day (not
including the hand delivery of mail ballots). This type of voting generally falls into two categories:
o A voter may go to a polling place before Election Day, receive a ballot, vote their ballot
while at the polling place, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.
o A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the
voter may be able to take their ballot home with them, whereas in other states, the ballot
must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated
along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.
The former type of voting is usually referred to as “in-person early voting” and the latter type is
usually referred to as “in-person absentee voting,” although these terms are not used consistently
across states. Some states use only one type of in-person voting before Election Day, while others
use both. Thirty-two states (57.1%) reported having in-person early voting and 29 states (51.8%)
69 Information on whether any jurisdictions within a state will allow voters to cast ballots at any polling
location or vote center in their jurisdiction was collected in item Q26 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item
Q25 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Information on how vote centers operate was collected in item Q26a of the
2022 Policy Survey and item Q25a of the 2020 Policy Survey.
70 Pennsylvania did not allow in-person voting before Election Day for the 2022 general election.
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Table 4. Examples of Unique Descriptions of In-Person Early Voting
State Description of In-Person Early Voting
American Samoa Local absentee voting
Hawaii In-person voting
Idaho Early voting
The in-person early voting process consists of casting an absentee
Indiana
ballot.
Kansas Advance voting
Kentucky In-person, no-excuse absentee voting
North Carolina One-stop and early voting
Members of specific populations can receive a ballot from their
Oregon county elections office and they may choose to vote there or take it
with them to return at a later date/time.
Washington In-person voting
Source: State descriptions of in-person early voting were collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey.
reported having in-person absentee voting; among these states, 11 reported having both.71 Nine
states specified unique descriptions for early voting, as seen in Table 4. Nine states (16.1%)
reported requiring an excuse to vote in person before Election Day,72 a decrease from 12 that
reported this policy in 2020 and 15 in 2018.73, 74 In-person early voting tended to start in mid to
late October75 and last until early November 2022 shortly before Election Day in most states.76 In
California, Kansas, and Utah, dates varied by jurisdiction and Hawaii’s dates varied by location.77
71 Information on the terminology used to describe the process of voting in person before Election Day was
collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey.
72 Pennsylvania did not provide a response to this item.
73 In Missouri, an excuse is required for four weeks of the absentee voting period; voters may vote with no
excuse two weeks prior to the election. In Maine, voters may request an absentee ballot without a reason
up to the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet
requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required
to provide an excuse. New York does not require an excuse for in-person early voting but does require an
excuse for in-person absentee voting. Information on whether an excuse is required for voters to participate
in voting in person prior to Election Day was collected in item Q25a of the 2022 Policy Survey, Q24a of the
2020 Policy Survey, and Q12a of the 2018 Policy Survey.
74 In Missouri, an excuse is required for four weeks of the absentee voting period; voters may vote with not
excuse two weeks prior to the election. In Maine, voters may request an absentee ballot without a reason
up to the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet
requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required
to provide an excuse. New York does not require an excuse for in-person early voting but does require an
excuse for in-person absentee voting.
75 Thirteen states listed a start date between September 9, 2022 and October 7, 2022, whereas the
Northern Mariana Islands and Oklahoma listed a start date in early November 2022.
76 The U.S. Virgin Islands was the only one to list a final day that was not in November—their final day was
October 31, 2022.
77 Colorado commented that although October 24, 2022 was the first day that jurisdictions were required to
have in-person polling locations open, some may choose to start in-person voting earlier than that.
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Oregon, a vote-by-mail state, does not have early voting, but does allow in-person voting in
specific circumstances. For example, if a voter loses or spoils their ballot, they may appear at a
local elections office to be issued a new ballot; this is allowed through 8:00 p.m. on the night of
the election.78
Voter Identification
Under HAVA, Congress established minimum identification standards that an individual must
meet in order to register to vote:
o Individuals who register to vote at their state’s motor vehicles agency, another government
agency, or using an online registration portal are typically authenticated by presenting
appropriate documentation to the government agency and by the state matching the
person’s driver’s license number or last four digits of their social security number to an
existing state record.
o Individuals who register by mail and who have not voted before for federal office in their
state of residence are required to present, at some point before voting, either a current
and valid photo identification or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement, government check,
paycheck, or other government document that shows the person’s name and address.
o Individuals who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under UOCAVA or entitled to vote
other than in person under the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act or
other federal law are exempt from HAVA’s identification requirements.79
The definition of voter identification varies by state. In some states, it can mean a government-
issued document with a photograph, whereas in other states, it can mean a voter-executed
affidavit affirming identity. For in-person, non-first time voting, whether before or on Election Day,
most states (63.6%) reported that they require voters to present an acceptable form of
identification in order to cast a ballot in person. For 62.9% of those states, photo identification as
proof of their identity was required.80 In the case that a voter does not have an acceptable form of
identification at the polling site, 82.9% of states that require identification reported that the voter
may cast a provisional ballot. Just under half (48.6%) of states reported that the voter must return
at a later time to present appropriate identification to the election officials before their ballot can
be counted. In over one-fifth of states, voters can sign an affidavit affirming their identity, with no
other action required for the voter to vote. Additionally, in one-fifth of states, another person may
formally vouch for the voter’s identity.81 These states mentioned examples such as another voter
Wisconsin noted that the reported timeframe is when in-person voting may be held, but each municipality
determines the specific days and times within the reported timeframe that they will offer the option to their
voters.
78 Information on the calendar dates for the beginning of the early voting period and end of the early voting
period was collected in item Q25b of the Policy Survey.
79 52 USC 21083 (b)(3)(C)
80 Information on establishing a voter’s identity during in-person voting was collected in item Q37 of the
Policy Survey. Information on whether photo identification is required for voters to establish their identity for
in-person voting was collected in item Q37a of the Policy Survey.
81 Information on what happens if a person does not have acceptable identification at the polling site was
collected in item Q37b of the Policy Survey.
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registered to vote in the same precinct, a precinct election official, an adult or poll worker who
has known the voter for six months, and a village or county mayor.82
In Kentucky and Massachusetts, the deadline by which voters were required to present
appropriate identification to verify their identity and have their provisional ballots accepted and
counted was Election Day in 2022. Fifteen other states reported deadline dates that varied from
the day after Election Day (i.e., November 9, 2022) up to November 21, 2022.83
Provisional Voting
The EAC has issued best practices on the development of provisional voting procedures and
notice to voters to ensure provisional voting procedures are fair, transparent, effective, and
consistently applied to all voters in the state. The EAC states in its Best Practices on Provisional
Voting report:
Section 302 of HAVA creates the right for potential voters to cast provisional ballots
in the event their names do not appear on the registration list or the voters’ eligibility
is challenged by an election official. The issuance of a provisional ballot is best
described as a safety net or fail-safe for the voter, in that:
o It maintains the person’s intent to vote and selections until election officials
determine that the person does or does not have the right to cast a ballot in the
election.
o It allows the determination of the voter’s eligibility to be made at a time when
more perfect or complete information is available either from the voter or from
the election jurisdiction.84
HAVA specifies minimum requirements for notice to voters and provides opportunities for voters
to resolve eligibility issues. Within the federal framework, states have different methods of
complying with the provisional notification to voter requirements, using different technology and
different timetables. State and local election officials ultimately apply their policies, procedures,
and state legal requirements when deciding whether to count a provisional ballot. For example, a
state that has a stricter standard for the identification of voters than is contained in HAVA would
apply its standard to determine if a given provisional ballot meets the state’s ID standard.
Fifty states and territories reported using provisional ballots, and the reasons for offering
provisional ballots varied.85 The most common reason for having a voter cast a provisional ballot
was that a voter’s name does not appear on the list of eligible voters, followed by situations
82 In some of these examples, an extra step was required to verify the voter’s identity (e.g., in the case
where a precinct election official was vouching for the voter’s identity, both parties were required to sign an
affidavit).
83 Information on the deadline by which voters must present the appropriate identification to verify their
identity and have their provisional ballot accepted and counted was collected in item Q37c of the Policy
Survey.
84 U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, February 27). Best Practices on Provisional Voting.
https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/02/27/eac-best-practices-on-provisional-voting/.
85 States that reported not using provisional ballots were largely NVRA-exempt states.
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where an election official has asserted an individual is not eligible to vote.86 Table 5 provides a
full list of reasons the states use provisional ballots.
Table 5. States That Use Provisional Ballots Most Often Do So When a
Voter’s Name Does Not Appear on the List of Eligible Voters
Percentage of States That
Use Provisional Voting and
Reason for Offering Voters a Provisional Ballot
Offer Provisional Ballots
for the Listed Reason
A voter’s name does not appear on the list of eligible voters. 88%
An election official asserts that an individual is not eligible to
82%
vote.
A voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are
80%
attempting to vote.
A voter does not have proper identification (as defined by state
80%
law).
Another person (not an election official) challenges a voter’s
qualifications, and the poll worker is not able to resolve the 56%
challenge.
A voter has changed their name or address (within the election
jurisdiction) but has not updated their voter registration to 54%
reflect the new information.
A federal or state judge extends the polling place hours in a
50%
federal election.
A voter was issued a mail ballot, chooses to vote in person
instead, and does not have the mail ballot to surrender to poll 48%
workers.
Other 24%
Source: Information on the circumstances under which a state uses provisional ballots was collected in
item Q33a of the Policy Survey.
After the election, many states have a limited amount of time in which to adjudicate provisional
ballots and decide whether the ballots will be counted (either in full or in part) or rejected. In
27.1% of states, this deadline is by a specified date; for the November 8, 2022 general election,
these dates ranged from November 8, 2022 to November 28, 2022. Thirty-five states (72.9%)
indicated that this deadline is specified as a number of calendar days or business days after
Election Day.87, 88
86 Information on whether states use provisional ballots was collected in item Q33 of the Policy Survey.
Information on the circumstances under which a state will use provisional ballots was collected in item
Q33a of the Policy Survey.
87 Twenty-five states reported 1 to 30 calendar days after Election Day, and 10 states reported 1 to 7
business days after Election Day.
88 Information on the deadlines for adjudicating provisional ballots was collected in item Q33b of the Policy
Survey.
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Five (10.2%) of the states that use provisional ballots reported provisional ballots cast in the
wrong precinct would be fully counted, and 40.8% of the states reported that they would be
partially counted.89 About half of the states reported that these ballots would be rejected fully. An
elected or appointed group, such as a Board of Canvassers or a Board of Elections, is responsible
for reviewing provisional ballot information to determine if the ballots are eligible to be counted in
the majority of states (56%) that use provisional ballots. Other states report that this may be done
by a single election official (14%) or more than one election official (16%). American Samoa,
Arizona, Maryland, Maine, Missouri, Oregon, and Pennsylvania specified other sources.90
In most cases, the person or entity that ultimately certifies the eligibility of provisional ballots is
the same as the person or entity that reviews provisional ballots to determine if they are eligible
to be counted. In 36% of states, this is not the case. Most of these states explained a process
where an initial person or entity (most commonly a county clerk or local election staff) does a first
review to gather information on the eligibility of a provisional ballot, and then presents these
findings for final determination to a second person or entity (most commonly a review board—e.g.,
a board of canvassers).91
Election Technology
Voting system testing and certification are required in the majority of states (78.6%) by statute,
and a few states (12.5%) indicated that they require testing and certification through a formal
administrative rule or guidance. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands,
Mississippi, and Puerto Rico reported that voting system testing and certification before the
system’s approval for purchase is not required. The 2022 Policy Survey then asked states to
describe their policies regarding the role of the EAC and federal testing and certification. States
most commonly reported requiring testing by an EAC-accredited Voting System Test Laboratory
(VSTL; 49%), state and federal certification (47.1%), and/or EAC-adopted Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines (VVSG; 43.1%; see Figure 7).92
89 For example, a state might only count items on the ballot for which the voter would have been eligible
had they voted in the correct precinct.
90 Information on how states will treat a provisional ballot if it is cast in the wrong precinct was collected in
item Q33c of the Policy Survey. Information on who is responsible for reviewing provisional ballot
information to determine if the ballots are eligible to be counted was collected in item Q33d of the Policy
Survey.
91 Information on whether the person verifying or certifying the eligibility of the provisional ballots and the
person reviewing provisional ballots to determine if they are eligible to be counted was collected in item
Q33e of the Policy Survey.
92 Information on voting system testing and certification policies was collected in items Q14 and Q14a of
the Policy Survey.
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Figure 7. States That Require Voting System Testing Most Commonly Require
Testing From an EAC-Accredited VSTL
Source: Information on voting equipment testing and certification policy was collected in item Q14a of the
Policy Survey.
Some states provided clarifying comments. The District of Columbia reported that it requires that
voting systems must meet or exceed HAVA standards and/or be federally certified. Similarly,
Oregon reported that the system must be EAC certified or examined by a federally accredited
VSTL. Maine indicated that federal EAC certification according to VVSG is required or preferred,
but testing based on another state certification program may be acceptable. Alaska reported that
it may approve a voting system upon consideration by an election administrator,93 and Wyoming
required the voting system to have been implemented for use in at least two other states.
Although there is no testing or certification of electronic poll books—sometimes called e-poll
books—on the federal level,94 many states have their own process for testing or certifying these
machines before approving them for purchase. Of the 41 states (73.2%) that reported using e-poll
books either statewide or only in certain jurisdictions, 41.5% indicated that they do not require
testing or certification before the e-poll books’ approval for purchase. In another 41.5% of the
states that reported having e-poll book requirements, the testing and certification are required by
93 AK Stat § 15.20.910 (2016).
94 As of the time of this report’s publication, the EAC is developing a pilot program for testing and certifying
e-poll books.
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statute, whereas in 17.1% of the states, testing and certification are required by a formal
administrative rule or guidance.95
The 2022 Policy Survey asked whether any jurisdictions in the state use e-poll books and whether
testing and certification are required before e-poll books’ “approval for purchase.” The Policy
Survey and EAVS did not collect data on other procedures a jurisdiction may require before
authorizing the use of e-poll books, including but not limited to pre-election testing, secure
physical storage, contingency planning, chain-of-custody practices, and poll worker training.
Recounts, Audits, and Election Certification
Before state and local election officials certify the results of an election, they take steps to verify
that all established election procedures were followed and that all voting equipment functioned
properly. The Policy Survey asked states about the activities that took place after ballots were
counted, special circumstances that occur when certifying election results, and the context
behind these activities. Many states require additional post-election verification that the counting
process was accurate. These additional verifications may take the form of a partial recount (in
which ballots in randomly selected precincts are counted a second time to ensure that the initial
tabulation of votes was accurate) or a more detailed audit (in which the entire voting process is
reviewed and key steps are verified).
Recounts
An election recount is a repeat tabulation of votes cast in an election, and it is used to determine
the accuracy of an initial count. Many recounts may be of only one contest or portions of contest.
Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons and repeat tabulations may be conducted in
a variety of ways. The 2022 Policy Survey collected data on the reasons a recount could be
conducted for the 2022 general election (Figure 8); these questions did not ask if the reasons for
a recount were automatic, mandatory, or triggered, or whether states actually conducted the
recount for one of the specified reasons. States reported that the most common reason a recount
may be conducted is at the request of an affected candidate or party (60%). Less common
reasons were if the results of a contest were within a specified margin (47.3%) or that a court
ordered that a recount be conducted (45.5%). Among the listed response options in the survey
question, four states indicated other reasons that a jurisdiction within their state may conduct a
post-election recount.96 In Idaho, for example, the Secretary of State also conducts post-election
recounts where ballots are manually counted in randomly selected jurisdictions and precincts. In
Texas, a losing candidate in an election that used electronic voting systems can request a recount
no matter how wide the margin. Additionally, Mississippi noted that although the state does not
have recount procedures, a candidate who was on the ballot may conduct a ballot box
examination within 12 days of election certification to review its contents under the supervision of
a county circuit clerk; the candidate may choose to tally the votes in anticipation of a challenge to
an election.
95 Information on poll books was collected in items Q15 and Q15a of the Policy Survey. Illinois did not
provide a response to this item.
96 Information on state policies regarding election recounts was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey.
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Figure 8. Post-Election Recounts Can Most Often Be Conducted
at the Request of an Affected Candidate or Party
Source: Information on post-election recount policy was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey.
States conduct recounts in multiple ways. Most (60%) states reported that recounts can be
conducted via a machine recount of paper ballots or voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT),
whereas 51% reported a manual recount of paper ballots or VVPAT.97 Some states explained
other ways or additional circumstances that determine how recounts are done; for example,
Nevada reported that recounts must be conducted in the same manner in which the election was
conducted, and in Idaho, a regular recount entails manually tabulating a sample of ballots
followed by a run through the electronic tabulator—if the results align within a small margin of
error, then all remaining ballots are counted through the tabulator. Otherwise, all ballots are
recounted manually. In some states, a candidate or a court can specify the manner in which the
recount is done, or this can vary by the locality.
Audits
The 2022 Policy Survey expanded the series of questions asking states to report their auditing
activities, this time focusing on specific types of audits both before and after an election. These
auditing activities are defined in Table 6.
97 Information on how recounts are conducted was collected in item Q35a of the Policy Survey.
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Table 6. Auditing Activities Before and After an Election
Auditing Activity Definition
An assessment of whether legal procedures were
Access audit followed to ensure the election’s accessibility to voters
with disabilities.
An assessment of the usability of the ballot(s) in an
election, often focusing particularly on voters with
Ballot design audit
disabilities or voters who use ballots in languages other
than English.
A comparison of the published election results with the
number of voters who signed poll books during in-
Ballot reconciliation audit
person voting or whose mail ballot envelopes were
checked in.
An audit that examines whether the established
Compliance audit or procedural
processes and procedures were followed throughout
audit
the election.
A process to verify that the ballots that were counted
Eligibility audit
were legally cast.
An assessment of whether election practices comply
Legal audit
with all applicable federal, state, and local laws.
A test to examine whether voting machines are
tabulating votes correctly before vote tabulation begins,
Logic and accuracy testing
usually by creating a test deck of ballots and running
them through the machines.
A sample of ballots are selected and re-tabulated, and
Post-election tabulation audit the results are compared to the originally reported vote
totals.
Source: Information on the type of audits states conduct was collected in item Q36 of the Policy Survey.
States were able to specify other types of audits that were unlisted in the question item.
Nearly all states reported conducting logic and accuracy testing (94.6%), which examines whether
voting machines are tabulating votes correctly before vote tabulation begins. The majority of
states (76.4%) also reported conducting some form of post-election tabulation audits, which is
when a sample of ballots are selected and retabulated and the results are compared to the
originally reported vote totals. The least common auditing activities were legal audits (conducted
in New Hampshire and South Carolina) and ballot design audits (conducted in American
Samoa).98 Some states reported additional auditing procedures not listed in the survey options.
North Carolina, for example, conducts close-contest99 audits and audits of provisional ballots that
are counted to ensure that the proper procedures were followed. As part of their auditing
procedures, Maryland conducts a comprehensive audit that includes 17 separate audits of the
voting system, polling place operations, and post-election conciliation. Alabama piloted a post-
election audit in three jurisdictions, and Kentucky reported piloting a risk-limiting audit that will
98 Information on the type of post-election audits states conduct was collected in item Q36 of the Policy
Survey.
99 North Carolina did not define what the threshold was for a “close contest.”
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become a statewide process in 2023. Additionally, Kentucky requires the attorney general to
randomly select 12 jurisdictions to conduct their own audit. Figure 9 displays the different types
of auditing activities that states conduct.
Figure 9. Most Common Auditing Activities were Logic and Accuracy Testing
and Post-Election Tabulation Audits
Source: Information on auditing activities was collected in item Q36 of the 2022 Policy Survey.
States that conduct post-election audits most commonly indicated that they are conducted as a
statutory requirement (92.9%). Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, and Utah stated that they conduct
an audit as required by a formal administrative rule or guidance.100 In Oklahoma, although post-
election tabulation audits are optional under state law, they will be authorized by the Secretary of
State Election Board.101 The Policy Survey did not collect information on whether these audits
were mandatory, triggered, or conducted only in certain circumstances.
The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report which of the following post-election tabulation
audits would be required for the 2022 general election. States could select multiple options as
applicable:
o A traditional, manual tabulation audit that comes from a fixed percentage of randomly
selected voting districts or voting machines and is compared to the results produced by
the voting system;
100 Information on whether states require post-election tabulation audits was collected in item Q36a of the
Policy Survey.
101 See 26 O.S. Section 3-130.
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o A traditional, machine tabulation audit that involves the same procedure as above but
involves machine, rather than manual, counting;
o A risk-limiting tabulation audit that is a protocol designed to limit the risk of certifying an
incorrect election outcome by using statistical methods to select the audit sample size; or
o Another type of audit.
Almost two-thirds of the states reported requiring a traditional manual tabulation audit, and just
under one-fourth reported requiring a traditional machine tabulation audit. Additionally, about
one-fifth of the states reported requiring a risk-limiting tabulation audit.102 Eleven states (26.2%)
provided comments detailing alternative procedures. For example, California stated that a
jurisdiction may choose to conduct a risk-limiting audit instead of a traditional tabulation audit,
and Pennsylvania reported that its local jurisdictions may be performing a risk-limiting audit, but
the details have not yet been finalized and are not statutorily required.
Some states reported having additional steps in their tabulation audit processes. For example,
Maryland stated that it conducts a traditional manual audit as well as a completely automated
tabulation audit using ballot images. New York noted that although an audit may be conducted
using an automated audit tool (similar to machine tabulation), there is still a component that
requires manual review based on the overall number of ballots being audited. Washington
reported that local election officials can choose among several methods to meet the state post-
election tabulation audit requirement, including the option for a risk-limiting audit. South Carolina
detailed a process where an independent, third-party vendor uses ballot images to tabulate all
ballots cast throughout the state, the results of which are compared to the results produced by
the voting system vendor.
Election Certification
State and federal election results are not final until the state completes their official certification.
The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to provide their election certification deadlines for the 2022
general election.103 The range was broad,104 with 47 states reporting a date between November
15, 2022 and December 8, 2022.105 States provided clarifying comments on their specific
policies regarding their certification deadline. For example, Delaware, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island reported not having a specific state certification deadline, and the District of
Columbia and Louisiana noted that their reported dates were tentative deadlines. Additionally,
Alaska commented that their reported date was a target deadline, and North Carolina noted their
reported deadline was barring recounts or protests in individual races.
102 Information on the type of post-election tabulation audit that states require was collected in item Q36b
of the Policy Survey.
103 Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in 2022.
104 The range was as early as November 10, 2022 in Delaware and as late as December 8, 2022 in Illinois.
105 Information on deadlines for certifying the November 2022 general election results was collected in
item Q34 of the Policy Survey.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Tables
Policy Survey Table 1: State Voter Registration Databases
Electronic Data Transfers
Frequency of
Information Agencies
Type of Motor State Public
State Transmission Serving People
Database Vehicle Assistance
From Local with
Jurisdictions Agency Agencies
Disabilities
Alabama Top-down -- Daily -- --
Alaska Top-down -- Daily -- --
American Samoa Top-down -- -- -- --
Arizona Hybrid Real time only Real time -- --
Arkansas Top-down -- Daily -- --
California Bottom-up Real time only Real time -- --
Colorado Top-down -- Daily -- --
Connecticut Top-down -- Daily -- --
Delaware Top-down -- Real time On demand On demand
District of Columbia Top-down -- Real time -- --
Real time and
Florida Hybrid Daily -- --
daily
Georgia Top-down -- Daily -- --
Guam Top-down -- On demand -- --
Hawaii Hybrid Real time only Other -- --
Idaho Hybrid Real time only On demand -- --
Illinois Bottom-up Daily only Daily Real time Real time
Indiana Top-down -- Daily -- --
Iowa Top-down -- Daily -- --
Kansas Top-down -- Daily -- --
Kentucky Top-down -- Real time -- --
Louisiana Top-down -- Daily -- --
Maine Hybrid Real time only Daily -- --
Maryland Top-down -- Daily Daily Daily
Massachusetts Top-down -- Daily -- Daily
Michigan Top-down -- Daily -- --
Minnesota Top-down -- Daily -- --
Mississippi Top-down -- Real time -- --
Missouri Bottom-up Real time only Daily -- --
Montana Top-down -- Weekly -- --
Nebraska [1] Top-down -- Other -- --
Nevada Bottom-up Daily only Daily -- --
New Hampshire Top-down -- Other -- --
New Jersey Top-down -- Daily -- --
New Mexico Top-down -- Real time -- --
New York Bottom-up Real time only -- -- --
North Carolina Top-down -- Daily -- --
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Electronic Data Transfers
Frequency of
Information Agencies
Type of Motor State Public
State Transmission Serving People
Database Vehicle Assistance
From Local with
Jurisdictions Agency Agencies
Disabilities
North Dakota Top-down -- Daily -- --
Northern Mariana
Top-down -- -- -- --
Islands
Ohio Bottom-up Real time only Daily -- --
Oklahoma Top-down -- Daily -- --
Oregon Top-down -- Daily -- --
Pennsylvania Top-down -- Daily Real time Real time
Puerto Rico [2] N/A N/A -- -- --
Rhode Island Top-down -- Daily -- --
South Carolina Top-down -- Weekly Weekly Weekly
South Dakota Top-down -- Daily -- --
Tennessee Bottom-up Daily only Monthly -- --
Real time and
Texas [3] Hybrid Daily -- --
daily
U.S. Virgin Islands Top-down -- -- -- --
Utah [4] Hybrid Real time only Daily Weekly Weekly
Vermont Top-down -- Daily -- --
Virginia Top-down -- Real time -- --
Washington Hybrid Real time only Real time Real time Real time
West Virginia Top-down -- Daily -- --
Wisconsin [5] Top-down -- Other -- --
Wyoming Top-down -- Daily -- --
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Electronic Data Transfers
Entities that
Entities Entities Maintain
Military that that Records of
State Other State Federal
Recruiting Maintain Maintain Individuals
Agencies Agencies
Offices Death Felony Declared
Records Records Mentally
Incompetent
Alabama -- -- -- Daily Daily --
Alaska Other -- -- -- -- --
American Samoa -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
Arizona -- -- -- -- -- --
Arkansas -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
California -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --
Colorado -- -- -- Monthly Daily --
Connecticut -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
On On
Delaware -- On demand Monthly On demand
demand demand
District of
-- -- -- Other -- --
Columbia
Florida -- -- -- Daily Daily --
Georgia -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
Guam -- -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii -- -- -- Monthly -- --
Idaho -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois Real time -- -- Other Weekly --
Indiana -- -- -- Monthly Daily --
Iowa -- -- -- -- -- --
Kansas -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --
Kentucky -- -- -- -- -- --
Louisiana -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
Maine -- -- -- Monthly -- --
Maryland Daily -- -- Monthly Monthly Other
Massachusetts -- -- -- -- -- --
Michigan -- -- -- -- -- --
Minnesota Daily -- -- Monthly Monthly Monthly
Mississippi -- -- -- Real time Real time --
Missouri -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --
Montana -- -- -- Monthly Weekly --
Nebraska [1] -- -- -- Weekly Monthly --
Nevada -- -- -- -- -- --
New Hampshire -- Other -- Other -- --
New Jersey -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --
New Mexico -- -- -- Other Other --
New York -- -- -- Monthly Monthly Monthly
North Carolina -- -- -- Monthly Daily --
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- --
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Electronic Data Transfers
Entities that
Entities Entities Maintain
Military that that Records of
State Other State Federal
Recruiting Maintain Maintain Individuals
Agencies Agencies
Offices Death Felony Declared
Records Records Mentally
Incompetent
Northern Mariana
-- -- -- Monthly Daily --
Islands
Ohio -- -- -- Monthly -- --
Oklahoma -- -- -- -- -- --
Oregon -- -- -- -- -- --
Pennsylvania -- -- -- Other -- --
Puerto Rico [2] -- -- -- -- -- --
Rhode Island -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
South Carolina -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
South Dakota -- -- -- Daily Daily Daily
Tennessee -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
Texas [3] -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --
On
U.S. Virgin Islands -- -- -- -- --
demand
Utah [4] Weekly Weekly Monthly Other Monthly Other
Vermont -- -- -- -- -- --
Virginia -- -- -- Other Monthly Monthly
Washington Real time -- -- Monthly Monthly Monthly
West Virginia -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --
Wisconsin [5] -- -- -- Monthly Daily --
Wyoming -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --
Policy Survey Table 1 Calculation Notes:
Type of Database uses question Q3.
Frequency of Information Transmission From Local Jurisdictions uses question Q3a.
Electronic Data Transfers, Motor Vehicle Agency uses question Q4a.
Electronic Data Transfers, Agencies Serving People with Disabilities uses question Q4b.
Electronic Data Transfers, State Public Assistance Agencies uses question Q4c.
Electronic Data Transfers, Other State Agencies uses question Q4d.
Electronic Data Transfers, Federal Agencies uses question Q4e.
Electronic Data Transfers, Military Recruiting Offices uses question Q4f.
Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Death Records uses question Q4g.
Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Felony Records uses question Q4h.
Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Records of Individuals Declared Mentally Incompetent
uses question Q4i.
Policy Survey Table 1 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q3 and Q4 were single-select questions. Q3a allowed states to select multiple responses.
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[1] Nebraska verifies driver’s license/state ID and SSN information with real-time data transfers. Voter
registrations at DMV, surrendered IDs, changed IDs, SSNs needing verification from the Social
Security Administration, and DMV signatures are acquired via daily transfers.
[2] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a
response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
[3] Most counties transmit data in real time, but larger counties transmit data overnight.
[4] All data entry is done by the local jurisdictions. The state hosts and maintains the voter registration
platform.
[5] Wisconsin receives data from the state’s motor vehicle agency in real time when a voter is
completing a registration online, and receives data daily during full DMV checks run against voter
registrations that were created or updated with certain data into the database in the 24 hours prior
to the full DMV checks. Wisconsin receives some competency data electronically by email from the
courts.
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Policy Survey Table 2: Voter Registration Policies
Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election Minimum Age
State In-Person Early Registration for Pre-
Election Day Other Cases Registration
Voting Overlap
Alabama -- -- -- -- 17.5
Alaska -- -- -- -- 17
American
No Yes No No 17
Samoa [1]
Arizona -- -- -- -- 16
Arkansas [2] -- -- -- -- 17
California Yes Yes Yes No 16
Colorado Yes Yes No No 16
Connecticut Yes No No No 17
Delaware -- -- -- -- 16
District of
Yes Yes No No 16
Columbia [3]
Florida -- -- -- -- 16
Georgia -- -- -- -- 17.5
Guam -- -- -- -- 16
Hawaii Yes Yes No No 16
Idaho Yes Yes Yes No 17
Illinois [4] Yes Yes Yes No 17
Indiana [5] -- -- -- -- 17
Iowa Yes Yes Yes No 17
Kansas -- -- -- -- 17
Kentucky -- -- -- -- 17
Louisiana [6] -- -- -- -- 16
Maine Yes Yes Yes No 16
Maryland Yes Yes No No 16
Massachusetts
No No Yes No 16
[7]
Michigan Yes Yes No No 17.5
Minnesota Yes Yes Yes No 17
Mississippi -- -- -- -- 17
Missouri -- -- -- -- 17.5
Montana [8] Yes Yes Yes No 17
Nebraska No No Yes No --
Nevada [9] Yes Yes Yes No 17
New Hampshire
Yes No No No 17
[10]
New Jersey -- -- -- -- 17
New Mexico Yes Yes Yes No 17
New York -- -- -- -- 16
North Carolina
No Yes No Yes 16
[11]
North Dakota
-- -- -- -- --
[12]
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Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election Minimum Age
State In-Person Early Registration for Pre-
Election Day Other Cases Registration
Voting Overlap
Northern
Mariana -- -- -- -- 17
Islands [13]
Ohio -- -- -- -- 17
Oklahoma [14] -- -- -- -- 17.5
Oregon [15] -- -- -- -- 16
Pennsylvania
-- -- -- -- 17
[16]
Puerto Rico
N/A N/A N/A N/A 14
[17]
Rhode Island -- -- -- -- 16
South Carolina
-- -- -- -- 17
[18]
South Dakota -- -- -- -- 17
Tennessee [19] -- -- -- -- 17
Texas -- -- -- -- --
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- 17.5
Islands
Utah Yes Yes Yes No 16
Vermont [20] Yes Yes No No 16
Virginia [21] Yes Yes No No 16
Washington Yes Yes Yes No 16
West Virginia
-- -- -- -- 17
[22]
Wisconsin [23] Yes Yes No Yes 17
Wyoming [24] Yes Yes Yes No 17
Policy Survey Table 2 Calculation Notes:
Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Election Day uses question Q8a.
Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, In-Person Early Voting uses question Q8a.
Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Registration Overlap uses question Q8a.
Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Other Cases uses question Q8a.
Minimum Age for Pre-Registration uses question Q9.
Policy Survey Table 2 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q8 and Q9 were single-select questions. Q8a allowed states to select multiple responses.
• Same-day registration (SDR) is defined as a voter registering to vote on the same day that they
cast a ballot in person.
[1] A person may pre-register to vote during an election year so long as they turn 18 years old before
the date of the election.
[2] Voter must be 18 years old on or before Election Day in order to vote.
[3] The District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) sent a ballot to every registered voter for the
November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was
passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction.
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[4] Seventeen-year-olds may register if they will be 18 by the date of the general election.
[5] A person who is 17 years of age, but will be 18 years of age on or before the next general or
municipal election in their precinct, may register to vote.
[6] Individuals who are 16 years of age must register in person at the registrar or with their application
for a driver’s license. Individuals who are 17 years old may pre-register via any method.
[7] There was a 1-week period during in-person early voting when voters were able to register and vote
at the same time. Early voting in person began on October 22, 2022, and the voter registration
deadline was October 29, 2022.
[8] Due to a District Court decision and at the time that this survey was filled out by the State of
Montana, SDR was not allowed. However, shortly after that decision, SDR was allowed by court order
and the 2022 general election proceeded under that decision. Only precinct-to-precinct address
changes within the same county or registrations that moved from inactive to active status are
allowed on Election Day. Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-2-205 outlines the procedure when a
prospective elector is not qualified at the time of registration (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca
/title_0130/chapter_0020/part_0020/section_0050/0130-0020-0020-0050.html).
[9] Each county determines the available dates and hours during which drop boxes will be available
based on facility, staffing, and security resources available to the county. Some counties have
permanently installed drop boxes that are available to the public at all times for county business.
Others will make drop boxes available starting in the hours of early voting.
[10] Voters may pre-register to vote at age 17 as long as they will be 18 before the next scheduled
election.
[11] Same-day voter registration was only available during the early in-person voting period, which ran
from October 20, 2022 to November 5, 2022. SDR was not available on Election Day.
[12] North Dakota does not have voter registration.
[13] Voters may pre-register to vote if they will turn 18 on or before Election Day.
[14] Oklahoma does not accept absentee ballots by the postmark date; absentee ballots must be
received by the county election board by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[15] Oregon’s registration cutoff is 21 days before each election. A voter could register that day and
request an absentee ballot, which would be mailed to them. Additionally, by registering to vote, an
individual is requesting a mail ballot since Oregon is a vote-by-mail state.
[16] Prior to the close of the voter registration period, a voter may go to their local county voter
registration office, register to vote, apply for a mail ballot, and vote a mail ballot all in one visit. The
mail ballot will then be canvassed and counted in the same manner as other mail ballots are
canvassed and counted. A person may register to vote prior to their 18th birthday as long as they will
be 18 by the upcoming election.
[17] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide
a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
[18] A person who will be 18 years old by the date of an election can begin registering 120 days prior to
the voter registration deadline for the election, or if there is a primary associated with the election,
120 days prior to the voter registration deadline for the primary.
[19] A 17-year-old who will be 18 by the next election in their jurisdiction can register to vote.
[20] A person can register to vote as long as they will be 18 years old on or before the date of the
general election.
[21] Prior to October 1, 2022, 17-year-olds could pre-register according to VA Code § 24.2-403. On
October 1, 2022, 16-year-olds became eligible to pre-register (see § 24.2-403.1).
[22] West Virginia does not have formal pre-registration; however, voters who are 17 years of age may
register and vote in a primary election as long as they are 18 by the general election.
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[23] In Wisconsin, voters are allowed to register in the clerk’s office any time through 5:00 p.m. the
Friday before Election Day. They can also vote in-person absentee ballots from 2 weeks prior to the
election through the Sunday prior to the election, so there is an overlap of time where they may
register to vote and complete their absentee ballot on the same day at the clerk’s office. Individuals
who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the
same day any time from the Tuesday prior to Election Day through 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Individuals who are 17 years old and will be turning 18 by the next upcoming election may pre-
register to vote.
[24] W.S. 22-3-102(a)(ii) states that an individual must “be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the
day of the next general election.”
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Policy Survey Table 3: State Mail Voting Policies
Populations Who May
Excuse Required
State All-Mail Elections Register as Permanent
for Mail Voting
Absentee Voters
Alabama Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other
Alaska [1] No -- No permanent absentee voting
American Samoa [2] Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
Arizona [3] No -- Any registrant
Arkansas Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
California [4] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
Colorado No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
Connecticut Yes -- Persons with disabilities
Delaware [5] Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other
District of Columbia No Statewide Any registrant
Florida [6] No -- No permanent absentee voting
Georgia [7] No -- No permanent absentee voting
Guam Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
Hawaii [8] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
Idaho No -- No permanent absentee voting
Illinois [9] No -- Any registrant
Indiana Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
Iowa No -- No permanent absentee voting
Kansas [10] No -- Persons with disabilities
Kentucky [11] Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
Individuals over a specified
Louisiana Yes --
age, Persons with disabilities
Maine [12] No -- No permanent absentee voting
Maryland No -- Any registrant
Massachusetts [13] No -- Other
Michigan [14] No -- Any registrant
Minnesota No Certain Jurisdictions No permanent absentee voting
Mississippi Yes -- Persons with disabilities
Missouri Yes -- Persons with disabilities
Montana [15] No -- Any registrant
Nebraska [16] No Certain Jurisdictions No permanent absentee voting
Nevada No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
New Hampshire Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
New Jersey No -- Any registrant
New Mexico [17] No Certain Jurisdictions No permanent absentee voting
New York Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other
North Carolina No -- No permanent absentee voting
North Dakota [18] No -- No permanent absentee voting
Northern Mariana Islands No -- No permanent absentee voting
Ohio No -- No permanent absentee voting
Oklahoma [19] No -- No permanent absentee voting
Oregon No Statewide Other
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Populations Who May
Excuse Required
State All-Mail Elections Register as Permanent
for Mail Voting
Absentee Voters
Pennsylvania [20] No -- Any registrant
Puerto Rico [21] N/A N/A N/A
Rhode Island No -- Persons with disabilities
South Carolina Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
South Dakota No -- No permanent absentee voting
Tennessee [22] Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other
Texas Yes -- No permanent absentee voting
U.S. Virgin Islands No -- No permanent absentee voting
Utah [23] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
Vermont No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
Virginia [24] No -- Any registrant
Washington [25] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting
West Virginia Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other
Wisconsin [26] No -- Persons with disabilities, Other
Wyoming [27] No -- No permanent absentee voting
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Drop Box Operational Dates
State Allows Drop
State Boxes First Date Final Date
Alabama No -- --
Alaska [1] Yes 09/26/2022 11/08/2022
American Samoa [2] No -- --
Arizona [3] Yes 10/12/2022 11/08/2022
Arkansas Yes 10/14/2022 11/08/2022
California [4] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022
Colorado Yes 10/17/2022 11/08/2022
Connecticut Yes 10/07/2022 11/08/2022
Delaware [5] No -- --
District of Columbia Yes 10/14/2022 11/08/2022
Florida [6] Yes 10/24/2022 11/08/2022
Georgia [7] Yes 10/17/2022 11/04/2022
Guam No -- --
Hawaii [8] Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022
Idaho Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022
Illinois [9] Yes 10/03/2022 11/08/2022
Indiana Yes 09/01/2022 11/08/2022
Iowa Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022
Kansas [10] Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022
Kentucky [11] Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022
Louisiana No -- --
Maine [12] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022
Maryland Yes 09/26/2022 11/08/2022
Massachusetts [13] Yes 09/15/2022 11/08/2022
Michigan [14] Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022
Minnesota Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022
Mississippi No -- --
Missouri No -- --
Montana [15] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022
Nebraska [16] Yes 09/30/2022 11/08/2022
Nevada Yes 10/22/2022 11/08/2022
New Hampshire No -- --
New Jersey Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022
New Mexico [17] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022
New York Yes 10/29/2022 11/08/2022
North Carolina No -- --
North Dakota [18] Yes 10/31/2022 11/07/2022
Northern Mariana Islands No -- --
Ohio Yes 10/12/2022 11/08/2022
Oklahoma [19] No -- --
Oregon Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022
Pennsylvania [20] Yes 09/21/2022 11/08/2022
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Drop Box Operational Dates
State Allows Drop
State Boxes First Date Final Date
Puerto Rico [21] N/A N/A N/A
Rhode Island Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022
South Carolina No -- --
South Dakota Yes 09/23/2022 11/07/2022
Tennessee [22] No -- --
Texas No -- --
U.S. Virgin Islands No -- --
Utah [23] Yes 10/17/2022 11/08/2022
Vermont Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022
Virginia [24] Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022
Washington [25] Yes 10/21/2022 11/08/2022
West Virginia No -- --
Wisconsin [26] Yes 09/25/2022 11/08/2022
Wyoming [27] Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022
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State
Deadline for Deadline for
Allows Mail Deadline for Curing
State Postmarking Mail Receiving Mail
Ballot Mail Ballots
Ballots Ballots
Curing
Alabama No -- Not required Election Day
10 calendar
Alaska [1] No -- Election Day days after
Election Day
American Samoa [2] No -- Election Day Election Day
Arizona [3] Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day
Arkansas Yes 11/14/2022 Not required Election Day
7 calendar days
California [4] Yes 12/06/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
Colorado Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day
1 day before Election
Connecticut No -- Election Day
Day
Delaware [5] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
7 calendar days
District of Columbia Yes 11/15/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
Florida [6] Yes 11/10/2022 Not required Election Day
Georgia [7] Yes 11/11/2022 Not required Election Day
10 business
Guam No -- Election Day days after
Election Day
Hawaii [8] Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day
Idaho Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
14 calendar
Illinois [9] Yes 11/11/2022 Election Day days after
Election Day
Indiana Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day
Iowa Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
3 business days
Kansas [10] Yes 11/21/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
Kentucky [11] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
1 day before
Louisiana Yes 11/07/2022 Not required
Election Day
Maine [12] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
10 calendar
Maryland Yes 11/18/2022 Election Day days after
Election Day
3 calendar days
Massachusetts [13] Yes 11/08/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
Michigan [14] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
Minnesota No -- Not required Election Day
5 business days
Mississippi Yes 11/18/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
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State
Deadline for Deadline for
Allows Mail Deadline for Curing
State Postmarking Mail Receiving Mail
Ballot Mail Ballots
Ballots Ballots
Curing
Missouri No -- Not required Election Day
Montana [15] Yes 11/09/2022 Not required Election Day
Nebraska [16] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
4 calendar days
Nevada Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
New Hampshire Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
6 calendar days
New Jersey Yes 11/19/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
New Mexico [17] Yes 11/25/2022 Not required Election Day
7 calendar days
New York Yes 12/05/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
3 business days
North Carolina Yes 11/17/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
13 calendar
1 day before Election
North Dakota [18] No -- days after
Day
Election Day
Northern Mariana
No -- Not required Election Day
Islands
10 calendar
1 day before Election
Ohio Yes 11/15/2022 days after
Day
Election Day
Oklahoma [19] No -- Not required Election Day
7 calendar days
Oregon Yes 11/29/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
Pennsylvania [20] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
Puerto Rico [21] N/A N/A Election Day N/A
7 calendar days
Rhode Island Yes 11/15/2022 Not required after Election
Day
South Carolina No -- Not required Election Day
South Dakota No -- Not required Election Day
Tennessee [22] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
1 business day
Texas Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
10 calendar
U.S. Virgin Islands No -- Not required days after
Election Day
13 calendar
1 day before Election
Utah [23] Yes 11/14/2022 days after
Day
Election Day
Vermont Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
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State
Deadline for Deadline for
Allows Mail Deadline for Curing
State Postmarking Mail Receiving Mail
Ballot Mail Ballots
Ballots Ballots
Curing
3 calendar days
Virginia [24] Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
20 calendar
Washington [25] Yes 11/28/2022 Election Day days after
Election Day
6 calendar days
West Virginia Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day after Election
Day
Wisconsin [26] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
Wyoming [27] No -- Not required Election Day
Policy Survey Table 3 Calculation Notes:
Excuse Required for Mail Voting uses question Q16.
All-Mail Elections uses questions Q17 and Q17a.
Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters uses questions Q18 and Q18a.
State Allows Drop Boxes uses question Q19.
Drop Box Operational Dates, First Date uses question Q19c.
Drop Box Operational Dates, Final Date uses question Q19c.
State Allows Mail Ballot Curing uses question Q20.
Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots uses question Q20b.
Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots uses question Q21.
Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots uses question Q21.
Policy Survey Table 3 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q16, Q17, Q17a, Q18, Q19, Q19c, Q20, Q20b, and Q21 were single-select questions. Q18a
allowed states to select multiple responses.
• An all-mail election is an election in which all registered voters or all active registered voters
are automatically sent a mail ballot. Some in-person voting may take place during all-mail
elections. All-mail elections may be conducted statewide or only in certain jurisdictions within a
state.
• A drop box is a locked container (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters’
authorized representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for
collection. Drop boxes are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate
from ballot boxes, which are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots
immediately after voting in person.
• A cured mail ballot is defined as a returned mail ballot that was originally rejected for an error
or because it was missing required information but was ultimately counted because the voter
corrected the error or supplied the required information.
[1] Drop boxes are only available when election offices are open.
[2] If a mail ballot is received within 7 days after Election Day and it is postmarked on or before
Election Day, the ballot may be counted.
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[3] The deadline to cure ballots with a missing signature was Election Day. The deadline to cure ballots
with a non-matching signature was 5 business days after Election Day; for counties with a 4-
business-day work week, this deadline fell on November 17, 2022.
[4] Mail ballots needed to be postmarked on or before Election Day and received by November 15,
2022.
[5] Absentee ballots were required to be received by the election office that issued the ballot by the
close of polls on Election Day.
[6] Mail ballots were required to be received no later than 7:00 p.m. local time on Election Day in the
office of the supervisor of elections.
[7] Drop boxes were available only during the dates and hours of advance voting.
[8] Drop box availability varied by county and location. Drop boxes were closed on Election Day at 7:00
p.m. Regardless of postmark date, ballots were required to be received by the County Clerk’s office
by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[9] Election authorities shall accept any vote-by-mail ballot returned, including ballots returned with
insufficient or no postage. Election authorities may maintain one or more secure collection sites for
the postage-free return of vote-by-mail ballots. Any election authority with collection sites shall collect
all ballots returned each day and process them as required, including noting the day on which the
ballot was collected. Ballots returned to such collection sites after close of business shall be dated
as delivered the next day, with the exception of ballots delivered on Election Day, which shall be
dated as received on Election Day. Election authorities shall permit electors to return vote-by-mail
ballots at any established collection site through the close of polls on Election Day. All collection sites
shall be secured by locks that may be opened only by election authority personnel. The State Board
of Elections shall establish additional guidelines for the security of collection sites.
[10] Due to Veteran’s Day, the 3rd business day after the 2022 general election was the Monday after
Election Day.
[11] Ballots were required to be received by 6:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[12] Ballots must be received by the municipal clerk by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[13] Voters with a letter from a physician stating they are unable to vote in person are eligible to be
permanent absentee voters. Only certain types of mail ballot errors may be cured (non-matching
voter signature, missing voter signature, or missing/incomplete required document).
[14] There is no formal start date for drop boxes.
[15] Montana uses the term “absentee ballots” rather than “mail ballots.” Montana uses “places of
deposit” instead of “ballot drop boxes.”
[16] Counties with a population under 10,000 may apply to the Secretary of State to conduct all-mail
elections for any or all of the precincts in the county for all future elections per Neb. Rev. Stat. §32-
960. The only exception to the deadline to cure is if there is a non-matching signature. Non-matching
signatures can be cured through the close of the provisional verification deadline (7 business days
after the election). For the 2022 general election, the deadline to cure a non-matching signature was
November 18.
[17] Drop boxes are available to voters 24 hours a day, up until 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[18] The dates that drop boxes are available is set at the discretion of the counties.
[19] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
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[20] Any registrant who is permanently disabled can request to be a permanent absentee voter. Any
registrant can request to be a permanent mail-in voter. Voters must re-apply for a ballot every year.
Voters with a permanent mail-in voter flag receive a ballot application from the county every year. If
they complete the application and are eligible, mail ballots are granted for all elections that year.
County election boards define the times drop boxes are open based on county election board
decisions. This can vary from county to county and hence the first day of drop boxes is not a valid
answer. For the last day of drop boxes, the counties can decide on this too. The ballots must be
received no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted. This question is not meaningful for
Pennsylvania. Specific dates cannot be selected in this question since the start date and end date
varies by county. Counties are permitted (but not required) to allow voters to cure deficiencies.
[21] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide
a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election. The voter shall return
the voted ballots to the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission (PR-SEC) by mail. Ballots must be
postmarked no later than the date of the voting event or general election. Valid ballots must be
received by mail, on or before the last day of the voting event general canvass, to be counted.
[22] Mail ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.
[23] Utah Code 20a-3a-401(5)(d)(ii) states that if an individual whose ballot is rejected because the
signature on the individual’s return envelope is not reasonably consistent with the individual’s
signature on their voter registration records, the individual should return an affidavit to the election
office no later than 5:00 p.m. the day before the canvass in order for the individual to have their
ballot counted.
[24] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter’s absentee ballot properly postmarked must be
returned by noon on the 3rd day after the election. Since that day fell on a holiday after the 2022
general election, Virginia Code § 1-210 required changing the deadline to noon on Monday,
November 14, 2022.
[25] Ballot drop boxes closed at 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots were required to be
postmarked by November 8, 2022 and received by the county elections office by November 28,
2022.
[26] In Wisconsin, individuals may claim a need to be a permanent absentee voter for reasons of age
(not specified), physical illness, infirmity, or disability for an indefinite period of time. Ballots can be
cured for missing voter signature, missing witness signature, or missing witness address. They must
be cured by no later than the close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day. Wisconsin does not track if a
ballot requires a voter to cure a ballot or which ballots were counted after being cured. Due to a
recent court challenge, the use of drop boxes “is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop
box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated alternate site
under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and the
subsequent ambiguity created by the decision means that most drop boxes were either closed or
moved into the clerk’s office, and reporting would be unlikely or unnecessary given the added layer of
security and placement. (see Teigen v. WEC, 403 Wis.2d 607). All ballots must be returned by close
of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.
[27] Drop boxes are not addressed in statute. Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Election Law and Procedure | 108
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Policy Survey Table 4: UOCAVA Voting
Deadline for Domestic
Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters
Military UOCAVA Voters
State
Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt
7 calendar days 7 calendar days
Alabama Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
10 calendar days 15 calendar days
Alaska Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
American Samoa Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day
Arizona Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
10 business days 10 business days
Arkansas Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
7 calendar days 7 calendar days
California Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
8 calendar days 8 calendar days
Colorado Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
Connecticut Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day
Delaware Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
7 business days 7 business days
District of Columbia Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
10 calendar days
Florida [1] Not required Election Day Election Day
after Election Day
3 business days 3 business days
Georgia [2] Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
10 business days 10 business days
Guam Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
Hawaii Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Idaho Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
14 calendar days 14 calendar days
Illinois Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
10 calendar days 10 calendar days
Indiana [3] Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
1 day before 6 calendar days 1 day before 6 calendar days
Iowa
Election Day after Election Day Election Day after Election Day
Kansas Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Kentucky Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day
Louisiana Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Maine Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
10 calendar days 10 calendar days
Maryland [4] Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
3 calendar days 10 calendar days
Massachusetts Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
Michigan Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Minnesota Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
5 business days 5 business days
Mississippi Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
3 calendar days 3 business days
Missouri [5] Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
Montana [6] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Nebraska [7] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
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Deadline for Domestic
Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters
Military UOCAVA Voters
State
Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt
4 calendar days 4 calendar days
Nevada Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
New Hampshire [8] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
New Jersey Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
New Mexico [9] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
13 calendar days 13 calendar days
New York Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
9 calendar days 9 calendar days
North Carolina [10] Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
1 day before 13 calendar days 1 day before 13 calendar days
North Dakota
Election Day after Election Day Election Day after Election Day
Northern Mariana
Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day
Islands
10 calendar days 10 calendar days
Ohio Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
Oklahoma [11] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
7 calendar days 7 calendar days
Oregon Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
7 calendar days 7 calendar days
Pennsylvania [12] Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
Puerto Rico [13] Election Day N/A Election Day N/A
7 calendar days 7 calendar days
Rhode Island Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
2 calendar days 2 calendar days
South Carolina [14] Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
South Dakota Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day
Tennessee [15] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
6 calendar days 5 calendar days
Texas Not required Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
10 business days 10 business days
U.S. Virgin Islands Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
1 day before 13 calendar days 13 calendar days
Utah [16] Election Day
Election Day after Election Day after Election Day
Vermont Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
3 calendar days 3 calendar days
Virginia [17] Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
20 calendar days 20 calendar days
Washington Election Day Election Day
after Election Day after Election Day
6 calendar days 6 calendar days
West Virginia Not required Not required
after Election Day after Election Day
Wisconsin [18] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Wyoming [19] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Election Law and Procedure | 110
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UOCAVA Ballot Transmission
State UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods
Methods
Alabama Postal mail, Online Postal mail, Online
Alaska Postal mail, Fax, Online Postal mail, Fax
American Samoa Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Arizona Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Arkansas Postal mail, Online Postal mail
California Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Other
Colorado Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Connecticut Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Delaware Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
District of Columbia Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Florida [1] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Fax
Georgia [2] Postal mail, Online Postal mail
Guam Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Hawaii Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Idaho Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Illinois Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail
Indiana [3] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Iowa Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Kansas Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Kentucky Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail
Louisiana Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Maine Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax
Maryland [4] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Massachusetts Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Michigan Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Minnesota Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Mississippi Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Missouri [5] Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Montana [6] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax
Nebraska [7] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
Nevada Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
New Hampshire [8] Postal mail, Email Postal mail, Other
New Jersey Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
New Mexico [9] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax
New York Postal mail, Fax, Online Postal mail
North Carolina [10] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
North Dakota Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Northern Mariana Islands Postal mail Postal mail
Ohio Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Oklahoma [11] Postal mail, Online Postal mail, Fax
Oregon Postal mail, Online, Other Postal mail, Email, Fax
Pennsylvania [12] Postal mail, Email Postal mail
111 | Election Law and Procedure
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UOCAVA Ballot Transmission
State UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods
Methods
Puerto Rico [13] Postal mail, Email Postal mail
Rhode Island Postal mail, Email Postal mail, Email, Fax
South Carolina [14] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
South Dakota Postal mail, Email Postal mail
Tennessee [15] Postal mail, Email Postal mail
Texas Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail, Other
U.S. Virgin Islands Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email
Utah [16] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Vermont Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail
Virginia [17] Postal mail, Email Postal mail, Other
Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online,
Washington Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Other
West Virginia Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online,
Wisconsin [18] Postal mail, Other
Other
Wyoming [19] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail
Policy Survey Table 4 Calculation Notes:
Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Postmark uses question Q30.
Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Receipt uses question Q30.
Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Postmark uses question Q31.
Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Receipt uses question Q31.
UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods uses question Q27.
UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods uses question Q28.
Policy Survey Table 4 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q27 and Q28 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q30 and Q31 were single-select
questions.
[1] Overseas voters (military and civilians) have up until 10 days after Election Day to have their ballot
received for a presidential preference primary election and the general election.
[2] Because November 11, 2022 was a state holiday, the 3rd business day after the 2022 general
election fell on November 14, 2022.
[3] If the board of elections is unable to determine the postmark date of an absentee ballot sent by
mail, the absentee ballot may not be counted. An absentee ballot received from an overseas voter is
not considered as arriving too late if both of the following apply: (1) the absentee ballot envelope is
postmarked no later than the date of the election, and (2) the absentee ballot is received not later
than noon 10 days after the election. If the postmark on the absentee ballot envelope is unclear, the
county election board, by unanimous vote of the entire membership of the board, determines the
postmark date. If the board is unable to determine the postmark date, the absentee ballot may not
be counted.
[4] Per state regulations, ballots are considered timely if they are received at the local election office on
or by 10:00 a.m. on the 2nd Friday after an election.
Election Law and Procedure | 112
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[5] The law specifies the UOCAVA ballot is timely if it is received by noon on the Friday after the election.
For the 2022 general election, a federal holiday on the Friday after the election meant that the
deadline was the Monday after the election.
[6] Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-21-226 outlines procedures for receipt of a voted UOCAVA
ballot (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0210/part_0020/section_0260/0130-
0210-0020-0260.html)
[7] UOCAVA ballot return via email or fax requires prior approval; county election offices seek approval
from the Secretary of State’s office on behalf of UOCAVA voters.
[8] All absentee ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[9] UOCAVA ballots must be received by local election administrators by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[10] UOCAVA ballots must arrive on the business day before the 10th calendar day after the election.
[11] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
[12] Domestic military UOCAVA voters need to sign an affirmation indicating that they completed the
ballot by 11:59 p.m. the day before the election. Ballots are counted as long as they are received by
the county 7 days after the election at the latest.
[13] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide
a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election. The voter shall return
the voted ballots to the PR-SEC by mail. Ballots must be postmarked no later than the date of the
voting event or general election. Valid ballots must be received by mail, on or before the last day of
the voting event general canvass, to be counted.
[14] UOCAVA ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. 2 days following the general election.
[15] UOCAVA ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.
[16] UOCAVA voters may return ballots until the canvass date.
[17] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter’s absentee ballot properly postmarked must be
returned by noon on the 3rd day after the election. Since that day fell on a holiday after the 2022
general election, Virginia Code § 1-210 required changing the deadline to noon on Monday,
November 14, 2022.
[18] In Wisconsin, all ballots must be returned by close of polls on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots can be
transmitted by postal mail, email, fax, online, or through an appointed agent. UOCAVA ballots can be
returned by postal mail or in person if the voter is local. All ballots must be returned by close of polls
(8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.
[19] Absentee ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
113 | Election Law and Procedure
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Policy Survey Table 5: Electronic Ballot Transmission
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances
State No Electronic
Emergency Replacement Voters with
Ballot
Situations Ballots Disabilities
Transmission
Alabama Yes No No No
Alaska No No No No
American Samoa Yes No No No
Arizona Yes No No No
Arkansas Yes No No No
California No Yes Yes Yes
Colorado No Yes No Yes
Connecticut Yes No No No
Delaware No No No Yes
District of Columbia No No No Yes
Florida No No No Yes
Georgia Yes No No No
Guam No No No No
Hawaii No No No Yes
Idaho Yes No No No
Illinois No No No Yes
Indiana No No No Yes
Iowa Yes No No No
Kansas Yes No No No
Kentucky No No No Yes
Louisiana No No No Yes
Maine No Yes No Yes
Maryland No No No No
Massachusetts [1] No No No Yes
Michigan No No No Yes
Minnesota No No No Yes
Mississippi No Yes No No
Missouri Yes No No No
Montana No No No Yes
Nebraska [2] No No No No
Nevada No No No Yes
New Hampshire No No No Yes
New Jersey No No No Yes
New Mexico No No No No
New York No Yes No Yes
North Carolina No No No Yes
North Dakota Yes No No No
Northern Mariana
Yes No No No
Islands
Ohio No No No Yes
Election Law and Procedure | 114
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Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances
State No Electronic
Emergency Replacement Voters with
Ballot
Situations Ballots Disabilities
Transmission
Oklahoma Yes No No No
Oregon No No No No
Pennsylvania No No No Yes
Puerto Rico [3] N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rhode Island No No No Yes
South Carolina Yes No No No
South Dakota No No No No
Tennessee Yes No No No
Texas Yes No No No
U.S. Virgin Islands No No No No
Utah No No No Yes
Vermont No No No Yes
Virginia No Yes No Yes
Washington No No No No
West Virginia No No No Yes
Wisconsin Yes No No No
Wyoming Yes No No No
115 | Election Law and Procedure
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Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances Terminology for
Electronic Voting by
State Voters with
Any Circumstance Other Circumstances
Disabilities
Alabama No No --
Alaska Yes No --
American Samoa No No --
Arizona No No --
Arkansas No No --
California Yes Yes Other
Colorado No No Other
Connecticut No No --
Accessible absentee
Delaware No Yes
voting
Remote ballot
District of Columbia No No
marking
Florida No Yes Other
Georgia No No --
Guam Yes No --
Hawaii No Yes Other
Idaho No No --
Accessible absentee
Illinois No No
voting
Indiana No No Other
Iowa No No --
Kansas No No --
Accessible absentee
Kentucky No No
voting
Louisiana No No Other
Maine No No Other
Maryland Yes No --
Massachusetts [1] No No Other
Accessible absentee
Michigan No No
voting
Accessible absentee
Minnesota No No
voting
Mississippi No Yes --
Missouri No No --
Montana No No Other
Nebraska [2] No Yes --
Remote ballot
Nevada No No
marking
Accessible absentee
New Hampshire No No
voting
New Jersey No No Other
New Mexico No Yes --
Accessible absentee
New York No No
voting
Election Law and Procedure | 116
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Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances Terminology for
Electronic Voting by
State Voters with
Any Circumstance Other Circumstances
Disabilities
Accessible absentee
North Carolina No No
voting
North Dakota No No --
Northern Mariana Islands No No --
Remote ballot
Ohio No No
marking
Oklahoma No No --
Oregon No Yes --
Remote ballot
Pennsylvania No No
marking
Puerto Rico [3] N/A N/A N/A
Accessible absentee
Rhode Island No No
voting
South Carolina No No --
South Dakota Yes No --
Tennessee No No --
Texas No No --
U.S. Virgin Islands No Yes --
Utah No No Other
Remote ballot
Vermont No No
marking
Accessible absentee
Virginia No No
voting
Washington Yes No --
West Virginia No No Other
Wisconsin No No --
Wyoming No No --
Policy Survey Table 5 Calculation Notes:
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, No Electronic Ballot Transmission uses question Q24.
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Emergency Situations uses question Q24.
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Replacement Ballots uses question Q24.
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Voters with Disabilities uses question Q24.
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Any Circumstance uses question Q24.
Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Other Circumstances uses question Q24.
Terminology for Electronic Voting by Voters with Disabilities uses question Q24a.
Policy Survey Table 5 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q24 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q24a was a single-select question.
• Q24 collected information on electronic ballot transmission for non-UOCAVA voters only. Voters
covered by UOCAVA may receive ballots electronically under the MOVE Act.
117 | Election Law and Procedure
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[1] Voters with a disability that prevents them from privately and independently marking a paper ballot
may transmit ballots electronically. Massachusetts refers to electronic ballot transmission for voters
with disabilities as “accessible vote by mail.”
[2] UOCAVA ballot return via email or fax requires prior approval; county election offices seek approval
from the Secretary of State’s office on behalf of UOCAVA voters.
[3] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a
response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
Election Law and Procedure | 118
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Policy Survey Table 6: In-Person Voting Before Election Day
In-Person Voting Before
Terminology for Casting Election Day
State a Ballot In Person Before Excuse Required
Election Day
First Day Last Day
Alabama In-person absentee voting Yes 09/14/2022 11/03/2022
In-person early voting, In-
Alaska [1] No 10/24/2022 11/07/2022
person absentee voting
American Samoa Other Yes 09/09/2022 11/07/2022
Arizona [2] In-person early voting No 10/12/2022 11/04/2022
Arkansas In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/07/2022
California [3] In-person early voting No 10/10/2022 11/07/2022
Colorado [4] In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/07/2022
Connecticut In-person absentee voting Yes 10/07/2022 11/07/2022
Delaware In-person early voting No 10/28/2022 11/06/2022
District of Columbia In-person early voting No 10/31/2022 11/06/2022
In-person early voting, In-
Florida [5] No 10/24/2022 11/06/2022
person absentee voting
In-person early voting, In-
Georgia No 10/17/2022 11/04/2022
person absentee voting
Guam In-person absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/03/2022
Hawaii [6] Other No 10/25/2022 11/07/2022
Idaho Other No 10/24/2022 11/04/2022
Illinois [7] In-person early voting No 09/29/2022 11/07/2022
In-person early voting,
Indiana No 10/12/2022 11/07/2022
Other
Iowa In-person absentee voting No 10/19/2022 11/07/2022
In-person early voting,
Kansas [8] No 10/19/2022 11/06/2022
Other
In-person absentee
Kentucky [9] Yes 10/26/2022 11/05/2022
voting, Other
Louisiana In-person early voting No 10/25/2022 11/01/2022
Maine [10] In-person absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/03/2022
Maryland [11] In-person early voting No 10/27/2022 11/03/2022
In-person early voting, In-
Massachusetts [12] No 10/22/2022 11/04/2022
person absentee voting
Michigan In-person absentee voting No 09/29/2022 11/07/2022
Minnesota In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/07/2022
Mississippi In-person absentee voting Yes 09/24/2022 11/05/2022
Missouri [13] In-person absentee voting No 09/27/2022 11/07/2022
Montana [14] In-person absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/07/2022
Nebraska [15] In-person early voting No 10/11/2022 11/07/2022
Nevada In-person early voting No 10/22/2022 11/04/2022
New Hampshire [16] In-person absentee voting Yes 09/24/2022 11/07/2022
New Jersey In-person early voting No 10/29/2022 11/06/2022
In-person early voting, In-
New Mexico No 10/11/2022 11/05/2022
person absentee voting
119 | Election Law and Procedure
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In-Person Voting Before
Terminology for Casting Election Day
State a Ballot In Person Before Excuse Required
Election Day
First Day Last Day
In-person early voting, In-
New York [17] No 10/29/2022 11/06/2022
person absentee voting
In-person early voting, In-
North Carolina person absentee voting, No 10/20/2022 11/05/2022
Other
In-person early voting, In-
North Dakota No 10/21/2022 11/07/2022
person absentee voting
Northern Mariana In-person early voting, In-
Yes 11/01/2022 11/07/2022
Islands person absentee voting
In-person early voting, In-
Ohio No 10/12/2022 11/07/2022
person absentee voting
Oklahoma In-person absentee voting No 11/02/2022 11/05/2022
Oregon [18] Other Yes 10/19/2022 11/07/2022
Pennsylvania [19] No such voting -- -- --
Puerto Rico [20] In-person early voting Yes N/A N/A
Rhode Island In-person early voting No 10/19/2022 11/07/2022
South Carolina [21] In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/05/2022
South Dakota In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/07/2022
Tennessee In-person early voting No 10/19/2022 11/03/2022
Texas In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/04/2022
In-person early voting, In-
U.S. Virgin Islands No 10/10/2022 10/31/2022
person absentee voting
Utah [22] In-person early voting No 10/25/2022 11/04/2022
Vermont [23] In-person absentee voting No 09/24/2022 11/07/2022
Virginia [24] In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/05/2022
Washington Other No 10/21/2022 11/07/2022
West Virginia In-person early voting No 10/26/2022 11/05/2022
Wisconsin [25] In-person absentee voting No 10/25/2022 11/06/2022
Wyoming In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/07/2022
Policy Survey Table 6 Calculation Notes:
Terminology for Casting a Ballot In Person Before Election Day uses question Q25.
Excuse Required uses question Q25a.
In-Person Voting Before Election Day, First Day uses question Q25b.
In-Person Voting Before Election Day, Last Day uses question Q25b.
Policy Survey Table 6 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q25 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q25a and Q25b were single-select questions.
[1] There are several in-person absentee and early vote locations that are also available on Election
Day. A list of these locations is available on the division’s website beginning 45 days prior to the
election.
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[2] Emergency voting was available from November 5, 2022 to November 7, 2022. Emergency voting
required the voter to sign an affidavit attesting to the fact they were experiencing an emergency that
would prevent them from voting on Election Day.
[3] The dates that early voting was offered varied by jurisdiction.
[4] October 24, 2022 was the first day that counties were required to have in-person polling locations
open. However, some counties chose to have in-person voting open earlier than that.
[5] Florida has 10 days of mandatory early voting with up to 5 additional days at the front end and one
at the back end.
[6] Schedules for each voting location varied. Some were open after October 25, 2022 and some
closed before November 7, 2022.
[7] The first date of early voting listed is for counties that have early voting at permanent polling places
other than the office of the election authority (10 ILCS 5/19A-15). The last day listed is for early
voting at the office of the election authority or at a location designated by the election authority for
this purpose (10 ILCS 5/19A-15, 19A-20).
[8] In-person early voting varies by jurisdiction. Counties may begin advance voting as early as the 20th
day prior to Election Day. All counties must allow in-person early voting no later than 1 week prior to
Election Day.
[9] Kentucky had in-person absentee voting, which required an excuse. This was conducted from
October 26, 2022 until November 2, 2022, excluding weekends. Afterward, there were 3 days of no-
excuse absentee in-person voting in which anyone eligible to vote on Election Day could vote
between November 3, 2022 and November 5, 2022
[10] Any voter may request and vote an absentee ballot without a reason as soon as ballots become
available (at least 30 days prior to Election Day) through the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that
date and through Election Day, voters who meet the requirements to get a special-circumstances
absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot, but they must have a reason.
[11] §10-301.1(d)(1) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, states that early voting
centers shall be open for voting “beginning the second Thursday before a primary or general election
through the Thursday before the election.”
[12] The in-person voting period applies to in-person early voting. In-person absentee voting may occur
once ballots are available until 12:00 p.m. the day before Election Day. In-person absentee voting
before Election Day requires an excuse but early voting does not.
[13] An excuse is required for 4 weeks of the absentee voting period. Two weeks prior to the election,
voters can vote in person with no excuse.
[14] In-person absentee voting is done at the county elections office. Under certain circumstances
(precinct-to-precinct change within the same county or moving from inactive to active status),
registration can be done on Election Day. Due to recent law changes in 2021, registration must be
done by noon on the day before Election Day (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130
/chapter_0020/part_0030/section_0040/0130-0020-0030-0040.html).
[15] Early voting is typically only available during regular business hours on weekdays, although some
jurisdictions may extend their hours or open on weekends to accommodate early voting.
[16] New Hampshire has absentee voting, not early voting. A voter can request an absentee ballot any
time during the year, but will not receive their general ballot until the ballots are ready. Absentee
ballots are not opened or cast until Election Day.
[17] In-person early voting is conducted between the dates provided and does not require an excuse.
In-person absentee voting does require an excuse, and can be completed any time after ballots are
available (usually not earlier than a month and a half prior to the election).
[18] Oregon does not have early voting, but allows in-person voting in specific circumstances. For
example, if the voter loses their ballot or otherwise spoils it, they can appear at the county elections
office and be issued a new ballot. That happens through 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
121 | Election Law and Procedure
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[19] In-person voting on voting machines is not allowed before Election Day. Prior to the close of the
mail ballot application period, a voter may go to their local county election board’s office, apply for a
mail ballot, and vote a mail ballot all in one visit.
[20] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide
a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
[21] Early voting locations are closed on Sundays.
[22] The dates and hours of in-person voting before Election Day vary by county.
[23] In-person early voting may only be done during the hours the town/city clerk’s office is open.
[24] Virginia Code § 24.2-701.1 requires at least 8 hours of in-person absentee voting on the 2
Saturdays before the election. Local electoral boards may provide for Sunday hours as well.
[25] In Wisconsin, statute determines the start and end dates of when in-person absentee voting can
be held; however, each municipality determines what days and times in that time frame they will
offer the option to their voters. The listed dates are the time frame in which in-person absentee
voting can be held.
Election Law and Procedure | 122
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Policy Survey Table 7: Election Certification and Recounts
Reason State May Conduct a Recount
2022 General When Result Is
Election When Result Is By Request of
Within Margin By Request of
State Certification Within Affected
AND Affected Other Person
Deadline Specified Candidate or
Candidate or or Group
Margin Party
Party Request
Alabama 11/30/2022 No Yes No No
Alaska 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
American
11/15/2022 No Yes No No
Samoa
Arizona 12/05/2022 Yes No No No
Arkansas 11/23/2022 No Yes No No
California 12/16/2022 No Yes No Yes
Colorado 11/23/2022 Yes Yes No No
Connecticut 11/29/2022 Yes No No No
Delaware [1] 11/10/2022 Yes No No No
District of
11/30/2022 Yes Yes No No
Columbia [2]
Florida [3] 11/22/2022 Yes No No No
Georgia [4] 11/25/2022 No No Yes No
Guam [5] 11/25/2022 Yes No No No
Hawaii [6] 11/28/2022 Yes No No No
Idaho 11/23/2022 No Yes No No
Illinois [7] 12/09/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
Indiana [8] 11/21/2022 No Yes No No
Iowa [9] 12/05/2022 No Yes No No
Kansas [10] 12/01/2022 No Yes No No
Kentucky 11/28/2022 Yes Yes No No
Louisiana [11] 11/23/2022 No No Yes No
Maine [12] 11/28/2022 No Yes No No
Maryland [13] 12/13/2022 No Yes No No
Massachusetts
11/23/2022 No Yes Yes No
[14]
Michigan 11/28/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
Minnesota 11/29/2022 No Yes Yes Yes
Mississippi [15] 12/08/2022 No No No No
Missouri [16] 12/13/2022 No No Yes No
Montana [17] 12/05/2022 Yes No Yes No
Nebraska 12/05/2022 Yes Yes No No
Nevada [18] 11/22/2022 No Yes No Yes
New Hampshire 12/07/2022 No Yes No No
New Jersey 12/08/2022 No Yes No No
New Mexico 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
New York 12/15/2022 Yes No No No
North Carolina
11/29/2022 No No Yes No
[19]
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Reason State May Conduct a Recount
2022 General When Result Is
Election When Result Is By Request of
Within Margin By Request of
State Certification Within Affected
AND Affected Other Person
Deadline Specified Candidate or
Candidate or or Group
Margin Party
Party Request
North Dakota 11/25/2022 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Northern
Mariana 11/28/2022 No Yes Yes No
Islands
Ohio 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
Oklahoma [20] 11/15/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
Oregon 12/15/2022 Yes Yes No No
Pennsylvania
11/28/2022 Yes No No Yes
[21]
Puerto Rico
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
[22]
Rhode Island
11/22/2022 No No Yes No
[23]
South Carolina 11/18/2022 Yes No No No
South Dakota 11/15/2022 No No Yes No
Tennessee [24] 12/08/2022 No No No No
Texas 12/12/2022 No No Yes No
U.S. Virgin
11/18/2022 No Yes No No
Islands
Utah [25] 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No No
Vermont [26] 11/15/2022 No No Yes No
Virginia [27] 12/05/2022 No No Yes No
Washington
12/08/2022 Yes Yes No Yes
[28]
West Virginia
12/08/2022 No Yes No No
[29]
Wisconsin [30] 12/01/2022 Yes No Yes No
Wyoming [31] 11/16/2022 Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Reason State May Conduct a Recount
By Order of Recount
State Other Methods
By Court Order Election
Circumstances
Authority
Alabama Yes No Yes Machine
Alaska No No No Manual, Machine
American Samoa No No No Manual
Arizona Yes No No Machine
Arkansas No No No Machine
California Yes Yes No Manual, Machine
Colorado No No No Machine
Connecticut Yes No No Manual, Machine
Delaware [1] No No No Manual
District of
No No No Manual, Machine
Columbia [2]
Florida [3] Yes No No Manual, Machine
Georgia [4] Yes Yes No Machine
Guam [5] Yes No No Machine
Hawaii [6] Yes No No Machine
Idaho No No Yes Other
Illinois [7] Yes No No Machine, Other
Indiana [8] No No No Manual, Machine
Iowa [9] Yes Yes No Manual, Machine
Kansas [10] Yes Yes No Manual, Machine
Kentucky Yes Yes No Manual, Machine
Louisiana [11] Yes No No Other
Maine [12] No No No Manual
Maryland [13] No No No Manual, Machine
Massachusetts
No No No Manual
[14]
Michigan Yes No No Manual, Machine
Minnesota Yes No No Manual
Mississippi [15] No No Yes Other
Missouri [16] No No No Machine
Montana [17] Yes No No Manual
Nebraska No No No Machine
Nevada [18] No No No Other
New Hampshire No No No Manual
New Jersey Yes No No Manual, Machine
New Mexico Yes Yes No Manual, Machine
New York Yes Yes No Manual
North Carolina
No Yes No Manual, Machine
[19]
North Dakota No No No Manual, Machine
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Reason State May Conduct a Recount
By Order of Recount
State Other Methods
By Court Order Election
Circumstances
Authority
Northern Mariana
No No No Manual
Islands
Ohio No No No Manual
Oklahoma [20] No No No Manual, Machine
Oregon Yes Yes No Manual
Pennsylvania
No No No Other
[21]
Puerto Rico [22] N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rhode Island
No No No Machine
[23]
South Carolina Yes No No Machine
South Dakota No No No Machine
Tennessee [24] Yes No No Other
Texas No No Yes Other
U.S. Virgin
Yes No No Machine
Islands
Utah [25] No No No Other
Vermont [26] No No No Machine
Virginia [27] No No No Machine
Washington [28] No Yes No Other
West Virginia [29] No No No Manual
Wisconsin [30] Yes No No Other
Wyoming [31] Yes Yes No Machine
Policy Survey Table 7 Calculation Notes:
2022 General Election Certification Deadline uses question Q34.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, When Result Is Within Specified Margin uses question Q35.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Request of Affected Candidate or Party uses question Q35.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, When Result Is Within Margin AND Affected Candidate or Party
Request uses question Q35.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Request of Other Person or Group uses question Q35.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Court Order uses question Q35.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Order of Election Authority uses question Q35.
Reason State May Conduct a Recount, Other Circumstances uses question Q35.
Recount Methods uses question Q35a.
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Policy Survey Table 7 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q34 was a single-select question. Q35 and Q35a allowed states to select multiple responses.
• Election certification refers to a written statement attesting that the tabulation and canvassing
of an election are complete and accurate, or the act of confirming the final official results of a
jurisdiction’s election. This event occurs after results from valid ballots are tallied from all
voting methods and results are validated and approved by those legally responsible.
• A recount is a repeat tabulation of the votes cast in an election to determine the accuracy of
the reported results of an election. Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons, and
the repeat tabulation may be conducted by hand or by machine, depending on local laws and
procedures.
[1] The date listed (10:00 a.m. on the Thursday following the day of the general election) is the date
that the Board of Canvass convenes. Delaware law does not specify a deadline by which the Board of
Canvass must complete its work. Per Delaware Code, the margin for a recount is one-half of 1%
difference between the candidate receiving the most votes and the candidate receiving the next
highest number of notes (or fewer than 1,000 votes for a statewide election).
[2] There is no required deadline. The date reported is the date the DCBOE was tentatively scheduled
to certify the November 2022 general election as of the date the 2022 Policy Survey was submitted.
[3] The applicable state or local canvassing entity has to issue a recount order once the threshold is
triggered. For a manual recount, the recount consists solely of overvotes and undervotes and only if
the difference is fewer than the number of votes needed to change the outcome of the election,
according to Section 102.166, F.S. (http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode
=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100-0199/0102/Sections/0102.166.html).
[4] The deadline for certifying the election is 17 days after the election. Manual recount of paper ballots
is only allowable under court order or if no scanner passes pre-recount logic and accuracy testing.
[5] In every election, except a primary election, the Guam Election Commission (GEC) shall not certify
the election results until the GEC makes a determination on all election complaints or causes for
contest brought to the attention of the GEC within 15 calendar days of the election. Thereafter, as
soon as all the votes are counted and the ballots are sealed, the GEC shall certify the results of the
election. The GEC Board may order a hand recount if warranted.
[6] There was no set deadline to certify the results of the 2022 general election. If no election contests
were filed with the Supreme Court within 20 days of the election, the results were certified after that
date.
[7] The local canvassing deadline for the 2022 general election was November 29, 2022, and the
State Board of Elections deadline was December 9, 2022; however, judges took the oath of office on
December 5, 2022 so the state canvassed by that date.
[8] For 2022, the Indiana Election Division (IED) tabulated the final results for all federal offices no
later than the second Monday following the general election (November 21, 2022) and prepared a
certificate of election to the Secretary of State. IED tabulated all statewide and judicial offices not
later than the last Tuesday in November (November 29, 2022). The Secretary of State (SOS) certified
immediately after IED finished the tabulation. IED tabulated all state legislative offices no later than
the second Monday following the general election (November 21, 2022). SOS signed the certificate
of elections and delivered to each person elected to a state legislative office.
[9] The appointed recount board determines if a recount is conducted by hand counting or machine
counting.
[10] A County Board of Canvassers has authority to order a recount in extraordinary circumstances. The
person making the recount request specifies the manner and location of ballots to be recounted.
[11] The certification deadline reported in the 2022 Policy Survey was tentative based upon election
contest suits and appeal delays. See La. R.S. 18:1405 and 1409.
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[12] The Secretary of State must submit the official tabulation of the votes to the Governor by the 20th
day after the election.
[13] §11-503(a)(1)(ii) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland requires that the Board
of State Canvassers must convene within 35 days to certify the results for federal and state offices.
Only an affected candidate can request a recount. A party cannot request a recount. The candidate
requesting the recount specifies the type of recount they want.
[14] Local election officials must certify their election results and transmit them to the Secretary of the
Commonwealth within 15 days after the election. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Commonwealth
tabulates the totals and presents them to the governor and the council for certification. There are
two types of recounts, both of which require a candidate to file a petition, but depending on the type,
the signature requirements vary. If the difference between the two leading candidates is less than
one-half of 1%, the candidate can petition for a district-wide or statewide recount. If the difference is
greater than one-half of 1%, a candidate can petition for recounts by ward and precinct. Any
registered Massachusetts voter can petition for a recount of ballot questions.
[15] Mississippi does not have recount procedures. However, within 12 days of certification of the
election, a candidate who was on the ballot may conduct a ballot box examination to review the
contents of the ballot box while under the supervision of the county circuit clerk. The candidate may
choose to tally the votes they review in anticipation of a challenge to an election.
[16] A recount conducted in cases of a close race will use a machine recount but also review voter
intent on paper ballots. A 5% manual recount is conducted after each election from a randomly
selected precinct.
[17] Within 27 days after the election, or sooner if the returns are all received, the state auditor,
superintendent of public instruction, and attorney general shall meet as a board of state canvassers
in the office of the secretary of state and determine the vote. The secretary of state shall serve as
secretary of the board, keep minutes of the meeting of the board, and file them in the official records
of the secretary of state’s office. (See https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0150
/part_0050/section_0020/0130-0150-0050-0020.html). Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-16-
201 outlines the conditions under which recounts are to be conducted (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills
/mca/title_0130/chapter_0160/part_0020/section_0010/0130-0160-0020-0010.html). Montana
Code Annotated (MCA) 13-16-412 outlines the procedure for recounting paper ballots (see
https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0160/part_0040/section_0120/0130-0160-
0040-0120.html).
[18] The reported state election certification is the date of the Nevada Supreme Court’s canvass
pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 293.395. The 17 county Boards of County
Commissioners must certify their county elections before the Nevada Supreme Court canvass and
this must be done no later than November 18 pursuant to NRS 293.387. NRS 293.403 allows that,
“Any voter at an election may demand and receive a recount of the vote for a ballot question.”
Recounts must be conducted in the same manner in which the election was conducted.
[19] The listed certification date was barring recounts and/or protests in individual races. A machine
recount is the first recount authorized, and a manual recount triggered by certain requirements may
follow.
[20] The Oklahoma State Election Board met on November 15, 2022 to certify the results of the 2022
general election. State law requires that if a recount or contest is filed that has not been resolved by
the certification date, all other races or elections not subject to the contest will be certified. A
separate meeting to certify the contested election may need to be scheduled.
[21] November 28, 2022 was the last day for county board of elections to file certified results with the
Secretary of the Commonwealth. There is no statutory deadline for the state to certify results.
[22] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide
a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
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[23] There is no definitive date, but the law mandates that a risk-limiting audit must be conducted prior
to certifying the election.
[24] By statute, the state officials must certify the statewide election results “...as soon as the returns
are received.” December 8, 2022 was an approximate date for when the state officials met to certify
federal elections.
[25] The state certification happens on the third Tuesday after the election.
[26] According to 17 V.S.A. § 2601 (a), “(1) In an election for federal office, statewide office, county
office, or State Senator, if the difference between the number of votes cast for a winning candidate
and the number of votes cast for a losing candidate is two percent or less of the total votes cast for
all the candidates for an office, divided by the number of persons to be elected, that losing candidate
shall have the right to have the votes for that office recounted. (2) In an election for State
Representative, if the difference between the number of votes cast for a winning candidate and the
number of votes cast for a losing candidate is five percent or less of the total votes cast for all the
candidates for an office, divided by the number of persons to be elected, that losing candidate shall
have the right to have the votes for that office recounted.”
[27] Virginia Code § 24.2-800 governs who may request a recount. The Section does not include
automatic recount provisions. Also, only a losing candidate may request a recount. There are
different allowable margins to request a recount for write-in candidates and for recounting a
referendum or issue election. Optical scan ballots that cannot be read by a scanner for any reason
and/or emailed ballots from UOCAVA voters, military voters, or print-disabled voters that also cannot
be read by a scanner are manually recounted in accordance with the “Virginia’s Guide to Hand-
Counting Ballots” document.
[28] County canvassing boards certified their county results on November 29, 2022. The Secretary of
State certified all results by December 8, 2022.
[29] The clerk shall transmit a copy to the Secretary of State within 30 days from the date of the
election, except in the case of a recount, in which the clerk shall transmit a copy of the results 30
days from the date of the completion of the recount.
[30] Wisconsin law permits a recount to occur under a wide variety of circumstances within specified
margins, by candidate request within specified margins, or when ordered by a court of law. When
conducting a recount, the Board of Canvassers may decide between hand count or machine count
and can also choose that one reporting unit is done one way while another reporting unit is done
another way. A court may order the count be done in a particular way if a reason can be proven by a
petitioner.
[31] Recounts may be conducted in cases of ballot proposition.
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Policy Survey Table 8: Election Audits
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election
Compliance
State Ballot
Ballot Design Audit or
Access Audit Reconciliation Eligibility Audit
Audit Procedural
Audit
Audit
Alabama No No No No No
Alaska No No Yes No No
American
No Yes No No No
Samoa
Arizona No No No No No
Arkansas No No Yes No No
California No No No No No
Colorado No No No No No
Connecticut No No No No No
Delaware No No No No No
District of
No No No No No
Columbia
Florida No No No No No
Georgia No No Yes No No
Guam No No Yes No No
Hawaii No No No No No
Idaho No No Yes No No
Illinois No No No No No
Indiana No No Yes No No
Iowa No No Yes No No
Kansas No No No Yes No
Kentucky No No Yes No No
Louisiana No No Yes No No
Maine No No Yes Yes No
Maryland No No Yes Yes No
Massachusetts No No No No No
Michigan No No Yes Yes No
Minnesota No No No Yes No
Mississippi No No No No No
Missouri No No No No No
Montana No No No No No
Nebraska Yes No Yes No No
Nevada No No No No Yes
New Hampshire Yes No Yes Yes No
New Jersey No No Yes No No
New Mexico No No No No No
New York No No No No No
North Carolina No No Yes No No
North Dakota No No Yes No Yes
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Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election
Compliance
State Ballot
Ballot Design Audit or
Access Audit Reconciliation Eligibility Audit
Audit Procedural
Audit
Audit
Northern
Mariana No No Yes Yes No
Islands
Ohio Yes No Yes No No
Oklahoma No No No No No
Oregon No No Yes No Yes
Pennsylvania
No No Yes No No
[1]
Puerto Rico [2] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rhode Island No No No No No
South Carolina Yes No Yes Yes No
South Dakota No No No No No
Tennessee Yes No Yes No Yes
Texas No No Yes Yes No
U.S. Virgin
No No No No No
Islands
Utah No No Yes No Yes
Vermont No No No No No
Virginia No No No No No
Washington No No No No No
West Virginia No No No No No
Wisconsin No No No No No
Wyoming No No No No No
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Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election
State Logic and Post-Election
Legal Audit Other
Accuracy Testing Tabulation Audit
Alabama No No No Yes
Alaska No Yes Yes No
American Samoa No No No No
Arizona No Yes No No
Arkansas No Yes Yes No
California No Yes Yes No
Colorado No Yes Yes No
Connecticut No Yes Yes No
Delaware No Yes Yes No
District of Columbia No Yes Yes No
Florida No Yes Yes No
Georgia No Yes Yes No
Guam No Yes No No
Hawaii No Yes Yes No
Idaho No Yes Yes No
Illinois No Yes Yes No
Indiana No Yes No Yes
Iowa No Yes Yes No
Kansas No Yes Yes No
Kentucky No Yes No Yes
Louisiana No Yes No No
Maine No Yes No No
Maryland No Yes Yes Yes
Massachusetts No Yes No No
Michigan No Yes No Yes
Minnesota No Yes Yes No
Mississippi No Yes No No
Missouri No Yes Yes No
Montana No Yes Yes No
Nebraska No Yes Yes No
Nevada No Yes Yes No
New Hampshire Yes Yes Yes No
New Jersey No Yes Yes No
New Mexico No Yes Yes Yes
New York No Yes Yes No
North Carolina No Yes Yes Yes
North Dakota No Yes Yes No
Northern Mariana
No Yes No No
Islands
Ohio No Yes Yes No
Oklahoma No Yes Yes No
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Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election
State Logic and Post-Election
Legal Audit Other
Accuracy Testing Tabulation Audit
Oregon No Yes Yes No
Pennsylvania [1] No Yes Yes No
Puerto Rico [2] N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rhode Island No Yes Yes No
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes Yes
South Dakota No Yes No No
Tennessee No Yes Yes No
Texas No Yes Yes No
U.S. Virgin Islands No Yes Yes No
Utah No Yes Yes Yes
Vermont No Yes Yes Yes
Virginia No Yes Yes No
Washington No Yes Yes Yes
West Virginia No Yes Yes No
Wisconsin No No Yes No
Wyoming No Yes Yes Yes
Policy Survey Table 8 Calculation Notes:
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Access Audit uses question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Ballot Design Audit uses question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Ballot Reconciliation Audit uses
question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Compliance Audit or Procedural Audit
uses question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Eligibility Audit uses question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Legal Audit uses question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Logic and Accuracy Testing uses
question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Post-Election Tabulation Audit uses
question Q36.
Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Other uses question Q36.
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Policy Survey Table 8 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Q36 allowed states to select multiple responses.
• An election audit may refer to (1) A systematic, independent, documented process for
obtaining records, statements of fact, or other relevant information and assessing them
objectively to determine the extent to which specified requirements are fulfilled. (2) The
verification of statistical or exact agreement of records from different processes or subsystems
of a voting system. (3) A review of a system and its controls to determine its operational status
and the accuracy of its outputs.
[1] The Secretary of the Commonwealth directed all counties to participate in a risk-limiting audit and
all but one of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties did so.
[2] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a
response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
Election Law and Procedure | 134
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Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The
NVRA and Beyond
Key Findings
Section A of the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on voter
registration between the 2020 and 2022 general elections. Election officials were asked
questions related to registration and list maintenance, including the number of people registered
and eligible to vote in the 2022 general election, registration applications processed,
confirmation notices sent pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and for other
purposes, and records removed from the voter registration rolls. Notable findings from Section A
of the 2022 EAVS include:
o State motor vehicle offices continued to be the most common source of registration and
accounted for 55% of all registrations received—the highest in EAVS history.
o Online registrations were the second most common source of registration and accounted
for 14% of the registrations received. However, this source dropped by 50.3% compared to
online registrations reported for the 2020 EAVS.
o The percentage of in-person voter registrations and registrations received by mail, fax, and
email continued to decrease and obtained the lowest results of the past election cycles. In-
person voter registration accounted for 5.9% of all registrations, whereas mail, fax, and
email registrations combined accounted for 9.1%.
o The total number of active registrations for the 2022 general election was more than 203
million, accounting for 85.4% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP). Over two-thirds of
the states reported a higher active registration rate in 2022 than in 2018.
o Nearly 81 million registration applications were processed for the 2022 general election.
The most common types of registration applications submitted by voters were changes to
the voter’s record (44.1%) and new valid registrations (27.9%).
o States reported sending 26.6 million confirmation notices between the close of
registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022
general election. More than half of these confirmation notices were not returned by voters.
Introduction
Voter registration is required in 49 states,1 all U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia,
making registration the first step toward election participation for most voters.2 Registration
serves multiple purposes: it allows election officials to confirm if a person is eligible to vote;
permits officials to efficiently allocate resources such as ballots, poll workers, and voting
1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 56
states, U.S. territories, and federal districts that submit Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico did not
submit data for the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022.
2 North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration.
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equipment, depending on the number of registrants per precinct and jurisdiction;3 and allows the
tracking of voter participation.
Congress passed the NVRA in 1993 to “establish procedures that will increase the number of
eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.”4 This act, commonly known as
the “Motor Voter Law,” requires that states offer the opportunity to register to vote at their motor
vehicle offices (known as the Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] in many states) and when
residents are applying for a driver’s license—including renewals. The law also requires states to
offer voter registration at offices that provide public assistance or state-funded programs
primarily engaged in providing services to individuals with disabilities, and at armed services
recruitment offices. The NVRA also provides guidelines on registration list maintenance and sets
limits on how voters can be removed from the rolls.
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 charged the U.S. Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) with collecting data on voter registration and list maintenance procedures. The EAC meets
its statutory requirement to report to Congress on the impact of the NVRA via Section A of EAVS.5
This chapter of the EAVS not only fulfills this requirement, but also provides insight on the
changes in registration behaviors of Americans during federal elections and the state policies
affecting the registration process.
Federal Laws Regulating Voter Registration
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993
The NVRA is the primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States. In this law,
Congress provides a clear statement regarding the importance of voter registration:
“(1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right;
(2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of
that right; and
(3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and
damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and
disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.”6
3 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For
the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for
Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction.
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to
counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city,
town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at
the town or township level. Maine also reported its Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA) data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information is only collected at the state
level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in
the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered
by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are
included with Maui’s data.
4 52 U.S.C. § 20501.
5 Before 2016, the EAC administered a separate survey called the NVRA Survey, which collected similar
information. This survey was consolidated with the EAVS for the 2016 elections. Before the creation of the
EAC, the NVRA Survey was administered by the Federal Election Commission.
6 52 U.S.C. § 20501.
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The primary purposes of the NVRA are:
“(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register
to vote in elections for Federal office;
(2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act
[NVRA] in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in
elections for Federal office;
(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
(4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”7
The NVRA was fully implemented after the 1994 general election. Several states are not covered by
the NVRA. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. U.S. territories are
also not subject to the NVRA, and the states of Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming are exempt because they had same-day registration (SDR) in 1993 and have continued to
make this option available to voters uninterrupted since that time.
The NVRA’s first purpose is to expand opportunities for voters to register by creating more uniform
processes for voter registration and designating more places and methods to register to vote. The
NVRA requires that states allow multiple methods and places to register to vote, including: (1)
motor vehicle offices when a person obtains, renews, or updates the address on their driver’s
license; (2) through the mail, using a standard registration application;8 (3) at all state offices
providing public assistance (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]); (4) at
all offices that provide state-funded programs focused on providing services to people with
disabilities; (5) at recruitment offices of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (6) at other
state-designated offices such as public libraries and local government offices. All of these offices
are mandated under the NVRA to provide their users with information on voter registration, to
assist in the registration process when required, and offer to transmit completed voter
registration applications to the appropriate election official.
The NVRA also sets some fundamental guidelines on voter registration that states must follow.
For example, states may set their own deadline for citizens to register to vote in a general election
for federal offices, but that deadline can never be more than 30 days before the date of the
election. The NVRA also sets the process that states need to follow to maintain and update their
voter registration rolls and to conduct removal processes.
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)
HAVA was enacted with the goal of updating the voting administration system in the United States
and creating a commission to assist in the administration of federal elections. In addition to
legislating the update of the administration process for federal elections in the United States,
HAVA mandates that states create and maintain a “computerized statewide voter registration list”
that serves as “the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for Federal office
7 52 U.S.C. § 20507.
8 States can make available the standard National Mail Voter Registration Form provided by the EAC
(https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf) or their
own version of a mail registration form following the NVRA’s requirements.
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in the State.”9 The computerized registration list must be centralized and “defined, maintained
and administered at the State level.”10 However, although the registration list is administered at
the state level, any local election official must have access to the registration list and is required
to enter any updated voter registration information in the computerized system. HAVA also
specifies that the maintenance of the implemented computerized registration list will be carried
out according to the NVRA’s mandates, and that duplicate names or registrations will be removed
from the state’s registration list.
State Voter Registration Policies
States have wide latitude on how to conduct their voter registration activities, as long as state
policies comply with federal laws like the NVRA and HAVA. This flexibility allows states to adapt
their laws as they see appropriate to better serve the interests of their citizens and permits them
to adapt when unforeseen circumstances arise.
During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, some states implemented laws to expand voter
registration opportunities by allowing residents to register to vote online, at the polls, or by
extending the deadline to register to vote. In some cases, these changes have been maintained
for the 2022 general election. For example, in 2020, Massachusetts extended its voter
registration deadline from 20 days before the election to 10 days before the election—which also
created an overlap between open voter registration and early voting, allowing residents to register
to vote and cast a ballot on the same day—and maintained this registration deadline for the 2022
general election.11
However, voter registration laws usually take years from when they are first proposed to when
they are fully implemented. For example, in April 2020—well before the November 2020 general
election—Virginia’s legislature approved the use of SDR for “any person who is qualified to
register to vote.”12 However, this law did not become effective until October 1, 2022, making the
2022 general election the first election in which Virginians were allowed to register to vote at the
polls on Election Day.13
The Registration Process
The typical voter registration process is depicted in Figure 1. Citizens in the United States can
register to vote using different methods—some of them mandated by federal law (e.g., mail
registration) and others offered at the discretion of the state (e.g., online registration). Once a
registration application is completed and submitted, the state or local election office must
confirm the eligibility of the applicant.14 Eligible applicants are added to the voter registration rolls
and notified of their registration status, whereas applicants who submitted ineligible or
incomplete applications are contacted for further information to complete their applications.
9 52 U.S.C. § 21083.
10 Ibid.
11 https://www.sec.state.ma.us/divisions/elections/voter-resources/registering-to-vote.htm
12 VA Code § 24.2-420.1 https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+ful+CHAP1153
&201+ful+CHAP1153.
13 For a more complete overview of states’ registration policies, see Chapter 2 of this report.
14 In order to be eligible to register to vote for federal elections, federal law requires that individuals must
be U.S. citizens and be at least 18 years old. Some states have additional eligibility requirements, such as
requiring individuals to have resided within the state or jurisdiction for a certain period of time before they
may register to vote.
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Figure 1. The Voter Registration Process
Voter registration also serves to assign each voter to a precinct—a bounded geographic area to
which voters are assigned according to their residential address as listed on their voter
registration record—so that voters receive the correct ballot in an election. The voter registration
system tracks each voter’s electoral participation so that an individual can be given credit for
voting in an election, which helps ensure that each registered voter casts only one ballot that is
counted per election.
Every person with a valid registration is considered an active, registered voter. However, at times,
a question arises as to whether a person still resides at the address at which they are registered.
The election official may receive a notification via the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
Address service that the voter has a new residential address. In these situations, the state or
local election office may send the registrant a confirmation of address notice. If the person
responds to the confirmation notice, the election office will take action as directed by the
recipient. In many states, if the person fails to return the form or the form is returned to the
election office as undeliverable, the person is placed on a list of inactive voters. Inactive voters
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are still part of the registration rolls and included in the registration totals in most jurisdictions.15
However, before they can vote, inactive voters are typically required to show approved
documentation of their eligibility (most commonly, proof that they live at an address within the
voting jurisdiction). In some cases, inactive voters may be required to cast a provisional ballot
when their eligibility cannot be established at the polls.
The NVRA also requires states to maintain their voter registration rolls by removing registrants
who are no longer eligible to vote. This process is referred to as “list maintenance.” When an
individual is removed from the voter registration roll because of a change in residence under the
NVRA process, this is called “address list maintenance.” More details about list maintenance
processes and procedures are available in the “Registration List Maintenance” section of this
chapter. Election offices may share data with other state agencies or entities that maintain death
records or felony and prison records for the purposes of identifying potentially ineligible voters.16
Voter Registration Rates for the 2022 General Election
The NVRA requires each state to report its total number of registered and eligible, active, and
inactive registrants for each federal general election.17 Most states report the total “registered
and eligible” voters as the sum of active and inactive registrants. However, data on registered and
eligible voters as reported in the EAVS should be used with caution, as these totals can include
registrants who are no longer eligible to vote in that state but who have not been removed from
the registration rolls because the removal process laid out by the NVRA can take up to two
election cycles to be completed.18, 19
15 Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10
of the Policy Survey. According to the 2022 Policy Survey, six states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming) do not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their
registration records. In survey comments in EAVS, Minnesota reported “Minnesota is NVRA exempt.
Minnesota does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.” Nebraska reported “Nebraska does not have
‘Inactive’ voters. The numbers in line A1c reflect the number of voters who were sent a Section 8(d)(2)
notice and have not responded.” Oregon reported “Do not track number of inactive voters,” and Wisconsin
reported “Wisconsin is NVRA exempt; Wisconsin does not have inactive registered voters.”
16 More information about state policies on voter registration database linkages is found in Chapter 2 of
this report.
17 Eleven states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Northern Mariana Islands,
Ohio, Oregon, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) reported only active registrants. North
Dakota does not have voter registration and thus did not have any data to report.
18 Utah reported 199,315 fewer “registered and eligible” voters in their state (item A1a of the EAVS) than
the sum of active and inactive registrants (items A1b and A1c of the EAVS). This discrepancy is mainly the
result of two of this state’s counties not reporting data in A1a for total registrations but reporting data in
A1b for total active registrations. Illinois reported 84,176 more “registered and eligible” voters than the
sum of active and inactive registrants. This discrepancy is the result of seven of this state’s counties
reporting data in A1a for total registrations but not reporting data in A1b for total active registrations and/or
A1c for total inactive registrations.
19 New Hampshire reported zero registered voters in 18 of its 320 jurisdictions and stated in comments:
“Unincorporated place – No voters.” Wisconsin reported zero registered voters in three of its 1,851
jurisdictions because these jurisdictions were incorporated or annexed into new municipalities where they
reported the corresponding registration data. Kalawao County in Hawaii did not report registered voters
because Maui County administers Kalawao County’s elections, and Maui’s registrants are reported in
Kalawao’s data. Two counties in Utah (Davis County and Morgan County) responded “Data not available” to
the number of registered voters in the county. North Dakota did not report the number of registered voters
because the state does not require voter registration.
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Calculating Registration Rates
As with voter turnout, there are different ways to calculate voter registration rates.
Registration Rate Numerator
o Total Registrants. The number of people that states reported as being registered and eligible
to vote (A1a in the EAVS). This total includes active and inactive registrants. This metric
overrepresents the actual number of registrants within a state, since some of the people
included (particularly inactive registrants) may not be eligible to vote in that jurisdiction.
o Active Registrants. The number of people that states reported as being eligible to cast a
ballot without the need to provide additional eligibility evidence at the polls (A1b in the EAVS).
This total excludes inactive registrants.
Registration Rate Denominator
o Voting Age Population (VAP). The estimate of the number of individuals ages 18 or older
provided by the Census Bureau.
o Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP). The estimate of the number of American citizens ages
18 or older provided by the Census Bureau. This estimate is more accurate than the VAP in
that it restricts the inclusion criteria to being a U.S. citizen, which is mandatory to vote in
federal elections.
o Voting-Eligible Population (VEP). The estimate created by subtracting from the CVAP the
citizens that are ineligible to vote (e.g., individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and
individuals who are in the military or citizens living overseas. This estimate is provided by the
U.S. Elections Project and is available at the state level but not at the jurisdiction level like
the VAP and the CVAP estimates.
The combination of active registrants and the CVAP to calculate the registration rate in the EAVS
provides a higher level of accuracy than using the total registrations and/or the VAP to calculate the
rate at the jurisdiction level when needed, as opposed to the use of the VEP. This calculation has
some limitations, such as the potential overrepresentation of total registrants in the active registrant
list due to challenges for states to keep their voter registration rolls fully up to date. When analyzing
EAVS data, the EAC recommends using the following method to calculate voter registration rates:
𝐴1𝑏 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑆
× 100 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃
See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of state policies on voter registration and list
maintenance.
For the 2022 general election, states reported that 226,339,980 citizens were registered to vote,
either as active or inactive voters.20 This represents a 7% increase compared to the number of
people who were registered to vote for the 2018 general election.21 Nationally, 90% of all
20 The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a in the 2022 EAVS.
21 The percentage change in total number of registered voters between 2018 and 2022 was calculated as
A1a(2022)/A1a(2018). One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was
multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.
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registrants were designated as active, and 11.1% of registrants were designated as inactive.22
The total number of active registrants exceeded the 200 million mark for the first time in EAVS
history in 2020 and continued to exceed that mark with 203,660,564 active registrations
reported in 2022, accounting for 85.4% of the 2021 CVAP.23, 24 The majority of states reported
active registration rates of 80% or more of their 2021 CVAP (see Table 1 of Appendix A in this
chapter).25 Compared to the active registration rates in 2018, 68.6% of the states reported a
higher active registration rate in 2022.26
There was a 2.8-percentage-point increase in the active registration rates at the national level
(from 82.5% in 2018 to 85.4% in 2022).27 At the state level, West Virginia and Michigan reported
the largest increases in active registration rates between 2018 and 2022 (11.3% and 10.1%,
respectively), and Maine and New Hampshire reported the largest drops in active registration
22 The percentage of active and inactive registrants was collected in items A1b and A1c of the 2022 EAVS,
respectively, and the two data points were each divided by the total number of registered voters (item A1a
of EAVS). North Dakota was not included in these calculations because it does not have voter registration.
American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming did not provide data about inactive voters in item A1c of
the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages;
because of this, the percentage of active and inactive registrants does not sum to 100%. Casewise deletion
only uses data from states that provide information for the numerator and the denominator of the
calculation and, in the case of inactive registrations, there are several states that do not have or track data
on inactive registrations. They were thus excluded from the percentage of inactive voter calculation,
whereas all states were included in the percentage of active registrations.
23 The total number of active registrants was collected in item A1b in the 2022 EAVS. The active CVAP voter
registration rate was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. North Dakota was not included in the calculation
because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation because there is no CVAP information from the
Census Bureau for these territories. For more information on the rationale to use these numbers to create
the active CVAP voter registration rate, see the callout box “Calculating Registration Rates” in this chapter.
Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.
24 This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2021 instead of
the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were
not available by the time this report was finalized.
25 The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. Casewise deletion
at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
26 The percentage of states reporting a higher active registration rate in 2022 was calculated by subtracting
the active registration rate for 2022 from the active registration rate for 2018 (both calculated as
A1b/CVAP x 100) and categorizing the positive results as increases and the negative results as decreases.
North Dakota was not included because it does not have voter registration. The U.S. territories of American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included because the
U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP.
27 The 2018 active CVAP registration rate uses the same calculation as 2022. The 2018 active CVAP
registration rate uses the 2017 CVAP as the denominator. The percentage point change between the 2018
and 2022 active CVAP voter registration rates was calculated by subtracting the 2018 active CVAP voter
registration percentage from the 2022 active CVAP voter registration percentage. New Mexico’s change in
registration rate has not been highlighted because of data quality issues with the state’s A1b submission in
the 2018 EAVS.
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rates (14.8% and 12.5%, respectively).28, 29 Figure 2 shows the change in the active CVAP voter
registration rate among states from the 2018 general election to the 2022 general election.
Figure 2. Most States Had an Increase in Active Citizen Voting Age Population
Registration Rate from 2018 to 2022
Source: The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2022 percentage of
active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2022 EAVS divided by the 2018 percentage of
active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2018 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the
result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. North Dakota does not have a
change rate because it does not have voter registration. Puerto Rico does not have data because it did not
conduct a 2022 federal general election. The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands do not have a change rate because the U.S. Census Bureau
does not provide an estimate for their CVAP. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that
decreased, that slightly increased, and that notably increased in terms of the active CVAP registration rate
from 2018 to 2022.
28 The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2022 percentage of
active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2022 EAVS divided by the 2018 percentage of
active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2018 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the
result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.
29 New Mexico reported an uncharacteristically low number of active registrations in the 2018 EAVS
(698,172) compared to the active registrations reported in the general elections of 2014, 2016, and 2020
(all of which exceeded 1 million active registrations), which led to a 65.9% increase in active registrants.
Because of concerns with the reliability of this result, it was not included as the largest increase in the body
of the report.
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How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2022 General Election
Americans can use different methods to register to vote as provided by their state. Voter
registration applications can be used not only to register to vote for the first time in a jurisdiction,
but also to update relevant voter information such as address, name, or political party affiliation.
In the period between the close of voter registration for the 2020 general election and the close
of registration for the 2022 general election, states reported receiving 80,764,222 registration
applications—909,250 more applications than were received in the same period leading up to the
2018 general election.30, 31 Motor vehicle offices continued to be the most common source of
these registration applications, accounting for 55% of the total registrations received for the 2022
general election—the highest share of voter registrations by any method in EAVS history.32 Online
registrations accounted for 14%; registrations by mail, fax, and email combined accounted for
9.1%; and in-person registrations accounted for 5.9% of the total registration applications.33 The
rest of the registration applications that were received during this period were from sources such
as registration drives (2.4%), public assistance offices (1.4%), and other state agencies not
mandated by the NVRA (2.6%), such as public libraries among other sources.34
30 The total number of registration applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal
general election was reported in item A3a in the 2022 and 2018 EAVS.
31 Guam, Idaho, and Mississippi did not provide data on the total number of registrations received in 2022.
Missouri and the Northern Mariana Islands did not provide data on the total number of registrations
received in 2018. North Dakota did not provide data on the total number of registrations received because
they do not require voter registration.
32 The percentage of registrations received by motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100.
American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands,
Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation because they did
not report data on item A3a and/or item A4d. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating
the national percentage.
33 The percentage of registrations received by mail, fax, or email was calculated as A4a/A3a x 100. The
percentage of registrations received in person was calculated as A4b/A3a x 100. The percentage of
registrations received online was calculated as A4c/A3a x 100. Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation of the percentage of
registrations received by mail, fax, or email because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4a.
Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Rhode Island were
not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received in person because they did not
report data on item A3a and/or item A4b. American Samoa, Arkansas, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of
registrations received online because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4c. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.
34 The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as A4i/A3a x 100. The
percentage of registrations received from public assistance offices was calculated as A4e/A3a x 100. The
percentage of registrations received from other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated
as A4h/A3a x 100. American Samoa, Connecticut, Georgia, Guam, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations
received from registration drives because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4i. American
Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not
included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at public assistance offices because
they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4e. American Samoa, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
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For the past four election cycles, there has been a downward trend in the percentage of
Americans that register to vote in person at their election or registrar’s office—13.5% of
registrations were submitted in person for the 2016 general election, and this percentage
decreased in each ensuing election cycle and reached 5.9% of in-person registrations reported in
2022 (see Figure 3).35 When comparing the results from the 2020 and 2022 general elections,
15 states reported increases and 33 reported decreases in the percentage of in-person
registrations.36 Most decreases ranged from 0.5 to 6 percentage points, whereas the majority of
increases ranged from 0.4 to 10 percentage points. West Virginia reported the largest change of
in-person registrations between 2020 and 2022 with an increase of 20.3 percentage points.37
The percentage of registrations filed by mail, fax, or email also decreased in recent years and now
account for less than 10% of all registrations for the first time in EAVS history.38, 39 In 2022,
77.6% of the states reported a decrease in voter registrations received by mail, fax, or email
compared to 2020, with Delaware and North Carolina reporting the largest drops (decreasing by
32.8 and 20.8 percentage points, respectively).40
Guam, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at
other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item
A4h. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages. The instructions
for this question noted that registration applications should be classified according to the mode used to
submit it. For example, if the voter submits a registration application online using the state’s online voter
registration portal, then this is considered an online voter registration. If the voter accessed the online voter
registration system at a public library, then this would also be considered an online registration.
35 The percentage of in-person registrations received for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same
calculation as the 2022 percentage. The percentage of in-person registrations received in 2016 was
calculated as A6b/A5b x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national
percentages.
36 Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Rhode Island
were not included in this comparison because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4b.
37 The percentage point difference of in-person registrations was calculated as the percentage of in-person
registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of in-person registrations in 2020.
38 The percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations received for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same
calculation as the 2022 percentage.
39 EAVS history refers to data collected by the EAC starting with the 2004 general election. Data for voter
registration were reported in the EAVS starting with the 2014 general election and in a separate report
(commonly known as the “NVRA Report”) before that election up to the 2004 general election. Before
2004, data on voter registration were collected by the Federal Election Commission.
40 The percentage point difference of mail, fax, or email registrations was calculated as the percentage of
mail, fax, or email registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations in 2020.
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Figure 3. Registrations Filed at Motor Vehicle Offices Account for More than Half of Registrations
Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100
for all years. The percentage of registrations received by other means was calculated as (A4e+A4f+A4g
+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a x 100 for all years. The percentage of registrations received online was
calculated as A4c/A3a x 100 for all years. The percentage of registrations received by mail/fax/email was
calculated as A4a/A3a x 100 for all years. The percentage of registrations received in person was
calculated as A4b/A3a x 100 for all years. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the
national percentage.
Online registration continues to be the second most popular method of voter registration in the
United States and has been since the 2016 general election, although it decreased by 50.3% in
2022 compared to 2020.41 The steep decline in the percentage of registrations received online is
likely the combination of multiple factors. One of the main reasons for this decline is that the
percentage of online registrations in 2020 was unusually high and reached a record 28.2% of all
registrations received, an increase of 75.2% compared to the online registrations recorded in the
41 The percentage difference in online registrations between 2022 and 2020 was calculated as the
percentage of online registrations in 2022 divided by the percentage of online registrations in 2020. One
unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the
percentage change.
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previous election cycle.42 This phenomenon was likely triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, which
led many states to expand remote registration opportunities to compensate for the curtailing of
in-person registration (e.g., many election offices limited visitors and many motor vehicle offices
limited in-person appointments). Once the distancing limitations started to ease and offices
started to reopen after 2020, the use of online registration returned to levels more similar to
those reported in the 2018 EAVS. In fact, the percentage of online registrations received for the
2020 general election was statistically significantly higher than the online registrations received
for the 2018 and 2022 general elections, whereas the online registrations received in 2018 and
2022 were not significantly different at a p < 0.05 level.43
In addition to changes in the percentage of Americans who used online registration, there were
some states that changed their policies for this type of registration. In 2022, the number of states
that offered online registration decreased for the first time since this method was first
implemented in Arizona in 2002. The state of New York reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that it
did not offer online registration—though the state offers an online option to register to vote
through their motor vehicle office—and Oklahoma used to allow voter registration online but
reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that it only allowed voter registration updates and not new
voter registrations online for the 2022 general election.44
At the state level, only Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, and South Carolina had increases in the
percentage of online registrations received when comparing data from the 2020 and 2022 EAVS.
The largest decreases in online registrations at the state level came from Illinois and
Massachusetts (a decrease of 85.2 and 61.9 percentage points, respectively).45
The Rise in Motor Vehicle Office Registrations
The most notable result in the 2022 EAVS in terms of voting registration method is the increase in
registrations processed by motor vehicle offices. Even though it has been the most popular
registration method for more than a decade, the 2022 general election is the first time in EAVS
history in which registrations processed by motor vehicle offices accounted for more than half of
all registrations processed in the country.46 At the national level, 55% of Americans submitted
voter registration information through a motor vehicle office, a 40.1% increase compared to the
42 The percentage of online registrations received for the 2020 EAVS used the same calculation as the
2022 percentage. The percentage difference in online registrations between 2020 and 2018 was
calculated as the percentage of online registrations in 2020 divided by the percentage of online
registrations in 2018. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied
by 100 to obtain the percentage change.
43 Paired t tests were used to calculate the differences between years, and p < 0.05 was used as the
threshold for statistical significance.
44 Data on online registration policy were collected in item Q6 in the 2022 Policy Survey, and item Q7 in the
2020 Policy Survey. More information about states with online registration is found in Chapter 2 of this
report.
45 The percentage point difference of online registrations between 2020 and 2022 was calculated as the
percentage of online registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of online registrations in 2020. Texas
reported 0% online registrations in 2020. However, they did allow for online updates of voter registration in
2020 according to their response to the 2020 Policy Survey. Illinois reported an unusually high percentage
of online registrations in the 2020 EAVS.
46 The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100.
Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
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result in 2020.47 At the state level, seven states reported a decrease in the percentage of
registrations received through their local motor vehicle offices and 37 states reported increases
when comparing the 2022 and 2020 results. The states that reported the largest increases in
this type of registration were Massachusetts and Nevada (an increase of 60.3 and 47.2
percentage points, respectively).48
Like the online registration change noted above, the large increase in the percentage of
registrations processed at motor vehicle offices is likely the result of several factors—one of which
is the unique circumstances leading up to the 2020 general election due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Starting in March 2020, motor vehicle offices started to close in most states due to
public health concerns, and when states started to reopen these offices, they did so in a limited
capacity (e.g., opening a limited number of offices, limiting the number of customers allowed in
the office to ensure social distancing, limiting the hours of operation and the types of transactions
allowed). These limitations were in effect for different periods of time depending on the state, and
in some cases were present past the November 2020 general election. Additionally, to account
for the extraordinary circumstances, most states extended the validity period for expiring driver’s
licenses to account for the limited-capacity operations, and some states implemented online
driver’s license renewal where this was previously not an option.49 These measures likely
decreased the number of registrations processed at motor vehicle offices for the 2020 general
election, because many Americans who would have interacted with their motor vehicle offices in
normal circumstances—and therefore would have updated or filed voter registration paperwork—
between March 2020 and the 2020 general election had to wait to complete these transactions.
In many cases these were likely pushed back until after November 2020 and were reported in the
2022 EAVS instead of the 2020 EAVS.
An example of the phenomenon described above is detailed in a report from the Office of the
District of Columbia Auditor (ODCA) on the District of Columbia’s 2020 election administration.50
Data from the District of Columbia Board of Elections showed that the number of registrations
received through motor vehicle offices effectively stopped in March 2020 and did not resume
until July 2020, and when they resumed, they did so at a slower pace than before the pandemic.
Meanwhile, the number of online registrations processed was not affected by the onset of the
pandemic and largely increased in the month leading up to the 2020 general election.
However, when looking at the relationship between the difference in 2020 and 2022 voter
registrations processed by motor vehicle offices in each state and the driver’s license expiration
extensions provided in each state—as a proxy for the potential backlog of 2020 driver license
transactions that may have resulted in 2022 voter registrations—the results were not conclusive.
Longer driver’s license expiration extensions were correlated with larger increases in the
47 The percentage difference in motor vehicle offices’ registrations between 2022 and 2020 was calculated
as the percentage of motor vehicle offices’ registrations in 2022 divided by the percentage of motor vehicle
offices’ registrations in 2020. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was
multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.
48 The percentage-point difference of motor vehicle offices’ registrations between 2020 and 2022 was
calculated as the percentage of motor vehicle offices’ registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of motor
vehicle offices’ registrations in 2020.
49 https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Policy-Scan-State-Drivers-Licesnse-Expirations.pdf
50 https://dcauditor.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Elections.Administration
.Report.11.16.21.pdf (pg. 22).
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percentage of voter registrations through the state’s motor vehicle office, but the correlation was
not statistically significant.51 ,52 These results suggest that although the effects of the COVID-19
response likely had an impact on the rebound of registrations filed at state’s motor vehicle
offices, additional factors such as policy changes (e.g., implementation of automatic voter
registration at motor vehicle offices) may have also contributed to the increase of this type of
registration.
Automatic Voter Registration
Automatic voter registration (AVR) laws allow for non-registered individuals to be added to the
voter registration rolls during or after an interaction with a designated state agency, such as the
motor vehicle office, unless the person specifically declines to be registered. The most common
differences between the types of AVR policies are the point at which the individual must decline
or “opt out” of being registered—either at the point of service or at a later time through a mailer
sent to the individual—and which state agencies participate in the AVR program.
In 2016, Oregon was the first state to implement AVR at the state level. Since then, 36 additional
states have begun using automatic voter registration or incorporated automated features into
their voter registration processes, though the details of these automatic or automated processes
vary widely among states.53 A more complete analysis of states’ automatic or automated
registration policies is found in Chapter 2 of this report. For the most part, states reported that
individuals must opt out of AVR at the point of service. A very common example is that a person is
provided the opportunity to register to vote while completing a transaction at a motor vehicle
office and is asked to provide a response of “yes” or “no” to be able to continue with the voter
registration transaction. Only the state of Colorado reported not asking individuals during their
transactions and later requiring that they actively respond to a mailer if they do not want to be
included in the voter registration rolls.54
In total, 37 states reported using some form of AVR and 18 reported not using AVR for the 2022
general election. All states with this registration policy reported that AVR is at least offered at
motor vehicle offices—with 15 states reporting additional agencies (e.g., agencies for people with
disabilities, public assistance offices) participating in the AVR program in their state.55 Figure 4
shows the percentage of registration applications processed at motor vehicle offices in 2020 and
2022 for states with and without AVR policies. In AVR states, motor vehicle office registrations
accounted for a larger portion of their total registrations in both 2020 and 2022 compared to
non-AVR states. Interestingly, the percentage point increase in these registrations between 2020
51 Data on driver’s license extensions came from the Department of Defense’s “COVID-19 Response State
Issued Driver’s License & ID Card Extension Guidance” (https://www.cac.mil/Portals/53/Documents
/DL%20Expiration%20Guidance_cac_mil.pdf?ver=2020-06-18-115456-723) and the National Governors
Association memorandum “Policy Scan of States Driver’s License Rules Ahead of the Election”
(https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Policy-Scan-State-Drivers-Licesnse-Expirations.pdf).
52 The result of the correlation was r = 0.062, p = 0.695.
53 Data on state AVR policy were collected in item Q5 in the 2022 Policy Survey.
54 Information on the point at which the individual has the opportunity to opt out of AVR was collected in
item Q5 in the 2022 Policy Survey. Although Colorado was the only state that reported only using a method
of AVR that requires the voter to decline registration by responding a mailer, this “mailer opt-out” method of
AVR was also used by Alaska, Illinois, and Oregon. However, these three states reported also using other
AVR methods where the voter is required to opt-out during the interaction with the appropriate agency.
55 Information on state agencies participating in the AVR program for each state was collected in item Q5a
in the 2022 Policy Survey.
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and 2022 was slightly higher for non-AVR states than for AVR states. It is worth noting that AVR
states reported 38,532,182 registrations received at their motor vehicle offices, accounting for
87.5% of these type of registrations in the 2022 EAVS.56
Figure 4. States With Automatic Voter Registration Had the Highest Rates of
Registrations at Motor Vehicle Offices
Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100
for 2020 and 2022. Item Q5a in the 2022 Policy Survey was used to group states with and without AVR
policies. There might be states in the AVR group that did not allow for this type of registration in 2020.
Because there was a change in the AVR question in the Policy Survey from 2020 to 2022 it was impossible
to consistently classify states as AVR and non-AVR in 2020 for this calculation. Casewise deletion at the
state level was used in calculating the overall percentages.
Although AVR is most commonly administered through state motor vehicle offices, 15 states use
additional offices to register voters through AVR. EAVS does not collect data specifically on the
number of AVRs processed by states, but there are instances in which a state will report the
number of registrations conducted in one of these state-funded agencies. In Alaska, the state’s
Permanent Fund Dividend program conducts AVR and filed a total of 760,797 voter registrations
56 The number of registrations received at motor vehicle offices used item A4d of the 2022 EAVS. Item Q5a
in the 2022 Policy Survey was used to identify states with AVR policies. The percentage of the total motor
vehicle offices registrations that were filed at states with AVR policies used the sum of A4d for these states
divided by the national level A4d sum multiplied by 100.
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in 2022.57 Registrations processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend accounted for 73.9%
of all the registrations received in Alaska in 2022, whereas they accounted for 68.1% in 2020
and 59.8% in 2018.58
Same-Day Registration
SDR allows voters to register to vote and cast their ballot on the same day. SDR can be offered on
Election Day, in which case it may be referred to as Election Day registration, or it can be offered
during in-person early voting.59 SDR depends on local laws and, thus, is only allowed in some
states and territories. Some states reported allowing SDR in very circumstances; Wisconsin, for
instance, reported offering regular SDR at the polls on Election Day and during in-person early
voting. In addition, Wisconsin has stated that “Individuals who are hospitalized may register and
request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day anytime from the Tuesday
prior to Election Day through 5 p.m. on Election Day.”60
In 2022, 26 states reported allowing some form of SDR. Twenty-two states reported allowing
voters to register to vote on Election Day, 14 states reported allowing SDR during an overlap
between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, 22 states reported allowing
for SDR during in-person early voting, and two states reported allowing for SDR in very specific
cases.61 The states that indicated allowing SDR were mostly the same as in 2020, with the
exception of Alaska, Guam, Mississippi and Rhode Island, which allowed some form of SDR for
the 2020 general election but not for the 2022 general election,62 and Virginia, which
implemented SDR in October of 2022.63
57 Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend automatically registers eligible voters unless they respond to a
registration notice within a 30-day period (https://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/PFDAVRindex.php).
Alaska reported data on the number of registrations received through the Permanent Fund Dividend
program in item A4j of the 2022, 2020 and 2018 EAVS.
58 The percentage of the total registrations that were processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend
program was calculated as A4j/A3a x 100 for each year.
59 Some states may have an overlap between their mail voting period and the close of their voter
registration, during which it is possible for a person to register on the same day that they cast a mailed
ballot; however, this is not considered SDR for purposes of the EAVS, and many states have noted in the
past that it is not possible to track the number of mail voters who register to vote on the same day that they
cast their mailed ballot. In-person early voting refers to any opportunity for voters in a state to cast a vote in
person before Election Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of the different types of in-person
early voting opportunities available in states.
60 Wisconsin reported this special situation in item Q8a of the 2022 Policy Survey.
61 These results were obtained from item Q8a of the 2022 Policy Survey. More information about state
policies on SDR can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.
62 Alaska and Rhode Island only allow SDR for voting for the U.S. president and vice president, thus they do
not allow for SDR in midterms when these races are not in the ballot.
63 These results were obtained from item Q8 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q9 of the 2020 Policy
Survey.
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The total number of SDRs recorded in 2022 was 1,019,300 and accounted for 2.7% of the total
registrations received among states allowing for SDR.64, 65 Election Day SDRs accounted for
64.5% of all SDRs reported and pre-Election Day SDRs accounted for 38.3% of the total SDR
registrations reported in states that allowed them.66
The use of SDR varied considerably between states for the 2022 general election, and the NVRA-
exempt states—which gained NVRA exemption for allowing SDR continuously since 199367—were
among the states where SDR accounted for the largest percentages of registration applications.
Wisconsin reported that 60.3% of the registrations received for the 2022 general election were
SDRs, whereas New Hampshire and Wyoming reported that SDRs accounted for 16.2% and
10.9% of all the registrations received, respectively. 68 Among states subject to the provisions of
the NVRA, Maine had the highest proportion of SDR registrations (20.3%); although this state was
NVRA exempt when the law was first implemented because it had SDR in 1993, Maine lost its
exemption in 2011 when it temporarily discontinued SDR before reinstating it later that year.
Other Modes of Registration
In addition to in-person, online, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle office registrations, states
reported data on registration applications received from other sources, which in 2022 accounted
for 14.5% of the applications received at the national level.69 Some of these modes of registration
are NVRA mandated, such as registrations through armed forces recruitment offices, public
assistance offices, and state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, which together
accounted for 1.6% of the national registrations for the 2022 general election (see Table 2 of
Appendix A in this chapter for a breakdown of registrations received by each of these methods).70
64 The total number of SDR applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general
election was reported in item A2a in the 2022 EAVS. The total corresponds to the 23 states that reported
allowing SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which allow for
SDR, did not provide data in item A2a for 2022.
65 The percentage of registrations received that were SDRs was calculated as A2a/A3a x 100. The
percentage of SDR applications corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing SDR and provided data
for SDR and total registrations received. American Samoa, Idaho, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which
allow for SDR, did not provide data in item A2a and/or item A3a and were excluded from the calculation.
Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
66 The percentage of SDRs received that were Election Day SDRs was calculated as A2b/A2a x 100. The
percentage of SDRs received that were pre-Election day SDRs was calculated as A2c/A2a x 100. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. The percentage of SDRs that
were Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing Election Day SDR and provided
data for it. New Mexico, which allows for Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2b for 2022. The
percentage of SDRs that were pre-Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 20 states that reported allowing
pre-Election Day SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Idaho, and Massachusetts, which allow for
some form of pre-Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2c for 2022.
67 Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt for this reason. North
Dakota is also NVRA exempt because it does not require voter registration, and the U.S. territories are NVRA
exempt.
68 The percentage of registration applications that were SDRs was calculated as A2a/A3a x 100. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
69 The percentage of registrations received by other sources different than in-person, online, mail/fax/
email, and motor vehicle office was calculated as (A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a x 100 for
the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.
70 The percentage of registrations received from NVRA-mandated sources other than in person,
mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle offices was calculated as (A4e+A4f+A4g)/A3a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS.
Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.
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States also reported registrations completed through other modes that are not required by the
NVRA and that are authorized at the discretion of the state, such as at registration drives (2.4%)
and other agencies required by the state (2.6%).71
Types of Registrations Received for the 2022 General Election
When a person submits a voter registration application, it is processed by an election office and
can reach one of several outcomes. Valid applications from people who are eligible and not
already registered are considered new applications and are added to the voter registration rolls.
Applications submitted by people already registered to vote at the same address with the same
name and personal information are considered duplicates. Applications from already-registered
individuals wishing to change their name, party affiliation, or address are processed as updates to
existing registrations. Applications that do not meet the requirements of eligibility are considered
invalid or rejected. When allowed by state law, applications submitted by individuals under 18
years old are processed as pre-registrations so that the individual who submitted the form will be
registered when they become of voting age.
All registration applications received are processed and scrutinized by election officials to ensure
that the information is correct, that only eligible voters are added to the voter registration rolls,
and that duplicate registration records are not created. After the application’s review by election
officials and following the NVRA’s guidelines, states must notify the applicant of the result of their
application. For example, a successful application may result in a notification in the form of a
registration card mailed to the applicant or a notice of rejection or request for additional
documents may be mailed to unsuccessful applicants.
Valid Registrations
Figure 5 displays information on the result of the registration applications that were received by
states. Of the more than 80,764,222 registration applications received between the 2020 and
2022 federal general elections, the most common type of registration was an update to an
existing record that did not involve a cross-jurisdiction change of address.72 These updates
usually involve a change of name (such as after a marriage or divorce), party affiliation, or within-
jurisdiction change of address; these updates accounted for 44.1% of the registrations processed
at the national level.73 New valid registrations—a registration application received from an eligible
person in a jurisdiction where they were not previously registered and that resulted in a new
registration record being added to the voter registration roll—made up 27.9% of the registrations
received.74
71 The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as A4i/A3a x 100. The
percentage of registrations received from state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated as
A4h/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.
72 The number of total registration applications was reported in item A3a of the 2022 EAVS.
73 The percentage of registration applications received that were a change of name, party, or within-
jurisdiction change of address was calculated as A3f/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was
used in calculating the national percentage.
74 The percentage of registration applications that were new registrations was calculated as A3b/A3a
x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
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Figure 5. Most Registration Applications Were New Applications or Within-Jurisdiction Changes
Source: The percentage of registrations received that were changes of name, party, or within-jurisdiction
changes of address was calculated as A3f/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received that were
new valid registrations was calculated as A3b/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received that
were duplicate registrations was calculated as A3d/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received
that were labelled as “Other” registrations was calculated as (A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a x 100. The percentage of
registrations received that were cross-jurisdiction changes of address was calculated as A3g/A3a x 100.
The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as A3e/A3a x 100.
The percentage of registrations received that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of age
was calculated as A3c/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received that were not categorized was
calculated as (1 – [A3b+A3c+A3d+A3e+A3f+A3g+A3h+A3i+A3j]/A3a) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state
level was used in calculating the national percentages.
Other types of valid registrations reported in the EAVS included a change of address that crossed
local jurisdiction borders but was still within the state, which accounted for 9.7% of the total
registration applications filed.75 Some states reported allowing for underage citizens to pre-
register to vote so that they are automatically added to the voter registration rolls when they turn
18 years old. These pre-registrations accounted for 1.4% of the total registrations among states
that allowed them.76 Finally, 11.1% of the registrations were labelled as “Other.” This category in
75 The percentage of registration applications that were cross-jurisdiction change of addresses was
calculated as A3g/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national
percentage.
76 The percentage of registration applications that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of
age was calculated as A3c/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the
national percentage.
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the EAVS is used by states to report registrations that were not covered among the standard
categories, or in most cases, to report registrations that could not be broken down into the
categories provided, such as a change to an existing registration record that could not be tracked
as being a within-jurisdiction or cross-jurisdiction change of address.77
Rejected and Duplicate Registrations
Some of the registration applications received by states do not result in the creation or the update
of a registration record. The EAVS collects data on two types of unsuccessful registration
applications: rejected and duplicate registrations. The first type includes applications that contain
incomplete information, incorrect information, information that cannot be validated against
existing state records, or applications from people who do not meet eligibility requirements. In the
period between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of
registration for the 2022 general election, states reported rejecting 1,873,700 applications,
accounting for 2.5% of the total registration applications received. This is comparable to the
percentage of registrations that were rejected in 2020 (2.9%) and 2018 (3.4%).78
Duplicate registrations include applications that are exact matches to existing registration
records; these can be applications submitted by people who did not realize they were already
registered to vote or who submitted multiple applications through different modes (e.g.,
submitted an application with the exact same information through the mail and online). States
reported receiving 9,083,395 duplicate applications between the 2020 and the 2022 general
elections, which accounted for 12.7% of the total registrations received.79 As with rejected
applications, the percentage of duplicate registrations registered in 2022 was comparable to
those in 2020 (9.7%) and 2018 (10.2%).80
A majority of states provided a breakdown of the total, rejected, and duplicate registrations they
received and the source of those registrations (e.g., online, in person, or at motor vehicle
offices).81 With a few exceptions, the percentage of applications that were duplicates comprised
at least 8% of the registrations received by each source; the exceptions were: online registrations
(7.4%), registration drives (6.3%), and registrations filed at non-NVRA-mandated state agencies
77 The percentage of registration applications that were categorized as “Other” was calculated as
(A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national
percentage. Not all the applications accounted for in the “Other” category may be valid; however, they were
included in this section because they cannot be fully identified as rejected or duplicate either.
78 The total number of rejected registration applications was collected in item A3e of the 2022 EAVS. The
percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as A3e/A3a x 100 for
2018, 2020, and 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national
percentages. Paired t tests between each pair of election years did not yield significant results at the p <
0.05 level, meaning that the results were not significantly different from each other.
79 The total number of duplicate registration applications was collected in item A3d of the 2022 EAVS. The
percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations was calculated as A3d/A3a x 100.
Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
80 The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS
used the same calculation as the 2022 percentage. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in
calculating the national percentages.
81 Thirteen states did not provide the application source breakdown for duplicate registrations and 14
states did not provide the application source breakdown for rejected registrations. Data from these states
were not included in the ensuing calculations in the paragraph.
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(3.2%).82 Registrations received by methods categorized as “Other” had the largest duplicate
registration rate with 18.3% of all registrations filed being classified as duplicates. For rejected
registrations, most registration methods had a rejection rate between 1.9% and 4%, with the
exception of registrations filed at state-funded agencies primarily serving individuals with
disabilities (7.3%), registrations from registration drives (9.8%), and registrations filed at public
assistance offices mandated by the NVRA (11.3%).83
Registration List Maintenance
The NVRA requires states to maintain an “accurate and current voter registration roll” to “protect
the integrity of the electoral process.”84 To facilitate this maintenance, the NVRA requires that any
change of address submitted to a motor vehicle office must serve as notification of a change of
address for voter registration, unless the individual indicates that the change is not for voter
registration purposes. The law also requires states to conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory
general program to remove the records of ineligible voters. States have considerable freedom to
choose when, where, and how these functions are performed, but must follow the guidelines
listed in the NVRA, which describe the need to use confirmation notices and to complete (with few
exceptions) systematic removal programs “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or
general election for Federal office,”85 and to keep a detailed list of instances in which it is
appropriate to remove a record from the voter registration rolls.
The NVRA’s list maintenance process, shown in Figure 6, specifies the steps that states need to
follow in order to confirm eligibility from registered voters and to remove them from the voter
registration rolls when registered voters are no longer eligible to vote in a jurisdiction. One key
tool in this process that states may use to keep their voter registration rolls up to date is
confirmation notices. These are postage-paid and pre-addressed return cards that are sent to
registrants who a state suspects are no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which they are
registered. If the registrant does not return the confirmation notice, they can be added to the
inactive registrant list and would typically be asked to provide proof of residency before voting. If
the registrant fails to return the confirmation notice and does not participate in the subsequent
82 The duplicate registration rate refers to the percentage of registration applications received from a
source and categorized as duplicate. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as A6a/A4a x 100. For in-
person registrations, this was calculated as A6b/A4b x 100. For online registrations, this was calculated as
A6c/A4c x 100. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as A6d/A4d x 100. For public assistance
offices, this was calculated as A6e/A4e x 100. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with
disabilities, this was calculated as A6f/A4f x 100. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated
as A6g/A4g x 100. For registration drives, this was calculated as A6i/A4i x 100. For other registration
sources, this was calculated as (A6j+A6k+A6l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level
was used in calculating the national percentages.
83 The rejection rate refers to the percentage of registration applications received from a source and
categorized as invalid or rejected. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as A7a/A4a x 100. For in-person
registrations, this was calculated as A7b/A4b x 100. For online registrations, this was calculated as
A7c/A4c x 100. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as A7d/A4d x 100. For public assistance
offices, this was calculated as A7e/A4e x 100. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with
disabilities, this was calculated as A7f/A4f x 100. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated
as A7g/A4g x 100. For registration drives, this was calculated as A7i/A4i x 100. For other registration
sources, this was calculated as (A7j+A7k+A7l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level
was used in calculating the national percentages.
84 52 U.S.C. § 20501.
85 52 U.S.C. § 20507.
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two consecutive federal general elections, then the NVRA grants the state the ability to remove
the registrant from the voter registration roll. If the registrant has not moved out of the voting
jurisdiction, they must complete and return the confirmation notice no later than the registration
deadline of the next election to remain on the list of active registrants.
Figure 6. The NVRA’s Voter Registration List Maintenance Process
The NVRA mandates that registrants may only be removed from the voter registration rolls in
these circumstances:
o Upon the death of the registrant;
o Upon the registrant’s written confirmation that their address has changed to a location
outside the registrar’s jurisdiction;
o On the request of the registrant;
o For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
o On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
o On the registrant’s failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to
appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.
Because registration removal can take up to two federal general election cycles to complete for
some registration records, particularly in states that are subject to the NVRA, it is inevitable that
voter registration rolls will contain some number of voter records for individuals who are no longer
eligible to vote.
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NVRA-exempt states do not need to adhere to these guidelines to complete list maintenance of
their voter registration rolls. However, they do have similar processes in place to guarantee that
their voter registration rolls are up to date and only non-eligible voters are removed from their
voter registration rolls. For example, Wisconsin sends mailing notices similar to the confirmation
notices described above to registrants who have not voted in a four-year period and to registrants
that are flagged via Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) as having outdated or
inaccurate information. If the voter fails to return the mail notice within 30 days, then they are
declared ineligible to vote.86, 87 A voter who is eligible to vote may register to vote and cast their
ballot at the polls on Election Day in Wisconsin and every NVRA-exempt state.
Confirmation Notices Processed
Nationally, 26,601,983 confirmation notices were sent between the 2020 general election and
the month before the 2022 general election, accounting for 13.7% of the active voters reported
by states in 2022.88 This percentage falls in the range of what was reported by states in 2020
(14.3%) and in 2018 (11.6%).89 Table 1 shows that unreturned confirmation notices accounted
for 57.4% of the total confirmation notices sent. These are confirmation notices that were not
returned by the voter confirming if they were—or were not—eligible to vote, nor were these
confirmation notices returned by the postal service as undeliverable. Unreturned confirmation
notices allow states to move the addressees of these notices to the inactive registration list if the
state uses that designation. States reported that 8.4% of confirmation notices were returned
confirming the voter’s continued eligibility, and 5% were returned confirming the voter was no
longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction or no longer wanted to be registered to vote.90
86 Wisconsin Statutes §§6.50 (1) and (2).
87 https://elections.wi.gov/statistics-data/voter-list-maintenance/electronic-registration-information-center-
eric
88 The total number of confirmation notices sent was reported in item A8a of the 2022 EAVS. The
percentage of active registered voters who received a confirmation notice was calculated as A8a/A1b x
100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In 2022, 48
states reported the number of confirmation notices sent during the period of registration for the 2022
general election. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and, thus, does not use
confirmation notices. American Samoa, Idaho, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt.
Alabama reported that they did “not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.”
Indiana did not provide this information because their voter registration system “is not able to track the
information requested.” Forty states reported the status of the confirmation notices sent. In addition to the
states that did not report on confirmation notices, Guam, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Rhode Island did not break down the number of confirmation notices sent by
status.
89 The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants in 2020 and 2018
used the same calculation as 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the
national percentage.
90 The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as A8e/A8a x 100. The percentage of
confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming valid registration was calculated as A8b/A8a
x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be
invalidated was calculated as A8c/A8a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating
the national percentage.
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Table 1. Most Confirmation Notices That Were Sent Were Not Returned by Voters
Percentage of Total
Result of Confirmation Notice
Confirmation Notices Sent
Unreturned (neither received back from voters nor
57.4%
returned as undeliverable)
Not categorized 23.8%
Undeliverable 13.6%
Other 10.4%
Returned by voter confirming valid registration 8.4%
Returned by voter confirming invalid registration 5%
Source: The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as A8e/A8a x 100. The
percentage of confirmation notices sent that were not categorized was calculated as (1 – [A8b+A8c+
A8d+A8e+A8f+A8g+A8h]/A8a) x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned
undeliverable was calculated as A8d/A8a x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were
labeled as “Other” was calculated as (A8f+A8g+A8h/A8a) x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices
sent that were returned confirming valid registration was calculated as A8b/A8a x 100. The percentage of
confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be invalidated was calculated
as A8c/A8a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
Voters Removed From the Voter Registration Rolls
Between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for
the 2022 general election, states reported removing 19,260,000 records from their voter
registration rolls.91 This was equal to 8.5% of the total number of voters who were registered in
the United States as of the close of registration for the 2022 general election.92 At the state level,
60.4% of the states reported removing a number of registrants that added up to between 3% and
10% of their total registered voters. There were some exceptions to this trend: the U.S. Virgin
Islands’ removals accounted for the lowest percentage of total registrants at less than 0.1%, and
New Hampshire reported the highest percentage of removals at 29.5% (see Table 5 of Appendix A
in this chapter).
States also reported the reasons for removing records from their voter registration rolls. These
reasons for removal are shown in Figure 7. The most common reason was a cross-jurisdiction
change of address, which accounted for 26.8% of all removals, followed by death of the registrant
91 The total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls was reported in item A9a of the
2022 EAVS. Fifty-two states reported data for the items related to voter removal. North Dakota does not
require citizens to register to vote and thus does not have registrants to remove from the voter registration
rolls. Idaho reported “Data not available” for all items related to registration removals. Mississippi reported
the total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls in item A9a but responded “Data
not available” to subitems A9b to A9g.
92 Registrants removed as a percentage of total registrants was calculated as A9a/A1a x 100. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
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(25.6%). Failure to both respond to a confirmation notice and to vote in two consecutive federal
general elections accounted for 25.4% of removals.93
Figure 7. Three Removal Reasons Accounted for the Majority of the Voter Registration Removals
Source: The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was
calculated as A9b/A9a x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated as
A9c/A9a x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices
(and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as A9e/A9a x 100. The percentage of
registrations removed because of other reasons was calculated as (A9f+A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a x 100. The
percentage of registrations removed because the voter requested to be removed was calculated as
A9g/A9a x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was
calculated as A9d/A9a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national
percentages.
The majority of states reported that a registrant could be removed from the voter registration rolls
if the registrant received a disqualifying criminal conviction and/or was incarcerated,94 but only
93 The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was
calculated as (A9b/A9a) x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated
as (A9c/A9a) x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation
notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as (A9e/A9a) x 100. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
94 Maine, Vermont, and the District of Columbia reported criminal conviction and/or incarceration was not a
reason for voter removal in item Q38 of the 2022 Policy Survey.
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1.4% of the removals were done for this reason.95 Two states, however, reported that more than
7% of their registration removals happened due to criminal convictions or incarceration. Kentucky
reported that 9.1% of registrants were removed for this reason, and New Mexico (13.3%) reported
the largest percentage of this type of removal. These two states also reported that criminal
convictions accounted for more than 6% of their voter registration removals in the 2020 and
2018 EAVS.96
Upcoming Changes to Section A for the 2024 EAVS
All voter registration-related topics discussed in this chapter are covered in Section A of the EAVS.
The questions in this section have changed little since the 2008 EAVS, even as the methods that
states offer to register to vote and use to collect registration data have continued to evolve (e.g.,
implementation of online registration in most states, AVR, changes in voter registration
databases).
Beginning with the 2024 EAVS, the EAC will update the vocabulary and the content of EAVS
Section A to better reflect the reality of voter registration in the United States. From late 2021 to
early 2022, the EAC consulted with state and local election officials from multiple states on
issues they experienced in the past with Section A, their current voter registration data collection
practices, and suggestions for updates to the survey questions.
The new Section A will cover the same topics discussed in this chapter and will add items
covering new topics, such as reasons for sending confirmation notices and instances where voter
registration records are merged. It will also transition from recording voter registration forms to
voter registration transactions and will record all registration updates in one category instead of
two. For a complete description of the upcoming changes and a look at the new Section A, see
the EAC’s “Planned Changes to 2024 EAVS” report at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-
data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.
95 The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as
A9d/A9a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.
96 The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction in 2020 and 2018
used the same calculation as 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the
national percentages.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Tables
Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History
Active Active Inactive
Regs. Regs. Inactive Regs.
State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.
(% of (% of Regs. (% of
CVAP) Total) Total)
2022 3,829,788 3,692,639 3,283,842 85.7% 88.9% 408,797 11.1%
Alabama 2020 3,731,336 3,717,798 3,438,213 92.1% 92.5% 279,585 7.5%
2018 3,688,249 3,465,352 3,164,301 85.8% 91.3% 301,051 8.7%
2022 533,852 648,790 601,795 112.7% 92.8% 46,995 7.2%
Alaska 2020 533,151 646,093 595,647 111.7% 92.2% 50,446 7.8%
2018 531,653 624,467 571,851 107.6% 91.6% 52,616 8.4%
2022 -- 14,314 14,314 -- 100.0% -- --
American Samoa 2020 -- 16,341 16,341 -- 100.0% 0 0.0%
2018 -- 15,527 8,462 -- 54.5% 7,065 45.5%
2022 5,216,518 4,833,160 4,143,929 79.4% 85.7% 689,231 14.3%
Arizona 2020 5,137,474 4,728,109 4,275,729 83.2% 90.4% 452,380 9.6%
2018 4,895,706 4,276,891 3,715,624 75.9% 86.9% 561,267 13.1%
2022 2,237,649 1,805,777 1,475,838 66.0% 81.7% 329,939 18.3%
Arkansas 2020 2,235,415 1,831,414 1,408,061 63.0% 76.9% 423,353 23.1%
2018 2,207,894 1,786,840 1,456,887 66.0% 81.5% 329,953 18.5%
2022 26,028,290 26,942,532 21,958,218 84.4% 81.5% 4,984,314 18.5%
California 2020 26,032,160 26,157,616 21,795,538 83.7% 83.3% 4,348,374 16.6%
2018 25,650,455 25,103,559 19,724,297 76.9% 78.6% 5,379,262 21.4%
2022 4,303,604 4,355,778 3,839,814 89.2% 88.2% 515,964 11.8%
Colorado 2020 4,244,210 4,211,528 3,803,762 89.6% 90.3% 407,766 9.7%
2018 4,057,437 3,953,613 3,426,499 84.4% 86.7% 527,114 13.3%
2022 2,659,979 2,491,987 2,259,575 84.9% 90.7% 232,412 9.3%
Connecticut 2020 2,619,474 2,524,717 2,335,860 89.2% 92.5% 188,857 7.5%
2018 2,611,667 2,369,335 2,193,586 84.0% 92.6% 175,749 7.4%
2022 754,114 762,908 702,029 93.1% 92.0% 60,879 8.0%
Delaware 2020 725,178 739,672 711,287 98.1% 96.2% 28,385 3.8%
2018 709,999 695,014 672,632 94.7% 96.8% 22,382 3.2%
2022 502,670 674,728 508,855 101.2% 75.4% 165,873 24.6%
District of
2020 536,768 625,683 517,890 96.5% 82.8% 107,793 17.2%
Columbia
2018 510,514 617,046 511,633 100.2% 82.9% 105,413 17.1%
2022 15,855,982 15,574,971 14,497,121 91.4% 93.1% 1,077,850 6.9%
Florida 2020 15,507,315 15,231,808 14,517,002 93.6% 95.3% 701,422 4.6%
2018 15,014,950 14,126,722 13,278,070 88.4% 94.0% 848,652 6.0%
2022 7,786,111 7,813,860 6,955,386 89.3% 89.0% 858,474 11.0%
Georgia 2020 7,581,837 7,618,436 7,194,889 94.9% 94.4% 423,547 5.6%
2018 7,362,615 6,944,851 6,437,524 87.4% 92.7% 507,327 7.3%
2022 -- 60,463 60,463 -- 100.0% -- --
Guam 2020 -- 55,896 55,896 -- 100.0% -- --
2018 -- 55,941 55,941 -- 100.0% -- --
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Active Active Inactive
Regs. Regs. Inactive Regs.
State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.
(% of (% of Regs. (% of
CVAP) Total) Total)
2022 1,044,019 861,475 764,102 73.2% 88.7% 97,373 11.3%
Hawaii 2020 1,014,035 832,466 759,971 74.9% 91.3% 72,495 8.7%
2018 1,025,548 756,751 712,765 69.5% 94.2% 43,986 5.8%
2022 1,373,714 1,004,608 1,004,608 73.1% 100.0% -- --
Idaho 2020 1,282,630 1,029,763 1,029,763 80.3% 100.0% -- --
2018 1,219,481 917,609 917,609 75.2% 100.0% -- --
2022 9,087,338 8,775,224 7,899,591 86.9% 90.0% 791,457 9.0%
Illinois 2020 9,088,036 9,789,893 9,103,542 100.2% 93.0% 686,351 7.0%
2018 9,055,927 8,751,060 8,091,045 89.3% 92.5% 660,015 7.5%
2022 5,030,200 4,767,111 4,197,437 83.4% 88.0% 569,674 12.0%
Indiana 2020 4,978,356 4,692,091 4,170,353 83.8% 88.9% 521,738 11.1%
2018 4,899,251 4,500,196 4,168,374 85.1% 92.6% 331,822 7.4%
2022 2,379,570 2,234,666 1,880,415 79.0% 84.1% 354,251 15.9%
Iowa 2020 2,348,787 2,243,758 2,094,770 89.2% 93.4% 148,988 6.6%
2018 2,325,355 2,193,813 2,037,516 87.6% 92.9% 156,297 7.1%
2022 2,128,111 1,975,321 1,830,216 86.0% 92.7% 145,105 7.3%
Kansas 2020 2,103,748 1,924,772 1,764,949 83.9% 91.7% 148,624 7.7%
2018 2,091,261 1,835,473 1,670,217 79.9% 91.0% 165,256 9.0%
2022 3,405,618 3,590,227 3,137,031 92.1% 87.4% 453,196 12.6%
Kentucky 2020 3,367,502 3,565,428 3,319,307 98.6% 93.1% 246,121 6.9%
2018 3,350,956 3,402,905 3,402,905 101.6% 100.0% 0 0.0%
2022 3,439,830 3,018,815 2,830,594 82.3% 93.8% 188,221 6.2%
Louisiana 2020 3,463,372 3,093,004 2,963,901 85.6% 95.8% 129,103 4.2%
2018 3,469,016 2,992,170 2,856,722 82.3% 95.5% 135,448 4.5%
2022 1,100,974 1,145,159 929,124 84.4% 81.1% 216,035 18.9%
Maine 2020 1,078,770 1,138,576 1,135,008 105.2% 99.7% 3,568 0.3%
2018 1,064,497 1,057,967 1,054,068 99.0% 99.6% 3,899 0.4%
2022 4,417,293 4,440,808 4,149,909 93.9% 93.4% 290,899 6.6%
Maryland 2020 4,316,921 4,298,942 4,142,347 96.0% 96.4% 156,595 3.6%
2018 4,310,864 3,954,027 3,954,027 91.7% 100.0% -- --
2022 5,121,488 4,884,076 4,173,942 81.5% 85.5% 710,134 14.5%
Massachusetts 2020 5,057,192 4,812,909 4,400,254 87.0% 91.4% 412,655 8.6%
2018 4,993,001 4,574,967 3,947,897 79.1% 86.3% 627,070 13.7%
2022 7,640,514 8,226,745 7,297,900 95.5% 88.7% 928,845 11.3%
Michigan [1] 2020 7,562,464 8,105,524 7,209,300 95.3% 88.9% 896,224 11.1%
2018 7,481,928 7,471,088 6,488,823 86.7% 86.9% 982,265 13.1%
2022 4,221,515 3,624,200 3,624,200 85.9% 100.0% -- --
Minnesota [2] 2020 4,157,556 3,731,016 3,731,016 89.7% 100.0% -- --
2018 4,079,652 3,422,515 3,422,515 83.9% 100.0% -- --
2022 2,226,474 2,081,999 1,922,707 86.4% 92.3% 159,292 7.7%
Mississippi 2020 2,246,323 2,143,149 1,982,632 88.3% 92.5% 160,517 7.5%
2018 2,234,722 2,079,732 1,880,197 84.1% 90.4% 199,535 9.6%
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Active Active Inactive
Regs. Regs. Inactive Regs.
State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.
(% of (% of Regs. (% of
CVAP) Total) Total)
2022 4,675,531 4,234,799 3,816,663 81.6% 90.1% 418,136 9.9%
Missouri 2020 4,650,318 4,338,133 3,963,980 85.2% 91.4% 374,153 8.6%
2018 4,606,843 4,127,333 3,803,881 82.6% 92.2% 323,452 7.8%
2022 857,649 757,914 661,320 77.1% 87.3% 96,594 12.7%
Montana [3] 2020 831,760 747,439 675,971 81.3% 90.4% 71,468 9.6%
2018 810,760 706,173 616,642 76.1% 87.3% 89,531 12.7%
2022 1,411,320 1,242,930 1,141,470 80.9% 91.8% 101,460 8.2%
Nebraska [4] 2020 1,388,950 1,266,730 1,168,708 84.1% 92.3% 98,022 7.7%
2018 1,368,000 1,219,276 1,096,862 80.2% 90.0% 122,414 10.0%
2022 2,193,360 2,200,151 1,840,748 83.9% 83.7% 359,403 16.3%
Nevada 2020 2,111,932 2,039,162 1,835,401 86.9% 90.0% 203,761 10.0%
2018 2,031,213 1,773,566 1,563,750 77.0% 88.2% 209,816 11.8%
2022 1,103,239 909,067 909,067 82.4% 100.0% -- --
New Hampshire 2020 1,070,215 1,087,145 1,087,145 101.6% 100.0% -- --
2018 1,048,883 988,148 988,148 94.2% 100.0% -- --
2022 6,433,068 6,430,740 5,934,029 92.2% 92.3% 496,711 7.7%
New Jersey 2020 6,170,130 6,310,564 5,896,836 95.6% 93.4% 413,728 6.6%
2018 6,199,409 5,869,078 5,456,506 88.0% 93.0% 412,572 7.0%
2022 1,545,938 1,375,200 1,198,896 77.6% 87.2% 176,304 12.8%
New Mexico 2020 1,522,171 1,360,871 1,255,669 82.5% 92.3% 105,202 7.7%
2018 1,493,318 1,261,639 698,172 46.8% 55.3% 563,467 44.7%
2022 14,109,037 13,131,592 12,125,966 85.9% 92.3% 1,005,626 7.7%
New York 2020 13,810,830 13,555,618 12,362,997 89.5% 91.2% 1,191,845 8.8%
2018 13,866,648 12,695,763 11,676,266 84.2% 92.0% 1,019,497 8.0%
2022 7,808,186 7,422,396 6,488,756 83.1% 87.4% 933,640 12.6%
North Carolina 2020 7,729,644 7,372,608 6,607,121 85.5% 89.6% 765,487 10.4%
2018 7,509,879 7,095,209 5,898,244 78.5% 83.1% 1,196,965 16.9%
2022 576,588 -- -- -- -- -- --
North Dakota 2020 567,545 -- -- -- -- -- --
2018 564,475 -- -- -- -- -- --
2022 -- 19,272 19,272 -- 100.0% -- --
Northern Mariana
2020 -- 18,526 18,526 -- 100.0% -- --
Islands
2018 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2022 8,943,128 8,029,950 8,029,950 89.8% 100.0% -- --
Ohio 2020 8,879,469 8,073,829 8,073,829 90.9% 100.0% -- --
2018 8,830,185 8,070,917 8,070,917 91.4% 100.0% -- --
2022 2,903,864 2,295,906 2,021,787 69.6% 88.1% 274,119 11.9%
Oklahoma 2020 2,875,059 2,259,107 2,021,846 70.3% 89.5% 237,261 10.5%
2018 2,835,451 2,120,843 1,857,700 65.5% 87.6% 263,143 12.4%
2022 3,200,314 2,985,820 2,985,820 93.3% 100.0% -- --
Oregon [5] 2020 3,162,204 2,944,588 2,944,588 93.1% 100.0% -- --
2018 3,060,328 2,748,232 2,748,232 89.8% 100.0% -- --
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Active Active Inactive
Regs. Regs. Inactive Regs.
State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.
(% of (% of Regs. (% of
CVAP) Total) Total)
2022 9,918,163 8,873,144 8,033,385 81.0% 90.5% 839,759 9.5%
Pennsylvania 2020 9,810,201 9,035,061 8,280,348 84.4% 91.6% 754,713 8.4%
2018 9,764,119 8,607,748 7,738,989 79.3% 89.9% 868,759 10.1%
2022 827,415 815,417 722,684 87.3% 88.6% 92,733 11.4%
Rhode Island 2020 800,798 809,117 735,195 91.8% 90.9% 73,922 9.1%
2018 792,337 781,478 737,419 93.1% 94.4% 44,059 5.6%
2022 3,940,745 3,740,723 3,376,917 85.7% 90.3% 363,806 9.7%
South Carolina 2020 3,892,341 3,854,209 3,535,061 90.8% 91.7% 319,148 8.3%
2018 3,799,298 3,538,580 3,538,580 93.1% 100.0% 396,653 11.2%
2022 659,768 660,327 599,919 90.9% 90.9% 60,408 9.1%
South Dakota 2020 653,394 635,256 578,683 88.6% 91.1% 56,573 8.9%
2018 641,666 594,453 539,788 84.1% 90.8% 54,665 9.2%
2022 5,248,512 4,549,183 4,218,165 80.4% 92.7% 331,018 7.3%
Tennessee 2020 5,129,580 4,436,727 4,226,928 82.4% 95.3% 209,799 4.7%
2018 5,016,103 4,163,359 3,764,513 75.0% 90.4% 398,846 9.6%
2022 19,375,866 17,672,143 15,847,341 81.8% 89.7% 1,824,802 10.3%
Texas 2020 18,875,542 16,955,519 15,279,870 81.0% 90.1% 1,675,649 9.9%
2018 18,174,345 15,615,925 13,790,247 75.9% 88.3% 1,653,986 10.6%
2022 -- 39,910 39,910 -- 100.0% -- --
U.S. Virgin
2020 -- 53,341 53,341 -- 100.0% -- --
Islands [6]
2018 -- 51,095 51,095 -- 100.0% -- --
2022 2,251,328 1,614,198 1,690,442 75.1% 104.7% 123,071 7.6%
Utah 2020 2,134,249 1,861,977 1,713,297 80.3% 92.0% 148,680 8.0%
2018 2,028,176 1,658,457 1,433,917 70.7% 86.5% 224,540 13.5%
2022 518,387 501,665 446,098 86.1% 88.9% 55,567 11.1%
Vermont 2020 498,705 489,277 440,920 88.4% 90.1% 48,357 9.9%
2018 494,550 489,385 447,709 90.5% 91.5% 41,676 8.5%
2022 6,354,439 6,105,868 5,736,016 90.3% 93.9% 369,852 6.1%
Virginia 2020 6,226,623 5,975,561 5,763,187 92.6% 96.4% 212,374 3.6%
2018 6,145,893 5,666,627 5,272,602 85.8% 93.0% 394,025 7.0%
2022 5,529,508 5,303,997 4,805,394 86.9% 90.6% 498,603 9.4%
Washington 2020 5,409,035 5,255,466 4,892,871 90.5% 93.1% 362,595 6.9%
2018 5,259,892 4,841,431 4,362,480 82.9% 90.1% 478,951 9.9%
2022 1,408,767 1,153,208 1,055,475 74.9% 91.5% 97,733 8.5%
West Virginia 2020 1,420,289 1,269,024 1,062,685 74.8% 83.7% 206,339 16.3%
2018 1,428,859 1,245,827 961,894 67.3% 77.2% 283,933 22.8%
2022 4,480,576 3,670,188 3,670,188 81.9% 100.0% -- --
Wisconsin [7] 2020 4,412,888 3,834,164 3,834,164 86.9% 100.0% -- --
2018 4,375,063 3,442,004 3,442,004 78.7% 100.0% -- --
2022 436,049 301,931 301,931 69.2% 100.0% -- --
Wyoming 2020 434,852 303,049 303,049 69.7% 100.0% -- --
2018 428,379 283,941 283,941 66.3% 100.0% -- --
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Active Active Inactive
Regs. Regs. Inactive Regs.
State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.
(% of (% of Regs. (% of
CVAP) Total) Total)
2022 239,035,960 226,339,980 203,660,564 85.4% 90.0% 22,794,555 11.1%
U.S. Total 2020 237,998,330 228,004,364 209,441,338 88.1% 91.8% 18,523,963 9.1%
2018 231,416,670 211,601,918 190,662,485 82.5% 90.1% 21,164,394 11.3%
Voter Registration Table 1 Calculation Notes:
CVAP Total uses the 1-year ACS CVAP estimate. The 2022 data uses the 2021 CVAP, the 2020 data
uses the 2019 CVAP, and the 2018 data uses the 2017 CVAP.
Reported Registrations uses question A1a for each year.
Active Registrations uses question A1b for each year.
Active Registrations (% of CVAP) uses A1b/CVAP x 100 for each year.
Active Registrations (% of Total) uses A1b/A1a x 100 for each year.
Inactive Registrations uses question A1c for each year.
Inactive Registrations (% of Total) uses A1c/A1a x 100 for each year.
Voter Registration Table 1 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the active registration (% of total)
and inactive registration (% of total) rates may not sum to 100% for some states or at the
national level.
• The citizen voting age population (CVAP) is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens ages 18
years or older in the state. This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state
estimate for 2021 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as
possible. The estimate for the year 2022 was not available by the time this report was
finalized. For consistency, the CVAP for the 2018 and 2020 general elections was the 1-year
ACS state estimate for 2017 and 2019, respectively.
• Some states may report an active CVAP registration rate of 100% or more. This is because the
2021 CVAP was used to calculate the 2022 registration rate and because due to federal law,
some ineligible voters may take up to two full election cycles to be removed from the voter
registration rolls.
• The Reported Registrations column includes both active and inactive voters (if the state uses
such a distinction).
[1] Voters reported in A1 are eligible to vote. Those defined as “inactive” need only to confirm their
address before receiving a ballot. Participation in past elections is not a factor in defining eligibility.
[2] Minnesota is NVRA exempt and does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.
[3] The total number of registered and eligible voters consists of active and inactive voters. Montana
reports a total registered and eligible number of 762,959. The difference is provisional, late
registration, and pending.
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[4] Nebraska does not have “inactive” voters. The number of inactive voters reported is voters who
were sent a notice in accordance with NVRA Section 8(d)(2) and have not responded.
[5] Oregon does not track the number of inactive voters.
[6] The U.S. Virgin Islands is not subject to the provisions of the NVRA.
[7] Wisconsin is not subject to the NVRA and does not have inactive registered voters. Military voters
are included in the reported registration numbers even though they are not required to “register” in
Wisconsin because they still have a voter record created.
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Voter Registration Table 2: Application Sources—Total Forms Received
Application Source
Total
Registration In Person at Election Motor Vehicle
State Mail/Email/Fax Online
Applications Office Agencies
Received
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Alabama 1,132,263 23,750 2.1% 111,139 9.8% 146,809 13.0% 770,324 68.0%
Alaska 1,028,887 31,023 3.0% 71,188 6.9% 81,104 7.9% 80,024 7.8%
American
1,014 0 0.0% 1,014 100.0% -- -- -- --
Samoa [1]
Arizona 2,187,271 87,185 4.0% 92,864 4.2% 433,681 19.8% 1,295,240 59.2%
Arkansas 486,722 74,917 15.4% 74,055 15.2% -- -- 263,883 54.2%
California 10,090,697 492,619 4.9% 277,191 2.7% 2,362,300 23.4% 3,901,637 38.7%
Colorado 3,042,434 248,408 8.2% 39,533 1.3% 468,561 15.4% 2,171,174 71.4%
Connecticut 887,202 381,409 43.0% 26,535 3.0% 159,610 18.0% 301,563 34.0%
Delaware 351,944 11,369 3.2% 9,679 2.8% 26,848 7.6% 285,635 81.2%
District of
96,410 3,497 3.6% 9,920 10.3% 17,279 17.9% 60,450 62.7%
Columbia
Florida 6,056,693 486,880 8.0% 350,438 5.8% 754,734 12.5% 3,457,205 57.1%
Georgia [2] 3,232,104 548,094 17.0% 86,297 2.7% 385,959 11.9% 2,149,658 66.5%
Guam [3] -- -- -- -- -- 3,268 -- 60,620 --
Hawaii 151,594 12,048 7.9% 0 0.0% 30,781 20.3% 108,765 71.7%
Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 1,906,637 281,760 14.8% 63,312 3.3% 214,006 11.2% 535,072 28.1%
Indiana [5] 1,922,116 167,194 8.7% 24,288 1.3% 266,258 13.9% 830,962 43.2%
Iowa 856,747 15,435 1.8% 15,606 1.8% 24,197 2.8% 122,074 14.2%
Kansas 709,206 87,190 12.3% 70,444 9.9% 205,830 29.0% 259,418 36.6%
Kentucky 1,332,191 21,195 1.6% 142,441 10.7% 223,945 16.8% 850,572 63.8%
Louisiana [6] 594,612 90,456 15.2% 96,301 16.2% 229,120 38.5% 147,761 24.8%
Maine 185,804 15,831 8.5% 132,296 71.2% -- -- 25,562 13.8%
Maryland [7] 3,513,915 120,297 3.4% 72,222 2.1% 435,442 12.4% 2,628,953 74.8%
Massachusetts
2,837,185 41,239 1.5% 28,593 1.0% 157,096 5.5% 2,370,248 83.5%
[8]
Michigan [9] 3,400,532 51,449 1.5% 127,503 3.7% 84,117 2.5% 3,080,445 90.6%
Minnesota [10] 1,158,190 27,992 2.4% 243,034 21.0% 88,971 7.7% 317,653 27.4%
Mississippi -- 36,851 -- 57,701 -- -- -- 146,795 --
Missouri 435,511 34,569 7.9% 26,902 6.2% 77,640 17.8% 282,727 64.9%
Montana [11] 237,013 51,854 21.9% 54,902 23.2% -- -- 93,139 39.3%
Nebraska [12] 427,117 63,743 14.9% 17,002 4.0% 145,695 34.1% 198,102 46.4%
Nevada 1,412,160 83,079 5.9% 24,335 1.7% 163,598 11.6% 1,004,394 71.1%
New Hampshire
300,559 994 0.3% 299,565 99.7% -- -- -- --
[13]
New Jersey [14] 3,927,225 14,071 0.4% -- -- 251,387 6.4% 2,056,334 52.4%
New Mexico 489,737 250,850 51.2% 26,778 5.5% 96,354 19.7% 108,316 22.1%
New York 1,748,658 303,848 17.4% 60,295 3.4% -- -- 698,361 39.9%
North Carolina 2,806,179 421,571 15.0% 423,222 15.1% 178,722 6.4% 1,401,721 50.0%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Application Source
Total
Registration In Person at Election Motor Vehicle
State Mail/Email/Fax Online
Applications Office Agencies
Received
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Northern
2,245 245 10.9% -- -- -- -- -- --
Mariana Islands
Ohio 2,519,705 428,473 17.0% 384,938 15.3% 704,636 28.0% 720,898 28.6%
Oklahoma 614,861 116,177 18.9% 68,065 11.1% 70,713 11.5% 336,073 54.7%
Oregon 1,623,822 77,749 4.8% 29,412 1.8% 230,483 14.2% 761,559 46.9%
Pennsylvania 2,881,107 177,508 6.2% 31,101 1.1% 568,912 19.7% 1,741,745 60.5%
Rhode Island
381,596 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
[15]
South Carolina 765,608 60,467 7.9% 55,381 7.2% 197,787 25.8% 409,922 53.5%
South Dakota 147,980 19,950 13.5% 29,365 19.8% -- -- 88,871 60.1%
Tennessee 1,138,627 105,696 9.3% 150,687 13.2% 442,107 38.8% 419,558 36.8%
Texas 5,380,314 1,271,780 23.6% 284,636 5.3% 136,343 2.5% 3,470,056 64.5%
U.S. Virgin
3,213 -- -- 3,213 100.0% -- -- -- --
Islands
Utah [16] 246,112 5,338 2.2% 17,280 7.0% 29,975 12.2% 36,131 14.7%
Vermont 74,895 589 0.8% 7,462 10.0% 13,049 17.4% 47,719 63.7%
Virginia 3,382,438 85,082 2.5% 52,037 1.5% 284,897 8.4% 2,829,275 83.6%
Washington 1,709,646 319,700 18.7% 44,002 2.6% 199,685 11.7% 991,442 58.0%
West Virginia 478,216 59,979 12.5% 117,260 24.5% 50,774 10.6% 133,342 27.9%
Wisconsin [17] 393,064 23,618 6.0% 66,659 17.0% 179,328 45.6% -- --
Wyoming [18] 74,244 5,440 7.3% 68,642 92.5% -- -- 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 80,764,222 7,340,458 9.1% 4,566,735 5.9% 10,822,001 14.0% 44,051,378 55.0%
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Application Source
Disability Services Armed Forces
State Public Assistance Offices Other State Agencies
Offices Recruitment Offices
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Alabama 37,486 3.3% 665 0.1% 109 0.0% 2,505 0.2%
Alaska 3,818 0.4% 26 0.0% 886 0.1% 21 0.0%
American
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Samoa [1]
Arizona 6,634 0.3% 141 0.0% 2,045 0.1% 1,285 0.1%
Arkansas 10,310 2.1% 294 0.1% 21 0.0% 178 0.0%
California 169,940 1.7% 1,668 0.0% 1,841 0.0% 43,785 0.4%
Colorado 24,508 0.8% 316 0.0% 13 0.0% -- --
Connecticut 8,791 1.0% 8,791 1.0% 503 0.1% -- --
Delaware 75 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 11,367 3.2%
District of
1,225 1.3% 103 0.1% 31 0.0% 1,417 1.5%
Columbia
Florida 7,129 0.1% 13,296 0.2% 732 0.0% 36,067 0.6%
Georgia [2] 10,208 0.3% 1,661 0.1% 55 0.0% -- --
Guam [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 22,780 1.2% 1,344 0.1% 132 0.0% 75,754 4.0%
Indiana [5] 8,390 0.4% 564 0.0% 0 0.0% 68 0.0%
Iowa 1,222 0.1% 19 0.0% 6 0.0% 55 0.0%
Kansas 5,914 0.8% 216 0.0% 38 0.0% 1,078 0.2%
Kentucky 88,292 6.6% 883 0.1% 865 0.1% 3,998 0.3%
Louisiana [6] 21,202 3.6% 1,940 0.3% 1,263 0.2% 0 0.0%
Maine -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Maryland [7] 15,344 0.4% 404 0.0% 105 0.0% 87,514 2.5%
Massachusetts
166,539 5.9% 488 0.0% -- -- 5,003 0.2%
[8]
Michigan [9] 644 0.0% 51 0.0% -- -- -- --
Minnesota [10] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Mississippi 4,808 -- 308 -- -- -- -- --
Missouri 13,430 3.1% 179 0.0% 36 0.0% 0 0.0%
Montana [11] 1,024 0.4% 19 0.0% 40 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska [12] 225 0.1% 129 0.0% 12 0.0% -- --
Nevada 19,882 1.4% 2,164 0.2% 55 0.0% 43 0.0%
New Hampshire
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
[13]
New Jersey [14] 3,050 0.1% 29,479 0.8% 1,308 0.0% 1,184,858 30.2%
New Mexico 7,331 1.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
New York 50,305 2.9% -- -- -- -- 73,225 4.2%
North Carolina 22,002 0.8% 1,331 0.0% 17 0.0% 3,547 0.1%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Mariana Islands
Ohio 145,421 5.8% 13,525 0.5% 177 0.0% 52,968 2.1%
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Application Source
Disability Services Armed Forces
State Public Assistance Offices Other State Agencies
Offices Recruitment Offices
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Oklahoma 4,804 0.8% 241 0.0% 14 0.0% 33 0.0%
Oregon 1,365 0.1% 544 0.0% -- -- 2,692 0.2%
Pennsylvania 42,146 1.5% 296 0.0% 7 0.0% -- --
Rhode Island
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
[15]
South Carolina 41,709 5.4% 200 0.0% 22 0.0% -- --
South Dakota 4,588 3.1% 622 0.4% 0 0.0% 1,633 1.1%
Tennessee 9,327 0.8% 53 0.0% 3,174 0.3% 8,005 0.7%
Texas 105,936 2.0% 505 0.0% 17,628 0.3% 0 0.0%
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Islands
Utah [16] 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- 151 0.2%
Virginia 1,530 0.0% 98 0.0% 14 0.0% 21,796 0.6%
Washington 23,968 1.4% 95 0.0% 2,405 0.1% 3,484 0.2%
West Virginia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wisconsin [17] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wyoming [18] -- -- 39 0.1% 0 0.0% 13 0.0%
U.S. Total 1,113,307 1.4% 82,698 0.1% 33,554 0.0% 1,622,543 2.6%
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Application Source
State Registration Drives Other Sources Not Categorized
Total % Total % Total %
Alabama 12,422 1.1% 4,236 0.4% 22,818 2.0%
Alaska 0 0.0% 760,797 73.9% 0 0.0%
American
-- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Samoa [1]
Arizona 142,560 6.5% 125,636 5.7% 0 0.0%
Arkansas 9,261 1.9% 58,962 12.1% -5,159 -1.1%
California 30,418 0.3% 1,721,297 17.1% 1,088,001 10.8%
Colorado 37,581 1.2% 52,340 1.7% 0 0.0%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Delaware 278 0.1% 6,693 1.9% 0 0.0%
District of
0 0.0% 2,488 2.6% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 424,144 7.0% 536,461 8.9% -10,393 -0.2%
Georgia [2] -- -- 50,172 1.6% 0 0.0%
Guam [3] -- -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 1,902 0.1% 264,556 13.9% 446,019 23.4%
Indiana [5] 7,997 0.4% 558,185 29.0% 58,210 3.0%
Iowa 156 0.0% 677,977 79.1% 0 0.0%
Kansas 10,154 1.4% 68,262 9.6% 662 0.1%
Kentucky -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Louisiana [6] 6,569 1.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
Maine 3,535 1.9% 8,580 4.6% 0 0.0%
Maryland [7] -- -- 153,634 4.4% 0 0.0%
Massachusetts
-- -- 67,979 2.4% 0 0.0%
[8]
Michigan [9] -- -- 56,323 1.7% 0 0.0%
Minnesota [10] 10,344 0.9% 470,196 40.6% 0 0.0%
Mississippi -- -- 8,515 -- -- --
Missouri -- -- 28 0.0% 0 0.0%
Montana [11] 10,628 4.5% 25,407 10.7% 0 0.0%
Nebraska [12] -- -- 2,209 0.5% 0 0.0%
Nevada 74,420 5.3% 40,190 2.8% 0 0.0%
New Hampshire
-- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
[13]
New Jersey [14] -- -- 386,738 9.8% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 0 0.0% -- -- 108 0.0%
New York 26,897 1.5% -- -- 535,727 30.6%
North Carolina 131,014 4.7% 223,032 7.9% 0 0.0%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern
-- -- -- -- 2,000 89.1%
Mariana Islands
Ohio 68,669 2.7% -- -- 0 0.0%
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Application Source
State Registration Drives Other Sources Not Categorized
Total % Total % Total %
Oklahoma -- -- 18,741 3.0% 0 0.0%
Oregon -- -- 520,018 32.0% 0 0.0%
Pennsylvania 156,101 5.4% 163,291 5.7% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island
-- -- -- -- 381,596 100.0%
[15]
South Carolina -- -- 120 0.0% 0 0.0%
South Dakota 2,832 1.9% 104 0.1% 15 0.0%
Tennessee 20 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Texas -- -- 93,430 1.7% 0 0.0%
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Islands
Utah [16] 149 0.1% 12,674 5.1% 144,559 58.7%
Vermont 5,925 7.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Virginia 16,260 0.5% 91,449 2.7% 0 0.0%
Washington 10,160 0.6% 114,705 6.7% 0 0.0%
West Virginia -- -- 116,861 24.4% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [17] -- -- 123,459 31.4% 0 0.0%
Wyoming [18] 8 0.0% 102 0.1% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 1,200,404 2.4% 7,585,847 10.6% 2,664,163 3.3%
Voter Registration Table 2 Calculation Notes:
Total Registration Applications Received uses question A3a.
Application Source, Mail/Email/Fax, Total uses question A4a.
Application Source, Mail/Email/Fax, % uses A4a/A3a x 100.
Application Source, In Person at Election Office, Total uses question A4b.
Application Source, In Person at Election Office, % uses A4b/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Online, Total uses question A4c.
Application Source, Online, % uses A4c/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, Total uses question A4d.
Application Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, % uses A4d/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Public Assistance Offices, Total uses question A4e.
Application Source, Public Assistance Offices, % uses A4e/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Disability Services Offices, Total uses question A4f.
Application Source, Disability Services Offices, % uses A4f/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, Total uses question A4g.
Application Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, % uses A4g/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Other State Agencies, Total uses question A4h.
Application Source, Other State Agencies, % uses A4h/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Registration Drives, Total uses question A4i.
Application Source, Registration Drives, % uses A4i/A3a x 100.
Application Source, Other Sources, Total uses the sum of questions A4j, A4k, and A4l.
Application Source, Other Sources, % uses (A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a x 100.
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Application Source, Not Categorized, Total uses A3a–(sum of A4a to A4l).
Application Source, Not Categorized, % uses (A3a–[sum of A4a to A4l])/A3a x 100.
Voter Registration Table 2 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• States have latitude in which registration application sources are offered to their citizens, so
long as they do not conflict with federal law. Not all states offer each of the application sources
that the EAVS collects data for.
• Questions A4j, A4k, and A4l were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in
these items if they offered another application source aside from those listed in questions
A4a–A4i or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions
A4a–A4i.
• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized application source indicate that the sum of
registrations received for each source accounted for more than the total number of
registrations reported received by the state.
• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications
received through each source may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
[1] American Samoa’s registration system is not web-based or online. Eligible voters who are qualified
to register in absentia can access the form online but have to send it to the election office for manual
processing.
[2] Election Day registrations listed in A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j represent applications submitted to poll
workers on Election Day. Changes made through applications turned in on Election Day are effective
for future elections. Georgia law does not allow SDR.
[3] Data reported in A4d and A7d include driver’s license applications where the applicant indicated
that they declined to register to vote.
[4] Idaho does not track data on the sources of registration forms.
[5] The data reported in A4a–l consisted of data from CEB-9 Section 2 (A4a–b, A4i) and the statewide
voter registration system (A4c–h, A4j, A4k, A4l). Counties do not always manually track the
information requested in A4a–b and A4i.
[6] Voters submit registration applications for new registrations as well as for updates or changes to
existing registrations. Data reported in A4 reflect both new registrations and changes to registrations.
[7] Questions A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j include two registration categories. The first is from volunteer
groups and the second is from high school registration drives. Registrations completed by
“registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties” as listed in A4i are included with the
registration source of “volunteer” as listed in A4j.
[8] Individuals who complete eligible transactions at some state agencies are automatically registered
to vote unless they opt out.
[9] Registrations reported in A4c and A5c reflect individuals who registered online using the Michigan
voter information center website. Over 800 of those registrations occurred via application
programming interface (API) from advocacy groups.
[10] Minnesota did not report data for some questions because the state is exempt from the NVRA.
Data reported for registrations received through mail/fax/email and online includes data on Federal
Post Card Applications (FPCA) that in previous years’ surveys were reported separately.
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[11] Data reported in A4k is for online pre-registration, which requires the voter to sign and submit a
registration form to their county elections office.
[12] Registrations received from registration drives by advocacy groups or political parties in A4i and
are included in the data reported in A4a.
[13] New Hampshire is not subject to the NVRA. This state offers Election Day registration but not
online voter registration.
[14] In-person registrations in A4b are not currently tracked.
[15] Rhode Island introduced automatic voter registration in June of 2018, which increased the
number of registrations received.
[16] Several Utah counties do not track data on the sources of voter registration applications.
[17] Wisconsin only tracks fax or email registrations for military voters because although they are not
required to register, a record is created as a registration in the system. Military voters’ data may be
received by fax or email, whereas non-military voters can only submit registrations by mail or in-
person. Registration applications falling under other sources come from care facilities and
registrations received at the polling place on Election Day. Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and
does not receive registrations from NVRA agencies.
[18] Wyoming is exempt from the NVRA. Wyoming has no system for web-based registration and no
system for registration through motor vehicle offices or driver’s license offices.
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Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Applications Processed
Registration Category
Total Pre-
Registration Change of Name,
New Valid Change of Address Registrations
State Applications Party or Address
Registrations (Cross-Jurisdiction) (Under 18 Years
Received (Within Jurisdiction)
of Age)
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Alabama [1] 1,132,263 437,156 38.6% 893,988 79.0% -- -- -- --
Alaska 1,028,887 45,400 4.4% 969,032 94.2% -- -- -- --
American
1,014 528 52.1% 25 2.5% 65 6.4% 0 0.0%
Samoa
Arizona 2,187,271 820,015 37.5% 863,020 39.5% 10,365 0.5% 8,286 0.4%
Arkansas [2] 486,722 227,470 46.7% 262,859 54.0% 2,861 0.6% -- --
California 10,090,697 3,084,231 30.6% 1,576,293 15.6% 592,958 5.9% 141,004 1.4%
Colorado 3,042,434 1,189,963 39.1% 1,466,226 48.2% 242,934 8.0% 77,620 2.6%
Connecticut 887,202 304,587 34.3% 562,986 63.5% 18,843 2.1% 786 0.1%
Delaware [3] 351,944 58,277 16.6% 268,097 76.2% 14,075 4.0% 6,232 1.8%
District of
96,410 60,180 62.4% 30,996 32.2% 0 0.0% 1,572 1.6%
Columbia
Florida [4] 6,056,693 1,601,825 26.4% 4,241,373 70.0% 110,151 1.8% 18,816 0.3%
Georgia 3,232,104 616,690 19.1% 1,220,083 37.7% 547,977 17.0% 26,238 0.8%
Guam -- 14,687 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii 151,594 56,520 37.3% -- -- -- -- 1,505 1.0%
Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 1,906,637 593,126 31.1% 573,408 30.1% 131,944 6.9% 4,538 0.2%
Indiana 1,922,116 447,414 23.3% 1,021,206 53.1% -- -- 38,617 2.0%
Iowa [5] 856,747 160,145 18.7% -- -- -- -- 13,100 1.5%
Kansas 709,206 211,448 29.8% 673,513 95.0% -- -- -- --
Kentucky 1,332,191 159,387 12.0% 700,769 52.6% 153,261 11.5% -- --
Louisiana [6] 594,612 159,421 26.8% 225,937 38.0% -- -- 11,943 2.0%
Maine 185,804 55,542 29.9% 55,038 29.6% 59,708 32.1% 1,034 0.6%
Maryland [7] 3,513,915 310,973 8.8% 2,994,726 85.2% 176,094 5.0% -- --
Massachusetts 2,837,185 323,970 11.4% 1,436,784 50.6% 461,613 16.3% 73,642 2.6%
Michigan [8] 3,400,532 558,078 16.4% 652,487 19.2% 1,111,884 32.7% 41,900 1.2%
Minnesota 1,158,190 255,292 22.0% 423,388 36.6% 282,926 24.4% 6,583 0.6%
Mississippi -- 262,005 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Missouri [9] 435,511 435,511 100.0% -- -- -- -- -- --
Montana 237,013 29,035 12.3% 95,495 40.3% 107,667 45.4% 664 0.3%
Nebraska [10] 427,117 128,436 30.1% 211,687 49.6% 46,112 10.8% -- --
Nevada 1,412,160 383,357 27.1% 804,375 57.0% 1,154 0.1% 16,750 1.2%
New Hampshire
300,559 52,564 17.5% 193,945 64.5% 52,283 17.4% 22 0.0%
[11]
New Jersey 3,927,225 380,156 9.7% 1,460,926 37.2% 312,155 7.9% 58,076 1.5%
New Mexico 489,737 110,197 22.5% 365,572 74.6% 5,740 1.2% 7,225 1.5%
New York [12] 1,748,658 556,051 31.8% 245,205 14.0% 598,988 34.3% 104,291 6.0%
North Carolina 2,806,179 1,021,059 36.4% 928,381 33.1% -- -- -- --
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Registration Category
Total Pre-
Registration Change of Name,
New Valid Change of Address Registrations
State Applications Party or Address
Registrations (Cross-Jurisdiction) (Under 18 Years
Received (Within Jurisdiction)
of Age)
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Northern
Mariana 2,245 -- -- 100 4.5% 300 13.4% -- --
Islands
Ohio 2,519,705 1,097,029 43.5% 1,006,854 40.0% -- -- 5,521 0.2%
Oklahoma [13] 614,861 350,173 57.0% 248,401 40.4% -- -- 4,028 0.7%
Oregon [14] 1,623,822 275,845 17.0% 1,302,003 80.2% -- -- 44,686 2.8%
Pennsylvania 2,881,107 462,995 16.1% 1,319,180 45.8% 462,253 16.0% -- --
Rhode Island 381,596 46,597 12.2% 259,599 68.0% 67,450 17.7% 7,896 2.1%
South Carolina
765,608 447,106 58.4% 318,502 41.6% -- -- -- --
[15]
South Dakota 147,980 54,293 36.7% 72,686 49.1% 19,365 13.1% 1,274 0.9%
Tennessee 1,138,627 552,128 48.5% 357,262 31.4% -- -- 0 0.0%
Texas 5,380,314 2,938,010 54.6% 2,323,494 43.2% 23,502 0.4% -- --
U.S. Virgin
3,213 3,213 100.0% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Islands
Utah 246,112 80,497 32.7% 56,559 23.0% 8,465 3.4% 10,557 4.3%
Vermont 74,895 70,429 94.0% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Virginia 3,382,438 500,541 14.8% 1,135,150 33.6% 433,479 12.8% 25,892 0.8%
Washington 1,709,646 454,968 26.6% 726,470 42.5% 94,003 5.5% 85,635 5.0%
West Virginia 478,216 79,626 16.7% 337,997 70.7% 21,033 4.4% 3,537 0.7%
Wisconsin [16] 393,064 267,393 68.0% 45,996 11.7% 70,425 17.9% 1 0.0%
Wyoming [17] 74,244 18,491 24.9% 42,789 57.6% 12,949 17.4% 2 0.0%
U.S. Total 80,764,222 22,810,030 27.9% 34,970,862 44.1% 6,254,982 9.7% 849,473 1.4%
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Registration Category
Duplicate Invalid or Rejected
State Other Registrations Not Categorized
Registrations Registrations
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Alabama [1] 4 0.0% 4,942 0.4% -- -- -203,827 -18.0%
Alaska 5,326 0.5% 9,129 0.9% -- -- 0 0.0%
American
396 39.1% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Samoa
Arizona 434,088 19.8% 37,850 1.7% 13,647 0.6% 0 0.0%
Arkansas [2] 129 0.0% 7,513 1.5% -- -- -14,110 -2.9%
California 2,791,684 27.7% 277,944 2.8% 579,521 5.7% 1,047,062 10.4%
Colorado 48,865 1.6% 16,826 0.6% -- -- 0 0.0%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Delaware [3] 4,738 1.3% 525 0.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
District of
2,725 2.8% 937 1.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida [4] 1,449 0.0% 72,090 1.2% 9,775 0.2% 1,214 0.0%
Georgia 87,858 2.7% 1,711 0.1% 731,547 22.6% 0 0.0%
Guam -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii -- -- -- -- 0 0.0% 93,569 61.7%
Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 165,553 8.7% 9,114 0.5% 84,416 4.4% 344,538 18.1%
Indiana 190,028 9.9% 19,587 1.0% 192,011 10.0% 13,253 0.7%
Iowa [5] 22,453 2.6% 279 0.0% 660,770 77.1% 0 0.0%
Kansas 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- -175,755 -24.8%
Kentucky -- -- 318,774 23.9% -- -- 0 0.0%
Louisiana [6] 8,965 1.5% 8,764 1.5% 179,582 30.2% 0 0.0%
Maine 3,638 2.0% 147 0.1% 10,697 5.8% 0 0.0%
Maryland [7] 31,680 0.9% 442 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Massachusetts 518,767 18.3% 22,409 0.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
Michigan [8] 1,006,903 29.6% 29,280 0.9% -- -- 0 0.0%
Minnesota 189,475 16.4% 526 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Mississippi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Missouri [9] -- -- 12 0.0% -- -- -12 0.0%
Montana 3,762 1.6% 390 0.2% -- -- 0 0.0%
Nebraska [10] 40,635 9.5% 247 0.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
Nevada 163,900 11.6% 42,523 3.0% 101 0.0% 0 0.0%
New Hampshire
1,745 0.6% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
[11]
New Jersey 163,002 4.2% 22,864 0.6% 1,530,046 39.0% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 0 0.0% 1,003 0.2% -- -- 0 0.0%
New York [12] 159,051 9.1% 84,886 4.9% -- -- 186 0.0%
North Carolina 699,970 24.9% 156,769 5.6% -- -- 0 0.0%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern
-- -- -- -- 3,045 135.6% -1,200 -53.5%
Mariana Islands
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Registration Category
Duplicate Invalid or Rejected
State Other Registrations Not Categorized
Registrations Registrations
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Ohio 294,216 11.7% 116,085 4.6% -- -- 0 0.0%
Oklahoma [13] 1,510 0.2% 10,749 1.7% -- -- 0 0.0%
Oregon [14] 1,288 0.1% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Pennsylvania 232,096 8.1% 372,054 12.9% 32,529 1.1% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island -- -- 54 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
South Carolina
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
[15]
South Dakota 215 0.1% 27 0.0% 120 0.1% 0 0.0%
Tennessee 184,943 16.2% 44,294 3.9% -- -- 0 0.0%
Texas -- -- 95,308 1.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Islands
Utah 2,317 0.9% 24,418 9.9% -- -- 63,299 25.7%
Vermont 2,151 2.9% 2,315 3.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Virginia 1,226,754 36.3% 60,622 1.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
Washington 348,388 20.4% 182 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
West Virginia 35,927 7.5% 96 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [16] 6,801 1.7% -- -- 2,448 0.6% 0 0.0%
Wyoming [17] 0 0.0% 13 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 9,083,395 12.7% 1,873,700 2.5% 4,030,255 11.1% 1,168,217 1.4%
Voter Registration Table 3 Calculation Notes:
Total Registration Applications Received uses question A3a.
New Valid Registrations, Total uses question A3b.
New Valid Registrations, % uses A3b/A3a x 100.
Change of Name, Party, or Address (Within Jurisdiction), Total uses question A3f.
Change of Name, Party, or Address (Within Jurisdiction), % uses A3f/A3a x 100.
Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction), Total uses question A3g.
Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction), % uses A3g/A3a x 100.
Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), Total uses question A3c.
Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), % uses question A3c/A3a x 100.
Duplicate Registrations, Total uses question A3d.
Duplicate Registrations, % uses A3d/A3a x 100.
Invalid or Rejected Registrations, Total uses question A3e.
Invalid or Rejected Registrations, % uses A3e/A3a x 100.
Other Registrations, Total uses the sum of questions A3h, A3i, and A3j.
Other Registrations, % uses (A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a x 100.
Not Categorized, Total uses A3a–(sum of A3b to A3j).
Not Categorized, % uses (A3a–[sum of A3b to A3j])/A3a x 100.
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Voter Registration Table 3 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Questions A3h, A3i, and A3j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in
these items if there was another registration category aside from those listed in questions
A3b–A3g or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions
A3b–A3g.
• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration category indicate that the sum of
registrations received for each category accounted for more than the total number of
registrations reported received by the state.
• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications in
each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
• Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration category.
[1] Totals reported in item A3 of the 2022 EAVS are from the Election Systems & Software (ES&S)
election survey. Alabama does not track data on pre-registration. Due to the way the state tracks
data for changes to records, the number of changes resulting directly from registration forms could
not be separated from the total number of changes made to voter’s records.
[2] Information on registrations that were address changes that crossed jurisdiction borders is included
in reports of new valid registrations.
[3] A change in the policy of how Delaware handles “invalid” or “rejected” registrations occurred since
the 2020 EAVS submission was made. Invalid registrations are no longer rejected; instead, they are
put in a suspense status and the registrant is contacted to correct the registration record. Some
invalid registrations that go through this process may not be marked as invalid; therefore, caution
should be taken in comparing Delaware’s invalid registration data to previous years.
[4] Some counties could not provide data on registrations by outcome in A3 in the way the question
required.
[5] Data reported in “Other Registrations” is due to a system limitation in reporting the transaction
source of registration updates that do not involve a change from a previous listed source. Pre-
registration of voters are considered valid new registrations for the purpose of reporting data
according to the source of a transaction.
[6] Address changes across jurisdictions are counted as new registrations. Citizens who are 16 and 17
years old can apply to register to vote, but they cannot vote until they are 18.
[7] The total of A3a is the sum of A3b, A3d, and A3e. Maryland does not consider the registration
changes listed in A3f and A3g as registrations, and therefore the source of these changes is not
recorded. For A3c, individuals can register to vote starting at age 16; however, they are not
considered “pre-registered.” Sixteen- and 17-year-olds are considered registered voters who cannot
vote until their 18th birthday.
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[8] In past EAVS, Michigan reported that data on the number of registration forms received for address
changes that crossed a jurisdiction border was not available. However, for this year’s survey,
Michigan can report that over 1.1 million registration transactions were for voters who changed their
city or township of residence. Additionally, the dramatic increase in the number of duplicate
registrations received compared to past EAVS responses is attributed to the implementation of
automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration data received for existing voter registrations
is rejected if all data already exists in the qualified voter file or otherwise merged with the existing
registration.
[9] If a voter is changing their name and updating their address, the state’s voter registration system
will record two changes made to one record and will track one change for each action to a voter
record.
[10] Nebraska law does not allow for pre-registrations for people not of voting age.
[11] New Hampshire uses voter registration forms for name, party, and address changes.
[12] The totals in A3a are numbers provided by counties.
[13] Address changes that cross jurisdiction borders are recorded as new registrations.
[14] Data on the number of cross-jurisdiction change of addresses is included with data on within-
jurisdiction change of name, party, or address.
[15] Cross-jurisdiction moves count as new registrations.
[16] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not collect data on rejected registrations.
[17] Multiple changes may occur on the same voter registration form.
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Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance—Confirmation Notices
Result of Confirmation Notice
Confirmation Notices Confirmation Notices
Confirmation Notices Received From Voter
Sent Returned
State Valid Invalid Undeliverable
% of
Total Active Total % Total % Total %
Voters
Alabama [1] -- -- 1,942 -- 40,598 -- 208,413 --
Alaska 78,183 13.0% 302 0.4% -- -- 23,293 29.8%
American Samoa -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Arizona 991,282 23.9% 68,611 6.9% 32,275 3.3% 57,079 5.8%
Arkansas 216,653 14.7% 28,181 13.0% 21,969 10.1% 25,017 11.5%
California 3,589,417 16.3% 404,858 11.3% 182,321 5.1% 509,518 14.2%
Colorado 651,897 17.0% 10,454 1.6% 15,733 2.4% 27,299 4.2%
Connecticut 83,937 3.7% 27,373 32.6% -- -- 56,564 67.4%
Delaware [2] 138,233 19.7% -- -- 7,782 5.6% 41,687 30.2%
District of
160,088 31.5% 6,704 4.2% 9,530 6.0% 3,858 2.4%
Columbia
Florida 1,336,199 9.2% 83,078 6.2% 122,334 9.2% 190,189 14.2%
Georgia 1,135,472 16.3% 2,392 0.2% 11,437 1.0% 166,411 14.7%
Guam 8,961 14.8% -- -- -- -- -- --
Hawaii [3] 63,259 8.3% 114 0.2% 203 0.3% -- --
Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 2,710,102 34.3% 80,181 3.0% 48,261 1.8% 94,964 3.5%
Indiana [5] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Iowa [6] 294,154 15.6% -- -- -- -- -- --
Kansas 237,940 13.0% 4,338 1.8% 34,003 14.3% 20,986 8.8%
Kentucky [7] 379,501 12.1% -- -- -- -- -- --
Louisiana [8] 483,961 17.1% -- -- -- -- -- --
Maine [9] 231,650 24.9% 6,190 2.7% 2,675 1.2% -- --
Maryland [10] 395,112 9.5% 2,794 0.7% 38,725 9.8% -- --
Massachusetts
632,191 15.1% -- -- -- -- -- --
[11]
Michigan [12] 590,172 8.1% 468 0.1% 82,814 14.0% 177,579 30.1%
Minnesota 115,653 3.2% -- -- -- -- -- --
Mississippi [13] 140,044 7.3% -- -- -- -- -- --
Missouri [14] 715,685 18.8% 2,553 0.4% 38,239 5.3% 67,888 9.5%
Montana 91,182 13.8% 4,966 5.4% 1,995 2.2% 20,274 22.2%
Nebraska 154,016 13.5% 19,828 12.9% 21,307 13.8% 14,135 9.2%
Nevada 404,874 22.0% 123,663 30.5% 32,456 8.0% 189,267 46.7%
New Hampshire
9,174 1.0% 105 1.1% 0 0.0% 3,121 34.0%
[15]
New Jersey 458,898 7.7% -- -- -- -- -- --
New Mexico 165,358 13.8% 0 0.0% 9 0.0% 36,190 21.9%
New York [16] 458,079 3.8% 27,311 6.0% 48,489 10.6% 22,710 5.0%
North Carolina
1,058,260 16.3% -- -- -- -- 336,561 31.8%
[17]
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Result of Confirmation Notice
Confirmation Notices Confirmation Notices
Confirmation Notices Received From Voter
Sent Returned
State Valid Invalid Undeliverable
% of
Total Active Total % Total % Total %
Voters
Northern
2,000 10.4% -- -- -- -- -- --
Mariana Islands
Ohio 1,253,658 15.6% 152,174 12.1% 21,112 1.7% 153,048 12.2%
Oklahoma 245,970 12.2% 20,862 8.5% 1,907 0.8% 34,311 13.9%
Oregon 390,806 13.1% -- -- -- -- -- --
Pennsylvania
964,386 12.0% 48,950 5.1% 47,021 4.9% 149,980 15.6%
[18]
Rhode Island 34,082 4.7% -- -- -- -- -- --
South Carolina 168,763 5.0% 6,086 3.6% 911 0.5% 1,354 0.8%
South Dakota 20,687 3.4% 141 0.7% 260 1.3% 11,963 57.8%
Tennessee 222,720 5.3% 21,773 9.8% 27,737 12.5% 56,568 25.4%
Texas 1,811,745 11.4% 593,213 32.7% 129,166 7.1% -- --
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Islands
Utah [19] 150,848 8.9% 788 0.5% 8,385 5.6% 24,330 16.1%
Vermont 62,476 14.0% 16,834 26.9% 45,642 73.1% 0 0.0%
Virginia 519,512 9.1% 24,450 4.7% -- -- 18,953 3.6%
Washington 1,782,901 37.1% 1,432 0.1% 7,007 0.4% 25,009 1.4%
West Virginia 169,472 16.1% 82,347 48.6% 14,525 8.6% -- --
Wisconsin [20] 622,370 17.0% 17,230 2.8% -- -- 299,490 48.1%
Wyoming [21] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
U.S. Total 26,601,983 13.7% 1,892,686 8.4% 1,096,828 5.0% 3,068,009 13.6%
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Result of Confirmation Notice
Unreturned Confirmation
Other Not Categorized
State Notices
Total % Total % Total %
Alabama [1] -- -- -- -- -- --
Alaska 54,588 69.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
American Samoa -- -- -- -- -- --
Arizona 80,923 8.2% 7 0.0% 752,387 75.9%
Arkansas 141,591 65.4% 6 0.0% -111 -0.1%
California 1,937,283 54.0% 132,743 3.7% 422,694 11.8%
Colorado 598,411 91.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Delaware [2] 88,764 64.2% -- -- 0 0.0%
District of Columbia 139,996 87.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Florida 930,170 69.6% 1,554 0.1% 8,874 0.7%
Georgia 904,346 79.6% 50,886 4.5% 0 0.0%
Guam -- -- -- -- 8,961 100.0%
Hawaii [3] 62,942 99.5% -- -- 0 0.0%
Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 451,420 16.7% 4,402 0.2% 2,030,874 74.9%
Indiana [5] -- -- -- -- -- --
Iowa [6] -- -- -- -- 294,154 100.0%
Kansas 63,940 26.9% 9 0.0% 114,664 48.2%
Kentucky [7] -- -- -- -- 379,501 100.0%
Louisiana [8] -- -- -- -- 483,961 100.0%
Maine [9] -- -- 222,785 96.2% 0 0.0%
Maryland [10] 353,593 89.5% -- -- 0 0.0%
Massachusetts [11] -- -- -- -- 632,191 100.0%
Michigan [12] 329,311 55.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
Minnesota 115,653 100.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Mississippi [13] -- -- -- -- 140,044 100.0%
Missouri [14] -- -- 147,187 20.6% 459,818 64.2%
Montana 61,826 67.8% 2,121 2.3% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 95,837 62.2% 2,909 1.9% 0 0.0%
Nevada 59,488 14.7% -- -- 0 0.0%
New Hampshire [15] 5,948 64.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
New Jersey -- -- -- -- 458,898 100.0%
New Mexico 129,159 78.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
New York [16] 343,514 75.0% -- -- 16,055 3.5%
North Carolina [17] 680,230 64.3% 41,469 3.9% 0 0.0%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern Mariana
-- -- 2,000 100.0% 0 0.0%
Islands
Ohio 927,324 74.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
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Result of Confirmation Notice
Unreturned Confirmation
Other Not Categorized
State Notices
Total % Total % Total %
Oklahoma 188,890 76.8% -- -- 0 0.0%
Oregon -- -- 390,806 100.0% 0 0.0%
Pennsylvania [18] 298,880 31.0% 419,555 43.5% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island -- -- -- -- 34,082 100.0%
South Carolina 160,412 95.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
South Dakota 8,323 40.2% -- -- 0 0.0%
Tennessee 116,642 52.4% -- -- 0 0.0%
Texas 1,089,366 60.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands -- -- -- -- -- --
Utah [19] 4,934 3.3% 7,404 4.9% 105,007 69.6%
Vermont 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Virginia 476,109 91.6% -- -- 0 0.0%
Washington 1,749,453 98.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
West Virginia -- -- 72,600 42.8% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [20] 305,650 49.1% -- -- 0 0.0%
Wyoming [21] -- -- -- -- -- --
U.S. Total 12,954,916 57.4% 1,498,443 10.4% 6,342,054 23.8%
Voter Registration Table 4 Calculation Notes:
Confirmation Notices Sent, Total uses question A8a.
Confirmation Notices Sent, % of Active Voters uses A8a/A1b x 100.
Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid, Total uses question A8b.
Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid, % uses A8b/A8a x 100.
Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, Total uses question A8c.
Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, % uses A8c/A8a x 100.
Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, Total uses question A8d.
Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, % uses A8d/A8a x 100.
Unreturned Confirmation Notices, Total uses question A8e.
Unreturned Confirmation Notices, % uses A8e/A8a x 100.
Other, Total uses the sum of questions A8f, A8g, and A8h.
Other, % uses (A8f+A8g+A8h)/A8a x 100.
Not Categorized, Total uses A8a–(sum of A8b to A8h).
Not Categorized, % uses (A8a–[sum of A8b to A8h])/A8a x 100.
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Voter Registration Table 4 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Questions A8f, A8g, and A8h were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data
in these items if there was another confirmation notice status aside from those listed in
questions A8b–A8e or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in
questions A8b–A8e.
• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized confirmation notices category indicate that the sum
of confirmation notices for each category accounted for more than the total number of
confirmation notices reported by the state.
• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation
notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
• Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each confirmation notice category.
• States that are exempt from the NVRA are not required to send confirmation notices pursuant
to the NVRA, although they may send confirmation notices (or other similar notices) pursuant
to state law or practice. States that do not use confirmation notices typically use other sources
of data to identify potentially ineligible voters.
[1] Alabama does not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.
[2] Delaware does not require confirmation notices to be returned. Notices are assumed correct if they
are not returned.
[3] Kauai County was the only county that logged received notices.
[4] Idaho does not track data on the outcomes of confirmation notices.
[5] Indiana’s statewide voter registration system is not able to track data on confirmation notices.
[6] Due to a change in state statute regarding how and when voters become inactive due to non-
participation, a large portion of mail processing is done outside of the state database; this affects the
ability to report data in A8e.
[7] As of the time the EAVS data were finalized, Kentucky had not yet finished scanning and
categorizing the returns.
[8] Confirmation notices are sent pursuant to 52 USC Section §20507(d)(2). The Department of State
only collects data on the total number of sent confirmation notices.
[9] Maine conducted a statewide NVRA list maintenance mailing in 2022.
[10] Data for A8d is included in what is reported in A8e.
[11] Data on the result of confirmation notices is not tracked.
[12] In 2021, the Michigan Bureau of Elections processed undeliverable mail from the first statewide
elections mailing in 10 years, triggering a significantly larger amount of cancellation notices mailed
than in the past.
[13] In the lead-up to the 2020 election, the Mississippi Secretary of State’s office sent postcards to
every registered voter to update them on changes that had been made in election laws. Postcards
that were undeliverable were returned to the local election officials and caused a confirmation card
to be sent.
[14] Missouri does not track all the requested information on confirmation notices.
[15] New Hampshire does not send confirmation notices, but does send 30-day letters.
[16] Some counties could not provide data on confirmation notices.
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[17] Data are not available in the statewide voter registration system showing whether confirmation
notices were confirmed by the voter or not. County boards process the returned confirmation notices
according to voter confirmation.
[18] The number reported in A8a includes initial notices sent to voters who appear to have moved
based upon information received pursuant to the National Change of Address program.
[19] Several Utah counties do not track data on confirmation notices or on unreturned confirmation
notices.
[20] Wisconsin is exempt from NVRA; however, the state sent notices to voters who have not voted in a
4-year period, as well as Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) mover mailings. Notices
are sent to voters who register to vote or whose voter information may be out of date.
[21] Wyoming does not require registration confirmation notices to be sent to voters and does not have
a system that tracks that information.
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Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance—Removal Actions
Voters Removed Reason for Removal
Moved Out of Failure to Return
Voter Deceased Voter’s Request
% of Jurisdiction Confirmation Notice
State
Total Reg.
Voters
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Alabama [1] 298,554 8.1% 20,019 6.7% 106,738 35.8% 149,982 50.2% 833 0.3%
Alaska 46,703 7.2% 2,683 5.7% 11,261 24.1% 22,937 49.1% 8,400 18.0%
American
2,736 19.1% -- -- 146 5.3% 2,590 94.7% -- --
Samoa
Arizona 432,498 8.9% 81,637 18.9% 108,103 25.0% 175,284 40.5% 50,092 11.6%
Arkansas 195,595 10.8% 10,598 5.4% 46,867 24.0% 128,798 65.8% 692 0.4%
California 977,773 3.6% 167,009 17.1% 406,702 41.6% 155,399 15.9% 137,839 14.1%
Colorado 394,628 9.1% 59,977 15.2% 99,024 25.1% 161,607 41.0% 64,478 16.3%
Connecticut 157,239 6.3% 85,519 54.4% 21,344 13.6% 49,109 31.2% -- --
Delaware 34,092 4.5% 15,278 44.8% 16,867 49.5% 4 0.0% 553 1.6%
District of
15,974 2.4% 10,707 67.0% 4,699 29.4% 0 0.0% 568 3.6%
Columbia
Florida 1,516,111 9.7% 572,346 37.8% 424,687 28.0% 379,356 25.0% 67,648 4.5%
Georgia [2] 483,386 6.2% 84,041 17.4% 175,817 36.4% 112,890 23.4% 6,142 1.3%
Guam 8,961 14.8% -- -- -- -- 8,961 100.0% -- --
Hawaii 41,308 4.8% 2,500 6.1% 34,440 83.4% 0 0.0% 4,323 10.5%
Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 692,003 7.9% 296,037 42.8% 123,012 17.8% 79,379 11.5% 21,596 3.1%
Indiana [3] 937,145 19.7% 5,806 0.6% 0 0.0% 127,072 13.6% -- --
Iowa 86,404 3.9% 25,516 29.5% 58,412 67.6% 1,326 1.5% 799 0.9%
Kansas 131,563 6.7% 12,818 9.7% 48,113 36.6% 60,911 46.3% 1,163 0.9%
Kentucky 131,260 3.7% 12,613 9.6% 103,997 79.2% 0 0.0% 1,752 1.3%
Louisiana [4] 266,821 8.8% 79,755 29.9% 88,094 33.0% 48,502 18.2% 14,516 5.4%
Maine 121,841 10.6% 84,069 69.0% 30,189 24.8% 1,396 1.1% 693 0.6%
Maryland 268,612 6.0% 58,085 21.6% 81,789 30.4% 123,377 45.9% 1,395 0.5%
Massachusetts 704,938 14.4% 438,479 62.2% 90,325 12.8% 108,282 15.4% 9,709 1.4%
Michigan 485,916 5.9% 71,108 14.6% 232,745 47.9% 176,788 36.4% 5,275 1.1%
Minnesota [5] 322,355 8.9% 141,242 43.8% 72,016 22.3% 107,878 33.5% -- --
Mississippi 152,455 7.3% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Missouri 468,943 11.1% 134,686 28.7% 132,372 28.2% 172,224 36.7% 3,547 0.8%
Montana [6] 60,248 7.9% 8,685 14.4% 18,028 29.9% 26,067 43.3% 2,678 4.4%
Nebraska 109,749 8.8% 47,516 43.3% 31,469 28.7% 26,143 23.8% 898 0.8%
Nevada 396,616 18.0% 112,129 28.3% 70,643 17.8% 163,986 41.3% 45,117 11.4%
New Hampshire 267,896 29.5% 66,932 25.0% 4,129 1.5% -- -- -- --
New Jersey [7] 402,607 6.3% 56,827 14.1% 118,186 29.4% 223,564 55.5% -- --
New Mexico 50,335 3.7% 5,011 10.0% 37,570 74.6% 7 0.0% 238 0.5%
New York 391,397 3.0% 229,160 58.5% 133,075 34.0% 3,609 0.9% 28,272 7.2%
North Carolina 981,703 13.2% 368,293 37.5% 164,937 16.8% 392,851 40.0% 3,957 0.4%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern
2,000 10.4% 20 1.0% 100 5.0% -- -- 5 0.3%
Mariana Islands
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Voters Removed Reason for Removal
Moved Out of Failure to Return
Voter Deceased Voter’s Request
% of Jurisdiction Confirmation Notice
State
Total Reg.
Voters
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Ohio 623,116 7.8% 201,421 32.3% 215,497 34.6% 116,823 18.7% 79,383 12.7%
Oklahoma 256,672 11.2% 74,948 29.2% 56,237 21.9% 110,973 43.2% 2,369 0.9%
Oregon [8] 117,307 3.9% 9,258 7.9% 72,444 61.8% 6,870 5.9% 28,373 24.2%
Pennsylvania 993,216 11.2% 392,536 39.5% 229,763 23.1% 360,132 36.3% 9,474 1.0%
Rhode Island 56,837 7.0% 14,530 25.6% 17,606 31.0% 15,534 27.3% 4,981 8.8%
South Carolina
262,015 7.0% 15,675 6.0% 101,404 38.7% 136,298 52.0% 1,625 0.6%
[9]
South Dakota 24,557 3.7% 1,234 5.0% 11,134 45.3% 9,889 40.3% 619 2.5%
Tennessee 424,647 9.3% 184,932 43.5% 125,326 29.5% 97,525 23.0% 5,979 1.4%
Texas 2,029,283 11.5% 91,966 4.5% 345,402 17.0% 56,506 2.8% 12,517 0.6%
U.S. Virgin
12 0.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
Islands
Utah 57,975 3.6% 18,142 31.3% 6,416 11.1% 32,917 56.8% 252 0.4%
Vermont 45,641 9.1% 0 0.0% 10,170 22.3% 20,685 45.3% 4,780 10.5%
Virginia 837,061 13.7% 556,858 66.5% 125,655 15.0% 114,945 13.7% 26,243 3.1%
Washington 628,840 11.9% 89,171 14.2% 128,774 20.5% 174,538 27.8% 97,607 15.5%
West Virginia 197,429 17.1% 1,065 0.5% 14,899 7.5% 150,079 76.0% 112 0.1%
Wisconsin [10] 643,975 17.5% 98,027 15.2% 337,081 52.3% 166,433 25.8% 830 0.1%
Wyoming 23,052 7.6% 1,097 4.8% 4,909 21.3% 16,280 70.6% 83 0.4%
U.S. Total 19,260,000 8.5% 5,117,961 26.8% 4,898,625 25.6% 4,776,706 25.4% 758,405 4.5%
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Reason for Removal
Felony or Conviction Mental Incompetence Other Not Categorized
State
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Alabama [1] 5,815 1.9% 145 0.0% 13,870 4.6% 1,152 0.4%
Alaska 1,422 3.0% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
American
0 0.0% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Samoa
Arizona 15,172 3.5% 717 0.2% 1,493 0.3% 0 0.0%
Arkansas 3,391 1.7% 57 0.0% 5,192 2.7% 0 0.0%
California 18,657 1.9% 980 0.1% 53,166 5.4% 38,021 3.9%
Colorado 9,480 2.4% -- -- 62 0.0% 0 0.0%
Connecticut 1,267 0.8% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Delaware 1,390 4.1% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
District of
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 18,314 1.2% 1,812 0.1% 51,916 3.4% 32 0.0%
Georgia [2] 32,273 6.7% 373 0.1% 71,850 14.9% 0 0.0%
Guam 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Hawaii 42 0.1% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 0 0.0%
Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Illinois 4,497 0.6% 29 0.0% 23,003 3.3% 144,450 20.9%
Indiana [3] 1 0.0% -- -- 2,584 0.3% 801,682 85.5%
Iowa 244 0.3% 75 0.1% 32 0.0% 0 0.0%
Kansas 1,543 1.2% 30 0.0% 6,586 5.0% 399 0.3%
Kentucky 11,932 9.1% 966 0.7% -- -- 0 0.0%
Louisiana [4] 11,165 4.2% 200 0.1% 24,589 9.2% 0 0.0%
Maine -- -- -- -- 5,494 4.5% 0 0.0%
Maryland 2,444 0.9% 40 0.0% 1,482 0.6% 0 0.0%
Massachusetts 244 0.0% -- -- 57,899 8.2% 0 0.0%
Michigan -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Minnesota [5] -- -- -- -- 1,219 0.4% 0 0.0%
Mississippi -- -- -- -- -- -- 152,455 100.0%
Missouri 12,630 2.7% 1,916 0.4% 11,568 2.5% 0 0.0%
Montana [6] 171 0.3% 3 0.0% 4,616 7.7% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 2,909 2.7% 0 0.0% 814 0.7% 0 0.0%
Nevada 4,696 1.2% 41 0.0% 4 0.0% 0 0.0%
New
13 0.0% -- -- 196,822 73.5% 0 0.0%
Hampshire
New Jersey [7] 22 0.0% 0 0.0% 4,008 1.0% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 7,509 14.9% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
New York 2,874 0.7% 68 0.0% -- -- -5,661 -1.4%
North Carolina 14,078 1.4% -- -- 37,587 3.8% 0 0.0%
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern
Mariana 50 2.5% 0 0.0% 2,000 100.0% -175 -8.7%
Islands
Ohio 9,989 1.6% 3 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
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Reason for Removal
Felony or Conviction Mental Incompetence Other Not Categorized
State
Total % Total % Total % Total %
Oklahoma 3,063 1.2% 231 0.1% 8,851 3.4% 0 0.0%
Oregon [8] -- -- -- -- 362 0.3% 0 0.0%
Pennsylvania 122 0.0% -- -- 1,189 0.1% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island 961 1.7% 1 0.0% 3,223 5.7% 1 0.0%
South Carolina
7,013 2.7% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
[9]
South Dakota 1,658 6.8% 0 0.0% 23 0.1% 0 0.0%
Tennessee 8,227 1.9% 1 0.0% 2,657 0.6% 0 0.0%
Texas 4,563 0.2% 756 0.0% 1,517,573 74.8% 0 0.0%
U.S. Virgin
0 0.0% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%
Islands
Utah 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 245 0.4%
Vermont -- -- -- -- 10,006 21.9% 0 0.0%
Virginia 9,740 1.2% 1,178 0.1% 2,442 0.3% 0 0.0%
Washington 6,389 1.0% 281 0.0% 132,080 21.0% 0 0.0%
West Virginia -- -- 0 0.0% 31,274 15.8% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [10] 4,851 0.8% 728 0.1% 36,025 5.6% 0 0.0%
Wyoming 64 0.3% 4 0.0% 615 2.7% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 240,887 1.4% 10,637 0.1% 2,324,178 13.8% 1,132,601 5.9%
Voter Registration Table 5 Calculation Notes:
Voters Removed, % of Registered Voters uses A9a/A1a x 100.
Moved Out of Jurisdiction, Total uses question A9b.
Moved Out of Jurisdiction, % uses A9b/A9a x 100.
Voter Deceased, Total uses question A9c.
Voter Deceased, % uses A9c/A9a x 100.
Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, Total uses question A9e.
Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, % uses A9e/A9a x 100.
Voter’s Request, Total uses question A9g.
Voter’s Request, % uses question A9g/A9a x 100.
Felony or Conviction, Total uses question A9d.
Felony or Conviction, % uses A9d/A9a x 100.
Mental Incompetence, Total uses question A9f.
Mental Incompetence, % uses question A9f/A9a x 100.
Other, Total uses the sum of questions A9h, A9i, and A9j.
Other, % uses (A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a x 100.
Not Categorized, Total uses A9a–(sum of A9b to A9j).
Not Categorized, % uses (A9a–[sum of A9b to A9j])/A9a x 100.
Voter Registration Table 5 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
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• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Questions A9h, A9i, and A9j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in
these items if there was another reason for registration removals aside from those listed in
questions A9b–A9g or if there were registration removals that could not be categorized in
questions A9b–A9g.
• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration removals category indicate that the sum
of registration removals for each category accounted for more than the total number of
registration removals reported received by the state.
• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation
notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
• Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration removal
category. In addition, not all states may remove registrations for the listed reason.
[1] Data reported in the “Other” category includes duplicate profiles for voters who were already
registered and reasons not listed.
[2] Data reported in A9b represents voters who moved out of state.
[3] The data reported in A9b–j consisted of data from an ad hoc report (A9b–d, A9g–j) and the
statewide voter registration system (A9e). Indiana provided the number of voter records cancelled
due to being in inactive status for more than two federal general elections for question A9e. These
statistics represent the majority of cancellations for this reason, based on county users selecting the
option to run this process in batch. County users have the option to also cancel voters one by one for
this reason, but those statistics are not included in the counts for question A9e.
[4] Irregularities include voters that were cancelled by the Registrar of Voters because the registrant
provided insufficient or incorrect data or a user processing error. Challenge 21 includes voters who
were registered in another state or not a United States citizen, or were otherwise not qualified to be
registered for reasons other than change of address.
[5] Pertaining to the number of removals reported because the voter received a disqualifying criminal
conviction or was declared mentally incompetent, these voters are not removed, but their status is
changed to “challenged.” For removals for a failure to respond to a confirmation notice and a failure
to vote, this includes data on individuals who did not vote or update their registration in the prior 4
years. Data on removals because of voter request is not tracked separately and is included as an
“other” reason for removal.
[6] Data reported in A9d includes felony cancellations as reported in the statewide voter registration
database. Data reported in A9j includes cancellations for which no reason was specified.
[7] There are no records for voters removed due to mental incompetence. “Administrative action” was
erroneously recorded with removals at the voter’s request in previous years.
[8] Data reported on removals at the voter’s request may include other reasons listed. Individuals who
receive a felony or criminal conviction are inactivated, not removed from the voter rolls.
[9] Tracking of voters removed for mental incompetence was implemented after the time period
covered by the 2022 EAVS.
[10] In Wisconsin, voters are only included in the data on voter registration removals if they remain
removed as of the time the data for this report was pulled. Voters who were removed during the
period and subsequently reregistered during the period are not included. Wisconsin is exempt from
the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions. Only active voters are registered
and eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s count of registered voters for this report includes
military voters, even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin.
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Chapter 4. Military and Overseas
Voting in 2022: UOCAVA
Key Findings
The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Section B collected data from states and
municipalities on individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA) during the 2022 federal general election. Election officials were asked a variety of
questions relating to UOCAVA voting practices, including the total number of registered UOCAVA
voters, the use of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), the quantity of and methods by which
ballots were transmitted to and returned by UOCAVA voters, and the use of the Federal Write-In
Absentee Ballot (FWAB).1 Notable findings from EAVS Section B include:
o Over 57% of registered UOCAVA voters held legal voting residence in three states: Florida
(182,506), California (137,273), and Washington (103,996). California and Florida had
more overseas citizens than uniformed services members2; Washington had more
uniformed services members than overseas citizens. More than 60% of EAVS jurisdictions
had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters and 85% of jurisdictions had at least one
registered UOCAVA voter.
o Continuing a trend that has been ongoing for several election cycles, overseas citizens
made up a larger percentage of registered UOCAVA voters than did uniformed services
members. In 2022, the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was nearly
double the number of ballots transmitted to voters who were uniformed services members.
o Email was the most popular mode for states to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters for the
2022 general election (48.5%), followed by postal mail (38.4%), and other methods such
as fax or online systems (12.6%). The percentage of ballots transmitted via email dropped
by about 8 percentage points from 2018 (56.6%). Transmission via other modes saw a
sizable increase between 2018 and 2022.
o The majority (52.8%) of overseas citizens received their ballot via email, compared to just
over a third of uniformed service members (36.6%). About 267,403 (41%) of transmitted
ballots for the 2022 general election were returned to election offices. This is about 22.4%
lower than the 344,392 returned ballots from 2018.
o Most UOCAVA voters returned ballots via postal mail (61.5%). This was particularly true for
uniformed services members (73.6%). A total of 257,657 UOCAVA voter ballots were
counted in 2022.
o Usage of the FWAB decreased by 26.8% compared to 2018. Usage of the FWAB resulted in
an additional 3,447 UOCAVA voters’ ballots being counted in the 2022 election and 655
1 The response rate among local jurisdictions for EAVS Section B was 99.9%; five counties in Arkansas did
not provide Section B data. In addition, the response rate for individual items varied. Results reported in
this chapter include only states for which data are available for a given question. State and national totals
include all available jurisdiction-level data. National-level percentages reported in this chapter used
casewise deletion.
2 Per UOCAVA, uniformed service members include both active duty military and their eligible family
members.
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FWABs were not counted in the 2022 election. Of this number, 159 FWABs were not
counted because they were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup
ballot unnecessary.
Introduction
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) to collect data from states3 and to report on absentee voting by uniformed services
members and overseas citizens.4 Since 2014, the EAC has fulfilled this reporting mandate in
partnership with the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the agency designated to
administer UOCAVA on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Through a memorandum
of understanding between the EAC and FVAP, Section B of the EAVS is administered on behalf of
both agencies. This agreement allows both the EAC and FVAP to fulfill congressionally mandated
requirements to study UOCAVA voting while reducing the data collection and reporting burden on
state and local election officials. States are required to report certain election data to the EAC
after each federal election.5
This chapter examines UOCAVA data from the 2022 EAVS, including use of the FPCA by UOCAVA
voters, ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by states, ballots returned by UOCAVA voters,
UOCAVA ballots counted, UOCAVA ballots rejected, and usage of the FWAB by UOCAVA voters.
Where appropriate, information about state laws and procedures related to UOCAVA voting,
collected as part of the EAC’s 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), is
presented to provide context for the EAVS results. Chapter 2 of this report contains a full analysis
of all UOCAVA data collected in the 2022 Policy Survey.
Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA)
UOCAVA protects the voting rights of active duty military members who are stationed away from
their voting residence, the spouses and other eligible family of active duty military members, U.S.
citizens residing outside of the United States, and other uniformed services members. UOCAVA
requires all states, territories, and the District of Columbia to allow these citizens to register to
vote and to cast an absentee ballot for all federal elections.6 For the estimated 1.33 million active
duty members and approximately 573,000 military spouses and voting-age dependents stationed
away from their legal voting residence7—as well as the estimated 2.6 million voting-age U.S.
3 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50
U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and four U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Due to the Northern
Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this
territory.
4 The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901. The EAC works with FVAP to collect
comprehensive data from the states on all of the ballots sent and received by voters covered under
UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(11)).
5 Section 703(a) HAVA amended section 102 of UOCAVA.
6 Throughout this report, the term “uniformed services voter” refers to U.S. citizens who are active members
of the uniformed services or a spouse or dependent family member thereof. “Overseas citizen” refers to
non-military U.S. citizens who reside overseas.
7 Information was provided by FVAP to Fors Marsh via email on April 6, 2023, and was current as of October
2022.
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citizens who live, study, or work overseas8—the absentee voting process is different from and can
be more challenging than the voting process for non-military voters residing in the United States.
Citizens protected by UOCAVA include:
• Members of the uniformed services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space
Force), Coast Guard, U.S. Public Health Service [USPHS] Commissioned Corps, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Commissioned Officer Corps) who
are stationed away from their legal voting residence;
• Members of the U.S. Merchant Marine;
• Eligible family members of the above; and
• U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States
Among the challenges UOCAVA sought to address was the wide variability in rules and procedures
governing registration and voting across states, which made it difficult for uniformed services
members and overseas citizens to navigate the voting process.9 UOCAVA established the FPCA,
which serves as a combination registration and ballot request application that is accepted in all
U.S. states and territories. In addition, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be cast by
UOCAVA voters who make a timely request for, but do not receive, a regular absentee ballot.10
Some, but not all, states consider the FWAB to be both a registration form and ballot request
application.
Although states and localities still maintain and administer elections according to their own laws
and procedures for registration and absentee voting among uniformed services members and
overseas citizens, the provisions of UOCAVA established some uniformity in the absentee voting
process for these voters.
The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009
Historically, UOCAVA ballots were transmitted from election offices to voters primarily through the
mail. Given long mailing times and high mobility rates for this population of voters, this practice
meant that many UOCAVA voters were unable to receive and return their absentee ballot before
state ballot return deadlines. The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act
amended UOCAVA to establish additional requirements to protect military and overseas citizens’
voting rights.11 These new rules required that all states, territories, and the District of Columbia
provide UOCAVA voters with an option to request and receive registration and absentee ballot
request materials electronically, directed states to establish an electronic means of transmitting
8 Federal Voting Assistance Program, “Comparing Models for Estimating the Total Overseas Citizen
Population, the Overseas Citizen Voting-Age Population, and Voting Rates,” at
https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/OCPA-Research-Note_Final.pdf. The 2022 Overseas Citizen
Population Analysis (OCPA) also estimates the number of overseas U.S. citizens, but results from this survey
were not available at the time of this report’s publication.
9 The U.S. Department of Justice. (2020, February 18). The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act. https://www.justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act.
10 Section 103 of UOCAVA provides a mechanism for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to
cast a FWAB (see 52 U.S.C.§ 20303).
11 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 statutory language can be found at
https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/moveact.pdf. State specific information can be found at
https://www.fvap.gov/guide.
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blank ballots to UOCAVA voters, and required states to provide free access to a system whereby
voters can verify the status of their ballot. Additionally, absentee ballots must be transmitted no
less than 45 days before a federal election to all UOCAVA voters who submit an absentee ballot
request before this deadline. These additional provisions aimed to ensure uniformed services
members and overseas citizens not only have the right to vote, but that they have sufficient time
to receive and return their absentee ballots ahead of state deadlines.
The UOCAVA Voting Process
Although the specific path may differ depending on the policies and procedures in one’s state of
voting residence and on a voter’s particular situation and preferences, in general, the UOCAVA
voting process can be summarized in six basic steps, as illustrated in Figure 1.12
Figure 1. The UOCAVA Voting Process
12 Adapted from an FVAP infographic. For more detailed information about state policies related to UOCAVA
voting, see Chapter 2 of this report.
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1. Register and request an absentee ballot: UOCAVA-eligible citizens can do this either by
completing a state application form or an FPCA (the federal form that functions as both a
registration and absentee ballot request and is accepted in all states and U.S. territories).
2. Submit the registration and ballot request: Completed applications must be submitted to
the appropriate state or local election office by mail or by an electronic means permitted
by the state. All states accept FPCAs by mail; states may also accept FPCAs via email, fax,
the state’s online voter registration portal, or by another mode.
3. Application processing: Once received, registration and absentee ballot request
applications are processed by the election office. If an application meets all requirements
and is accepted, then it is valid as a registration and ballot request. UOCAVA voters can
use the FPCA as a single ballot request form for all federal elections during the calendar
year in which it is submitted. State laws vary on how long this request is valid beyond the
initial year.
4. Ballot transmission: Election officials transmit absentee ballots to registered UOCAVA
voters no later than 45 days before a federal election (ballots may be transmitted later if
the ballot request is submitted by the state deadline but less than 45 days before an
election).13 Ballots may be transmitted to a voter by mail or through some other state-
approved electronic means of transmission, as requested by the voter.
5. Complete and return absentee ballot: UOCAVA voters complete and return their absentee
ballot to the appropriate election office for processing. Ballots may be returned and
submitted for processing either by mail or through some other electronic means allowed
by a state.
6. Ballot processing and counting: Completed absentee ballots that are returned and
submitted for counting to an election office must be received by state deadlines and meet
other state requirements. State policies on when completed ballots must be postmarked
and when they must be returned to an election office in order to be eligible to be counted
vary widely.
7. Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB): The FWAB is an emergency or “back-up” ballot
available for citizens covered under UOCAVA. It is used to vote in any election for federal
offices and as otherwise permitted by state law. UOCAVA requires that to use a FWAB, a
voter must be a member of the uniformed services or Merchant Marine (or eligible family
member), or a U.S. citizen overseas who is absent from their place of residence where
they are otherwise qualified to vote, and must not have received their requested regular
absentee ballot from their state. Depending on state law, the FWAB may also be used to
request voter registration and/or an absentee ballot.
13 The UOCAVA ballot transmission date is set by the MOVE Act of 2009. Because 45 days before a federal
general election always falls on a Saturday, election officials may refer to this ballot transmission deadline
as “UOCAVA Saturday.”
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UOCAVA stipulates that voters may also return the state-issued absentee ballot after returning the
FWAB, as the state ballot may offer other offices or referenda. Only one ballot is counted for each
voter; if a state-issued absentee ballot is received from the voter, it supersedes the FWAB and
only the official ballot is counted.
UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests
For the 2022 general election, registered overseas citizens outnumbered registered uniformed
services members covered by UOCAVA. Uniformed services members and their eligible family
members accounted for 43.1% of registered UOCAVA voters and overseas citizens accounted for
56.5% of this population.14 This continues a trend that was also seen in 2020, 2018, and 2016.
Table 1. Four Jurisdictions Accounted for 12%+ of All Registered UOCAVA Voters
Jurisdictions With More Than 15,000 UOCAVA Voters
Number of Registered and Eligible
Jurisdiction
UOCAVA Voters in 2022
Los Angeles County, CA 31,273
King County, WA 30,885
Miami-Dade County, FL 16,294
Pierce County, WA 15,663
Source: Information on the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was item B1a of the 2022
EAVS.
Registered UOCAVA voters’ legal voting residences15 are disproportionately concentrated in just a
few U.S. states. In 2022, the states with the largest numbers of registered UOCAVA voters were
Florida (182,506), California (137,273), and Washington (103,996).16 Together, these three
states represented 57.5% of all registered UOCAVA voters reported in the 2022 EAVS. Fourteen
14 The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2022 EAVS.
The number of registered and eligible uniformed services UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1b; the
percentage of uniformed services UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1b by B1a. The number of
registered and eligible overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1c; the percentage of
overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1c by B1a. Casewise deletion at the state level
was used in calculating the national percentage. In total, 754 jurisdictions in 13 states and 3 territories did
not report data in B1; this count excludes jurisdictions in Maine, which reported UOCAVA data at the state
level and not the jurisdiction level, and jurisdictions in North Dakota as they do not use voter registration. A
total of 5,716 registered and eligible voters reported in B1a were not classified as either uniformed
services members or overseas citizens. These percentages exclude the seven states that did not report the
number of registered UOCAVA voters and the state and territory that did not subdivide this number by
UOCAVA voter type.
15 According to FVAP’s guidance for service members, “Your voting residence is within your state of legal
residence or domicile. It is the address that you consider your permanent home and where you had a
physical presence. Your state of legal residence is used for state income tax purposes, determines eligibility
to vote for federal and state elections, and qualification for in-state tuition rates.” For more information, see
https://www.fvap.gov/military-voter/voting-residence.
16 The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in a state was calculated by summing B1a
across all jurisdictions for each state.
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local jurisdictions17 reported having 10,000 or more registered UOCAVA voters, and four reported
more than 15,000 registered and eligible UOCAVA voters. These four jurisdictions, shown in Table
1, accounted for 12.8% of all registered UOCAVA voters.
Conversely, of the 5,233 local jurisdictions for which the number of registered UOCAVA voters was
available, 89.4% reported fewer than 100 registered UOCAVA voters, including 775 (14.8%)
jurisdictions that reported having zero UOCAVA voters in 2022. Figure 2 shows the number of
registered UOCAVA voters by jurisdiction.
Figure 2. Most Jurisdictions Had Fewer Than 50 Registered UOCAVA Voters
Source: Information for the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of
the 2022 EAVS.
Election offices reported receiving 309,867 FPCAs ahead of the 2022 general election, which
was almost identical to the 312,437 FPCAs that states reported receiving ahead of the last
17 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For
the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for
Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction.
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to
counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city,
town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on
the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction,
because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but
most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state.
Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as
a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.
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midterm general election in 2018. Overall, 20.7% of these registration and absentee ballot
requests came from uniformed services members, and 76.5% were submitted by overseas
citizens.18 States reported rejecting 1.9% of the FPCAs received—21.4% of these were rejected
because the election office received the form after their state’s absentee ballot request
deadline.19 The FPCA rejection rate among uniformed services members was slightly higher than
among overseas citizens (although not to a statistically significant degree), with 2.6% of military
FPCAs rejected compared to 1.8% of FPCAs submitted by overseas citizens.20
Figure 3. Ballot Transmissions Were the Highest in States with Large UOCAVA Populations
Source: Information on the number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2022
EAVS. State-level data were aggregated from jurisdiction data. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to
reflect states that had the lowest and highest number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted and to differentiate
among the states in between the lowest and highest UOCAVA ballot transmission numbers.
18 Data on the total number of FPCAs submitted were collected in item B2a of the 2022 EAVS. For 2022,
the percentage of FPCAs received from uniformed services members was calculated as B2b/B2a x 100.
The percentage of FPCAs received from overseas citizens was calculated as B2c/B2a x 100. Casewise
deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.
19 The total number of FPCAs rejected was collected in item B3a in the 2022 EAVS; the percentage of
FPCAs rejected was calculated as B3a/B2a x 100. The percentage of FPCAs rejected because they were
received late was calculated as B4a/B3a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in
calculating the national percentages.
20 The percentage of rejected FPCAs from uniformed services voters was calculated as B3b/B2b. The
percentage of rejected FPCAs from overseas citizens was calculated as B3c/B2c. Casewise deletion was
used at the state level in calculating these percentages.
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UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted
In 2022, election offices in the 50 states, three U.S. territories,21 and the District of Columbia
reported transmitting 654,786 ballots to UOCAVA voters.22 Figure 3 shows the number of ballots
sent out from election offices or transmitted for each state. The states colored in the darkest blue
represent the states that distributed the most ballots to UOCAVA voters. The states colored in the
lightest blue are the states that distributed the fewest ballots to UOCAVA voters. States on or near
the West Coast such as Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, Mid-Atlantic states
including New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and populous states
like Florida and Texas all transmitted 10,000 or more UOCAVA ballots.
Figure 4. Steady Increase in the Percentage of UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted to
Overseas Citizens Relative to Uniformed Services Members
Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as
B1b/B1a x 100 for 2014 and 2016 and B5b/B5a x 100 for 2018, 2020, and 2022. The percentage of
UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B1c/B1a x 100 for 2014 and 2016, and
B5c/B5a x 100 for 2018, 2020, and 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating
national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100% for each year.
21 Puerto Rico was not required to report data for the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general
election in November 2022. The Northern Mariana Islands did not report data on the number of absentee
ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters in the 2022 EAVS.
22 The number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of
ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters was reported by 5,933 of 6,460 jurisdictions.
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Of the UOCAVA ballots transmitted for the 2022 general election, 34.6% were sent to uniformed
services members and 64.4% were transmitted to overseas citizens.23 Figure 4 shows that the
percentage of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens has continued to rise steadily over the last
several election cycles, increasing by 12.8 percentage points since the 2014 general election and
by 4.4 percentage points since the last midterm general election in 2018.
Although the nationwide percentage of ballots sent to overseas citizens was greater than the
percentage sent to uniformed services members, the proportion of ballots sent to overseas
citizens or uniformed services members varied by state. Arkansas, Montana, Tennessee, and
Wyoming, for example, reported that UOCAVA ballots were split about evenly between uniformed
services members and overseas citizens. However, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island all reported that more than 90% of
UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens. American Samoa and the U.S. Virgin
Islands reported that 100% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services voters, and
more than 60% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services members in Alaska,
Oklahoma, and Washington State. Figure 5 shows the percentage of ballots transmitted to
uniformed services voters versus overseas citizens.
23 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as B5b/B5a
x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B5c/B5a x
100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level when calculating national percentages. An additional
1% of the transmitted ballots could not be classified by voter type.
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Figure 5. Twenty-Four States Transmitted More UOCAVA Ballots to
Uniformed Services Members Than to Overseas Citizens
Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B5c/B5a
x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was
calculated as B5b/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of uncategorized ballots was calculated
as (B5a-B5b-B5c)/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in
calculating national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%. Iowa, Puerto Rico, and the Northern
Mariana Islands did not report data on the number of ballots transmitted.
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Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission
Over the last several election cycles, the modes by which absentee ballots have been transmitted
to voters have changed substantially. Since voters were given the option of how to receive their
blank absentee ballot with the passage of the MOVE Act in 2009, transmission of ballots to
UOCAVA voters has increasingly occurred electronically. Email was the most popular method of
ballot transmission for the 2022 general election, with 48.5% of absentee ballots transmitted to
UOCAVA voters via email, 38.4% transmitted via postal mail, and 12.6% sent to voters through
some other mode of transmission (e.g., fax or online systems).24 By comparison, during the
Figure 6. Modes of Ballot Transmission to Voters Differed for
Overseas Citizens and Uniformed Services Members
Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted overall were calculated as B7a/B5a x 100 for
email, B6a/B5a x 100 for postal mail, and B8a/B5a x 100 for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA
ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters were calculated as B7b/B5b x 100 for email, B6b/B5b x
100 for postal mail, and B8b/B5b x 100 for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted
for overseas citizens were calculated as B7c/B5c x 100 for email, B6c/B5c x 100 for postal mail, and
B8c/B5c x 100 for other modes. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national
percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%.
24 The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as B7a/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The
percentage of ballots transmitted by postal mail was calculated as B6a/B5a x 100. The percentage of
ballots transmitted by other modes of transmission was calculated as B8a/B5a x 100. Casewise deletion
was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.
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previous midterm election cycle in 2018, among states that provided data on transmission by
mode, 56.6% of ballots were transmitted via email, with 42.2% of UOCAVA ballots transmitted via
postal mail. Figure 6 displays the percentage of ballots transmitted by mail, email, or other modes
for the 2022 general election.
Modes of ballot transmission differed based on UOCAVA voter type. Uniformed services members
used postal transmission (58.1%) more than email transmission (36.6%), and just 6.2% of
uniformed services members had their ballots transmitted via other modes. For ballots
transmitted to overseas citizens, most ballots were transmitted by email (52.8%) while ballots
transmitted by postal mail accounted for 27.1%, and 15.8% were transmitted via other means,
including fax and online ballot delivery portals.
Overall, 1.5% of all ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters were returned as undeliverable,
including mailed ballots returned to sender, emailed ballots that bounced back, and ballots that
were undeliverable by other modes, such as being sent to an incorrect fax number.25
Figure 7. UOCAVA Ballot Return Rates Show No Distinct Geographic Pattern
Source: The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters was calculated as
B9a/B5a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the percentages shown in this
map.
25 The percentage of ballots returned as undeliverable was calculated as B13a/B5a x 100. Casewise
deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. States and jurisdictions vary in
the extent to which they are able to capture and report undeliverable ballots, both overall and by mode of
transmission.
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UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting
States reported 267,403 regular absentee ballots being returned and submitted for counting by
UOCAVA voters for the 2022 election, comprising 40.9% of the UOCAVA ballots that were
transmitted from election offices to voters.26 This is a decrease of 23.2% from 2018, when
344,392 regular absentee ballots were returned by UOCAVA voters.27 Figure 7 shows the UOCAVA
ballot return totals by state in 2022. The states colored in dark blue represent the states that had
the highest ballot return totals. The states colored in light blue were the states that had the
lowest ballot return totals. The UOCAVA ballot return rate does not show any type of geographic or
regional pattern.
Of the ballots returned to election offices, 31.5% were returned by uniformed services members
and 65.8% were returned by overseas citizens.28 Overall, 61.5% of absentee ballots returned and
submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters were returned to the election office via postal mail,
37.7% were returned by email, and 17.1% were returned through some other mode (e.g., fax or
an online system).29 Data on email ballot returns was not available in or not provided by 21
states. Among the states that reported UOCAVA ballots returned by email, 37.7% of ballots were
returned through email, and 61.5% were returned via mail.30 Half of states allow UOCAVA voters
to return their ballots by email.31
26 The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a in the 2022 EAVS. The
percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned was calculated as B9a/B5a x 100. Casewise
deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. FWABs were reported separately
from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and were not included in these figures. Because more than one
ballot may be transmitted to an individual voter (e.g., because the original was returned undeliverable or
was spoiled and replaced), this rate likely underestimates the rate of ballot return by UOCAVA voters.
27 The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a for the 2018 EAVS.
28 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services members was calculated as
B9b/B9a x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizens was calculated as
B9c/B9a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.
29 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail was calculated as B10a/B9a x 100. The
percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email was calculated as B11a/B9a x 100. The percentage of
UOCAVA ballots returned by some other mode was calculated as B12a/B9a x 100. Casewise deletion was
used at the state level in calculating these percentages.
30 Thirty states reported at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in the 2022 EAVS). The percentage of
ballots returned by email was calculated as B11a/B9a x 100 among states reporting at least one email
ballot returned (item B11a in the 2022 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by mail was calculated as
B10a/B9a x 100 among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in 2022 EAVS).
Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.
31 Information on how UOCAVA ballots may be returned by voters was collected in item Q28 of the 2022
Policy Survey.
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Figure 8. Postal Mail Was the Primary Mode of Ballot Return for UOCAVA Voters
Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode overall were calculated as B10a/B9a x 100
for postal mail and B11a/B9a x 100 for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for
overseas citizens were calculated as B10c/B9c x 100 for postal mail and B11c/B9c x 100 for email. The
percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for uniformed services members were calculated as
B10b/B9b x 100 for postal mail and B11b/B9b x 100 for email. Casewise deletion was used at the state
level in calculating national percentages, and because percentages for each type of voter and each mode
of return were calculated independently—and only states that reported data for a given mode of return were
included in the analysis—the percentages do not sum to 100%. Other modes of ballot return are not shown
here.
Although postal mail was the most common mode of ballot return for both uniformed services
members and overseas citizens, uniformed services members used email return far less than
overseas citizens, with just 14.6% using email to return an absentee ballot versus 52.8% of
overseas citizens.32 Figure 8 displays the method of ballot return for UOCAVA voters by type.
Overall, 257,657 regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters were counted in the 2022
general election. Of these votes, 66.4% were cast by overseas citizens and 31.1% by uniformed
32 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by uniformed services members was calculated as
B11b/B9b x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by overseas citizens was calculated
as B11c/B9c x 100. Of note, two of the states with the largest numbers of UOCAVA voters—California and
Florida—do not allow email return of absentee ballots. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to
calculate the national percentages.
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services voters.33 The overall rejection rate for regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA
voters was 3.9%, a 46% decrease from the 5.7% reported in 2018.34 The overall rejection rate did
not differ significantly across UOCAVA voter types.35
Figure 9 shows the number of rejected UOCAVA ballots returned and submitted by voters for
counting in each state. The states that are colored in dark blue represent the states that reported
the highest number of rejected ballots, and the states that are colored in light blue reported the
lowest number of rejected ballots. Rejection rates were highest in southern states including
Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee as well as in western states like California,
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.
Rejected ballots were divided into three reasons for rejection: missed deadline, problem with
voter signature, and lacked postmark.36 By far, the most common reason for rejection was that a
ballot was received after a state’s deadline for UOCAVA absentee ballot receipt. Of the 10,456
returned UOCAVA ballots rejected, 6,774 were rejected because they were received after the
state deadline, which was 65.4% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections.37 Voter signature problems were
responsible for 18.1% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections, 1% of ballot rejections were the result of
postmark issues, and 18% of rejections were caused by some other issue.38
33 The total number of UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted was collected in item
B14a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of ballots that were returned by uniformed services members was
calculated as B14b/B14a x 100. The percentage of ballots that were returned by overseas citizens was
calculated as B14c/B14a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national
percentages. An additional 8,127 (3.2%) UOCAVA absentee ballots counted were not classified by voter
type.
34 Before survey revisions were made in the 2018 EAVS, UOCAVA ballot rejection data included both regular
absentee ballots and FWABs, making direct comparisons with years prior to 2018 complicated. The 2016
ballot rejection rate was calculated as (B16a+B16b+B16c)/B26b and produced an overall rejection rate of
2.4%.
35 The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100 for the 2018 and 2022 EAVS.
The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as B18b/B9b x 100. The
percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as B18c/B9c x 100. Casewise
deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned
ballots was 4.3% for uniformed services members, 3.7% for overseas citizens, and 4.6% among rejected
ballots not classified by voter type.
36 Rhode Island did not report the number of ballots rejected. The number of ballots rejected was reported
for 65.5% of jurisdictions nationwide. Most of these jurisdictions also subdivided rejected ballots by reason
for rejection. Puerto Rico did not provide these data because it was not required to respond to the 2022
EAVS.
37 The total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received after the state deadline was item B19a of
the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received late was calculated as
B19a/B18a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.
38 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of signature issues was calculated as B20a/B18a x
100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of postmark issues was calculated as
B21a/B18a x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons was calculated as
B22a/B18a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.
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Figure 9. UOCAVA Ballot Rejection Rates Varied Significantly Across States
Source: The percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were rejected was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100.
Cutoff points in the graph are quartiles.
Uniformed services members’ and overseas citizens’ UOCAVA ballots were rejected for similar
reasons. Missing the deadline was the most common reason for rejection among both
populations—60.1% for uniformed services members and 67.4% for overseas citizens. Signature
issues were the cause of 21.1% of ballot rejections for ballots returned by uniformed services
members and 17.2% of ballot rejections for overseas citizens. Neither of these reasons for
rejection differed significantly across UOCAVA voter types.39
Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB)
If a regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time for a UOCAVA individual to vote, the FWAB
functions as a backup ballot that can be used to vote for all federal offices and, in some states,
state and local offices as well.
39 The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100 for the 2018 and 2022 EAVS.
The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as B18b/B9b x 100. The
percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as B18c/B9c x 100. Casewise
deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned
ballots was 4.3% for uniformed services members, 3.7% for overseas citizens, and 5.2% among rejected
ballots not classified by voter type.
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The FWAB is a special type of UOCAVA ballot that may be used as a backup in the event that a
voter’s regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time to vote. In most states, a UOCAVA voter must
have registered and requested an absentee ballot in order to use the FWAB.
The 4,089 FWABs submitted in 2022 made up a relatively small proportion (1.6%) of all the
UOCAVA ballots returned and represented a 26.8% decrease in the volume of FWABs reported
compared to the 2018 election.40 FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of the
UOCAVA methods of voting among both uniformed services members and overseas citizens.
However, the FWAB resulted in 3,447 additional UOCAVA voters’ ballots being counted in the
2022 general election, with 22.2% of these additional voters being uniformed services
members and 77.3% being overseas citizens.41 Eleven states and territories reported that they
received no FWABs during the 2022 presidential election.42
Nearly one in five (655 or 16%) of the 4,089 FWABs submitted in the 2022 general election were
not counted. Of these, 159 FWABs—25.4% of the rejected FWABs—were replaced by a regular
absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.43 The rate of uncounted FWABs returned
by uniformed services members (27.2%) was more than double the rate of uncounted FWABs
returned by overseas citizens (12%).44 The other major reason FWABs went uncounted (and the
only other reason states reported via the EAVS) was because they were received after the ballot
receipt deadline (27.2% of rejected FWABs).45
40 The percentage of all ballots returned that were FWABs was calculated using the total number of FWABs
received (B23a) divided by the total number of UOCAVA ballots received (the sum of B9a and B23a).
Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. The total number of
FWABs received was collected in item B23a in the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. In 2018, states reported
receiving 7,284 FWABs. For 2022, the total number of FWABs returned was based on the 76.2% of
jurisdictions for which this information was available.
41 The total number of FWABs received and counted was item B24a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of
FWABs counted from uniformed services members was item B24b, and the number of FWABs counted from
overseas citizens was item B24c. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by uniformed services
members was calculated as B24b/B24a x 100. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by overseas
citizens was calculated as B24c/B24a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating
the national percentages.
42 American Samoa, Colorado, Delaware, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, South Dakota, the
U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming reported receiving zero FWABs. Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont reported FWABs with regular UOCAVA
ballots because they could not separate the two types.
43 The number of FWABs rejected because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received and counted
was item B26a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of FWABs that were rejected for this reason was
calculated as B26a/(B25a+B26a+B27a) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in
calculating the national percentage.
44 The total percentage of FWABs rejected was calculated as (B25a+B26a+B27a)/B23a x 100. The
percentage of FWABs rejected from uniformed services members was calculated as
(B25b+B26b+B27b)/B23b x 100. The percentage of FWABs rejected from overseas citizens was calculated
as (B25c+B26c+B27c)/B23c x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the
national percentages.
45 The percentage of FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the deadline was
calculated as B25a/(B25a+B26a+B27a) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in
calculating the national percentage.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Tables
UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters
Registered UOCAVA Voters
All Uniformed Services Not Categorized by
State Overseas Citizens
UOCAVA Members Voter Type
Voters
Total % Total % Total %
Alabama 527 273 51.8% 254 48.2% 0 0.0%
Alaska 5,153 3,322 64.5% 1,831 35.5% 0 0.0%
American
16 16 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Samoa
Arizona 12,122 3,795 31.3% 8,327 68.7% 0 0.0%
Arkansas 1,327 774 58.3% 553 41.7% 0 0.0%
California 137,273 29,863 21.8% 107,242 78.1% 168 0.1%
Colorado 39,482 13,344 33.8% 26,138 66.2% 0 0.0%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Delaware 1,161 192 16.5% 969 83.5% 0 0.0%
District of
1,055 239 22.7% 816 77.3% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 182,506 123,227 67.5% 59,279 32.5% 0 0.0%
Georgia 7,494 2,457 32.8% 5,037 67.2% 0 0.0%
Guam 134 80 59.7% 54 40.3% 0 0.0%
Hawaii 809 59 7.3% 750 92.7% 0 0.0%
Idaho 347 102 29.4% 245 70.6% 0 0.0%
Illinois 3,881 830 21.4% 2,954 76.1% 97 2.5%
Indiana 21,718 10,400 47.9% 11,318 52.1% 0 0.0%
Iowa 1,920 367 19.1% 1,553 80.9% 0 0.0%
Kansas 2,070 411 19.9% 1,643 79.4% 16 0.8%
Kentucky 1,887 812 43.0% 1,075 57.0% 0 0.0%
Louisiana 1,783 792 44.4% 991 55.6% 0 0.0%
Maine 2,504 382 15.3% 2,122 84.7% 0 0.0%
Maryland 7,347 1,494 20.3% 5,853 79.7% 0 0.0%
Massachusetts 5,438 166 3.1% 5,272 96.9% 0 0.0%
Michigan 7,777 1,297 16.7% 6,480 83.3% 0 0.0%
Minnesota 5,329 1,084 20.3% 4,245 79.7% 0 0.0%
Mississippi 3,954 3,680 93.1% 275 7.0% -1 0.0%
Missouri [1] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Montana 2,737 1,192 43.6% 1,545 56.4% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 705 168 23.8% 537 76.2% 0 0.0%
Nevada 5,615 1,110 19.8% 4,505 80.2% 0 0.0%
New
2,158 597 27.7% 1,561 72.3% 0 0.0%
Hampshire
New Jersey 15,454 1,397 9.0% 14,057 91.0% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 2,082 659 31.7% 1,423 68.3% 0 0.0%
New York 36,600 3,961 10.8% 32,639 89.2% 0 0.0%
North Carolina 10,400 2,733 26.3% 7,667 73.7% 0 0.0%
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Registered UOCAVA Voters
All Uniformed Services Not Categorized by
State Overseas Citizens
UOCAVA Members Voter Type
Voters
Total % Total % Total %
North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Northern
Mariana -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Islands [2]
Ohio [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Oklahoma 6,888 4,372 63.5% 2,516 36.5% 0 0.0%
Oregon 16,257 4,383 27.0% 11,874 73.0% 0 0.0%
Pennsylvania 11,250 2,625 23.3% 8,625 76.7% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island 795 56 7.0% 739 93.0% 0 0.0%
South Carolina 2,362 784 33.2% 1,578 66.8% 0 0.0%
South Dakota 1,462 645 44.1% 817 55.9% 0 0.0%
Tennessee 2,912 1,443 49.6% 1,469 50.4% 0 0.0%
Texas 22,876 7,826 34.2% 13,277 58.0% 1,773 7.8%
U.S. Virgin
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
Islands [4]
Utah 4,398 1,261 28.7% 2,369 53.9% 768 17.5%
Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Virginia 11,570 3,723 32.2% 7,847 67.8% 0 0.0%
Washington 103,996 64,855 62.4% 39,141 37.6% 0 0.0%
West Virginia 438 180 41.1% 221 50.5% 37 8.4%
Wisconsin 20,904 14,203 67.9% 6,701 32.1% 0 0.0%
Wyoming 565 301 53.3% 264 46.7% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 737,438 317,932 43.1% 416,648 56.5% 2,858 0.4%
UOCAVA Table 1 Calculation Notes:
All UOCAVA Voters uses question B1a.
Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B1b.
Uniformed Services Members, % uses B1b/B1a x 100.
Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B1c.
Overseas Citizens, % uses B1c/B1a x 100.
Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B1a–(B1b+B1c).
Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B1a–[B1b + B1c])/B1a x 100.
UOCAVA Table 1 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
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[1] Missouri’s statewide voter registration system does not track UOCAVA registrations.
[2] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is
not available from this territory.
[3] Because Ohio permits UOCAVA voters to register by several means other than a FPCA or FWAB, this
state cannot accurately provide the actual number of UOCAVA voters.
[4] The U.S. Virgin Islands does not register voters based on UOCAVA status.
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UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)
FPCAs Received
Uniformed Services Not Categorized by Voter
Overseas Citizens
Members Type
State
Total
Total % Total % Total %
Alabama 482 227 47.1% 247 51.2% 8 1.7%
Alaska 430 200 46.5% 230 53.5% 0 0.0%
American
1 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Samoa
Arizona 5,752 1,755 30.5% 3,997 69.5% 0 0.0%
Arkansas 117 48 41.0% 69 59.0% 0 0.0%
California 66,176 10,858 16.4% 55,301 83.6% 17 0.0%
Colorado 5,988 774 12.9% 5,214 87.1% 0 0.0%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Delaware 1,161 192 16.5% 969 83.5% 0 0.0%
District of
682 74 10.9% 608 89.1% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 28,392 13,285 46.8% 15,107 53.2% 0 0.0%
Georgia 934 208 22.3% 726 77.7% 0 0.0%
Guam 18 11 61.1% 7 38.9% 0 0.0%
Hawaii 809 59 7.3% 750 92.7% 0 0.0%
Idaho 347 102 29.4% 245 70.6% 0 0.0%
Illinois 8,412 961 11.4% 1,389 16.5% 6,062 72.1%
Indiana 1,999 345 17.3% 1,654 82.7% 0 0.0%
Iowa [1] 1,558 -- -- -- -- 1,558 100.0%
Kansas 2,050 411 20.0% 1,643 80.1% -4 -0.2%
Kentucky 1,517 991 65.3% 526 34.7% 0 0.0%
Louisiana [2] 89 -- -- -- -- 89 100.0%
Maine [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Maryland 7,230 1,482 20.5% 5,748 79.5% 0 0.0%
Massachusetts 3,495 76 2.2% 3,419 97.8% 0 0.0%
Michigan 6,097 957 15.7% 5,140 84.3% 0 0.0%
Minnesota 5,331 1,079 20.2% 4,252 79.8% 0 0.0%
Mississippi 261 145 55.6% 116 44.4% 0 0.0%
Missouri [4] 498 -- -- -- -- 498 100.0%
Montana 1,531 667 43.6% 864 56.4% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 663 150 22.6% 513 77.4% 0 0.0%
Nevada 5,578 866 15.5% 4,712 84.5% 0 0.0%
New
2,158 597 27.7% 1,561 72.3% 0 0.0%
Hampshire
New Jersey 14,634 1,123 7.7% 13,511 92.3% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 1,795 486 27.1% 1,309 72.9% 0 0.0%
New York 66,830 6,513 9.7% 60,317 90.3% 0 0.0%
North Carolina 8,886 2,147 24.2% 6,739 75.8% 0 0.0%
North Dakota 35 3 8.6% 32 91.4% 0 0.0%
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FPCAs Received
Uniformed Services Not Categorized by Voter
Overseas Citizens
Members Type
State
Total
Total % Total % Total %
Northern
Mariana 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Islands [5]
Ohio 6,324 1,514 23.9% 4,810 76.1% 0 0.0%
Oklahoma 1,023 642 62.8% 381 37.2% 0 0.0%
Oregon [6] 429 -- -- -- -- 429 100.0%
Pennsylvania 10,013 2,007 20.0% 8,006 80.0% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island 795 56 7.0% 739 93.0% 0 0.0%
South Carolina
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
[7]
South Dakota 6 4 66.7% 2 33.3% 0 0.0%
Tennessee 2,545 1,223 48.1% 1,322 51.9% 0 0.0%
Texas 22,878 7,826 34.2% 13,277 58.0% 1,775 7.8%
U.S. Virgin
5 5 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Islands
Utah 1,026 160 15.6% 247 24.1% 619 60.3%
Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Virginia 9,715 2,774 28.6% 6,941 71.4% 0 0.0%
Washington 1,656 335 20.2% 1,321 79.8% 0 0.0%
West Virginia 324 135 41.7% 189 58.3% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [8] 1,007 71 7.1% 936 92.9% 0 0.0%
Wyoming 185 112 60.5% 73 39.5% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 309,867 63,657 20.7% 235,159 76.5% 11,051 3.6%
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FPCAs Rejected
Uniformed Services Not Categorized by Voter
Overseas Citizens
Members Type
State % of
Total FPCAs % of % of
Received Received Received % of Total
Total from Total from Total FPCAs
Uniformed Overseas Rejected
Services Citizens
Alabama 17 3.5% 4 1.8% 11 4.5% 2 11.8%
Alaska 21 4.9% 11 5.5% 10 4.3% 0 0.0%
American
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 -- 0 --
Samoa
Arizona 6 0.1% 0 0.0% 6 0.2% 0 0.0%
Arkansas 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
California 2,216 3.3% 728 6.7% 1,486 2.7% 2 0.1%
Colorado 44 0.7% 7 0.9% 37 0.7% 0 0.0%
Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Delaware 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
District of
33 4.8% 4 5.4% 29 4.8% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 587 2.1% 438 3.3% 143 0.9% 6 1.0%
Georgia 87 9.3% 12 5.8% 75 10.3% 0 0.0%
Guam 2 11.1% 0 0.0% 2 28.6% 0 0.0%
Hawaii 5 0.6% 1 1.7% 4 0.5% 0 0.0%
Idaho 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
Illinois 43 0.5% 13 1.4% 28 2.0% 2 4.7%
Indiana 25 1.3% 7 2.0% 18 1.1% 0 0.0%
Iowa [1] 0 0.0% 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Kansas 11 0.5% 3 0.7% 8 0.5% 0 0.0%
Kentucky 12 0.8% 2 0.2% 10 1.9% 0 0.0%
Louisiana [2] 2 2.2% -- -- -- -- 2 100.0%
Maine [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Maryland 19 0.3% 5 0.3% 14 0.2% 0 0.0%
Massachusetts 9 0.3% 0 0.0% 9 0.3% 0 0.0%
Michigan 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
Minnesota 58 1.1% 17 1.6% 41 1.0% 0 0.0%
Mississippi 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
Missouri [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Montana 6 0.4% 0 0.0% 6 0.7% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 20 3.0% 4 2.7% 16 3.1% 0 0.0%
Nevada 473 8.5% 1 0.1% 472 10.0% 0 0.0%
New
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
Hampshire
New Jersey 4 0.0% 1 0.1% 3 0.0% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 9 0.5% 6 1.2% 3 0.2% 0 0.0%
New York -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
North Carolina 45 0.5% 14 0.7% 31 0.5% 0 0.0%
North Dakota 20 57.1% 0 0.0% 20 62.5% 0 0.0%
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FPCAs Rejected
Uniformed Services Not Categorized by Voter
Overseas Citizens
Members Type
State % of
Total FPCAs % of % of
Received Received Received % of Total
Total from Total from Total FPCAs
Uniformed Overseas Rejected
Services Citizens
Northern
Mariana 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --
Islands [5]
Ohio 77 1.2% 22 1.5% 55 1.1% 0 0.0%
Oklahoma 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
Oregon [6] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Pennsylvania 21 0.2% 1 0.0% 20 0.2% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island 8 1.0% 1 1.8% 7 0.9% 0 0.0%
South Carolina
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
[7]
South Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
Tennessee 56 2.2% 37 3.0% 19 1.4% 0 0.0%
Texas 639 2.8% 147 1.9% 459 3.5% 33 5.2%
U.S. Virgin
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 -- 0 --
Islands
Utah 8 0.8% 0 0.0% 5 2.0% 3 37.5%
Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Virginia 5 0.1% 3 0.1% 2 0.0% 0 0.0%
Washington 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --
West Virginia 5 1.5% 1 0.7% 4 2.1% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [8] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wyoming 3 1.6% 3 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
U.S. Total 4,596 1.9% 1,493 2.6% 3,053 1.8% 50 1.1%
UOCAVA Table 2 Calculation Notes:
FPCAs Received, Total uses question B2a.
FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B2b.
FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, % uses B2b/B2a x 100.
FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B2c.
FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, % uses B2c/B2a x 100.
FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B2a–(B2b+B2c).
FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B2a–[B2b+B2c])/B2a x 100.
FPCAs Rejected, Total uses question B3a.
FPCAs Rejected, % of FPCAs Received uses B3a/B2a x 100.
FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B3b.
FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, % of Received from Uniformed Services uses
B3b/B2b x 100.
FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B3c.
FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, % of Received from Overseas Citizens uses B3c/B2c x 100.
FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B3a–(B3b+B3c).
FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % of Total FPCAs Rejected uses (B3a–[B3b+B3c])/B3a
x 100.
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UOCAVA Table 2 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from the states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FPCAs received or rejected categories indicate that
the sum of FPCAs for uniformed services members and overseas citizens in that category
account for more than the total number of FPCAs reported by the state in the corresponding
category.
[1] Data on FPCAs by type of UOCAVA voter is not tracked.
[2] The Department of State only collects data for totals, not for the breakdowns by type of UOCAVA
voter.
[3] Maine does not distinguish FPCAs from other registration forms.
[4] Missouri’s statewide voter registration system does not track data on UOCAVA voter type (uniformed
services vs. overseas citizen).
[5] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is
not available from this territory.
[6] Oregon does not track data on UOCAVA voter type.
[7] Data were not available to break down the type of applications for UOCAVA voters.
[8] Data on rejected FPCAs and rejected absentee applications is not tracked.
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UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted, and Rejected
UOCAVA UOCAVA UOCAVA Ballots Counted UOCAVA Ballots Rejected
State Ballots Ballots
Transmitted Returned Total % of Returned Total % of Returned
Alabama 710 494 477 96.6% 10 2.0%
Alaska [1] 5,092 3,914 3,814 97.4% 100 2.6%
American Samoa 25 16 16 100.0% 0 0.0%
Arizona 12,104 6,979 6,913 99.1% 66 0.9%
Arkansas 1,304 473 426 90.1% 35 7.4%
California [2] 132,855 34,054 31,774 93.3% 2,280 6.7%
Colorado 38,736 14,289 13,426 94.0% 863 6.0%
Connecticut 2,580 1,056 1,016 96.2% 40 3.8%
Delaware 1,161 581 539 92.8% 42 7.2%
District of
730 469 464 98.9% 5 1.1%
Columbia [3]
Florida 102,010 40,901 38,987 95.3% 1,849 4.5%
Georgia 7,482 5,194 4,913 94.6% 281 5.4%
Guam [4] 134 85 79 92.9% 6 7.1%
Hawaii 816 496 491 99.0% 5 1.0%
Idaho [5] 343 317 316 99.7% 1 0.3%
Illinois 3,370 2,729 2,776 101.7% 18 0.7%
Indiana 2,476 2,033 2,012 99.0% 22 1.1%
Iowa [6] 1,916 1,452 1,401 96.5% 53 3.7%
Kansas 2,054 1,684 1,678 99.6% 6 0.4%
Kentucky 1,390 893 830 92.9% 63 7.1%
Louisiana [7] 1,795 848 764 90.1% 84 9.9%
Maine 2,516 1,739 1,734 99.7% 5 0.3%
Maryland 7,603 4,763 4,551 95.5% 212 4.5%
Massachusetts 5,286 4,229 4,204 99.4% 25 0.6%
Michigan 7,994 5,869 5,727 97.6% 142 2.4%
Minnesota [8] 5,373 3,421 3,105 90.8% 316 9.2%
Mississippi 261 211 211 100.0% 0 0.0%
Missouri 3,615 1,886 1,837 97.4% 49 2.6%
Montana [9] 2,741 1,790 1,768 98.8% 22 1.2%
Nebraska 692 552 538 97.5% 14 2.5%
Nevada 6,188 3,442 3,388 98.4% 54 1.6%
New Hampshire 2,158 1,789 1,668 93.2% 121 6.8%
New Jersey 10,146 2,925 2,849 97.4% 76 2.6%
New Mexico 2,086 1,558 1,558 100.0% 0 0.0%
New York [10] 65,275 22,664 22,391 98.8% 715 3.2%
North Carolina 10,277 8,449 8,390 99.3% 59 0.7%
North Dakota 433 363 343 94.5% 20 5.5%
Northern Mariana
-- -- -- -- -- --
Islands [11]
Ohio 7,148 5,323 5,238 98.4% 85 1.6%
Oklahoma 7,035 1,604 1,545 96.3% 59 3.7%
Oregon [12] 16,257 6,962 6,830 98.1% 132 1.9%
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UOCAVA UOCAVA UOCAVA Ballots Counted UOCAVA Ballots Rejected
State Ballots Ballots
Transmitted Returned Total % of Returned Total % of Returned
Pennsylvania 11,593 8,416 8,069 95.9% 347 4.1%
Rhode Island [13] 630 -- -- -- -- --
South Carolina
2,356 1,991 1,983 99.6% 8 0.4%
[14]
South Dakota 985 757 718 94.8% 39 5.2%
Tennessee 2,912 2,074 1,935 93.3% 139 6.7%
Texas 21,644 13,867 13,228 95.4% 654 4.7%
U.S. Virgin Islands 10 0 0 -- 0 --
Utah 4,495 2,064 2,043 99.0% 284 13.8%
Vermont 935 543 534 98.3% 19 3.5%
Virginia 11,491 6,968 6,755 96.9% 57 0.8%
Washington 108,585 27,125 26,579 98.0% 546 2.0%
West Virginia [15] 434 287 431 150.2% 6 2.1%
Wisconsin 6,003 4,444 4,048 91.1% 396 8.9%
Wyoming [16] 546 371 347 93.5% 26 7.0%
U.S. Total 654,786 267,403 257,657 96.4% 10,456 3.9%
UOCAVA Table 3 Calculation Notes:
UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted uses question B5a.
UOCAVA Ballots Returned uses question B9a.
UOCAVA Ballots Counted, Total uses question B14a.
UOCAVA Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses B14a/B9a x 100.
UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, Total uses question B18a.
UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses B18a/B9a x 100.
UOCAVA Table 3 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
[1] Alaska does not track data on the method by which UOCAVA ballots are returned. All ballots sent to
voters by mail can only be returned by mail, and all electronic transmission (online or fax) ballots sent
to voters may either be returned by mail or by fax. The largest number of election transmission
(online or fax) ballots sent to voters are returned by mail.
[2] Some California counties accept UOCAVA ballots by fax.
[3] For the 2022 general election, the District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) transmitted
ballots only to active UOCAVA voters.
[4] Guam law allows UOCAVA ballots to be transmitted to voters via email; however, these ballots must
be returned via air mail.
[5] Idaho was not able to track data on rejected UOCAVA ballots and FWABs.
[6] Data on FWABs is not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.
[7] Registrars may transmit multiple ballots to a single voter in some circumstances (i.e., the voter did
not receive the original ballot or the original ballot is returned to the registrar as undeliverable).
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[8] Minnesota only accepts UOCAVA ballots returned via mail.
[9] The number of UOCAVA ballots issued may exceed the number of registered UOCAVA voters due to
replacement ballots being issued.
[10] There are circumstances under which a UOCAVA voter registered in New York may have been
transmitted more than one ballot or may return more than one ballot (for instance, some county
boards mail a ballot to every UOCAVA voter, regardless of their transmission preference, so voters
who already received their ballot electronically, completed, and returned it may subsequently receive
a physical ballot in the mail). Additional data collected by New York State Board of Elections has
shown that more than 1,700 UOCAVA voters returned multiple ballots, although the data does not
report how many ballots each of these voters returned.
[11] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is
not available from this territory.
[12] Oregon statute requires ballots to be mailed to voters.
[13] According to Rhode Island general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail
ballot category.
[14] Data on FWABs are not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots. The
number of UOCAVA ballots reported as counted are ballots that were received before the deadline,
and the number of UOCAVA ballots reported as rejected are ballots that were returned after the
deadline. No data are available on UOCAVA ballots that may have been challenged or were not
counted for other reasons.
[15] West Virginia reports a UOCAVA ballot count rate of more than 100% primarily because two
counties did not report data on ballots returned but reported data on ballots counted.
[16] UOCAVA ballots must be returned by mail.
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UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB)
FWABs Rejected Because a
FWABs Counted Valid Ballot Was Accepted and
Total FWABs Counted
State Received
% of Total % of Total
Total Total
Received Received
Alabama 7 4 57.1% 0 0.0%
Alaska [1] 24 3 12.5% 4 16.7%
American
0 0 -- 0 --
Samoa
Arizona 224 208 92.9% 12 5.4%
Arkansas 22 17 77.3% 1 4.5%
California 189 171 90.5% 0 0.0%
Colorado 0 0 -- 0 --
Connecticut -- -- -- -- --
Delaware 0 0 -- 0 --
District of
14 14 100.0% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 204 134 65.7% 25 12.3%
Georgia [2] -- -- -- -- --
Guam 0 0 -- 0 --
Hawaii 0 0 -- 0 --
Idaho [3] 0 0 -- 0 --
Illinois 70 61 87.1% 9 12.9%
Indiana 168 148 88.1% 1 0.6%
Iowa -- -- -- -- --
Kansas 17 16 94.1% 1 5.9%
Kentucky [4] 8 -- -- -- --
Louisiana [5] 0 0 -- -- --
Maine 15 15 100.0% 0 0.0%
Maryland 63 35 55.6% 6 9.5%
Massachusetts 150 147 98.0% 0 0.0%
Michigan [6] 126 84 66.7% 41 32.5%
Minnesota 38 26 68.4% 1 2.6%
Mississippi [7] -- -- -- -- --
Missouri 40 40 100.0% 0 0.0%
Montana 3 3 100.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 12 10 83.3% 0 0.0%
Nevada 21 19 90.5% 0 0.0%
New Hampshire 17 16 94.1% 0 0.0%
New Jersey [8] 1,442 1,429 99.1% -- --
New Mexico 0 0 -- 0 --
New York 240 169 70.4% 14 5.8%
North Carolina 120 119 99.2% -- --
North Dakota 3 2 66.7% 0 0.0%
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FWABs Rejected Because a
FWABs Counted Valid Ballot Was Accepted and
Total FWABs Counted
State Received
% of Total % of Total
Total Total
Received Received
Northern
Mariana -- -- -- -- --
Islands [9]
Ohio 251 216 86.1% 6 2.4%
Oklahoma 9 9 100.0% 0 0.0%
Oregon [10] -- -- -- -- --
Pennsylvania 90 89 98.9% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island
-- -- -- -- --
[11]
South Carolina
-- -- -- -- --
[12]
South Dakota 0 0 -- 0 --
Tennessee 17 2 11.8% 5 29.4%
Texas 269 51 19.0% 29 10.8%
U.S. Virgin
0 0 -- 0 --
Islands
Utah 21 19 90.5% 1 4.8%
Vermont -- -- -- -- --
Virginia [13] 68 53 77.9% -- --
Washington 110 107 97.3% 0 0.0%
West Virginia 4 4 100.0% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [14] 13 7 53.8% 3 23.1%
Wyoming 0 0 -- 0 --
U.S. Total 4,089 3,447 84.5% 159 6.5%
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FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons FWABs Not Categorized
State % of Total % of Total
Total Total
Received Received
Alabama 3 42.9% 0 0.0%
Alaska [1] 17 70.8% 0 0.0%
American Samoa 0 -- 0 --
Arizona 4 1.8% 0 0.0%
Arkansas 5 22.7% -1 -4.5%
California 21 11.1% -3 -1.6%
Colorado 0 -- 0 --
Connecticut -- -- -- --
Delaware 0 -- 0 --
District of
0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Columbia
Florida 45 22.1% 0 0.0%
Georgia [2] -- -- -- --
Guam 0 -- 0 --
Hawaii 0 -- 0 --
Idaho [3] 0 -- 0 --
Illinois 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Indiana 7 4.2% 12 7.1%
Iowa -- -- -- --
Kansas 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Kentucky [4] -- -- 8 100.0%
Louisiana [5] 0 -- 0 --
Maine 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Maryland 22 34.9% 0 0.0%
Massachusetts 3 2.0% 0 0.0%
Michigan [6] 1 0.8% 0 0.0%
Minnesota 11 28.9% 0 0.0%
Mississippi [7] -- -- -- --
Missouri 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 2 16.7% 0 0.0%
Nevada 2 9.5% 0 0.0%
New Hampshire 1 5.9% 0 0.0%
New Jersey [8] 13 0.9% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 0 -- 0 --
New York 87 36.3% -30 -12.5%
North Carolina 1 0.8% 0 0.0%
North Dakota 0 0.0% 1 33.3%
Northern Mariana
-- -- -- --
Islands [9]
Ohio 29 11.6% 0 0.0%
Oklahoma 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Oregon [10] -- -- -- --
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FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons FWABs Not Categorized
State % of Total % of Total
Total Total
Received Received
Pennsylvania 1 1.1% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island [11] -- -- -- --
South Carolina
-- -- -- --
[12]
South Dakota 0 -- 0 --
Tennessee 10 58.8% 0 0.0%
Texas 189 70.3% 0 0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands 0 -- 0 --
Utah 1 4.8% 0 0.0%
Vermont -- -- -- --
Virginia [13] 15 22.1% 0 0.0%
Washington 3 2.7% 0 0.0%
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin [14] 3 23.1% 0 0.0%
Wyoming 0 -- 0 --
U.S. Total 496 12.2% -13 -0.3%
UOCAVA Table 4 Calculation Notes:
Total FWABs Received uses question B23a.
FWABs Counted, Total uses question B24a.
FWABs Counted, % of Total Received uses B24a/B23a x 100.
FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, Total uses question B26a.
FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, % of Total Received uses
B26a/B23a x 100.
FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, Total uses the sum of questions B25a and B27a.
FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, % of Total Received uses (B25a+B27a)/B23a x 100.
FWABs Not Categorized, Total uses B23a–(B24a+B25a+B26a+B27a).
FWABs Not Categorized, % of Total Received uses (B23a–[B24a+B25a+B26a+B27a])/B23a x 100.
UOCAVA Table 4 Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The
percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that
provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FWABs category indicate that the sum of counted
and rejected FWABs accounted for more than the total number of FWABs received as reported
by the state.
• The EAVS tracks data on FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the ballot
receipt deadline (B25), because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received and counted
(B26), and for other reasons (B27).
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[1] The data reported in B25 of the 2022 EAVS reflects FWABs received after the deadline to apply for
an absentee ballot by mail or by electronic transmission (online or fax).
[2] Data on accepted and rejected FWABs cannot be reported separately from regular UOCAVA ballots.
[3] Idaho was not able to track data on rejected UOCAVA ballots and FWABs.
[4] Data on the reasons that FWABs were rejected was not tracked.
[5] The Department of State does not track data on FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was
accepted and counted.
[6] All FWABs received were either counted, rejected because the voter’s regular ballot was received, or
rejected for arriving late.
[7] FWABs are not recorded separately from UOCAVA ballots in the Statewide Election Management
System (SEMS).
[8] Rejection because a valid ballot was accepted and counted is not a recorded rejection reason.
[9] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is
not available from this territory.
[10] Oregon does not track data on FWABs separately from regular UOCAVA ballots.
[11] According to Rhode Island general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail
ballot category.
[12] Data on FWABs is not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.
[13] Virginia does not have a way to track FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was accepted and
counted.
[14] In Wisconsin, many jurisdictions track the return of ballots received after Election Day, but they are
not required to do so. The counts reported in B25a (total number of FWABs rejected because they
were received after the ballot receipt deadline) are limited to ballots in jurisdictions that recorded
these in the statewide database.
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Chapter 5. Survey Methodology
Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The project
collects data on election policies, voter registration, voting by individuals covered by the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), mail voting, in-person voting, poll
workers and polling places, provisional voting, election technology, and turnout. Data from all U.S.
states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are included in the EAVS.1 The EAVS helps the
EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national
clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and the review of procedures with
respect to the administration of federal elections.
The EAVS collectively consists of two surveys administered separately. The 2022 Election
Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), which collected data on state election policies and
procedures, was administered from August 2022 to January 2023. The information collected
through the Policy Survey helps provide context to the data reported through the EAVS. The 2022
EAVS, which collected data on registrations, voters, and ballots during the 2022 general election,
was administered from November 2022 to March 2023. The data collected through the EAVS
allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established by the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA and provide a detailed snapshot of how general elections
are administered in the United States every two years.
This report relies on EAVS and Policy Survey data submitted and certified by 50 states, the District
of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. Data for each state were collected at the jurisdiction level,
with 100% of the 6,460 jurisdictions nationwide submitting at least partial data in 2022.2
Appendix A of this chapter shows the number of jurisdictions and the response rate by state
(overall and for each section of the EAVS).
1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50
U.S. states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS
data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for
federal candidates in midterm election years; thus, Puerto Rico completed the 2022 Policy Survey but not
the 2022 EAVS. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands
participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.
2 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For
the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for
Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction.
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to
counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city,
town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on
the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction,
because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but
most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state.
Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as
a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.
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Survey Questions
The 2022 Policy Survey consisted of 96 questions (38 required questions, 37 follow-up questions
based on a state’s responses to the required questions, and 21 optional comments boxes). Of
these, 70 were single-select or multi-select questions, 25 were open-ended with a text response,
and one was a hybrid single-select and text question.
The 2022 EAVS consisted of 424 questions (242 required, 59 follow-up questions based on a
jurisdiction’s responses to the required questions, 83 optional questions based on whether a
jurisdiction had additional data to provide, one required comment box, and 39 optional
comments boxes). Of these questions, 269 were fill-in-the-blank with a numerical response, 40
were item descriptions, 63 were single-select questions, and 52 were open-ended with a text
response.
The content of the questions in the EAVS has largely been unchanged since the 2008 survey,
although questions are periodically removed, updated, or reordered. Beginning in 2018, the
Policy Survey replaced the previous Statutory Overview with a set of primarily closed-ended
questions on states’ election policies. The full set of EAVS and Policy Survey questions can be
found at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.
The following sections detail the data collected by these surveys and the changes that were made
to the survey questionnaires from the 2020 versions. In 2022, the primary changes to the survey
questions involved:
o Adding Policy Survey questions that could be used to validate EAVS items.
o Adding Policy Survey and EAVS questions to gather data on new topics that had previously
not been collected.
o Clarifying instructions to make completion easier for election officials and to improve data
quality.
Policy Survey
Since 2008, the EAVS has been accompanied by a survey that collects information on states’
election policies and practices to provide greater context for the jurisdiction-level data collected
through the EAVS. This originally took the form of the Statutory Overview, which consisted of open-
ended questions on statutory requirements for various parts of the election process, asking
states to report information on their election laws and policies. However, the open-ended format
made it difficult to interpret states’ statutory language, identify patterns in election practices, and
draw meaningful comparisons between states.
Beginning with the 2018 EAVS, the Statutory Overview was significantly redesigned and renamed
the Policy Survey. The survey now uses closed-ended questions and is intended to capture states’
broad policies rather than to represent a comprehensive overview of state statutory language.
This allows for greater ease in interpreting the results, creating comparisons across states, and
providing context in understanding the EAVS data. The Policy Survey questions are designed to
map onto the EAVS data questions so that the two surveys can be used in concert.
The 2022 Policy Survey collected information on how the state answers the EAVS; voter
registration and list maintenance; election technology; mail voting; in-person voting; UOCAVA
voting; provisional voting; election certification, recounts, and audits; voter identification; and how
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criminal convictions affect voting. Questions that were added to the Policy Survey for 2022
included:
New Question
Description
for 2022
Q9a When voter pre-registration forms are processed
Whether the state’s definitions of active and inactive voters match the NVRA
Q10a
definitions
Q19 Whether state used drop boxes for the 2022 general election
Q19a Where drop boxes were located
Q19b How often ballots were collected from drop boxes
Q19c Dates and times that drop boxes were available to voters
Q19d Drop box security measures
Q20 Whether state allowed voters to cure mail ballots
Q20a Types of mail ballot errors that voters could cure
Q20b Deadline for voters to cure mail ballots
Q24a Terminology state uses for accessible absentee voting
Q24b How voters participating in accessible absentee voting receive their ballots
Whether a witness must be present when a voter completes their accessible
Q24c
absentee ballot
Q25b Length of in-person voting period before Election Day
Q27 UOCAVA ballot transmission methods
Q28 UOCAVA ballot return methods
What person or persons are responsible for reviewing provisional ballots within the
Q33d
state
Whether provisional ballot eligibility reviewers are the same as those who count
Q33e
provisional ballots
Q35a How recounts are conducted
Whether state will conduct different types of auditing activities either before or after
Q36
the election
Q37a Whether state requires photo identification for in-person voters
Q37b How voter proves their identity if they do not have acceptable identification
What happens to the registration record of a person whose voting rights are limited
Q38b
due to criminal conviction or incarceration
Questions that were significantly revised from the 2020 Policy Survey included:
Significantly Revised
Description
for 2022
Q5 Types of automatic voter registrations provided to voters in the state
Q8 Whether the state offers same-day voter registration (SDR)
Q8a Circumstances under which voters may use SDR in the state
Q12a Which groups of voters are sent confirmation of registration notices
Q17 Whether all-mail elections are conducted within the state
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Significantly Revised
Description
for 2022
Whether all-mail elections are conducted statewide or only in certain
Q17a
jurisdictions
Q18 Whether state allows permanent absentee voting
Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for domestic civilian
Q21
(non-UOCAVA) voters
Terminology the state uses to refer to in-person voting that takes place before
Q25
Election Day
Q26 Whether the state uses vote centers
Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for domestic military
Q30
UOCAVA voters
Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for overseas UOCAVA
Q31
voters
Q33a Under what circumstances the state issues provisional ballots to voters
Q33b Deadline for adjudicating provisional ballots
Q34 Deadline for certifying the 2022 general election
Q35 Reasons the state may conduct a post-election recount of ballots
Q36a Statutory requirements for post-election tabulation audits
Q36c Type of post-election tabulation audit conducted
Whether the state requires non–first time in-person voters to present
Q37
identification
Deadline for the voter to provide identification if the voter does not have
Q37c
identification at the voting location
Which groups of voters may become ineligible to vote due to criminal conviction
Q38
or incarceration
How long individuals lose the right to vote due to criminal conviction or
Q38a
incarceration
The following questions had no change except for renumbering and, for some, the addition of a
comment section and/or option for a response of “Does not apply”:
2022 2020
Description
Numbering Numbering
Q1 Q3 How states answer the six sections of the EAVS
Whether the state experienced a change in its EAVS reporting
Q2 Q2b
jurisdiction list since the 2020 EAVS
Q3 Q4 Type of state voter registration database
Frequency of data transmission for states with a bottom-up or hybrid
Q3a Q4a
database
Government agencies that the state’s voter registration database
Q4 Q5
conducts data transfers with and the frequency of the data transfers
Government agencies that participate in the state’s automatic voter
Q5a Q6a
registration program
Q6 Q7 Whether the state offers online voter registration
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2022 2020
Description
Numbering Numbering
Whether registrants need a state-issued identification in order to
Q6a Q7a
register to vote online
Voter information lookup tools available on the state’s election
Q7 Q8
website
Whether the state offers pre-registration to persons under the age of
Q9 Q10
18
Whether the state distinguishes between active and inactive voters
Q10 Q11
in its voter registration database
Whether state and/or local election officials are responsible for
Q11 Q12
modifying voter registration records
Q12 Q13 Whether the state sends confirmation of registration notices
Q13 Q14 Data sources used to identify potentially ineligible registered voters
Whether the state’s voting system testing and certification is
Q14 Q15
required
Q14a Q15a Type of voting system testing and certification conducted
Q15 Q16 Whether electronic poll books are used in the state
Whether electronic poll books are required to be tested and certified
Q15a Q16a
before purchase
Whether voters are required to provide a valid excuse in order to
Q16 Q17
vote by mail
Q18a Q19a What groups of voters may register as permanent absentee voters
Q22 Q21 How long past the ballot receipt deadline mail ballots are tracked
Q23 Q22 Postmark requirements for mail ballots from domestic civilian voters
Circumstances under which non-UOCAVA voters may receive their
Q24 Q23
ballots electronically
Whether voters are required to provide a valid excuse in order to
Q25a Q24a
vote in-person before Election Day
Whether vote centers are used statewide or only in certain
Q26a Q25a
jurisdictions
Q29 Q28 How long the FPCA remains valid as a ballot request mechanism
Whether UOCAVA ballots have different postmark requirements than
Q32 Q31
mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters
Q33 Q32 Whether the state uses provisional ballots
How a state would adjudicate a provisional ballot cast in the wrong
Q33c Q32c
precinct
How the voting rights of individuals are restored when they are re-
Q38c Q37b eligible to vote after being made ineligible due to criminal conviction
or incarceration
The 2020 Policy Survey questions on election office infrastructure, how and when voters decline
to be registered under automatic voter registration (if available in the voter’s state), features of a
state’s online registration system, actions that can move an active registered voter to the inactive
registration list, actions that can move an inactive voter to the active registration list, modes by
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which UOCAVA voters can submit FPCAs, and the length of FPCA registration were removed for
2022.
Section A: Voter Registration
Section A of the EAVS collects data on voter registration. This includes the number of persons
registered and eligible to vote in the November 2022 general election, active and inactive voters,
voters who used SDR, registration forms processed between the close of registration for the 2020
general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election, confirmation notices
sent, and voters removed from the voter registration rolls.
In 2022, changes made to this section included updating the definition of “same-day registration”
(SDR) to match the revised definition from the Policy Survey and clarifying that both new and
updated registrations received through SDR should be reported in question A2 of the EAVS;
adding a definition of “confirmation notice” to the instructions of question A8 and specifying that
confirmation notices not sent directly pursuant to the NVRA should be reported in this question;
clarifying the instructions for questions A8d and A8e, changing the terminology used in question
A8e from “status unknown” to “unreturned confirmation notices”; and clarifying that voters
removed from the list of registered voters should be included in the data reported in question A9.
The EAC plans to make additional changes to Section A of the 2024 EAVS. The proposed
questions and an explanation of the reasoning for these changes can be found in the “Planned
Changes to 2024 EAVS” report at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-
and-surveys.
Section B: UOCAVA
Section B of the EAVS collects data on voters covered by UOCAVA. This includes the number of
registered UOCAVA voters; FPCAs received and rejected; UOCAVA ballots transmitted, returned,
counted, and rejected; and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) received, counted, and
rejected. Most questions in Section B were divided by type of voter (uniformed services members
and overseas citizens) and by method of ballot transmission and return (postal mail, email, and
other).
In 2014, the UOCAVA section of the EAVS was expanded to include questions from the Federal
Voting Assistance Program’s (FVAP) Post-Election Quantitative Survey. The goal of combining
surveys was to reduce the burden on election officials by asking them to answer a single set of
questions about UOCAVA voting rather than responding to two surveys that captured many of the
same data points. The current format of Section B is the result of a memorandum of
understanding between the EAC and FVAP that allows both agencies to collect, share, and
evaluate data on the voting experiences of citizens covered under UOCAVA and to fulfill their
congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voters.
In 2022, changes made to this section included modifying the language about ballot requests
that originated from rejected FPCAs in question B3; removing language about eligibility for a
federal-only ballot from B4; clarifying in the instructions for questions B5–B8 and B9–B13 that
data on duplicate UOCAVA ballot transmissions and returns, respectively, should be reported in
these questions; and clarifying in the instructions of question B21 that states should report
“Does not apply” as their responses for B21a–c if the state does not reject UOCAVA ballots for
lacking a postmark.
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Section C: Mail Voting
Section C of the EAVS collects data on mail voting. This includes the number of mailed ballots
transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; the number of ballots sent to permanent mail
voters; the number of mail ballot drop boxes and the number of mail ballots returned at drop
boxes; and the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured by voters.
In 2022, the title of this section was updated from “Domestic Civilian By-Mail Voting” to “Mail
Voting,” and the terminology throughout this section was standardized from “by-mail voting” to
“mail voting.” This change reflects the terminology that is most commonly in use among election
offices. The instructions for Section C were updated to include a definition of mail voting and to
clarify that any voter who voted with a UOCAVA absentee ballot should be reported in Section B
instead of Section C and that duplicate mail ballot transmissions and returns should be reported
in the data for Section C.
Several of the questions within this section were also revised. For question C1b, the instructions
were updated to state that mail ballots that went through the cure process should be reported
with other mail ballots that were returned by voters. For C1d, the instructions were updated to
specify that mail ballots that were voided so a replacement ballot could be sent should be
reported in this item. For C1f, the terminology was updated from “status unknown” to “unreturned
mail ballots.” For C2a, the definition of “permanent absentee voting” was updated to reflect the
definition used in the Policy Survey. Several new questions were added to this section to collect
data on the total number of drop boxes used (C3a), the number of drop boxes used on Election
Day (C4a–c), the number of drop boxes used during in-person voting before Election Day (C5a–c),
the number of mail ballots returned at drop boxes (C6a), and the number of mail ballots that were
successfully cured (C7a). This caused the renumbering of the subsequent questions in this
section that collected data on mail ballots returned and counted (C8) and rejected (C9). In
addition, question C9 saw the reasons for mail ballot rejections revised, including eliminating one
sub-question, adding additional reasons for rejection, and rewording some of the rejection
reasons.
Section D: In-Person Polling Operations
Section D of the EAVS collects data on in-person polling operations. This includes the number of
precincts and polling places, the number of poll workers and the level of difficulty involved in
recruiting poll workers, and the number of poll workers who served for the first time in the 2022
general election.
In 2022, the title of this section was updated from “In-Person Voting and Polling Operations” to
“In-Person Polling Operations” to better reflect the scope of the questions. A question on the total
number of in-person voters that had been present in previous surveys was removed from the
2022 survey, as it was redundant with data collected in Section F. In its place, a question on the
total number of physical polling places was added as question D2a. In the questions related to
poll workers (D5–D9), the instructions were clarified to state that office staff who served as poll
workers should be reported in the data for these questions, and instructions were added that
respondents should report the total number of poll workers who served for the election in D7a
even if they were unable to provide an age breakdown for poll workers in questions D7b–g. Lastly,
the comment for question D8 was made a required item and a new item was added in D9 to
collect data on the total number of new poll workers.
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Section E: Provisional Ballots
Section E of the EAVS collects data on provisional voting, including provisional ballots submitted,
provisional ballot adjudication, the reasons provisional ballots were cast, and reasons for
rejection of provisional ballots.
In 2022, changes made to this section include the addition of a question to collect data on the
number of provisional ballots cast according to the reason why the ballot was cast (E2). This
caused the question on reasons for rejecting provisional ballots to be renumbered as E3.
Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies
Section F of the EAVS collects data on voter participation and election technologies. This includes
total participation in the 2022 general election, how many ballots were cast and counted by mode
of participation, the source of participation data, use of electronic and paper poll books, voting
equipment used, and the location where votes were tallied. Respondents were also invited to
share general comments regarding their state or jurisdiction’s Election Day experiences,
noteworthy successes, and challenges they overcame in administering the November 2022
general election.
In 2022, questions F1 and F10 were updated to use the terminology “mail ballot” to match
changes made in Section C of the survey. Question F2 was updated to a multi-select question so
that respondents could report multiple sources for their voter participation data in F1. Questions
F3 and F4 had options added for respondents to report the use of electronic and paper poll books
to assist with same-day registration and checking voters’ mail ballot status at the polling place.
Two questions that collected data on punch card and lever voting machines in previous years
were removed from the survey, as no jurisdiction in the United States had reported using these
types of voting equipment in several election cycles. This removal caused the subsequent
questions in Section F to be renumbered.
Data Collection Procedures
In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the EAC submitted the questions for
the 2022 Policy Survey and the EAVS for review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and for public comment. Public comments were collected from November 21, 2021, to January
28, 2022, and from March 3, 2022, to April 4, 2022. The questions were approved under OMB
Control No. 3265-0006, expiration date April 30, 2025. The survey questions were made
available publicly on the EAC’s website on April 21, 2022. Targeted communications with state
points of contact (POC) responsible for completing the surveys began on July 8, 2022 and
continued regularly throughout the data collection period. These targeted communications aimed
to keep states aware of data collection deadlines and resources available to assist them with
completing the survey.
The following sections describe each aspect of the EAVS data collection process in more detail.
Needs Assessment
To better understand how state-level officials respond to the EAVS and where they need support,
the EAC undertook a systematic assessment of the needs of EAVS POCs in September and
October of 2021. The goal of these interviews was to better understand each state’s EAVS
reporting process (including how data are collected, which templates are used, the state’s use of
technical assistance resources, and data quality) and how improvements could be made to the
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2022 EAVS. All state POCs that completed the 2020 EAVS were invited to participate and
interviews with personnel from 27 states were completed. The EAC created semi-structured
interview guides for each participant that also left room for the interviewer to probe further.
During these needs assessment calls, the EAC also encouraged state POCs to review and provide
comments on the draft 2022 survey questions when they were available for public comment.
The information collected through these needs assessment conversations helped the EAC’s
outreach plan design, shaped the training opportunities provided to each state, and identified
states that needed specialized support to complete the EAVS. Based on these conversations, the
EAC implemented the following changes:
o Made improvements to the design and usability of the data collection templates,
o Added supplementary instructions to clarify how respondents were to use the missing data
codes in the survey,
o Introduced additional levels of data review for the 2022 EAVS and Policy Survey to assist
state POCs in better understanding how their data would be reported, and
o Created an online feedback survey to be administered directly after a state finalized and
certified its 2022 EAVS data to collect immediate feedback on future survey improvements
and better inform the post-2022 needs assessment conversations that will take place in
the fall of 2023.
Collecting the Policy Survey Data
Invitations to complete the 2022 Policy Survey were sent to POCs from the 56 states on August 1,
2022. The Policy Survey data were collected in advance of EAVS data collection to reduce
respondent burden and to allow the EAC to create customized data validation rules for the 2022
EAVS data. The Policy Survey was completed through an online survey; this online data collection
tool had undergone usability testing with POCs from seven states in July 2022, and edits to the
survey based on the results of this testing were completed in advance of the survey’s launch.3
Periodic reminders were issued to POCs during the data collection period. All 56 states,
territories, and districts submitted their Policy Survey data by January 5, 2023. When the answer
options within a question did not fully capture a state’s policy, POCs were encouraged to provide
comments with further explanation.
Once received, each Policy Survey submission was reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
State and territory POCs were also able to update or correct Policy Survey responses through the
end of the EAVS data collection period. The EAC made Policy Survey data updates for 36 states
before the end of the EAVS data collection period.
The EAC incorporated states’ Policy Survey submissions directly into the EAVS data collection
template validations. This meant that a state’s 2022 EAVS data collection templates could not be
released until the state’s Policy Survey submission was finalized.
3 Fifty-two states completed the Policy Survey via the online survey. Four states completed the survey via a
paper instrument; for these states, the Policy Survey help desk assistants entered the data from the paper
instrument into the online survey and asked the state to review for accuracy and submit the data.
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Collecting the EAVS Data
The EAVS data collection period was opened to 44 states on November 14, 2022. The data
collection was opened to the 11 remaining states once their Policy Survey submissions were
received and their templates were created; all data collection templates were released to states
by January 18, 2023. The EAVS data collection period ended on March 30, 2023. Data
submissions from 55 states were received by that date, with a response rate of 100% of states.4
To build on the needs assessment conversations that were completed in September and October
2021, the EAC completed pre-survey outreach calls with officials from states that had new
designated POCs for the 2022 EAVS or that had requested further follow-up after the needs
assessment calls. POCs from 13 states were invited to participate in the outreach calls, and 11
calls were completed for 10 states in July and August of 2022.5 During these interviews, the EAC
provided an overview of the project timeline and the types of data collected in the Policy Survey
and the EAVS, notified the POCs of the help desk support and other resources that would be
provided as part of the 2022 EAVS, and probed POCs on data issues from the 2020 EAVS. These
conversations helped ensure that the EAC was prepared to provide adequate support to states as
they completed their EAVS data collection.
Data Collection Templates
Given the diversity in how states respond to the EAVS, creating data templates that accommodate
the needs of all states and all local jurisdictions is especially challenging. The 2022 EAVS data
were collected using two data collection templates:
o The Excel template was a flat data format that allowed POCs to copy and paste large
amounts of data, such as from a report generated from the state’s centralized election
database. Each EAVS item was listed in a column in the Excel template and each EAVS
jurisdiction within the state was listed in a row. States with multiple jurisdictions were
required to submit their data through the Excel template. For the first time in the 2022
EAVS, the Excel template automatically calculated selected percentages using the state’s
EAVS data to assist state POCs in reviewing their data for accuracy and understanding how
their data would be reported.
o The online template was an item-by-item survey hosted online that guided respondents
through entering their responses. This template was primarily intended to be used by
jurisdictions that entered EAVS data or by states and territories that reported as a single
jurisdiction. The data from the online template was exported to an Excel file that matched
the format of the Excel data collection template.
Usability testing of the draft online template was completed with 8 local election officials from 5
states in September 2022, and edits to the survey based on the results of this testing were
completed in advance of the online template’s launch.
4 Puerto Rico was not required to complete the 2022 EAVS because the territory did not hold a general
election in November 2022.
5 One state completed two outreach calls because its project personnel experienced turnover after the first
call was complete and requested an additional call to assist its new POCs in learning about the EAVS.
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The EAC pre-populated data into the online template for 3 states and into the Excel template for
one state. Pre-fill data were provided by state POCs via the Excel template or via an email or
phone request that provided details on which items were to be populated.
Both data collection templates employed a variety of error-checking data validations to reduce
response burden and to increase data quality.
Data Validation
One of the key issues associated with any data collection project is ensuring that the data
collected are as accurate as possible. Given the number of survey questions, their complexity and
granularity, and the variety of approaches in how state and local jurisdictions track election data
and provide survey responses, it can be easy to make data entry mistakes or report data in an
incorrect survey item. All 2022 EAVS data collection templates included built-in internal and
external validation checks that flagged specific types of potential errors within a data submission.
The validation checks were designed to flag common data issues so that respondents were aware
of them before submitting their data to the EAC. In response to these validations, states and
jurisdictions were encouraged to review their data, make corrections if needed, and use the
comments fields to explain any peculiarities and give context to the data that were being
reported.
In addition, once a state submitted data for review by the EAC, additional data reviews were
conducted by trained data analysts. These reviews checked for missing data, internal math and
logic issues, conflicts with Policy Survey responses, and significant changes compared to 2018
EAVS data.6 The results of this review were provided to state POCs in a written memo, along with
a file that had sample rates and percentages calculated using their draft submission. These
sample rates and percentages were provided to assist POCs with identifying results that did not
align with their expectations so they could be corrected in the final submission.
A complete list of all validation checks that were built into the data collection templates and
additional data validations that were conducted for draft submissions can be found in Appendices
B and C of this chapter. In general, there were five types of data validations.
Math Validations
Many items in the EAVS asked respondents to report a total and then divide that total into
subcategories. The math validations within the templates checked that the sum of the
subcategories equaled the reported total of the overall category. For example, if the total number
of voters who cast a ballot that was counted in the 2022 general election did not match the sum
of the number of voters who used different modes of voting, then the respondent was asked to
review the numbers reported in these items.7
Logic Validations
Logic validations identified when a value in the survey was incompatible with a response provided
in another related question in the survey. For example, if the number of mail ballots that a
6 The 2018 EAVS was used as a point of comparison in the data reviews because it was the most recent
midterm election.
7 The total number of voters participating in the 2022 general election was reported in item F1a in the
2022 EAVS. The number of voters who participated using different modes of voting were items F1b through
F1h.
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jurisdiction reported counting for the 2022 election exceeded the number of mail ballots the
jurisdiction’s voters had returned, then the respondent was asked to review these items.8
Policy Survey Validations
These validations identified instances in which an EAVS item conflicted with the Policy Survey
data that had been submitted by the state. For example, if a state reported having an online voter
registration system through which an individual could submit a voter registration application, but
reported “Does not apply” to EAVS items relating to the number of voter registration forms
submitted through online sources, then the validations would highlight that a conflict existed
between the respondent’s EAVS and Policy Survey data and would ask the respondent to review
the EAVS items and contact the EAC if the Policy Survey response needed to be updated.9
Missing Items
With the exception of most comment boxes and “other” subcategories for reporting data beyond
what was specified in a question, all items in the EAVS required a response. An alert appeared if a
response to a required item was not provided. For example, if a respondent reported the total
number of registered voters in their jurisdiction but not the number of active and inactive
registered voters, the latter items would be flagged with a request that the respondent report
“Does not apply” (if their state did not have an applicable law or policy), “Data not available” (if
the data for an item were not tracked), or zero (if no instance of an item occurred for the 2022
general election) rather than leave the item blank.10
Valid Skips
The EAC introduced a valid skip code in EAVS beginning with the 2020 data set. This code was
automatically filled in by the template validations when an item did not require an answer
because of a response to a previous item in the survey. The use of the valid skip code is distinct
from the use of the “Does not apply” code (for when a jurisdiction does not have a law or policy in
place that allows for the type of election participation in the question) and the “Data not
available” code (for when the data for a type of election participation is not tracked). For instance,
if a jurisdiction indicated in EAVS question F5a that it did not use direct-recording electronic (DRE)
voting machines without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), then items F5b through F5d—
relating to the make and model of equipment, the number deployed, and the usage of the
equipment—were filled as “Valid skip” by the template validations.
EAVS Rates
The Excel template used states’ data to calculate a select number of EAVS percentages, and data
validations highlighted when these percentages fell outside of an expected threshold. For
instance, if a jurisdiction’s voter turnout as a percent of the jurisdiction’s active registered voters
8 The number of mail ballots counted by a jurisdiction was reported in item C8a in the 2022 EAVS. The
number of mail ballots returned by voters was reported in item C1b.
9 Data on states’ policies regarding online voter registration were reported in item Q6 of the 2022 Policy
Survey. The number of total, new, duplicate, and rejected registrations received through online registration
systems were reported in items A4c, A5c, A6c, and A7c, respectively, of the 2022 EAVS.
10 The total number of registered voters for the 2022 general election was reported in item A1a in the
EAVS. The number of active registered voters was item A1b. The number of inactive registered voters was
item A1c.
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was either lower than 35% or higher than 95%, the respondent would be asked to review these
items for accuracy.11
Finalizing and Certifying Data Submissions
After the EAC reviewed each state’s draft EAVS data submission, additional targeted data reviews
were conducted on subsequent EAVS submissions until the EAC was satisfied that data quality
issues had been sufficiently addressed by the state’s POC(s). Once the data submission had been
finalized, the EAC generated a copy of the appendix tables that appear in Chapters 1–4 of this
report and how the state’s data would be portrayed in those tables; this analysis was shared with
the state POC(s) to conduct a final review. During this review, state POC(s) were invited to provide
final data corrections, determine whether the data underlying the analysis were incorrect, and to
add footnotes and explanations to be printed alongside the tables. The footnotes that were
provided by state POCs to accompany the appendix tables have been printed in this report as
closely as possible to the language requested by POCs, with minor edits for proofreading and
clarity.
Once the state POCs approved of the analysis and provided any requested footnotes, the EAC
requested that the state’s chief election officer certify their state’s 2022 Policy Survey and EAVS
submissions as accurate and complete. Fifty-four states certified their data submissions by
May 19, 2023.12
Technical Assistance
Technical assistance was provided through the duration of the Policy Survey and the EAVS data
collection periods. Help desk support was provided for 20 hours each week from August 1, 2022,
to December 30, 2022, and for 50 hours each week from January 3, 2023, to March 30, 2023.
State and local EAVS respondents could request assistance via email or phone. A team of trained
technical assistants provided support on all aspects of the survey data collection processes. A
total of 786 support tickets were received from 55 states, territories, and districts. The most
common inquiries were related to using the EAVS data collection templates, the use of the data
missingness codes, and how to interpret survey instructions in questions A3 and A4–A7.
Resources for EAVS Respondents
In addition to providing direct, customized technical assistance, the EAC made a wide variety of
written and video training resources available to survey respondents on demand. A website was
established to house these resources and to provide a secure place for state EAVS POCs to
upload data submissions and other documents for the EAC to review.
The resources on this website included PDF copies of the Policy Survey and EAVS questions; a
link to the online template; six videos that outlined the questions and instructions in the six
sections of the EAVS; three video webinars that provided guidance on the overall EAVS process,
on collecting data from local jurisdictions, and for state POCs new to EAVS data collection; eleven
newsletters that were released between August 2022 and March 2023; an extensive user guide
11 The number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was item F1a and the number of active
registered voters was item A1b in the 2022 EAVS. The turnout rate within the Excel template was
calculated as F1a/A1b x 100. Although the EAC normally recommends using CVAP as a denominator when
calculating voter turnout, A1b was used in this calculation because the 2022 CVAP data were not available
at the time the Excel template was being programmed.
12 Florida and Oregon did not sign the 2022 EAVS certification form.
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that provided step-by-step instructions for both data collection templates; a policy guide approved
by the EAC Commissioners that provided information to election officials responsible for
completing EAVS; a glossary of EAVS and Policy Survey terms and their definitions; and an Excel
crosswalk that documented survey changes from 2020 to 2022.
The website also contained a section that was restricted to state POCs. This section had copies of
the state’s EAVS and Statutory Overview/Policy Survey submissions from 2016, 2018, and 2020;
a table that tracked the online template progress for each jurisdiction within the state; and the
capacity for POCs to upload files and data submissions for the EAC to review.
Data Reporting and Calculations
In 2022, most EAVS data were reported at the local jurisdiction level. For the purposes of this
report, for states that have multiple jurisdictions, state totals were calculated by summing the
data from all jurisdictions within a state. National totals were calculated by summing the state-
level totals.
Whenever possible, this report uses percentages and rates rather than raw numbers to make
comparisons across states and across election years. For these calculations, items were
combined as necessary to create the numerator and denominator and to produce a percentage
or rate. For example, the following formula was used to calculate the percentage of transmitted
mailed ballots that were returned by voters for the 2022 general election:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 (𝐶1𝑏)
× 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (𝐶1𝑎)
Percentages at the national level were calculated using casewise missing data deletion at the
state level. Only states that had data for both the numerator and denominator for a calculation
were included when reporting percentages at the national level. Responses of “Does not apply,”
“Data not available,” and “Valid skip” were considered missing for purposes of creating these
calculations. Casewise deletion was used in the analysis for this report to avoid overinflating the
denominator of the calculations. This is especially applicable when states do not track data for a
particular item, or when election policy differences mean that not all states can provide data for
an item. For example, online registration is not available in every state, so the calculation of the
nationwide percentage of registrations that were received online will only use data from states
that reported at least one online registration. Otherwise, the national percentage would include in
the denominator (in this case, the total number of registrations received) data from states that do
not have online registration, thus underestimating the percentage of online registrations that
were received.13
This decision rule means that there were instances in which the percentages reported at the
national level for a given calculation in this report did not use data from every state. Because
each category was calculated independently of others and only states that reported data in both
13 The total number of registration applications received between the close of registration for the 2020
general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election was collected in item A3a. The
total number of registration applications received online between the close of registration for the 2020
general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election was collected in item A4c. The
application of casewise deletion means that only states that reported at least one registration in both of
these items on a statewide level were included in the calculation of the percentage of registration
applications received through online sources.
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the numerator and the denominator were included in the analysis, casewise deletion also created
instances in which percentages do not sum to 100%. Those cases in which data were not
available for every state to calculate the percentage at the national level are noted in the
footnotes throughout this report.
The use of casewise deletion for calculating national percentages does not affect the state-level
percentages calculated in this report.
Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data
The most up-to-date version of the 2022 EAVS and Policy Survey data can always be found on the
EAC’s website (https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys). If the
EAC is notified by a state of an error or omission in the state’s data, the agency will issue the
updated EAVS and Policy Survey data sets on its website with an errata note of changes that have
been made to the newly issued data sets. Updated data sets will be issued on a quarterly basis.
There are four types of data missingness codes used in the 2022 Policy Survey and EAVS data:
o Valid skip (-77): This code indicates that no response is expected based on a previous
survey response. For instance, in the Policy Survey, if a state answered “no” to Q6 to
indicate that it does not provide an option for voters to register to vote online, then item
Q6a, which collected further information on the specifics of a state’s online registration
system, would be marked as -77. In the EAVS, if a state indicates in item A4c, which asks
for the total number of registration forms submitted online, that this question does not
apply, then items A5c, A6c, and A7c, which collect data on new, duplicate, and rejected
registrations submitted online, would be marked as -77.
o Does not apply (-88): This code indicates that a question does not apply to a state,
because the state does not have an applicable policy in place. For instance, a response of
-88 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state does not have online registration.
o Data not available (-99): This code indicates that the data for an item cannot be tracked.
For instance, a response of -99 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state accepts
online voter registrations but cannot track the number of these registrations that were
submitted by voters.
o Refused (-100): This code indicates that a response was expected but was not provided.
This code is only used in the Policy Survey data.
When summing the EAVS data, either on a state or a national level, analysts should take care to
treat these missingness codes as missing items and not as negative numbers.
Users of the EAVS data are also encouraged to refer to the comments that accompany all of the
EAVS items and many of the Policy Survey items. During data collection, the EAC encouraged all
respondents to use these comments to provide context to their responses. In many cases, these
comments contain valuable information about how state and jurisdiction respondents formulated
their responses, why some responses do not align with the data validations outlined in this
chapter, or context about how the 2022 general election was conducted in a state or jurisdiction.
If data users have further questions about the data that have been submitted, they are
encouraged to contact states or jurisdictions directly.
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The EAC also encourages data users to take care when calculating percentages to ensure that the
correct EAVS items are used. Appendix D of this chapter contains recommendations for how to
calculate EAVS rates using the 2022 data. These recommendations align with how rates were
calculated throughout this report.
This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimates for the 2021
citizen voting age population (CVAP) for state and nation level calculations instead of the 5-year
estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. However, for any jurisdiction level
analysis reported that involves the CVAP, this report used the 5-year estimate due to its better
coverage of the counties in the United States. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were not available by
the time this report was finalized. Once they are released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2022
CVAP estimates can be found at https://data.census.gov/. Data analysts should import both
state- and county-level geographies and merge them into the EAVS data using the Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code. For states that have sub-county jurisdictions,
these jurisdictions will need to be aggregated at the county level in order to merge in the CVAP
data.14 For this report, the state-level CVAP was used for Alaska, as the state reported its data in a
single EAVS jurisdiction. Finally, the Census Bureau does not provide CVAP estimates for the U.S.
territories (with the exception of Puerto Rico), so no CVAP estimate was available for American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
14 These are the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Wisconsin. Additionally, the state of Illinois reported six cities independently of their corresponding
counties (i.e., Bloomington, Chicago, Danville, East St. Louis, Galesburg, and Rockford), and Missouri
reported Kansas City independently of its corresponding county.
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Methodology Appendix A: Survey Response Rates
EAVS Section A Section B Section C Section D Section E Section F
State Response Response Response Response Response Response Response
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
Alabama 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Alaska 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
American
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Samoa
Arizona 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Arkansas 99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 98.9% 100.0% 99.7%
California 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Colorado 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Connecticut 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Delaware 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
District of
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Columbia
Florida 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.7% 100.0% 100.0%
Georgia 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Guam 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 97.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Hawaii [1] 98.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 92.9%
Idaho 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Illinois 99.6% 99.9% 99.2% 99.9% 99.6% 100.0% 99.1%
Indiana 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0%
Iowa 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
Kansas 94.3% 99.5% 97.2% 95.8% 91.0% 96.1% 77.2%
Kentucky 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Louisiana 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Maine [2] 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Maryland 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Massachusetts 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Michigan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Minnesota 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Mississippi 98.3% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Missouri 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Montana 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Nebraska 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Nevada 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
New
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Hampshire
New Jersey 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
New Mexico 99.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 96.4% 100.0% 100.0%
New York 99.7% 99.6% 99.9% 99.9% 99.3% 99.3% 99.9%
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EAVS Section A Section B Section C Section D Section E Section F
State Response Response Response Response Response Response Response
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
North Carolina 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
North Dakota 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Northern
Mariana 94.4% 100.0% 100.0% 67.6% 90.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Islands
Ohio 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Oklahoma 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Oregon 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Pennsylvania 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Rhode Island 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
South Carolina 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
South Dakota 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0%
Tennessee 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Texas 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
U.S. Virgin
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Islands
Utah 97.2% 92.8% 98.2% 99.9% 97.6% 100.0% 98.4%
Vermont 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Virginia 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Washington 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
West Virginia 98.1% 100.0% 99.8% 94.0% 98.7% 92.3% 98.7%
Wisconsin 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Wyoming 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
U.S. Total 99.8% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.1% 99.9% 99.6%
Survey Response Rate Calculation Notes:
EAVS Response Rate uses responses to all items listed below.
Section A Response Rate uses responses to questions A1a, A1b, A1c, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c,
A3d, A3e, A3f, A3g, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g,
A5h, A5i, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i,
A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, and A9g.
Section B Response Rate uses responses to questions B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c,
B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B10a, B10b, B10c, B11a, B11b,
B11c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B13d, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B18a,
B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a,
B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, and B26c.
Section C Response Rate uses responses to questions C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C2a, C3a, C4a,
C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l,
C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, and C9q.
Section D Response Rate uses responses to questions D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a,
D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D8, D8Comment, and D9a.
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Section E Response Rate uses responses to questions E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e,
E2f, E2g, E2h, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, and E3j.
Section F Response Rate uses responses to questions F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F2_1, F2_2,
F2_3, F2_4, F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, F4a, F4b, F4c, F4d, F4e, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, F9a, F10a, F10b,
F10c, F10d, and F10e.
Survey Response Rate Data Notes:
General Notes:
• Response rates were calculated as the percentage of jurisdictional responses within a state
that were not left blank (i.e., had a numerical response of zero or greater or a response of
“Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or “Valid skip”). Percentages were rounded to 1
decimal place.
• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that
round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
• Item descriptions, optional “other” categories, and optional survey comments were not
included in the response rate calculation.
[1] Information for Kalawao County, Hawaii was reported with Maui County.
[2] Maine reported its UOCAVA data on a statewide level, not a jurisdiction level.
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Methodology Appendix B: Data Collection Template
Validation Rules
Table 1: Math Validation Rules
Validation Rule Error Text
The sum of A1b + A1c should The sum of active (A1b) and inactive (A1c) registered voters should be
equal A1a equal to the total number of registered voters (A1a).
The sum of SDRs received on Election Day (A2b) and SDRs received prior
The sum of A2b + A2c should
to Election Day (A2c) should be equal to the total number of SDRs
equal A2a
received (A2a).
The sum of A3b–j should The sum of the numbers you report in A3b–j should equal the total
equal A3a number of registration forms you report in A3a.
The sum of A4a–l should The sum of the numbers you report in A4a–l should equal the total
equal A3a number of registration forms you reported in A3a.
The sum of A5a–l should The sum of the numbers you report in A5a–l should equal the total
equal A3b number of registration forms you reported in A3b.
The sum of A6a–l should The sum of the numbers you report in A6a–l should equal the total
equal A3d number of registration forms you reported in A3d.
The sum of A7a–l should The sum of the numbers you report in A7a–l should equal the total
equal A3e number of registration forms you reported in A3e.
The amounts you report in A5a, A6a, and A7a should not exceed the total
The sum of A5a + A6a + A7a number of registration forms received by mail, fax, or email you reported
should not exceed A4a in A4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to
explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5b, A6b, and A7b should not exceed the total
The sum of A5b + A6b + A7b number of registrations in person at the election/registrar’s office you
should not exceed A4b reported in A4b. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5c, A6c, and A7c should not exceed the total
The sum of A5c + A6c + A7c number of registration forms submitted online you reported in A4c. Please
should not exceed A4c correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5d, A6d, and A7d should not exceed the total
The sum of A5d + A6d + A7d number of registration forms received from motor vehicle offices you
should not exceed A4d reported in A4d. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5e, A6e, and A7e should not exceed the total
The sum of A5e + A6e + A7e number of registration forms received from public assistance offices you
should not exceed A4e reported in A4e. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5f, A6f, and A7f should not exceed the total
The sum of A5f + A6f + A7f number of registration forms received from state-funded agencies you
should not exceed A4f reported in A4f. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5g, A6g, and A7g should not exceed the total
The sum of A5g + A6g + A7g number of registration forms received from armed forces recruitment
should not exceed A4g offices you reported in A4g. Please correct your responses or use the
comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5h, A6h, and A7h should not exceed the total
number of registration forms received from other agencies designated by
The sum of A5h + A6h + A7h
the state but not mandated by the NVRA you reported in A4h. Please
should not exceed A4h
correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The amounts you report in A5i, A6i, and A7i should not exceed the total
The sum of A5i + A6i + A7i number of forms received from registration drives from advocacy groups
should not exceed A4i or political parties you reported in A4i. Please correct your responses or
use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5j, A6j, and A7j should not exceed the total
The sum of A5j + A6j + A7j number of forms received from “Other” sources you reported in A4j.
should not exceed A4j Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5k, A6k, and A7k should not exceed the total
The sum of A5k + A6k + A7k number of forms received from “Other” sources you reported in A4k.
should not exceed A4k Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A5l, A6l, and A7l should not exceed the total
The sum of A5l + A6l + A7l number of forms received from “Other” sources you reported in A4l.
should not exceed A4l Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A8b–h should equal the total number of
The sum of A8b–h should confirmation notices sent to registered voters you reported in A8a. Please
equal A8a correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in A9b–j should equal the total number of voters
The sum of A9b–j should
removed you reported in A9a. Please correct your responses or use the
equal A9a
comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B1b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B1b–c should registered and eligible UOCAVA voters you reported in B1a. Please correct
equal B1a your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B2b–c should equal the total number of FPCAs
The sum of B2b–c should received from UOCAVA voters you reported in B2a. Please correct your
equal B2a responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
not add up.
The amounts you report in B3b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B3b–c should rejected FPCAs from UOCAVA voters you reported in B3a. Please correct
equal B3a your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B5b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B5b–c should absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a.
equal B5a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B6b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B6b–c should absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by postal mail you
equal B6a reported in B6a. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B7b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B7b–c should absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by email you reported in
equal B7a B7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to
explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B8b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B8b–c should absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by other methods you
equal B8a reported in B8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B6a, B7a, and B8a should equal the total
The sum of B6a, B7a, and number of ballots transmitted to all UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a.
B8a should equal B5a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The amounts you report in B6b, B7b, and B8b should equal the total
The sum of B6b, B7b, and number of ballots transmitted to all uniformed services voters you
B8b should equal B5b reported in B5b. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B6c, B7c, and B8c should equal the total
The sum of B6c, B7c, and B8c number of ballots transmitted to all overseas citizen voters you reported
should equal B5c in B5c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to
explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B9b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B9b–c should UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. Please correct
equal B9a your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B10b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B10b–c should UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by postal mail you reported in
equal B10a B10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to
explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B11b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B11b–c should UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by email you reported in B11a.
equal B11a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B12b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B12b–c should UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by other methods you reported in
equal B12a B12a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to
explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B10a, B11a, and B12a should equal the total
The sum of B10a, B11a, and number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a.
B12a should equal B9a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B10b, B11b, and B12b should equal the total
The sum of B10b, B11b, and number of transmitted ballots returned by all uniformed services voters
B12b should equal B9b you reported in B9b. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B10c, B11c, and B12c should equal the total
The sum of B10c, B11c, and number of transmitted ballots returned by all overseas citizen voters you
B12c should equal B9c reported in B9c. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B13b–d should equal the total number of
The sum of B13b–d should ballots returned undeliverable you reported in B13a. Please correct your
equal B13a responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
not add up.
The amounts you report in B14b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B14b–c should UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. Please
equal B14a correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B15b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B15b–c should counted UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail you reported in B15a.
equal B15a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B16b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B16b–c should counted UOCAVA ballots returned by email you reported in B16a. Please
equal B16a correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The amounts you report in B17b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B17b–c should counted UOCAVA ballots returned by other methods you reported in B17a.
equal B17a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B15a, B16a, and B17a should equal the total
The sum of B15a, B16a, and number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a.
B17a should equal B14a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B15b, B16b, and B17b should equal the total
The sum of B15b, B16b, and number of uniformed services voters’ ballots counted by your office you
B17b should equal B14b reported in B14b. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B15c, B16c, and B17c should equal the total
The sum of B15c, B16c, and number of overseas citizen voters’ ballots counted by your office you
B17c should equal B14c reported in B14c. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B18b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B18b–c should rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please correct your
equal B18a responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
not add up.
The amounts you report in B19b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B19b–c should UOCAVA ballots rejected because they were received after the deadline
equal B19a you reported in B19a. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B20b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B20b–c should UOCAVA ballots rejected because of a problem with the voter signature
equal B20a you reported in B20a. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B21b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B21b–c should UOCAVA ballots rejected for lack of a postmark you reported in B21a.
equal B21a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B22b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B22b–c should UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons reported in B22a. Please
equal B22a correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14a and B18a should equal the total number of UOCAVA
The sum of B14a and B18a ballots returned by voters that you reported in B9a. Please correct your
should equal B9a responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not
sum as expected.
The sum of B14b and B18b should equal the total number of UOCAVA
The sum of B14b and B18b ballots returned by uniformed services voters that you reported in B9b.
should equal B9b Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14c and B18c should equal the total number of UOCAVA
The sum of B14c and B18c ballots returned by overseas citizen voters that you reported in B9c.
should equal B9c Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these items do not sum as expected.
The amounts you report in B19a, B20a, B21a, and B22a should equal the
The sum of B19a, B20a,
total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please
B21a, and B22a should equal
correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
B18a
subitems do not add up.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The amounts you report in B19b, B20b, B21b, and B22b should equal the
The sum of B19b, B20b,
total number of rejected ballots from uniformed services voters you
B21b, and B22b should equal
reported in B18b. Please correct your responses or use the comments
B18b
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of the amounts you report in B19c, B20c, B21c, and B22c
The sum of B19c, B20c,
should equal the total number of rejected ballots from overseas citizen
B21c, and B22c should equal
voters you reported in B18c. Please correct your responses or use the
B18c
comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B23b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B23b–c should FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. Please correct
equal B23a your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B24b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B24b–c should
FWABs counted you reported in B24a. Please correct your responses or
equal B24a
use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B25b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B25b–c should FWABs rejected because they were received after the deadline you
equal B25a reported in B25a. Please correct your responses or use the comments
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B26b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B26b–c should FWABs rejected because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received
equal B26a and counted you reported in B26a. Please correct your responses or use
the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B27b–c should equal the total number of
The sum of B27b–c should FWABs rejected for other reasons you reported in B27a. Please correct
equal B27a your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a should equal the
The sum of B24a, B25a,
total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a.
B26a, and B27a should equal
Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
B23a
why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of the amounts you report in B24b, B25b, B26b, and B27b
The sum of B24b, B25b,
should equal the total number of FWABs returned by uniformed services
B26b, and B27b should equal
voters you reported in B23b. Please correct your responses or use the
B23b
comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of the amounts you report in B24c, B25c, B26c, and B27c
The sum of B24c, B25c,
should equal the total number of FWABs returned by overseas citizen
B26c, and B27c should equal
voters you reported in B23c. Please correct your responses or use the
B23c
comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The amounts you report in C1b–i should equal the number of total mail
The sum of C1b–i should
ballots transmitted you reported in C1a. Please correct your responses or
equal C1a
use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C4b–c should
The number of Election Day drop boxes you report in C4b and C4c should
equal C4a (excepting
sum to the total number of drop boxes you reported in C4a. Please correct
responses of “Data not
your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
available” and “Does not
subitems do not add up.
apply”)
The sum of C5b–c should
The number of early voting drop boxes you report in C5b and C5c should
equal C5a (excepting
sum to the total number of drop boxes you reported in C5a. Please correct
responses of “Data not
your responses or use the comments section to explain why these
available” and “Does not
subitems do not add up.
apply”)
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Validation Rule Error Text
The numbers you report in C9b–t should equal the total number of
The sum of C9b–t should rejected mail ballots you reported in C9a. Please correct your responses
equal C9a or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add
up.
The sum of D3b–c should
The sum of the amounts you report in D3b–c should equal the total
equal D3a (excepting
number of physical polling places for Election Day in your jurisdiction you
responses of “Data not
reported in D3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments
available” and “Does not
section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
apply”)
The sum of D4b–c should
The sum of the amounts you report in D4b–c should equal the total
equal D4a (excepting
number of physical polling places for early voting in your jurisdiction you
responses of “Data not
report in D4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section
available” and “Does not
to explain why these subitems do not add up.
apply”)
The sum of D7b–g should
The numbers you report in D7b–g should equal the total number of poll
equal D7a (excepting
workers in your jurisdiction you reported in D7a. Please correct your
responses of “Data not
responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
available” and “Does not
not add up.
apply”)
The amounts you report in E1b–e should equal the total number of voters
The sum of E1b–e should who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your
equal E1a responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
not add up.
The amounts you report in E2a–k should equal the total number of voters
The sum of E2a–k should who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your
equal E1a responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
not add up.
The amounts you report in E3b–m should equal the total number of
The sum of E3b–m should rejected provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your
equal E3a responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do
not add up.
The amount you report in E1d should equal the total number of rejected
E1d should be equal to E3a provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your responses or
use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of the amounts you report in F1b–h should equal the total
The sum of F1b–h should number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted you reported in F1a.
equal F1a Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain
why these subitems do not add up.
Table 2: Logic Validation Rules
Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state does not differentiate between active (A1b) and
If A1c = Does not apply, then inactive voters (A1c), then A1a should equal A1b. Please correct your
A1a = A1b responses or use the comments section to explain why those two items
differ.
The number of SDRs you report in A2a cannot exceed the total number of
registered voters you report in A1a. Please review your responses or use
A2a cannot exceed A1a
the comments section to explain why the value in A2a exceeds the value
in A1a.
The number of rejected FPCAs you report in B3a should not exceed the
total number of FPCAs received you reported in B2a. Please review your
B3a cannot exceed B2a
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B3a
exceeds the value in B2a.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The number of FPCAs rejected because they were late that you report in
B4a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs rejected you reported in
B4a cannot exceed B3a
B3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to
explain why the value in B4a exceeds the value in B3a.
The number of ballots returned you report in B9a should not exceed the
number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a.
B9a cannot exceed B5a
Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why
the value in B9a exceeds the value in B5a.
The number of ballots returned from uniformed services members you
report in B9b should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to
B9b cannot exceed B5b uniformed services members you reported in B5b. Please review your
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9b
exceeds the value in B5b.
The number of ballots returned from overseas citizen voters you report in
B9c should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to overseas
B9c cannot exceed B5c citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please review your responses or use
the comments section to explain why the value in B9c exceeds the value
in B5c.
The number of ballots returned as undeliverable you report in B13a
should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters
B13a cannot exceed B5a
you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B13a exceeds the value in B5a.
The total number of ballots counted you report in B14a should not exceed
the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in
B14a cannot exceed B9a
B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to
explain why the value in B14a exceeds the value in B9a.
The total number of ballots counted you report in B14b should not exceed
the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you
B14b cannot exceed B9b
reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B14b exceeds the value in B9b.
The total number of ballots counted you report in B14c should not exceed
the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you
B14c cannot exceed B9c
reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B14c exceeds the value in B9c.
The number of ballots counted you report in B15a should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by postal mail by UOCAVA voters you
B15a cannot exceed B10a
reported in B10a. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B15a exceeds the value in B10a.
The number of ballots counted you report in B15b should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by postal mail by uniformed services
B15b cannot exceed B10b members you reported in B10b. Please review your responses or use the
comments section to explain why the value in B15b exceeds the value in
B10b.
The number of ballots counted you report in B15c should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by postal mail by overseas citizen voters
B15c cannot exceed B10c
you reported in B10c. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B15c exceeds the value in B10c.
The number of ballots counted you report in B16a should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by email by UOCAVA voters you reported
B16a cannot exceed B11a
in B11a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to
explain why the value in B16a exceeds the value in B11a.
The number of ballots counted you report in B16b should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by email by uniformed services members
B16b cannot exceed B11b
you reported in B11b. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B16b exceeds the value in B11b.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The number of ballots counted you report in B16c should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by email by overseas citizen voters you
B16c cannot exceed B11c
reported in B11c. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B16c exceeds the value in B11c.
The number of ballots counted you report in B17a should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by other modes by UOCAVA voters you
B17a cannot exceed B12a
reported in B12a. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B17a exceeds the value in B12a.
The number of ballots counted you report in B17b should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by other modes by uniformed services
B17b cannot exceed B12b members you reported in B12b. Please review your responses or use the
comments section to explain why the value in B17b exceeds the value in
B12b.
The number of ballots counted you report in B17c should not exceed the
total number of ballots returned by other modes by overseas citizen voters
B17c cannot exceed B12c
you reported in B12c. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B17c exceeds the value in B12c.
The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18a should not exceed
the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in
B18a cannot exceed B9a
B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to
explain why the value in B18a exceeds the value in B9a.
The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18b should not exceed
the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you
B18b cannot exceed B9b
reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B18b exceeds the value in B9b.
The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18c should not exceed
the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you
B18c cannot exceed B9c
reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments
section to explain why the value in B18c exceeds the value in B9c.
The number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters you
report in C2a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted
C2a cannot exceed C1a
in C1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to
explain why the value in C2a exceeds the value in C1a.
The number of drop boxes used during Election Day you report in C4a
cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your
C4a cannot exceed C3a
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C4a
exceeds the value in C3a.
The number of drop boxes used during early voting you report in C5a
cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your
C5a cannot exceed C3a
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C5a
exceeds the value in C3a.
The total number of mail ballots returned via drop box you report in C6a
cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b.
C6a cannot exceed C1b
Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain
why the value in C6a exceeds the value in C1b.
The total number of successfully cured mail ballots you report in C7a
cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b.
C7a cannot exceed C1b
Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain
why the value in C7a exceeds the value in C1b.
The sum of the amounts you report in C8a and C9a should equal the
The sum of C8a and C9a number of mail ballots returned by voters you report in C1b. Please review
should equal C1b your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of
C8a and C9a does not match the value in C1b.
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Validation Rule Error Text
The number of physical polling places used during Election Day you report
in D3a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a.
D3a cannot exceed D2a
Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why
the value in D3a exceeds the value in D2a.
The number of physical polling places used during early voting you report
in D4a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a.
D4a cannot exceed D2a
Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why
the value in D4a exceeds the value in D2a.
Because you reported using poll workers in D5a and/or D6a, you should
If D5a > 0 or D6a > 0, then
provide the total number of poll workers used in the jurisdiction in D7a.
D7a > 0
Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
The number of poll workers serving during Election Day you report in D5a
cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your
D5a cannot exceed D7a
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D5a
exceeds the value in D7a.
The number of poll workers serving during early voting you report in D6a
cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your
D6a cannot exceed D7a
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D6a
exceeds the value in D7a.
The number of poll workers serving for the first time in this election in D9a
cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your
D9a cannot exceed D7a
responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D9a
exceeds the value in D7a.
The sum of counted absentee UOCAVA ballots reported in B14a and
counted FWABs reported in B24a should equal the total number of
The sum of B14a and B24a
counted UOCAVA votes reported in F1c. Please review your responses or
should equal F1c
use the comments section to explain why the sum of B14a and B24a do
not match the value in F1c.
The number of counted absentee ballots reported in C8a should equal the
total number of counted mail votes reported in F1d and F1g. Please
C8a should equal F1d+F1g
review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the
value in C8a does not match the value in F1d+F1g.
Because you reported in E1b and/or E1c that your jurisdiction counted
If E1b > 0 or E1c > 0, then some provisional ballots, you should provide data on the number of voters
F1e > 0 who cast a provisional ballot that was counted in F1e. Please review your
responses and add comments as necessary.
The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted, as
reported in F1a, cannot exceed the total number of registered voters as
F1a cannot exceed A1a
reported in A1a. Please review your responses and add comments as
necessary.
The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted, as reported
in F1d, cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted, as
F1d cannot exceed C1a
reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as
necessary.
The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted in an all-
mail election jurisdiction, as reported in F1g, cannot exceed the total
F1g cannot exceed C1a
number of mail ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your
responses and add comments as necessary.
The number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted, as
reported in F1e, cannot exceed the total number of provisional ballots
F1e cannot exceed E1a
cast, as reported in E1a. Please review your responses and add
comments as necessary.
If F5a = Yes, then Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report
F5b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F5b.
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Validation Rule Error Text
If F5a = Yes, then Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report
F5c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply data on the number of machines deployed in F5c.
If F6a = Yes, then Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report
F6b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F6b.
If F6a = Yes, then Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report
F6c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply data on the number of machines deployed in F6c.
If F7a = Yes, then Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should
F7b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F7b.
If F7a = Yes, then Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should
F7c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply report data on the number of machines deployed in F7c.
If F8a = Yes, then Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on
F8b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F8b.
If F8a = Yes, then Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on
F8c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply the number of machines deployed in F8c.
Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules
Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in
Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A4c-A7c.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then Instead, please report the total number of online registrations received,
A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c ≠ Does new online registrations received, duplicate online registrations, or invalid
not apply online registrations. If that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in
Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A4c.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then Instead, please report the total number of online registrations received, or,
A4c ≠ Does not apply if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in
Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A5c.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then Instead, please report the number of new online registrations received, or,
A5c ≠ Does not apply if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in
Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A6c.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then Instead, please report the number of duplicate online registrations
A6c ≠ Does not apply received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the
Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the
EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in
Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A7c.
If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then Instead, please report the total number of invalid online registrations
A7c ≠ Does not apply received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the
Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the
EAVS technical assistance team.
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Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state reported having a form of same-day registration in Q8
of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2a. Instead,
If Q8 = 1, then A2a ≠ Does please report the total number of same day registrations received, or, if
not apply that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having same-day registration on Election Day
in Q8a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2b.
If Q8a_1 = 1, then Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations received on
A2b ≠ Does not apply Election Day, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If
the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and
the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having same-day registration during in-person
early voting in Q8a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q8a_2 = 1 OR Q8a_3 = 1, apply” to A2c. Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations
then A2c ≠ Does not apply received prior to Election Day, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data
not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact
your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported having pre-registration for persons under 18
years of age in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q9 = 1, then A3c ≠ Does apply” to A3c. Instead, please report the number of pre-registrations
not apply received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the
Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the
EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported differentiating between active and inactive
voters in Q10 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply”
If Q10 = 1, then A1b ≠ Does
to A1b and A1c. Instead, please report the number of active and inactive
not apply and A1c ≠ Does not
voters in these items, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
apply
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported using confirmation notices in Q12 of the Policy
Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A8a. Instead, please
If Q12_1 = 1 OR Q12_2 = 1
report the total number of confirmation notices sent, or, if that data is not
OR Q12_3 = 1, then
tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is
A8a ≠ Does not apply
incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance
team.
Because your state reported using a statewide all-vote-by-mail system in
Q17a of the Policy Survey, you must report data on the number of voters
who cast a ballot in a jurisdiction that votes entirely by mail in F1g. If that
If Q17a = 1, then F1g > 0
data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing some or all registered voters to be
designated as permanent absentee voters in Q18 of the Policy Survey, you
may not respond “Does not apply” to C2a. Instead, please report the
If Q18 = 2 OR Q18 = 3, then
number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters, or, if
C2a ≠ Does not apply
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing for mail ballot curing in Q20 of the
Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to C7a. Instead,
If Q20 = 1, then C7a ≠ Does please report the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured, or, if
not apply that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
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Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to
Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q25_4 = 0, then apply” to D4a. Instead, please report the number of polling places used
D4a ≠ Does not apply during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to
Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q25_4 = 0, then apply” to D4b. Instead, please report the number of polling places other
D4b ≠ Does not apply than election offices used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked,
respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect,
please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to
Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q25_4 = 0, then apply” to D4c. Instead, please report the number of polling places located
D4c ≠ Does not apply at election offices used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked,
respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect,
please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to
Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q25_4 = 0, then apply” to D6a. Instead, please report the number of poll workers used
D6a ≠ Does not apply during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to
Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
apply” to F1f. Instead, please report the number of voters who cast ballots
If Q25_4 = 0, then
during in-person early voting that were counted, or, if that data is not
F1f ≠ Does not apply
tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is
incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance
team.
Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by postal mail in
Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B6a.
If Q27_1 = 1, then Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by postal
B6a ≠ Does not apply mail, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the
Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the
EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by email in Q27
of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B7a. Instead,
If Q27_2 = 1, then please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by email, or, if
B7a ≠ Does not apply that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by another mode
in Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B8a.
If Q27_3 = 1 OR Q27_4 = 1
Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by other
OR Q27_5 = 1, then
modes, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the
B8a ≠ Does not apply
Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the
EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots
by postal mail in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q28_1 = 1, then apply” to B10a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’
B10a ≠ Does not apply ballots returned by postal mail, or, if that data is not tracked, respond
“Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please
contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
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Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots
by email in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply”
If Q28_2 = 1, then to B11a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots
B11a ≠ Does not apply returned by email, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots
by another mode in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does
If Q28_3 = 1 OR Q28_4 = 1
not apply” to B12a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’
OR Q28_5 = 1, then
ballots returned by other modes, or, if that data is not tracked, respond
B12a ≠ Does not apply
“Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please
contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots
by postal mail in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q28_1 = 1, then apply” to B15a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’
B15a ≠ Does not apply ballots returned by postal mail and counted, or, if that data is not tracked,
respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect,
please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots
by email in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply”
If Q28_2 = 1, then to B16a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots
B16a ≠ Does not apply returned by email and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond
“Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please
contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots
by another mode in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does
If Q28_3 = 1 OR Q28_4 = 1
not apply” to B17a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’
OR Q28_5 = 1, then
ballots returned by other modes and counted, or, if that data is not tracked,
B17a ≠ Does not apply
respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect,
please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy
Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1a. Instead, please
If Q33 = 1, then E1a ≠ Does report the total number of provisional ballots cast, or, if that data is not
not apply tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is
incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance
team.
Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy
Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1b. Instead, please
If Q33 = 1, then E1b ≠ Does report the number of provisional ballots cast that were counted in full, or, if
not apply that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy
Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1d. Instead, please
If Q33 = 1, then E1d ≠ Does report the number of provisional ballots cast that were rejected, or, if that
not apply data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a federal or state judge extends polling hours,
you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2h. Instead, please report the
If Q33a_1 = 1, then
number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data
E2h ≠ Does not apply
is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response
is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical
assistance team.
Survey Methodology | 258
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Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when an election official asserts a voter is not
eligible, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2c. Instead, please
If Q33a_2=1, then
report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if
E2c ≠ Does not apply
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a person who is not an election official asserts
a voter is not eligible and the challenge cannot be resolved, you may not
If Q33a_3 = 1, then respond “Does not apply” to E2d. Instead, please report the number of
E2d ≠ Does not apply provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not
tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is
incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance
team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a person does not appear on the list of eligible
voters, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2a. Instead, please
If Q33a_4 = 1, then
report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if
E2a ≠ Does not apply
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey
response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS
technical assistance team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a voter does not have proper identification,
you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2b. Instead, please report the
If Q33a_5 = 1, then
number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data
E2b ≠ Does not apply
is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response
is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical
assistance team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a voter is not a resident of the precinct in
which they are attempting to vote, you may not respond “Does not apply” to
If Q33a_6 = 1, then
E2e. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast
E2e ≠ Does not apply
for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC
and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a voter's registration has not been updated
with their current name and address, you may not respond “Does not
If Q33a_7 = 1, then
apply” to E2f. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that
E2f ≠ Does not apply
were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered when a voter who was issued a mail ballot does not
surrender the mail ballot when they wish to vote in person, you may not
If Q33a_8 = 1, then respond “Does not apply” to E2g. Instead, please report the number of
E2g ≠ Does not apply provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not
tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is
incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance
team.
259| Survey Methodology
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Validation Rule Error Text
Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional
ballots may be offered for reasons other than those listed in E2a-E2h, you
may not respond “Does not apply” to E2i. Instead, please report the
If Q33a_9 = 1, then
number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data
E2i ≠ Does not apply
is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response
is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical
assistance team.
Because your state reported partially counting provisional ballots in some
instances in Q33c of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not
If Q33c = 2, then E1c ≠ Does apply” to E1c. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots
not apply counted in part, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy
Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E3a. Instead, please
If Q33 = 1, then E3a ≠ Does report the total number of provisional ballots rejected, or, if that data is not
not apply tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is
incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance
team.
Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy
Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to F1e. Instead, please
If Q33 = 1, then F1e ≠ Does report the total number of voters who cast provisional ballots that were
not apply counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the
Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the
EAVS technical assistance team.
Because your state reported that criminal convictions or incarceration can
affect individuals' voting eligibility in Q38 of the Policy Survey, you may not
respond “Does not apply” to A9d. Instead, please report the total number
If Q38_5 = 0, then
of persons who were removed from the voter rolls because of disqualifying
A9d ≠ Does not apply
felony conviction, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your
state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Table 4: Policy Survey Pre-Fills
Policy Survey Response Expected Response in EAVS
Q6 = No A4c, A5c, A6c and A7c = Does not apply
Q8 = No A2a, A2b, and A2c = Does not apply
Q9 = No A3c = Does not apply
Q10 = No A1c = Does not apply
Q12 = No A8a–A8h = Does not apply
Q15 = No F3a–e = No
Q17 = No F1g = Does not apply
Q18 = No C2a = Does not apply
Q19 = No C3a, C4a–c, C5a–c, and C6a = Does not apply
Q20 = No C7a = Does not apply
Q21 = Postmark not required C9k = Does not apply
Q25 = Early voting is not allowed D4a–c, D6a, and F1f = Does not apply
Q27 ≠ Postal mail B6a–c = Does not apply
Q27 ≠ Email B7a–c = Does not apply
Survey Methodology | 260
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Policy Survey Response Expected Response in EAVS
Q27 ≠ Fax AND Q27 ≠ Online AND
B8a–c = Does not apply
Q27 ≠ Other
Q28 ≠ Postal mail B10a–c and B15a–c = Does not apply
Q28 ≠ Email B11a–c and B16a–c = Does not apply
Q28 ≠ Fax AND Q28 ≠ Online AND
B12a–c and B17a–c = Does not apply
Q28 ≠ Other
E1a–e, E2a–k, E3a–m, F1e, F5d_3, F6d_3, F7d_3, F8d_3, F9d_3,
Q33 = No
and F10c = Does not apply
Q33a ≠ Voter’s name does not
E2a = Does not apply
appear on list of eligible voters
Q33a ≠ Voter does not have proper
E2b = Does not apply
identification
Q33a ≠ An election official asserts
E2c = Does not apply
voter is ineligible
Q33a ≠ Another person asserts
E2d = Does not apply
voter is ineligible
Q33a ≠ Voter is not a resident of
the precinct in which they E2e = Does not apply
attempted to vote
Q33a ≠ Voter’s registration has
E2f = Does not apply
outdated information
Q33a ≠ Voter received a mail ballot
and did not surrender it at polling E2g = Does not apply
place to vote in person
Q33a ≠ When a judge extends
E2h = Does not apply
polling place hours
Q33c = Fully count or partially
E3d = Does not apply
count the provisional ballot
Q38 = No one; criminal convictions
A9d = Does not apply
do not limit a person’s right to vote
Table 5: EAVS Rates Validations
Validation Rule Error Text
Percent of registrations that were new and This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
valid: (A3b/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A3b for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 5%–95% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations that were This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
duplicates: (A3d/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A3d for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations that were rejected: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(A3e/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A3e for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations that were name,
This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
political party, or within-jurisdiction
review items A3a and A3f for this jurisdiction to ensure the
changes: (A3f/A3a) x 100
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
these items to provide context to your submission.
Threshold: 5%–95%
261| Survey Methodology
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Validation Rule Error Text
Percent of registrations received by mail: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(A4a/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A4a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations received in person: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(A4b/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A4b for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations received online: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(A4c/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A4c for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations received at motor This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
vehicle agencies: (A4d/A3a) x 100 review items A3a and A4d for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Confirmation notices sent as percent of This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
active registered voters: (A8a/A1b) x 100 review items A1b and A8a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–35% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of confirmation notices returned
This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
confirming valid registration:
review items A8a and A8b for this jurisdiction to ensure the
(A8b/A8a) x 100
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
these items to provide context to your submission.
Threshold: 1%–50%
Percent of confirmation notices returned
This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
confirming invalid registration:
review items A8a and A8c for this jurisdiction to ensure the
(A8c/A8a) x 100
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
these items to provide context to your submission.
Threshold: 1%–35%
Percent of confirmation notices returned This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
as undeliverable: (A8d/A8a) x 100 review items A8a and A8d for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 1%–35% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of confirmation notices This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
unreturned: (A8e/A8a) x 100 review items A8a and A8e for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 10%–80% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of registrations removed as
This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
percent of total registrants: (A9a/A1a) x
review items A1a and A9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
100
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
these items to provide context to your submission.
Threshold: 1%–99%
Percent of FPCAs that were rejected: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(B3a/B2a) x 100 review items B2a and B3a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 0.5%–99% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(B9a/B5a) x 100 review items B5a and B9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 5%–95% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
were counted: (B14a/B9a) x 100 review items B9a and B14a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 10%–100% these items to provide context to your submission.
Survey Methodology | 262
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Validation Rule Error Text
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
were rejected: (B18a/B9a) x 100 review items B9a and B18a for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 0.5%–90% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of FWABs counted: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(B24a/B23a) x 100 review items B23a and B24a for this jurisdiction to ensure
the data are correct. You may also use the comments section
Threshold: 10%–100% for these items to provide context to your submission.
This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
Percent of FWABs rejected:
review items B23a, B25a, B26a, and B27a for this
([B25a+B26a+B27a]/B23a) x 100
jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use
the comments section for these items to provide context to
Threshold: 0.5%–90%
your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots returned: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(C1b/C1a) x 100 review items C1a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 5%–95% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots unreturned: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(C1f/C1a) x 100 review items C1a and C1f for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 5%–95% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots returned via drop This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
box: (C6a/C1b) x 100 C1b and C6a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >95% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of mailed ballots successfully This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
cured: (C7a/C1b) x 100 C1b and C7a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >20% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of returned mail ballots counted: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(C8a/C1b) x 100 review items C8a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 10%–100% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of returned mail ballots rejected: This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please
(C9a/C1b) x 100 review items C9a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the
data are correct. You may also use the comments section for
Threshold: 0.5%–90% these items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers under age 18: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(D7b/D7a) x 100 D7a and D7b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 18 to 25: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(D7c/D7a) x 100 D7a and D7c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 26 to 40: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(D7d/D7a) x 100 D7a and D7d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 41 to 60: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(D7e/D7a) x 100 D7a and D7e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
263| Survey Methodology
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Validation Rule Error Text
Percent of poll workers ages 61 to 70: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(D7f/D7a) x 100 D7a and D7f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers ages 71+: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(D7g/D7a) x 100 D7a and D7g for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of poll workers who served for first This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
time: (D9a/D7a) x 100 D7a and D9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: >50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of provisional ballots rejected: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(E1d/E1a) x 100 E1a and E1d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 0.5%–95% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent of turnout by active registration: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(F1a/A1b) x 100 A1b and F1a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 35%–95% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast in person on Election This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
Day: (F1b/F1a) x 100 F1a and F1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 10%–90% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast by mail: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
([F1d+F1g]/F1a) x 100 F1a, F1d, and F1g for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 5%–95% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast in person before This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
Election Day: (F1f/F1a) x 100 F1a and F1f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 1%–95% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(F1c/F1a) x 100 F1a and F1c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 0.1%–50% items to provide context to your submission.
Percent ballots cast that were provisional: This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items
(F1e/F1a) x 100 F1a and F1e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are
correct. You may also use the comments section for these
Threshold: 0.01%–25% items to provide context to your submission.
Total number of voting machines deployed:
This number is lower than expected. Please review items
F5c_1 + F5c_2 + F5c_3 + F6c_1 + F6c_2
F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2,
+ F6c_3 + F7c_1 + F7c_2 + F7c_3 +
F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3 for this jurisdiction to
F8c_1 + F8c_2 + F8c_3
ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments
section for these items to provide context to your submission.
Threshold: <1
Table 6: Valid Skips
If… Items Filled
A4e = Does not apply (-88) A5e, A6e, and A7e = Valid skip (-77)
A4f = Does not apply (-88) A5f, A6f, and A7f = Valid skip (-77)
A4g = Does not apply (-88) A5g, A6g, and A7g = Valid skip (-77)
Survey Methodology | 264
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If… Items Filled
A4h = Does not apply (-88) A5h, A6h, and A7h = Valid skip (-77)
A4i = Does not apply (-88) A5i, A6i, and A7i = Valid skip (-77)
A8a = Does not apply (-88) A8b–h = Valid skip (-77)
A9a = Does not apply (-88) A9b–j = Valid skip (-77)
B1a = Does not apply (-88) B1b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B5a = 0 B5b–B22c = Valid skip (-77)
B7a = Does not apply (-88) B7b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B8a = Does not apply (-88) B8b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B11a = Does not apply (-88) B11b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B12a = Does not apply (-88) B12b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B16a = Does not apply (-88) B16b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B17a = Does not apply (-88) B17b–c = Valid skip (-77)
B21a = Does not apply (-88) B21b–c = Valid skip (-77)
C4a = Does not apply (-88) C4b–c = Valid skip (-77)
C5a = Does not apply (-88) C5b–c = Valid skip (-77)
D3a = Does not apply (-88) D3b–c = Valid skip (-77)
D4a = Does not apply (-88) D4b–c = Valid skip (-77)
D7a = Does not apply (-88) D7b–g = Valid skip (-77) and D9a = Valid skip (-77)
F5a = No F5b_1–F5d_4 = Valid skip (-77)
F6a = No F6b_1–F6d_4 = Valid skip (-77)
F7a = No F7b_1–F7d_5 = Valid skip (-77)
F8a = No F8b_1–F8d_5 = Valid skip (-77)
F9a = No F9d_1–F9d_5 = Valid skip (-77)
Table 7: Special Conditions and Data Missingness
Validation Rule Error Text
If state = North Dakota, then Section
A = Does not apply and B1a-c = Does --
not apply
If state = Maine, then Section B =
Data not available for all jurisdictions --
except UOCAVA-ME
If state = HI and jurisdiction =
“Kalawao County”, then all items = --
Data not available
If state = ME and jurisdiction =
“UOCAVA-ME”, then all items = Data
--
not available except for Section B and
contact information
A1a ≠ Does not apply unless the Please provide the total number of people who were registered
state = “ND” OR jurisdiction = and eligible to vote in your jurisdiction in the November 2022
“Kalawao County” OR jurisdiction = general election. If that data is not tracked, respond “Data not
“MAINE - UOCAVA” available.”
265| Survey Methodology
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Validation Rule Error Text
Please provide the total number of registration forms received in
A3a ≠ Does not apply unless the state
your jurisdiction between the close of registration for the
= “ND” OR jurisdiction = “Kalawao
November 2020 general election and the close of registration for
County” OR jurisdiction = “MAINE -
the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked,
UOCAVA”
respond “Data not available.”
B1a-c cannot be Does not apply
unless the state = “ND” OR Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
jurisdiction = “Kalawao County” OR that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
jurisdiction = “MAINE - UOCAVA”
B2a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B3a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B4a cannot be Does not apply unless
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B5a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B6a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B9a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B10a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B13a-d cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B14a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B15a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B18a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B19a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B20a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B23a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
B24a-c cannot be Does not apply
Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If
unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
“Kalawao County”
Survey Methodology | 266
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Validation Rule Error Text
C1a cannot be Does not apply unless Please provide the total number of mail ballots transmitted to
state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = voters for the November 2022 general election. If that data is not
“Kalawao County” tracked, respond “Data not available.”
D1a cannot be Does not apply unless Please provide the total number of precincts in your jurisdiction for
state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked,
“Kalawao County” respond “Data not available.”
Please provide the total number of voters who cast a ballot
F1a cannot be Does not apply unless
(regardless of mode) that was counted for the November 2022
state = “ME” OR jurisdiction =
general election in your jurisdiction. If that data is not tracked,
“Kalawao County”
respond “Data not available.”
F7b_1 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking
You have selected a make and model which is not used in your
Device (Los Angeles County) unless
jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”
F7b_2 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking
You have selected a make and model which is not used in your
Device (Los Angeles County) unless
jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”
F7b_3 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking
You have selected a make and model which is not used in your
Device (Los Angeles County) unless
jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”
F8b_1, F8b_2, F8b_3 cannot be
IBML (Los Angeles County) or LRC- You have selected a make and model which is not used in your
1000 (Los Angeles County) unless jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”
Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not
have the information to respond, please enter “Data not
Required items cannot be left blank available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this
category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you,
please enter “Does not apply” and explain in comments section.
If any of A3h to A3j is > 0, response
to corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A3h_other to A3j_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of A4j to A4l is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A4j_other to A4l_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of A5j to A5l is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A5j_other to A5l_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
267| Survey Methodology
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Validation Rule Error Text
If any of A6j to A6l is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A6j_other to A6l_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of A7j to A7l is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A7j_other to A7l_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of A8f to A8h is > 0, response
to corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A8f_other to A8h_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of A9h to A9j is > 0, response
to corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
A9h_other to A9j_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of B22a to B22c is filled, Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
response to corresponding open- category you entered information in. If you do not have any
ended item B22_other is required information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
and vice versa blank.
If any of B27a to B27c is filled, Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
response to corresponding open- category you entered information in. If you do not have any
ended item B27_other is required information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
and vice versa blank.
If any of C1g to C1i is > 0, response
to corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
C1g_other to C1i_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of C9r to C9t is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
C9r_other to C9t_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
Survey Methodology | 268
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Validation Rule Error Text
If E1e is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
E1e_other is required and vice versa category you entered information in. If you do not have any
(i.e., if response is provided for the information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
open-ended text item, a number in blank.
the corresponding item is expected)
If any of E2i to E2k is > 0, response
to corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
E2i_other to E2k_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If any of E3k to E3m is > 0, response
to corresponding open-ended item
Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
E2k_other to E2m_other is required
category you entered information in. If you do not have any
and vice versa (i.e., if response is
information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
provided for the open-ended text
blank.
item, a number in the corresponding
item is expected)
If F1h is > 0, response to
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description and a response for the “Other”
F1h_other is required and vice versa category you entered information in. If you do not have any
(i.e., if response is provided for the information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them
open-ended text item, a number in blank.
the corresponding item is expected)
If F2e_5 is selected in the Online
Survey or Excel template, a response
Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
to the corresponding open-ended
item F2_other is required
If F3f = Yes, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F3f_other is required
If F4f = Yes, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F4f_other is required
If F5b_1 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F5b_1other is required
If F5b_2 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F5b_2other is required
If F5b_3 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F5b_3other is required
If F6b_1 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F6b_1other is required
If F6b_2 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F6b_2other is required
If F6b_3 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F6b_3other is required
269| Survey Methodology
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Validation Rule Error Text
If F7b_1 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F7b_1other is required
If F7b_2 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F7b_2other is required
If F7b_3 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F7b_3other is required
If F8b_1 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F8b_1other is required
If F8b_2 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F8b_2other is required
If F8b_3 = Other, a response to the
corresponding open-ended item Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
F8b_3other is required
Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not
have the information to respond, please enter “Data not
If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1, F5c_1,
available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this
F5d_1, F5d_2, F5d_3 and F5d_4
category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you,
cannot be blank
please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments
section.
Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not
have the information to respond, please enter “Data not
If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1, F6c_1,
available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this
F6d_1, F6d_2, F6d_3 and F6d_4
category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you,
cannot be blank
please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments
section.
Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not
have the information to respond, please enter “Data not
If F7a = Yes, then F7b_1, F7c_1,
available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this
F7d_1, F7d_2, F7d_3, F7d_4 and
category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you,
F7d_5 cannot be blank
please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments
section.
Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not
have the information to respond, please enter “Data not
If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1, F8c_1,
available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this
F8d_1, F8d_2, F8d_3, F8d_4 and
category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you,
F8d_5 cannot be blank
please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments
section.
Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not
have the information to respond, please enter “Data not
If F9a = Yes, then F9d_1, F9d_2,
available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this
F9d_3, F9d_4 and F9d_5 cannot be
category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you,
blank
please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments
section.
Negative numbers are not allowed as responses in EAVS. If you
Flag any negative value in numeric
intended to respond “Does not apply” (-88) or “Data not available”
items
(-99), please select the appropriate check box instead.
Negative numbers outside of responses of “Data not available” (-
Flag any negative value except for 99), “Does not apply” (-88), and “Valid skip”
-77, -88, and -99 in numeric items (-77) are not allowed as responses in EAVS. Please review and
provide a valid response.
Survey Methodology | 270
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Validation Rule Error Text
Flag any value with decimals in Numbers with decimals are not allowed as valid responses. Please
numeric items review your response to the item and enter a valid number.
271| Survey Methodology
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Methodology Appendix C: Post-Submission Validations and
Sample Rates
Table 1: Sample Rates and Outlier Thresholds
Threshold for Flagging
EAVS Rate Calculation Result for Further
Review
Percent of registrations that were new and 𝐴3𝑏 <5%
valid × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >95%
𝐴3𝑑 <1%
Percent of registrations that were duplicates × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >99%
Percent of registrations that were invalid or 𝐴3𝑒 <1%
rejected × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >99%
Percent of registrations that were name, 𝐴3𝑓 <5%
political party, or within-jurisdiction changes × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >95%
𝐴4𝑎 <1%
Percent of registrations received by mail × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >99%
𝐴4𝑏 <1%
Percent of registrations received in person × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >99%
𝐴4𝑐 <1%
Percent of registrations received online × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >99%
Percent of registrations received at motor 𝐴4𝑑 <1%
vehicle agencies × 100
𝐴3𝑎 >99%
Confirmation notices sent as percent of active 𝐴8𝑎 <1%
registered voters × 100
𝐴1𝑏 >35%
Percent of confirmation notices returned 𝐴8𝑏 <1%
confirming valid registration × 100
𝐴8𝑎 >50%
Percent of confirmation notices returned 𝐴8𝑐 <1%
confirming invalid registration × 100
𝐴8𝑎 >35%
Percent of confirmation notices returned as 𝐴8𝑑 <1%
undeliverable × 100
𝐴8𝑎 >35%
𝐴8𝑒 <10%
Percent of confirmation notices unreturned × 100
𝐴8𝑎 >80%
Percent of registrations removed as percent of 𝐴9𝑎 <1%
total registrants × 100
𝐴1𝑎 >99%
𝐵3𝑎 <0.5%
Percent of FPCAs that were rejected × 100
𝐵2𝑎 >99%
𝐵9𝑎 <5%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned × 100
𝐵5𝑎 >95%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were 𝐵14𝑎 <10%
counted × 100
𝐵9𝑎 >100%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were 𝐵18𝑎 <0.5%
rejected × 100
𝐵9𝑎 >90%
Survey Methodology | 272
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Threshold for Flagging
EAVS Rate Calculation Result for Further
Review
𝐵24𝑎 <10%
Percent of FWABs counted × 100
𝐵23𝑎 >100%
𝐵25𝑎 + 𝐵26𝑎 + 𝐵27𝑎 <0.5%
Percent of FWABs rejected × 100
𝐵23𝑎 >90%
𝐶1𝑏 <5%
Percent of mailed ballots returned × 100
𝐶1𝑎 >95%
𝐶1𝑓 <5%
Percent of mailed ballots unreturned × 100
𝐶1𝑎 >95%
Percent of mailed ballots returned via drop 𝐶6𝑎
× 100 >95%
box 𝐶1𝑏
𝐶7𝑎
Percent of mailed ballots successfully cured × 100 >20%
𝐶1𝑏
𝐶8𝑎 <10%
Percent of mailed ballots counted × 100
𝐶1𝑏 >100%
𝐶9𝑎 <0.5%
Percent of mailed ballots rejected × 100
𝐶1𝑏 >90%
𝐷7𝑏
Percent of poll workers under age 18 × 100 >50%
𝐷7𝑎
𝐷7𝑐
Percent of poll workers ages 18 to 25 × 100 >50%
𝐷7𝑎
𝐷7𝑑
Percent of poll workers ages 26 to 40 × 100 >50%
𝐷7𝑎
𝐷7𝑒
Percent of poll workers ages 41 to 60 × 100 >50%
𝐷7𝑎
𝐷7𝑓
Percent of poll workers ages 61 to 70 × 100 >50%
𝐷7𝑎
𝐷7𝑔
Percent of poll workers ages 71+ × 100 >50%
𝐷7𝑎
Percent of poll workers who served for first 𝐷9𝑎
× 100 >50%
time 𝐷7𝑎
𝐸1𝑑 <0.5%
Percent of provisional ballots rejected × 100
𝐸1𝑎 >95%
𝐹1𝑎 <35%
Percent of turnout by active registration × 100
𝐴1𝑏 >95%
𝐹1𝑏 <10%
Percent ballots cast in person on Election Day × 100
𝐹1𝑎 >90%
𝐹1𝑑 + 𝐹1𝑔 <5%
Percent ballots cast by mail × 100
𝐹1𝑎 >95%
Percent ballots cast in person before Election 𝐹1𝑓 <1%
Day × 100
𝐹1𝑎 >95%
𝐹1𝑐 <0.1%
Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters × 100
𝐹1𝑎 >50%
273| Survey Methodology
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Threshold for Flagging
EAVS Rate Calculation Result for Further
Review
𝐹1𝑒 <0.01%
Percent ballots cast that were provisional × 100
𝐹1𝑎 >25%
𝐹5𝑐_1 + 𝐹5𝑐_2 + 𝐹5𝑐_3 +
𝐹6𝑐_1 + 𝐹6𝑐_2 + 𝐹6𝑐_3 +
Total number of voting machines deployed <1
𝐹7𝑐_1 + 𝐹7𝑐_2 + 𝐹7𝑐_3 +
𝐹8𝑐_1 + 𝐹8𝑐_2 + 𝐹8𝑐_3
𝐴1𝑎 <50%
Percent of registrants by CVAP × 100
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃 >130%
𝐹1𝑎 <35%
Percent of turnout by CVAP × 100
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃 >95%
Survey Methodology | 274
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Table 2: Comparisons to the 2018 EAVS Data
Threshold for Flagging
EAVS Rate Calculation
Result for Further Review
2022 total registrations as percentage 𝐴1𝑎[2022] <50%
× 100
of 2018’s registrations 𝐴1𝑎[2018] >150%
2022 registrations received as 𝐴3𝑎[2022] <25%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐴3𝑎[2018] >200%
2022 registrations removed as 𝐴9𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐴9𝑎[2018] >200%
2022 UOCAVA registrants as 𝐵1𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐵1𝑎[2018] >200%
2022 UOCAVA ballots transmitted as 𝐵5𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐵5𝑎[2018] >200%
2022 UOCAVA ballots returned as 𝐵9𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐵9𝑎[2018] >200%
2022 UOCAVA ballots counted as 𝐵14𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐵14𝑎[2018] >200%
2022 mailed ballots transmitted as 𝐶1𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐶1𝑎[2018] >500%
2022 mailed ballots returned as 𝐶1𝑏[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐶1𝑏[2018] >500%
2022 mailed ballots counted as 𝐶8𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐶3𝑎[2018] >500%
2022 provisional ballots cast as 𝐸1𝑎[2022] <10%
× 100
percentage of 2018’s 𝐸1𝑎[2018] >500%
2022 total turnout as percentage of 𝐹1𝑎[2022] <50%
2018’s × 100
𝐹1𝑎[2018] >150%
275| Survey Methodology
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Methodology Appendix D: How to Calculate Selected EAVS Rates
The EAVS item numbers in this table correspond to the question numbering for the 2022 EAVS.
To determine item numbering for previous EAVS surveys, please refer to the survey instrument
and data codebook for each year.
EAVS Rate Calculation
𝐴1𝑎
Total CVAP registration rate × 100
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃
𝐴1𝑏
Active CVAP registration rate × 100
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃
𝐴3𝑏
Percentage of registrations that were new and valid × 100
𝐴3𝑎
𝐴3𝑑
Percentage of registrations that were duplicates × 100
𝐴3𝑎
𝐴3𝑒
Percentage of registrations that were rejected × 100
𝐴3𝑎
Percentage of registrations that were name, political party, or 𝐴3𝑓
× 100
within-jurisdiction changes 𝐴3𝑎
Percentage of total registration forms that were received by 𝐴4𝑎
× 100
mail 𝐴3𝑎
Percentage of total registration forms that were received in 𝐴4𝑏
× 100
person at election or registrar offices 𝐴3𝑎
Percentage of total registration forms that were submitted by
𝐴4𝑐
individual voters through web-based online registration × 100
systems 𝐴3𝑎
Percentage of total registration forms that were received 𝐴4𝑑
× 100
through motor vehicle agencies 𝐴3𝑎
Voter registration removal rate as a percentage of total 𝐴9𝑎
× 100
registrants 𝐴1𝑎
𝐵3𝑎
Percentage of FPCAs that were rejected × 100
𝐵2𝑎
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were 𝐵9𝑎
× 100
returned by voters 𝐵5𝑎
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were 𝐵14𝑎
× 100
returned by voters and counted 𝐵9𝑎
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were 𝐵18𝑎
× 100
returned by voters and rejected 𝐵9𝑎
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were 𝐵24𝑎
× 100
counted 𝐵23𝑎
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were (𝐵25𝑎 + 𝐵26𝑎 + 𝐵27𝑎)
rejected × 100
𝐵23𝑎
Percentage of transmitted mail ballots that were returned by 𝐶1𝑏
× 100
voters 𝐶1𝑎
Survey Methodology | 276
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EAVS Rate Calculation
𝐶8𝑎
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were counted × 100
𝐶1𝑏
𝐶9𝑎
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were rejected × 100
𝐶1𝑏
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were returned via 𝐶6𝑎
drop box × 100
𝐶1𝑏
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were successfully 𝐶7𝑎
cured × 100
𝐶1𝑏
Percentage of counted mail ballots that were successfully 𝐶7𝑎
cured × 100
𝐶8𝑎
Percentage of poll workers who served for the first time in 𝐷9𝑎
the 2022 general election × 100
𝐷7𝑎
Percentage of provisional ballots that were counted, either in (𝐸1𝑏 + 𝐸1𝑐)
× 100
full or in part (𝐸1𝑏 + 𝐸1𝑐 + 𝐸1𝑑 + 𝐸1𝑒)
𝐸1𝑑
Percentage of provisional ballots that were rejected × 100
(𝐸1𝑏 + 𝐸1𝑐 + 𝐸1𝑑 + 𝐸1𝑒)
𝐹1𝑎
Voter turnout rate by CVAP × 100
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑃
Percentage of ballots that were cast at a physical polling 𝐹1𝑏
place on Election Day × 100
𝐹1𝑎
(𝐹1𝑑 + 𝐹1𝑔)
Percentage of ballots that were cast as mail ballots × 100
𝐹1𝑎
Percentage of ballots that were cast in-person before 𝐹1𝑓
Election Day × 100
𝐹1𝑎
𝐹1𝑐
Percentage of ballots that were cast by UOCAVA voters × 100
𝐹1𝑎
𝐹1𝑒
Percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters × 100
𝐹1𝑎
277| Survey Methodology
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Survey Methodology | 280