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Alaskans for Mary and DSCC's motion to intervene and memorandum in support, United States v. State of Alaska

U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska (via Democracy Docket) · 2026-10-23

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David R. Fox* Thomas P. Amodio
Joshua Abbuhl* Kevin M. Boots
Qizhou Ge* Lily Ginsburg
Max C. Accardi* REEVES AMODIO, LLC
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP 500 L Street, Suite 300
250 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 400 Anchorage, AK 99501
Washington, DC 20001 (907) 222-7100
(202) 948-1135 (907) 222-7199 (facsimile)
dfox@elias.law tom@reevesamodio.com
jabbuhl@elias.law kevin@reevesamodio.com
age@elias.law lginsburg@reevesamodio.com
maccardi@elias.law
Attorneys for Proposed Intervenors
*Pro Hac Vice Applications Forthcoming Alaskans for Mary and DSCC
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT O
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA KE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AC
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Plaintiff, C
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v. EM Case No. 3:26-cv-00376-SLG
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STATE OF ALASKA; CAROL O
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BEECHER, in her official capacity as
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Director of the Division of Elections of the
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State of Alaska; the ELECTION BOARDS
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of the STATE OF ALASKA; and the
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BALLOT COUNTING REVIEW
BOARDS of the STATE OF ALASKA,

Defendants.

ALASKANS FOR MARY AND DSCC’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................. 2

LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 6

ARGUMENT....................................................................................................................... 8

I. Proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervene as of right. ....................................... 8

A. This motion is timely. .................................................................................... 8

B. Proposed Intervenors have protectable interests in the certification of M
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the November 2026 election result................................................................ 8
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C. The existing parties do not adequately represent Proposed Intervenors. .... 12
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II. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenors should be granted permissive
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intervention. ............................................................................................................ 16
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CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 18
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UNITED STATES V. STATE OF ALASKA, ET AL.
Case No. 3:26-cv-00376-SLG
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INTRODUCTION

In an unprecedented pre-emptive strike on democratic elections, the Department of

Justice—acting on the President’s personal orders—demands that this Court enjoin the

certification of the ongoing U.S. Senate election, but only if the President’s preferred

candidate loses.1 Alaskans, apparently, must elect Senator Dan S. Sullivan or the President

will not let them elect anyone at all. But the federal government has no power to impose

that Hobson’s choice on the people of this State. Daniel J. Sullivan’s presence on the ballot

raises a question of Alaska law that was litigated and definitively resolved by the Alaska
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Supreme Court months ago. The National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”)—the only
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legal basis the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provides for its claims—regulates voter
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registration and has literally nothing to say about which candidates are listed on the ballot
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or how they are displayed. Those issues are governed by state law. And the Department of
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Justice’s assumption that every voter who casts a vote for Daniel J. Sullivan really meant
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to vote for Senator Sullivan is insulting to voters and irreconcilable with Alaska’s ranked-
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choice voting procedures and the ballot’s clear differentiation between the two candidates.
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Alaskans for Mary and DSCC are entitled to intervene as of right to defend against

the Department of Justice’s extraordinary assault. Candidates and their campaigns have

“an obvious personal stake in how the result” of their election “is determined and

regarded,” and interference with the electoral process “deprives candidates of the[ir]

1
See Nicholas Riccardi, WATCH: Trump Says He Ordered DOJ Lawsuit over Alaska
Senate Race, PBS.com (Oct. 23, 2026), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-
administration-files-lawsuit-to-block-possible-democratic-win-in-alaska-senate-race.
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opportunity to compete for election under the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 79 (2026). DSCC is the Democratic Party’s

national senatorial campaign committee, with a direct interest in supporting the election of

Democratic Senate candidates like Mary Peltola. This case directly threatens both Proposed

Intervenors’ interests by demanding that defendants refuse to certify the election if, and

only if, Peltola wins. It is part of a nationwide attack on free elections by the federal

government, which the DSCC has fought at every turn.2 And there is reason to doubt that

the existing defendants will vigorously defend against DOJ’s demands, given their effort
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to exclude Daniel J. Sullivan from the ballot earlier this year.
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The Court should grant this Motion and, ultimately, dismiss this case.
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BACKGROUND
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Mary Peltola declared her candidacy for the U.S. Senate seat currently held by
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Senator Dan S. Sullivan on January 12, 2026. On the same day, she launched her campaign
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committee, Alaskans for Mary. In the August 18, 2026, primary election, Peltola received
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2
See, e.g., Complaint, DSCC v. Trump, No. 1:26-cv-3674 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2026), ECF
No. 1 (challenging DOJ’s unlawful threats to state election officials if they do not
unlawfully purge lawfully registered voters); Complaint, DSCC v. ICE, No. 1:26-cv-3330
(D.D.C. Sep. 23, 2026), ECF No. 1 (challenging voter intimidation by armed federal agents
at polling places); DSCC v. Trump, No. 1:26-cv-1114, 2026 WL 2681471 (D.D.C. Sept. 13,
2026) (enjoining, nationwide, unlawful Postal Service rule restricting mail voting in case
brought by DSCC).
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49.5% of the vote, more than any other candidate. She advanced to the general election

along with three other candidates.

Peltola’s candidacy is supported by DSCC, the Democratic Party’s national

senatorial committee, which is charged with supporting the election of Democratic

candidates to the U.S. Senate. It accomplishes that mission by, among other things,

assisting state parties, mobilizing their supporters, protecting access to the franchise for

Democratic voters, and—particularly relevant here—defending the victories of

Democratic candidates. M
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One of Peltola’s three opponents in the general election is Daniel S. Sullivan, the
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incumbent junior U.S. Senator from Alaska who is up for reelection this November.
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Senator Sullivan is a member of the Republican Party. Earlier this year, the Alaska
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Republican Party complained to the Alaska Division of Elections about the candidacy of
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another of Peltola’s opponents, Daniel J. Sullivan (“Mr. Sullivan”), asserting that voters
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might confuse Mr. Sullivan with Senator Sullivan. The Division of Elections excluded Mr.
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Sullivan’s name from the primary election ballot based on a determination that he was not
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a good-faith candidate. But Mr. Sullivan successfully challenged the Division’s decision

to remove him from the primary ballot as a violation of Alaska law and the U.S.

Constitution in state court. On June 26, 2026, a superior court judge ordered the Division

of Elections to include Mr. Sullivan’s name on the primary ballot, Order on Administrative

Appeal, Sullivan v. Alaska Division of Elections, No. 3AN-26-07485CI (Alaska Super. Ct.

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June 26, 2026).3 Three days later, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. Order, Alaska

Division of Elections v. Sullivan, No. S-19935 (Alaska June 29, 2026).4 The Alaska

Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Division of Elections and directed it to decide

how to list Mr. Sullivan as a candidate in accordance with Alaska ballot design law. Id.

On June 29, 2026, the Division of Elections released the sample ballot for the 2026

primary. To ensure that voters could distinguish the two candidates, it listed Mr. Sullivan

with no party designation and added “Incumbent” next to Senator Sullivan’s listing.5 No

one—from DOJ or otherwise—sued to challenge this approach. The primary occurred on
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August 18, and on August 31, the Division of Elections certified the results of the primary
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and finalized the general election ballot design with the top four candidates advancing to
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the general election. The ballot listings for Senator Sullivan and Mr. Sullivan mirrored the
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primary-election ballot design, indicating Senator Sullivan’s status as “Incumbent” and
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listing Mr. Sullivan without a party designation:
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3
Available at https://perma.cc/WY72-2DK7.
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Available at https://perma.cc/UFR5-GTJF.
5
See Sample Ballot 2026 Primary, Div. of Elections, State of Alaska,
https://perma.cc/3UBW-7FEB (last visited Oct. 23, 2026).
6
Sample Ballot: Federal Only, Div. of Elections, State of Alaska, https://perma.cc/F6LL-
TKVC (last visited Oct. 23, 2026).
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Once again, no one—from DOJ or otherwise—challenged this ballot listing or the

Division’s decision to list these four candidates on the general election ballot. The ballots

were therefore printed in that format. Absentee ballots were mailed on October 9, and in-

person early voting began on October 19.7

Yesterday, DOJ filed this case against the State of Alaska, the Director of the

Division of Elections of the State of Alaska, the Election Boards, and the State Ballot

Counting Review Board. DOJ seeks a court order prohibiting the State from certifying the

results of the U.S. Senate election, if “(1) Senator Sullivan does not win the election; and
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(2) had all votes cast for Daniel J. Sullivan been cast instead for Senator Sullivan and
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Alaska’s rank-choice process played out accordingly, Senator Sullivan would have won
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the election.” Compl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 1. In other words, if Senator Sullivan wins, DOJ wants
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the election certified. But if he loses, DOJ wants the Court to assume that every vote cast
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for Mr. Sullivan should have been cast for Senator Sullivan instead, and to further forbid
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the State from certifying Peltola’s victory if that hypothetical would change the result.
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DOJ then demands an unspecified “investigation to determine whether votes cast
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for Daniel J. Sullivan were meant to be cast for Senator Sullivan and any further procedures

or relief this Court deems necessary and appropriate to determine what the result would

have been absent Daniel J. Sullivan’s inclusion on the ballot.” Compl. ¶ 44. DOJ does not

7
Absentee and Early Voting, Div. of Elections, State of Alaska, https://perma.cc/U6CD-
KCSY (last visited Oct. 23, 2026); James Brooks, Thousands of Alaskans are Voting Before
Election Day. Some ballots Won’t Be Counted Until After It, Alaska Beacon (Oct. 22, 2026),
https://perma.cc/RXZ4-SXHJ.

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explain how such an investigation could possibly be undertaken given the secret ballot, nor

provide any explanation for why the voters’ own votes are not the best evidence of their

intent—particularly under Alaska’s ranked-choice voting system, where a voter who is not

sure which Sullivan to vote for is perfectly able to rank both.

The only legal basis DOJ cites for its extreme demands is the NVRA, a statute that

exclusively regulates voter registration. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501, et seq. Nothing in the

NVRA regulates which candidates are listed on ballots or how they are displayed. See id.

The language that the Complaint cites from the NVRA—about “protect[ing] the integrity
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of the electoral process,” Compl. ¶ 3 (alteration in original) (quoting 52 U.S.C.
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§20501(b)(3))—comes from Congress’s explanation of the “purposes of” the law’s new
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federal voter regulations, and does not purport to itself impose any obligations on States,
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much less obligations disconnected from the registration regulations that are the NVRA’s
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exclusive subject. DOJ does not cite a single case holding or suggesting otherwise.
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D LEGAL STANDARD
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A party may intervene either as a matter of right or with permission of the Court.
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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a movant has a right to intervene if it satisfies

four requirements:

(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly
protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect
that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented
by the parties to the action.

Wilderness Soc’y. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra

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Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)). In applying this test, “[c]ourts are to

take all well-pleaded, nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the proposed

complaint or answer in intervention, and declarations supporting the motion as true absent

sham, frivolity or other objections.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d

810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001).

Alternatively, the Court has discretion to grant permissive intervention under Rule

24(b) if the movant can show that “(1) it shares a common question of law or fact with the

main action; (2) its motion is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for
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jurisdiction over the applicant’s claims,” Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th
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Cir. 1998), though the third element is not required where—as here—the movant seeks to
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intervene as a defendant and does not seek additional relief, see Freedom from Religion
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Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining third element “does
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not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor
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is not raising new claims”). D
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“Regardless of what type of intervention is sought, the Ninth Circuit upholds a
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liberal policy in favor of intervention.” Nw. Env’t Advocs. v. EPA, No. 3:12-cv-1751, 2014

WL 1094981, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2014) (citing Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179).

“Such a policy allows for both efficient resolution of issues and broadened access to the

courts.” Id. (citation modified).8

8
In compliance with Rule 24(c), Proposed Intervenors attach a Proposed Answer to this
motion. However, Proposed Intervenors intend to file a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if intervention is granted.
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ARGUMENT

I. Proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervene as of right.

A. This motion is timely.

In determining whether a motion for intervention as of right is timely, courts

consider the totality of the circumstances, with a focus on three factors: “(1) the stage of

the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties;

and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.” W. Watersheds Project v. Haaland, 22 F.4th

828, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2022). M
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This motion is indisputably timely. DOJ filed suit on October 22, and this motion
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was filed the next day—before any case schedule has been set, before any defendants have
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appeared or answered, and before the Court has taken any substantial action. There is no
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conceivable prejudice to any existing party because no deadlines have yet been set. See Or.
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Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Shuford, No. 6:06-cv-242, 2006 WL 2601073, at *2 (D. Or. Sep. 8,
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2006) (finding no prejudice where intervenors moved promptly and agreed “to comply with
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the court’s discovery and pretrial scheduling order”), aff’d sub nom. Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n
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v. McDaniel, 405 F. App’x 197 (9th Cir. 2010). Proposed Intervenors therefore satisfy the

timeliness factor for intervention as of right.

B. Proposed Intervenors have protectable interests in the certification of
the November 2026 election result.

“[A] prospective intervenor ‘has a sufficient interest for intervention purposes if it

will suffer a practical impairment of its interests as a result of the pending litigation.”

Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179 (quoting California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States,

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450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2006)). Consistent with its liberal standard, “Rule 24(a)(2) does

not require a specific legal or equitable interest,” id. (citing County of Fresno v. Andrus,

622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980)), and “[i]t is generally enough that the interest is

protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship between the legally protected

interest and the claims at issue.” Id. (quoting Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1484). “[T]he

‘interest’ test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many

apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process.” Id.

(citation modified). Applicants thus need not show that impairment is a “certainty,” but
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only that “disposition of the action ‘may’ practically impair a party’s ability to protect their
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interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont.
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Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)).
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Once an applicant has shown some protectible interest, courts generally “have little
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difficulty concluding that the disposition of [a] case may, as a practical matter, affect” those
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interests. California ex rel. Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 442.
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Proposed Intervenors self-evidently satisfy that standard here. Alaskans for Mary is
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the principal campaign committee for Mary Peltola, the Democratic Party candidate for the

U.S. Senate from Alaska. As the Supreme Court made clear earlier this year, “[c]andidates

. . . are not ‘mere bystanders’ in their own elections,” and “[t]hey have an obvious personal

stake in how the result is determined and regarded.” Bost, 607 U.S. at 78–79 (citation

omitted). Thus, a “[d]eparture[] from the preordained rules cause[s] them particularized

and concrete harm.” Id. at 79. In particular, the Court held that candidates have a “legally

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cognizable” interest in ensuring that their elections are “certified with lawful votes.,” Iid.

at 77 n.4 (citation modified). And Bost involved Article III standing, which sets a higher

bar than the showing necessary for intervention. See Yniquez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735

(9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Article III standing requirements are more stringent than those for

intervention under rule 24(a).”).

DOJ’s Complaint directly threatens Alaskans for Mary’s interest in seeing Peltola

elected as a U.S. Senator and having that election certified. If Peltola receives the most

votes at the conclusion of the ranked-choice voting process, the Complaint seeks a judicial
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order that would prevent her election from being certified pending some undefined (and
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obviously unworkable) “investigation” to determine whether votes cast for one candidate
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“were meant to be cast” for another. See Compl. ¶¶ 42, 44. Lest there be any doubt, the
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Complaint is crystal clear that the relief it seeks is specifically intended to guard against a
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Peltola victory. See id. ¶¶ 34, 42, 44 (noting, based on DOJ’s review of “[m]any polls,”
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that there is a “realistic chance” of “a victory for Peltola,” and therefore asking for an order
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preventing the certification of election results if she wins pending DOJ’s undefined,
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hypothetical investigation into the intent of potentially thousands of voters). Courts

consistently allow candidates (or their campaigns) to intervene in lawsuits that threaten

their election. See, e.g., Craig v. Simon, 493 F. Supp. 3d 773, 781 (D. Minn. 2020)

(observing “[a]s a nominee in the election for Minnesota’s Second Congressional District,

Kistner has an interest in the subject matter and the outcome of this litigation,” and granting

intervention as of right); Martin v. Crittenden, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2018)

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(granting intervention as of right to congressional campaign committee in lawsuit

challenging rule regarding the counting of certain ballots); Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of

Elections, 233 F.R.D. 95, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The Candidates here have shown that

they have a direct, substantial and protectable interest in this litigation, and upon

determination of the suit their interests will be impacted by the outcome of the election.”

(citation omitted)). Consequently, this unprecedented lawsuit is a direct threat to the

“significantly protectible” interests of Alaskans for Mary.

DSCC’s interests are similarly threatened by DOJ’s lawsuit. As the Democratic
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Party’s national senatorial campaign committee, DSCC has a substantial interest in the
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election of Democratic candidates to the U.S. Senate, and in Alaska, it is specifically
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interested in the election of Mary Peltola. It has poured staff time, money, and other
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resources into the campaign, and its interest in her election is directly threatened by DOJ’s
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last-minute ploy to stop the certification of the election. Courts have regularly recognized
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the interests of political parties in election litigation, including the inclusion of candidates
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from other political parties on the general election ballot, and granted their intervention.
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See, e.g., La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 29 F.4th 299, 305 (5th Cir. 2022) (granting

intervention as of right for political parties, including the National Republican Senatorial

Committee, where “claims . . . could affect [their] ability to participate in . . . the election

process”); N.C. Green Party v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 619 F. Supp. 3d 547, 562

(E.D.N.C. 2022) (granting intervention as of right for political party committees, including

DSCC, in dispute about the inclusion of another political party’s candidates on the general

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election ballot); Issa v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-1044, 2020 WL 3074351, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

June 10, 2020) (granting intervention as of right for political party that sought to

“advance[e] their overall electoral prospects”); Pa. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v.

Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., No. 23-3166, Doc. 129 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2024) (granting

intervention for political parties, including DSCC in election lawsuit).

C. The existing parties do not adequately represent Proposed Intervenors.

Proposed Intervenors cannot be assured adequate representation if they are denied

intervention. “The burden of showing inadequacy of representation is minimal and is
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satisfied if the applicant can demonstrate that representation of its interests may be
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inadequate.” Alaska Indus. Dev. & Exp. Auth. v. Biden, No. 3:21-CV-00245-SLG, 2022
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WL 1137312, at *2 (D. Alaska Apr. 18, 2022) (quoting W. Watersheds Project v. Haaland,
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22 F.4th 828, 840 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified)); see also Berger v. N.C. State Conf.
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of the NAACP, 597 U.S. 179, 196 (2022) (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers., 404
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U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)). Courts are “liberal in finding” this requirement satisfied
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because “there is good reason in most cases to suppose that the applicant is the best judge
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of the representation of the applicant’s own interests.” 7C Wright & Miller’s Federal

Practice & Procedure § 1909 (3d ed. 2024). Because Proposed Intervenors’ interests are

distinct, none of the existing parties adequately represents them.

DOJ naturally does not represent Proposed Intervenors’ interests, as it seeks an order

that would prevent the prompt and lawful certification of an election victory by Peltola.

Compl. ¶¶ 42, 44. Nor can Proposed Intervenors count on adequate representation by the

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UNITED STATES V. STATE OF ALASKA, ET AL.
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State of Alaska or any of the other named defendants. DOJ’s Complaint is based in

substantial part on Defendant Beecher’s prior attempt—reversed by the Alaska Supreme

Court—to disqualify the same candidate that DOJ asserts will cause voter confusion. See

id. ¶¶ 22–23. In light of those past actions, Proposed Intervenors have reason to fear that

Defendant Beecher may not vigorously oppose DOJ’s requested relief.

Further, federal courts have “often concluded that governmental entities do not

adequately represent the interests of aspiring intervenors.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v.

Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This is because a government-official
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defendant’s interests are “necessarily colored by [their] view of the public welfare rather
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than the more parochial views of a proposed intervenor whose interest is personal to it.”
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Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the burden
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in these circumstances is “comparatively light”). Simply put, “the government’s
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representation of the public interest may not be ‘identical to the individual parochial
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interest’ of a particular group just because ‘both entities occupy the same posture in the
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litigation.’” Citizens for Balanced Use, 647 F.3d at 899 (quoting WildEarth Guardians v.
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U.S. Forest Serv., 573 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 2009)).

The Supreme Court recently emphasized this point, explaining that public officials

must “bear in mind broader public-policy implications,” whereas private litigants—like

Proposed Intervenors—seek to vindicate their own rights “full stop.” Berger, 597 U.S. at

195–96 (quoting Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10). Thus, courts should not conduct the

adequacy of representation analysis at too “high [a] level of abstraction,” even where the

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parties’ interests “seem[] closely aligned,” as the burden to demonstrate inadequate

representation remains “minimal” unless those interests are “identical.” Id. at 196 (citation

omitted). In other words, even if one or more of the State defendants were to oppose the

relief that DOJ seeks at a high level of abstraction—a perhaps doubtful proposition in light

of Defendant Beecher’s involvement with the prior administrative process discussed in

DOJ’s complaint—it does not follow that they would share “identical” interests to the

electoral and partisan interests of Alaskans for Mary and DSCC. See id.

Because the existing defendants are government entities and officials, they do not
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share “identical” interests with Proposed Intervenors. Defendants are obliged to carry out
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Alaska’s electoral process, in theory without preferencing any individual candidate.
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Proposed Intervenors, in contrast, are focused entirely on ensuring that Peltola is elected in
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Alaska and, in DSCC’s case, that DOJ does not succeed in interfering with the
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certifications of victories by Democratic candidates, both in Alaska and across the country.
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See Craig, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 781 (holding that because the proposed intervenor was “a
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candidate for [Congress],” the candidate’s “interests are not adequately represented by the
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existing [State] defendant”); see also, e.g., Bellitto v. Snipes, No. 16-cv-61474, 2016 WL

5118568, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2016) (concluding adequate representation was not

guaranteed where existing defendant was “an elected official” whose interpretation of legal

requirements might not be aligned with intervenors’ interests).

For similar reasons, defendants may have incentives to settle the case on terms

favorable to DOJ in order to avoid potential retaliation from DOJ (or the federal

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government more broadly). Defendants may justifiably fear such retaliation, particularly

given President Trump’s personal directive to file this lawsuit. Indeed, less than a year ago,

Alaska gave DOJ an unredacted copy of its entire statewide voter file, providing DOJ with

access to highly sensitive information about every one of its voters merely because DOJ

asked for it,9 even while dozens of other States refused DOJ’s request because it had no

authority to request such information (notably, those States have uniformly succeeded in

resisting such efforts in court). See United States v. Hobbs, No. C25-6078-KKE, 2026 WL

2833713, at *1 & n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 22, 2026) (collecting cases in which federal courts
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dismissed lawsuits in which DOJ attempted to gain the same information from other states).
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Courts regularly find inadequate representation where an existing party may resolve a case
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on terms that Proposed Intervenors would not agree to. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Fed.
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Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 660 F.3d 980, 986 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a possible
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“conflict of interest . . . when it comes to settlement possibilities” favors intervention);
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Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 974 (similar); cf. United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-
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02265-SI, 2013 WL 12309780, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013) (finding lack of adequate
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representation where parties disagreed on terms of settlement agreement).

In sum, the government entities and public officials on both sides of this case have

markedly different interests than Proposed Intervenors and thus do not sufficiently

represent their interests, which are directly impacted by the disposition of this matter.

9
See Press Release, Div. of Elections, State of Alaska, Lt. Gov. Submits Alaska Voter
Registration List to the U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 23, 2025), https://perma.cc/6PX5-
HAFZ.
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II. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenors should be granted permissive
intervention.

If the Court denies intervention as of right, it should alternatively exercise its

discretion to grant permissive intervention. Rule 24(b) is readily satisfied: Proposed

Intervenors assert a “defense that shares with the main action a common question of law

or fact,” and granting intervention would not “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication”

of the matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Proposed Intervenors have moved promptly, so there

will be no delay or prejudice to the existing parties. See supra Section I.A. And Proposed
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Intervenors’ defense requires resolution of the same factual and legal issues raised in the
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underlying lawsuit. See Ex. A (Proposed Intervenors’ Proposed Answer).
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The Ninth Circuit has also identified additional considerations the Court can weigh
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for permissive intervention requests. See Callahan v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc.,
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42 F.4th 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2022). Those considerations—including the proposed
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intervenors’ interests, the adequacy of the representation for their interests, and the
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intervenors’ contribution to the factual and legal issues—buttress the case for intervention
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here. See id.
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First, Proposed Intervenors have especially stark interests at stake. Alaskans for

Mary is the principal campaign committee for Mary Peltola, and the relief DOJ seeks would

prevent Alaska from certifying Peltola’s victory if she wins by a narrow margin. DSCC’s

interests are equally strong. DSCC’s principal mission is to help Democrats regain control

of the Senate, and Peltola is a Democrat running in a competitive Senate race. Preventing

certification of the election results would directly frustrate DSCC’s mission. These are

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precisely the sort of significant interests that courts in this circuit have held warrant

intervention. See, e.g., Issa v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-01044-MCE-CKD, 2020 WL

3074351, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (granting intervention for DCCC, DSCC’s

counterpart for the U.S. House of Representatives, in a challenge to a California executive

order concerning mail-in voting, in part because of DCCC’s interest in “advancing [the

Democrats’] overall electoral prospects”); Paher v. Cegavske, No. 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-

WGC, 2020 WL 2042365, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020) (similarly granting a motion to

intervene by DCCC in a suit concerning election rules based on DCCC’s interest in
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“ensur[ing] the election of Democratic Party candidates”). KE
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Second, for the reasons explained above, the interests of Alaskans for Mary and
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DSCC are not adequately represented by the existing Defendants. Indeed, Proposed
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Intervenors’ “private interests” in securing Peltola’s election to the U.S. Senate are
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“different in kind from the public interests of the State or its officials.” La Union del Pueblo
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Entero, 29 F.4th at 309. The disparity in interests is particularly salient here, given Alaska
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election officials’ previous determination disqualifying Daniel J. Sullivan from the ballot,
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on which DOJ bases its claim here.

Third, Proposed Intervenors will contribute to the “full development of the

underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal

questions presented.” Callahan, 42 F.4th at 1022 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd.

of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977)). Indeed, many of the factual allegations in

the complaint directly concern Peltola and her campaign. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 31, 34. These

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allegations not only supply Alaskans for Mary with an independent protectable interest in

this litigation, see N.C. Green Party v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 619 F. Supp. 3d 547,

562 (E.D.N.C. 2022) (holdingthat a party could intervene as of right, in part because there

were “numerous allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint concerning the intervenor[]”

to which it was entitled to respond), they also underscore why Proposed Intervenors’

participation will help elucidate the issues at stake. “Courts often allow the permissive

intervention of political parties in actions challenging voting laws for exactly th[ese]

reason[s].” Democratic Party of Virginia v. Brink, No. 3:21-CV-756-HEH, 2022 WL
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330183, at *2 & n.5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2022) (collecting cases).10
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Because Rule 24 is liberally construed to protect Proposed Intervenors’ rights and
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interests, and because Proposed Intervenors’ participation will assist rather than prejudice
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the efficient development and resolution of this matter, the Court should grant permissive
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intervention if it does not find that Proposed Intervenors may intervene as of right.
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For the foregoing reasons, Proposed Intervenors respectfully request that the Court
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grant intervention as of right—or in the alternative grant permissive intervention.

10
See also Ariz. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hobbs, No. CV-22-01374-PHX-GMS, 2022 WL
4448320, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2022) (collecting cases); Nielsen v. DeSantis, No.
4:20CV236-RH-MJF, 2020 WL 6589656, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 2020) (granting
permissive intervention to Republican-affiliated organizations “with experienced attorneys
who might well bring perspective that others miss or choose not to provide”); Martin, 347
F. Supp. 3d at 1307 (alternatively granting congressional campaign permissive intervention
in case involving counting of ballots).
ALASKANS FOR MARY AND DSCC’S MOTION TO INTERVENE PAGE 18 OF 21
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Dated: October 23, 2026. REEVES AMODIO LLC
Attorneys for Proposed Intervenors

By: /s/ Thomas P. Amodio
Thomas P. Amodio, ABA #8511142
tom@reevesamodio.com

By: /s/ Lily Ginsburg
Lily Ginsburg, ABA #2411117
lginsburg@reevesamodio.com

By: /s/ Kevin M. Boots
Kevin M. Boots, ABA #0912090
kevin@reevesamodio.com
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500 L Street, Suite 300
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Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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Telephone: (907) 222-7100
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David R. Fox*
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Joshua Abbuhl*
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Qizhou Ge*
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Max C. Accardi*
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M ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
O 250 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 400
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D (202) 948-1135
IE dfox@elias.law
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age@elias.law
maccardi@elias.law

*Pro Hac Vice Applications Forthcoming

Attorneys for Proposed Intervenors
Alaskans for Mary and DSCC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 23, 2026, I filed a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court of

Alaska by using the CM/ECF system. Participants in this Case No. 3:26-cv-00376-SLG

who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the CM/ECF system.

/s/ Lily Ginsburg
Lily Ginsburg

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