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Application 26A305 for a stay of the September 4 injunction
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General · 2026-09-06
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No. _____
In the Supreme Court of the United States
───────────
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
───────────
DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.
───────────
APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION ISSUED
BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
AND REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
───────────
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement ....................................................................................................................... 7
Argument ..................................................................................................................... 12
A. The Government Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits Because The
Postal Service’s Rule Is Lawful ........................................................................ 13
B. The Remaining Factors Favor a Stay .............................................................. 28
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 35
(i)
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Applicants in United States Postal Service v. California (defendants-appellants
below) are the United States Postal Service; David Steiner, Postmaster General and
Chief Executive Officer of the Postal Service, and Member of the Postal Service Board
of Governors; Douglas Tulino, Deputy Postmaster General, Chief Operating Officer,
and Chief Human Resources Officer of the Postal Service, and Member of the Postal
Service Board of Governors; Amber McReynolds, Chair of the Postal Service Board of
Governors; Derek T. Kan, Vice Chairman of the Postal Service Board of Governors;
Ronald Stroman, Member of the Postal Service Board of Governors; and Daniel Mark
Tangherlini, Member of the Postal Service Board of Governors.
Respondents in California (plaintiffs-appellees below) are California; Massa-
chusetts; Nevada; Washington; Arizona; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; the Dis-
trict of Columbia; Hawaii; Illinois; Maine; Maryland; Michigan; Minnesota; New Jer-
sey; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; Oregon; Rhode Island; Vermont; Vir-
ginia; Wisconsin; and Josh Shapiro, Governor of Pennsylvania.
Respondents in California (intervenor-defendants below) are Alabama; Flor-
ida; Indiana; Kansas; Louisiana; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Oklahoma; South
Carolina; South Dakota; and Texas.
Applicants in Trump v. League of Women Voters of Massachusetts (LWVMA)
(defendants-appellants below) are Donald J. Trump, President of the United States;
the United States Postal Service; the Board of Governors of the United States Postal
Service; David Steiner, Postmaster General; Douglas Tulino, Deputy Postmaster
General; Amber McReynolds, Chairwoman of the Board of Governors of the United
States Postal Service; Derek T. Kan, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
United States Postal Service; Ronald Stroman, Member of the Board of Governors of
iii
the United States Postal Service; Daniel Mark Tangherlini, Member of the Board of
Governors of the United States Postal Service; the Department of Homeland Security;
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; the Social
Security Administration; Frank J. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; and Joseph B. Edlow,
Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Respondents in LWVMA (plaintiffs-appellees below) are League of Women Vot-
ers of Massachusetts; League of Women Voters Lotte E. Scharfman Memorial Edu-
cation Fund; League of Women Voters of the United States; League of Women Voters
Education Fund; Association of Americans Resident Overseas; U.S. Vote Foundation;
OCA-Asian Pacific American Advocates; and Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc.
Respondents in LWVMA (intervenor-defendants below) are Alabama; Florida;
Indiana; Kansas; Louisiana; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Oklahoma; South Caro-
lina; South Dakota; and Texas.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (D. Mass.):
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (June 18,
2026) (order granting motion to dismiss in part)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (July 13,
2026) (order denying preliminary injunction without prejudice)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (July 22,
2026) (order granting motion to dismiss in part)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (Aug. 11,
2026) (order granting preliminary injunction)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (Aug. 26,
2026) (order vacating preliminary injunction)
State of California v. United States Postal Service, No. 26-cv-13917 (Aug. 27,
iv
2026) (order granting temporary restraining order)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (Aug. 27,
2026) (order granting temporary restraining order)
State of California v. United States Postal Service, No. 26-cv-13917 (Aug. 31,
2026) (docket order denying stay)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (Aug. 31,
2026) (docket order denying stay)
State of California v. United States Postal Service, No. 26-cv-13917 (Sept. 4,
2026) (order granting preliminary injunction)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (Sept. 4,
2026) (order granting preliminary injunction)
United States Court of Appeals (1st Cir.):
State of California v. United States Postal Service, No. 26-2031 (stay motion
filed Sept. 5, 2026)
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-2029 (stay motion
filed Sept. 5, 2026)
In the Supreme Court of the United States
───────────
No. 26A
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
───────────
DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.
───────────
APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION
ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
AND REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
───────────
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
1651, the Solicitor General—on behalf of applicants the United States Postal Service
(“Postal Service” or “USPS”), et al.—respectfully requests that this Court stay the
preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (App., infra, 1a-49a) pending appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit and, if the court of appeals affirms the order, pending
the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further
proceedings in this Court. The Solicitor General also respectfully requests an imme-
diate administrative stay of the order to prevent ongoing irreparable injury while this
application is pending.
(1)
2
Less than two weeks ago, this Court issued a stay of a prior order entered by
the same district court. See Trump v. California, No. 26A124, 2026 WL 2473573
(Aug. 24, 2026) (per curiam). That order had enjoined implementation of a potential
final rule by the Postal Service before it had even issued. In granting a stay, this
Court concluded that the order was necessarily unripe because the district court “had
to engage in a string of speculations to find th[e] suit justiciable” given that it did not
know, for example, “what [a] final rule would say” or whether it “would harm the
States.” Id. at *4. Just three days later—the day after the Postal Service formally
published a final rule—the district court issued a putative temporary restraining or-
der that partially barred implementation of that rule, without meaningfully address-
ing the rule’s contents or providing any meaningful analysis to support its conclusion
that the rule was unlawful. See 26A297 Appl. App. 3a-13a. On Friday, September
4—the day after applicants filed an application for a stay of that order in this Court,
see 26A297 Appl.—the district court issued a preliminary injunction. App., infra, 1a-
49a. The preliminary injunction is materially identical to the temporary restraining
order, both in its substantive scope and its minimal, conclusory reasoning. Compare
id. at 24a-31a, 47a-49a, with 26A297 Appl. App. 9a-10a, 12a-13a. The district court’s
continuing prejudgment of the rule is baseless, and an immediate stay is warranted
because “the District Court’s errors deal ‘a serious setback’ to the Executive’s ‘goals’
while this litigation unfolds.” California, 2026 WL 2473573, at *4.
Contrary to the claims of the district court and respondents that the Postal
Service is trying to federalize the rules for mail-in voting, App., infra, 25a-28a, the
Postal Service’s final rule imposes only modest envelope-design and addressee-infor-
mation requirements for federal-election ballots sent via U.S. Mail. See Ballot Mail
3
for Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Aug. 26, 2026) (“Final Rule” or “Rule”).
Specifically, the Rule creates standardized design and review requirements for ballot
envelopes that build on practices the Postal Service has long recommended, some of
which are already in use in many States (including many of the respondents here).
And it requires States to upload the name, address, and barcode information of in-
tended recipients of ballot mail in an online portal—information that election officials
would necessarily already possess to send ballot mail under the Rule to those recipi-
ents. The Rule ensures that States remain responsible for determining voter eligibil-
ity and eligibility to vote by mail, and it does not dictate ballot content, mailing or
receipt deadlines, or ballot-counting procedures. The Rule thus plainly does not seize
control of States’ administration of elections—it simply imposes reasonable prepara-
tion requirements for certain election-related mail.
The Postal Service has longstanding authority to “adopt * * * such rules and
regulations * * * as may be necessary in the execution of its functions,” 39 U.S.C.
401(2), which include “the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding,
returning, and holding of mail,” 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(1). That authority plainly encom-
passes the power to promulgate rules like this that govern envelope design and ad-
dressee information. The Postal Service has previously wielded that authority to is-
sue analogous preparation requirements for the mailing of cremated remains and
replica explosives. Indeed, the Postal Service has also used that authority to adopt
policies that specifically govern election-related mail, such as supporting the use of
the Election Mail logo and prioritizing ballot mail for processing and delivery.
The Rule’s regulation of the U.S. Mail—not federal elections—is plainly con-
stitutional. While the States have primary authority to regulate the manner of elec-
4
tions, they cannot choose to use the federal mails to carry out their elections but then
insist that their election-related mail is somehow exempt from the Postal Service’s
rulemaking authority, conferred by Congress, to regulate envelope design and ad-
dressee information. Neither the statutory nor constitutional provisions contain or
compel any such carveout from this type of core regulation of use of the federal mails.
The district court’s preliminary-injunction opinion fails to seriously address,
much less refute, any of these points. Instead, while devoting 18 pages to background,
App., infra, 2a-19a, and another 15 pages to the equities, id. at 32a-46a, the court’s
analysis of the merits is a scant seven pages, the substance of which can truly be
reduced to three sentences: The Rule regulates elections rather than the mail be-
cause it is election-specific; no statute explicitly authorizes USPS to adopt mandatory
rules for the preparation of election mail; and thus the Rule usurps the authority of
States and Congress to regulate federal elections. See id. at 25a-31a. The court pro-
vided no response whatsoever to the fatal flaws in that simplistic rationale: (1) the
plain text of the Postal Service’s rulemaking powers unambiguously authorizes the
imposition of mandatory envelope-design and addressee-information requirements
for specific categories of sensitive mail; (2) USPS has previously adopted these types
of policies in the context of cremated remains and replica explosives; (3) there is no
statutory or constitutional basis to distinguish the Postal Service’s existing election-
specific policies merely because they are permissive rather than mandatory; and (4)
there is no viable constitutional objection to the Rule if it falls within the statutory
authority that Congress delegated to the Postal Service, because Congress unques-
tionably has the power to regulate both the manner of federal elections and the use
of the federal mails.
5
The district court’s baseless order also imposes serious irreparable harm on
the federal government, the States themselves, and the voting public. Indeed, this
Court has already recognized earlier in this case that “[t]he Government is likely to
suffer irreparable harm without a stay” “[b]ecause reversal of the District Court’s
judgment” against implementation of the final Rule “would come too late for the 2026
midterms.” California, 2026 WL, 2473573, at *4. In particular, the injunction bars
the Postal Service from verifying that mailed envelopes comply with the Rule’s re-
quirements for the upcoming elections, see App., infra, 47a-48a, nullifying the Postal
Service’s efforts to address the risk that the federal mails will be used to perpetrate
voter fraud, 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,969—a particularly pernicious species of fraud that
dilutes the votes of lawful voters, prevents election results from reflecting the will of
the American people, and undermines “public confidence in the integrity of the elec-
toral process,” Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008).
Ballots have already begun to be mailed in North Carolina, and more States
will begin the mailing process as the injunction remains in place—including Alabama
on September 9 and at least five States the week of September 13. Once those ballot
envelopes enter the mailstream, there is no retrieving them. And while the injunction
allows the Postal Service and the States to continue taking steps to ensure that their
envelopes satisfy the Rule’s requirements, see App., infra, 47a-48a, each day the in-
junction is in place risks sowing confusion and chaos because the injunction makes
those preparatory steps voluntary, rather than mandatory. Thus, if the injunction is
eventually stayed and the rule takes effect for this year’s elections—as should occur—
there is a grave risk that States may not have taken the necessary steps to comply,
due to the false sense of latitude created by the court’s improper injunction, poten-
6
tially depriving those States’ citizens of the ability to vote by mail. In addition, the
injunction even bars the Postal Service from conducting the training necessary for
the enjoined verification process for the upcoming elections, see ibid., which makes
an immediate stay all the more essential.
Respondents cannot defeat a stay merely by asserting that they will be harmed
by implementation of the Rule. Consistent with the principle that “the most critical”
stay factors are whether the applicant has shown a likelihood of success on the merits
and irreparable injury, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), this Court reiterated
this past Friday that “balanc[ing] the equities” matters only “[i]n close cases,” Na-
tional Republican Congressional Comm. v. Brown, No. 26A274, 2026 WL 2618462, at
*1 (Sept. 4, 2026) (per curiam) (citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)
(per curiam)). This is not remotely a close case: As discussed above, the Court has
already found that the government is suffering serious irreparable harm warranting
a stay, and the Rule’s plain lawfulness is underscored by the district court’s inability
to provide much more than ipse dixit to the contrary. In these circumstances, the
valid Rule should not be enjoined for even a single day more based just on respond-
ents’ complaints that compliance will harm them. That is especially so because re-
spondents’ claims of harm are overblown. As for the suggestion that USPS is not
prepared to perform its functions under the Rule, the district court relied on specula-
tive fears, mischaracterizations of the record, and delays occasioned by its own im-
proper orders. And as for the suggestion that the States are not prepared to satisfy
their obligations under the Rule, the district court relied on ordinary compliance
costs, self-serving assertions, and self-inflicted impediments.
7
More fundamentally, though, there is no “reverse Purcell” principle under
which district courts are free to issue improper injunctions close to an election just
because parties purportedly cannot comply with a lawful regulation in time for the
election. That is especially so here, where there is no claim that the purported ina-
bility to comply in time for the election itself renders the Rule unlawful. The district
court made no such holding, and it could not have done so. Congress expressly ex-
empted the Postal Service from arbitrary-and-capricious review under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), see 39 U.S.C. 410(a), which is the only conceivable basis
for such a claim if the Rule is otherwise lawful for future elections where there is
more time to comply.
Simply put, the best way to address respondents’ fears about inability to com-
ply with the Rule is to grant an immediate administrative stay of the order, followed
by a full stay pending further review. That will remove the improper cloud of uncer-
tainty that the district court has cast over the Rule, making clear to all involved that
compliance with the Rule is not optional and must start without further delay.
STATEMENT
1. On August 21, 2026, the Postal Service promulgated a final rule entitled
Ballot Mail for Federal Elections. 91 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Aug. 26, 2026). The Final
Rule amends USPS’s Domestic Mail Manual to impose modest design and informa-
tional requirements for ballot-mail envelopes sent via U.S. Mail for federal elections.
The Rule requires federal-election ballots transmitted through the U.S. Mail to be
mailed in envelopes that include the official Election Mail logo, are automation com-
patible,1 and use unique barcodes that denote the item’s status as ballot mail and its
1 Automation compatibility ensures that mail can be processed by USPS’s
high speed mail processing equipment. Mail that is not automation compatible can
8
delivery point ZIP code. See id. at 54,990-54,991. State election officials must submit
their envelope designs to ensure compliance with those requirements, ibid., and pro-
vide the Postal Service with a list of the ballot-mail items they intend to send, see id.
at 54,991. That list must contain the unique barcodes assigned to each ballot’s enve-
lopes, along with the name and address of the recipient and the State sending the
ballot. Ibid. State election officials may continually update their lists as necessary.
Ibid. When outbound federal-election ballot mail (that is, mail sent from States to
voters) is presented for mailing, the Postal Service will verify that the barcode data
matches the portal data to ensure compliance with the Rule. Ibid. All mailings that
comply with these requirements will be accepted, but those that do not will be “re-
turned to the authorized ballot mailer,” who may then “address the error(s)” and “re-
submit[] the mailing.” Ibid.
The Postal Service will not perform any verification of voter eligibility; its role
is limited to ensuring that envelopes comply with the Rule’s design and informational
requirements. As the Rule emphasizes, “[e]ligible voters will therefore be listed [in
the Portal] by and at the discretion of election officials, and the Postal Service will
not second-guess the states’ submissions. State election officials will thus retain full
control over who is permitted to vote in federal elections in their state by U.S. mail.”
91 Fed. Reg. at 54,969. States likewise need not worry about the accuracy of lists
maintained by the Postal Service—all lists will consist solely of information provided
by the States themselves. On or near the date of the election, USPS will also provide
each State that uses the U.S. mail to transport ballots with a single list containing
the State’s submissions of the ballots it intended to send. Id. at 54,991.
require hand processing, which may result in slower delivery. See USPS, Business
Mail 101: Automation, https://perma.cc/RY48-FWT9.
9
Several features of this Rule are not new. For years, the Postal Service has
recommended that ballot mail envelopes use unique barcodes, be automation compat-
ible, include the official Election Mail logo, and undergo mailpiece design review in
advance of mailing. See USPS, Kit 600: Official Election Mail Guide (Kit 600),
https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600.pdf; Domestic Mail Manual 703.8.0,
https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/703.htm#ep1174014. This Rule simply turns
“these longstanding recommendations”—which many of the State respondents have
already adopted, at least in part—into requirements. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,986; see id.
at 54,978. These requirements are only a baseline; “nothing in the [R]ule prevents or
discourages election officials from including envelope design elements required by
state law,” nor will the Rule “create a single, uniform ballot envelope design across
all states[.]” Id. at 54,978. And most importantly, the Rule “leav[es] the administra-
tion of elections firmly in the hands of the [S]tates.” Id. at 54,970. “[T]he Postal
Service will not play any role in determining voter eligibility, maintaining voter rolls,
or counting ballots.” Id. at 54,978.
The Rule explains that these requirements “will help ensure proper handling,
efficient processing, and timely delivery of [federal-election ballots] to and from vot-
ers.” 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,974. The Rule will also “afford significantly enhanced visi-
bility into the sending of Federal Ballot Mail, and this will in turn facilitate law en-
forcement efforts by enabling law enforcement to better detect potential issues mer-
iting further investigation.” Id. at 54,969. Ultimately, “[w]hether or not voter fraud
is common or uncommon,” the Rule is intended “to facilitate enforcement of federal
law, reduce the risk of fraud, and help protect the integrity of federal elections” with
respect to the narrow but important role played by the Postal Service in mailing bal-
10
lots for States that choose to use the U.S. Mail. Ibid.
2. These suits began as challenges to Executive Order 14,399, 91 Fed. Reg.
17,125 (Mar. 31, 2026), “an internal directive from the President to his subordinates
mandating that certain agencies pursue certain policies,” including that USPS “initi-
ate a proposed rulemaking” with respect to ballot mail. California, 2026 WL 2473573,
at *1. The district court previously enjoined implementation of that section of the
Executive Order with respect to the upcoming November 2026 election, but this Court
stayed the California injunction pending appeal, ibid., and the district court subse-
quently vacated its LWVMA injunction, see LWVMA D. Ct. Doc. 204 (Aug. 26, 2026).
On August 26, 2026—the day the Final Rule was published in the Federal Reg-
ister—the LWVMA respondents filed a supplemental complaint, and the California
respondents filed a new action. Both sets of respondents moved for temporary re-
straining orders and preliminary injunctions barring implementation of the Rule.
The following day, the district court granted respondents’ motions for a tempo-
rary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). 26A297 Appl.
App. 3a-13a. The court opined that the plaintiffs in both cases had standing. Id. at
9a. The court also summarily asserted that respondents were likely to succeed on
their claims that USPS lacked authority to issue the Rule and that the Rule’s design
and informational requirements are unconstitutional. Id. at 10a.
The court granted an “emergency fourteen-day stay of the implementation or
enforcement of” several sections of the Rule “as to elections occurring before or on
November 3, 2026.” 26A297 Appl. App. 12a. The order allowed States to voluntarily
participate in the Rule’s envelope-design review process and use USPS’s online por-
tal, but prohibited the government from treating the Rule as “mandatory” and veri-
11
fying that ballot envelopes comply with the Rule’s requirements before accepting
them for mailing. Id. at 12a-13a.
3. The next day, applicants promptly appealed the district court’s order
and sought a stay pending appeal. California D. Ct. Docs. 55, 58; LWVMA D. Ct.
Docs. 226, 229 (Aug. 28, 2026). On August 31, the district court denied the stay
largely for reasons it had previously articulated. 26A297 Appl. App. 1a-2a.
The same day, the government filed an emergency stay motion in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The court of appeals requested responses by 5
p.m. on Tuesday, September 1, and the government filed replies around 1 p.m. on
Wednesday, September 2. The court of appeals did not act on that stay motion.
On Thursday, September 3, the district court held a preliminary-injunction
hearing. The government requested that the court issue a ruling on respondents’
preliminary-injunction motions that day to ensure timely review. But the court de-
clined to commit to do so or provide any firm schedule for when it would rule, instead
taking the motions under advisement. See California D. Ct. Doc. 149; LWVMA D. Ct.
Doc. 279 (Sept. 3, 2026). Applicants thus filed an application in this Court for a stay
of the district court’s temporary restraining order that afternoon. See 26A297 Appl.
4. The day after that application was filed, the district court issued a pre-
liminary injunction. App., infra, 1a-49a. The court’s opinion essentially echoed the
limited reasoning it had supplied in support of its temporary restraining order. It
concluded that “the Final Rule is an election rule where it purports to regulate the
time, place, and manner of elections and is unconstitutional where Congress has not
authorized such a rule under the Elections Clause,” id. at 28a, and that “the Final
Rule is also ultra vires where the USPS has acted beyond any statutory authority”
12
because “Title 39 excludes any reference to elections,” id. at 28a-29a; see also id. at
30a-31a (similarly reasoning that the Rule “impermissibly establishes a new category
of nonmailable material”). The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction near-
identical to its temporary restraining order, which it purported to dissolve (id. at
49a.). Although the injunction allows States to voluntarily participate in the Rule’s
envelope-design review process and use USPS’s online portal, it prohibits the Postal
Service from treating the Rule as “mandatory,” and from verifying that ballot enve-
lopes comply with the Rule’s requirements before accepting them for mailing, for the
upcoming elections in November. Id. at 47a-49a. And because the injunction bars
“tak[ing] any further preparatory steps to implement” the enjoined verification pro-
cess, id. at 48a, it stops the Postal Service from even conducting training for that
process for this year’s elections. The district court also summarily denied the govern-
ment’s request for a stay of the preliminary injunction. Id. at 46a-47a.
5. The government appealed the district court’s order the same night. Cal-
ifornia, D. Ct. Doc. 158 (Sept. 4, 2026); LWVMA, D. Ct. Doc. 286 (Sept. 4, 2026). And
the next day, the government moved for an emergency stay pending appeal in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, but as of this filing the court of appeals
has not acted on that pending stay motion.
ARGUMENT
Under Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651,
to obtain a stay of an injunction pending review in the court of appeals and in this
Court, an applicant must show a likelihood of success on the merits, a reasonable
probability of obtaining a writ of certiorari, and a likelihood of irreparable harm; in
close cases, the Court will also consider the balance of the equities. See National
13
Republican Congressional Comm. v. Brown, No. 26A274, 2026 WL 2618462, at *1
(Sept. 4, 2026) (per curiam); Trump v. California, No. 26A124, 2026 WL 2473573, at
*2 (Aug. 24, 2026) (per curiam).
Under that standard, a stay is strongly warranted here. The district court’s
decision warrants this Court’s review because it blocks a significant federal election-
integrity measure shortly before an election. The Rule is a lawful and modest exercise
of rulemaking authority delegated by Congress to the Postal Service; it regulates the
U.S. Mail, not federal elections. The validity of the Rule is only underscored by the
inadequacy of the district court’s conclusory rationale for enjoining it. And absent a
stay, the injunction will irreparably harm the federal government and the public by
barring implementation of an important federal policy to protect the mails from being
used to commit voter fraud, with respect to countless ballots that will be mailed while
an appeal is pending and cannot be retrieved. This is therefore not a close case where
the equities must be balanced—any harms that respondents may incur based on pur-
ported obstacles to complying with this lawful Rule cannot sustain the district court’s
lawless injunction, which should be immediately stayed.
A. THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS BE-
CAUSE THE POSTAL SERVICE’S RULE IS LAWFUL
The Rule is a valid exercise of the Postal Service’s authority to regulate the
U.S. Mail. It imposes only modest requirements on the use of the federal postal sys-
tem—it does not regulate state administration of elections. That reality wholly un-
dermines the district court’s order, which conclusorily asserted that the Postal Ser-
vice lacks statutory authority to issue the Rule and that the Rule is unconstitutional.
App., infra, 25a-31a.
14
1. As a threshold matter, respondents’ claims that the Rule is contrary to
statute are subject to narrowly circumscribed judicial review. Congress has generally
exempted the Postal Service from ordinary APA review. See 39 U.S.C. 410(a). In
light of this preclusion of review, respondents must satisfy the ultra-vires review
standard under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958), to prevail on their statu-
tory claims. See Mittleman v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 757 F.3d 300, 304-308 (D.C.
Cir. 2014). To succeed on a Leedom ultra vires claim—which this Court has recently
analogized to a “Hail Mary pass”—a plaintiff must demonstrate that “an agency has
taken action entirely in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific pro-
hibition in a statute.” NRC v. Texas, 605 U.S. 665, 681 (2025) (emphasis and quota-
tion marks omitted). Finding that “an agency has arguably reached a conclusion
which does not comport with the law” is not enough under that standard. Ibid. (quo-
tation marks omitted).
The district court refused to apply the Leedom standard, asserting that it is
inapplicable unless Congress “has provided a reticulated judicial review scheme.”
App., infra, 28a n.32 (citing Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v.
MCorp. Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). That is incorrect. In NRC, this Court
made clear that Leedom’s standard applies to all attempts to “end-run * * * the
limitations of judicial-review statutes.” 605 U.S. at 681. While that can occur where
judicial review of statutory claims is channeled into a specific statutory scheme, see
ibid., it also can occur where, as here, Congress has expressly eliminated judicial re-
view under the APA, see 39 U.S.C. 410(a); Federal Express Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 39 F.4th 756, 763-764 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Indeed, it would be backwards if
litigants could obtain a more favorable standard of review for a statutory claim be-
15
cause Congress eliminated judicial review for that claim rather than merely chan-
neled it. Cf. MCorp., 502 U.S. at 42-44 (holding that even ultra-vires review of stat-
utory claims is unavailable where Congress has expressly precluded judicial review).
Notably, the district court did not alternatively suggest that respondents could
satisfy the ultra-vires standard if it applies. See App., infra, 28a n.32. And for good
reason: Respondents fall well short of that high bar. They “basically dress up a typi-
cal statutory-authority argument as an ultra vires claim.” NRC, 605 U.S. at 682.
Because they fail to identify any “specific prohibition” that the Postal Service has
violated, their claims are a nonstarter under the ultra-vires standard. Id. at 681.
(emphasis omitted).
2. Even setting aside the standard of review, the Final Rule is a proper
exercise of the Postal Service’s statutory authority. Congress authorized the Postal
Service “to adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
this title, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions under this title and
such other functions as may be assigned to the Postal Service under any provisions
of law outside of this title.” 39 U.S.C. 401(2). Congress further granted the Postal
Service “all other powers incidental, necessary, or appropriate to the carrying on of
its functions or the exercise of its specific powers.” 39 U.S.C. 401(10). Those specific
powers include the power “to provide for the collection, handling, transportation, de-
livery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliv-
erable mail.” 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(1).
Interpreting these provisions, this Court has explained that, “under 39 U.S.C.
§ 401[,] the Postal Service is broadly empowered to adopt rules and regulations de-
signed” “to maintain an efficient system of collection, sorting, and delivery of the mail
16
nationwide.” USPS v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 123 (1981);
see Associated Third Class Mail Users v. USPS, 600 F.2d 824, 826 n.5 (D.C. Cir.)
(“[T]he Service is authorized under 39 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1976) to promulgate regula-
tions to further the objectives of Title 39.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979). Both
text and precedent thus make clear that the Postal Service’s general rulemaking pow-
ers include authority to impose reasonable requirements for envelope design and ad-
dressee information with respect to particularly sensitive items.
As the Rule explains, see 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,974, the Postal Service has issued
regulations governing particular types of mail pursuant to these authorities before—
including where, as here, the type of mail in question is sensitive, but non-dangerous
and mailable. For example, cremated human and animal remains can be mailed only
using specific types of USPS-provided boxes via Priority Mail Express, must include
a complete return address and delivery address, and must be trackable via barcode.
See Cremated Remains Packaging Requirements, 90 Fed. Reg. 9843, 9843-9844 (Feb.
19, 2025) (imposing those requirements for the sending of cremated remains based
on the Postal Service’s assessment that such remains are “sensitive matter” and that
the requirements “will improve visibility and enhance handling methods throughout
processing and transportation”). Similarly, replica explosives—which, although not
dangerous, also require special handling to prevent operational disruptions based on
the misperception that they are actual explosives—must be mailed in certain ways,
which include in-person presentation to a retail counter and shipment via Registered
Mail. See Restricting the Mailing of Replica or Inert Explosive Devices, 75 Fed. Reg.
282, 283 (Jan. 5, 2010) (noting that “[t]his process will ensure that packages contain-
ing these items remain separate and easily identifiable during the mailing process”).
17
Importantly, absent these rules, cremated remains and replica explosives
would be mailable through ordinary methods. While there are statutory restrictions
on mailing “explosives,” 18 U.S.C. 1716(a); 39 U.S.C. 3001(a), replicas are not in fact
explosive. And while there are statutory restrictions on mailing various types of ma-
terials that are “hazardous” or “injure the mails,” ibid., cremated remains do not fall
within those categories or any of the relevant provisions. Instead, it is USPS’s gen-
eral rulemaking authority that allows the Postal Service to adopt these types of mod-
est processing rules for mailable but sensitive materials.
This Rule functions similarly, and for similar reasons. Although ballot mail
does not present the same operational issues as cremated remains or replica explo-
sives, it is sensitive mail that raises unique operational considerations. Timely de-
livery of ballot mail is especially important given specific state deadlines for receipt
of ballots, e.g., Watson v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 146 S. Ct. 2165, 2171 (2026); see
91 Fed. Reg. at 54,974, and allowing ballots to be submitted by mail creates an op-
portunity for the mails themselves to be used to facilitate serious frauds that under-
mine public confidence in federal elections, see 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,969; Crawford v.
Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008). The Postal Service has at least
as much authority to prevent those ballot-related harms as it does to ensure that
mortal remains are not lost in the mail or delivered too slowly.
Indeed, the federal government has long been concerned about the federal
mails being abused to perpetrate frauds. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1341 (criminalizing mail
fraud). It is thus a particularly appropriate use of the Postal Service’s general rule-
making power to adopt modest envelope-design and addressee-information require-
ments for specific types of mail that present unique risks of fraud, while still allowing
18
all such compliant mail to be delivered. Consider, for example, a scenario in which
retirement communities are repeatedly targeted for elder-abuse mail scams: There
is no evident reason why the Postal Service could not impose special design and reg-
istration rules for envelopes used to send solicitations to such locations. Although
such prophylactic mail-preparation rules are not authorized by any of Congress’s spe-
cific regulations addressing fraudulent use of the mails, see, e.g., 39 U.S.C. 3001(d),
3005, they fall squarely within the text and purpose of the Postal Service’s general
rulemaking authority. This Rule follows the same basic form, by acknowledging the
indisputable reality that election-related mail is particularly sensitive, and that
crimes relating to election mail are particularly important. See 91 Fed. Reg. at
54,969. The Postal Service permissibly determined that “[w]hether or not voter fraud
is common or uncommon, the Postal Service has the legal authority to take the
measures in this rule to facilitate enforcement of federal law.” Ibid.
3. The analysis above refutes the district court’s assertion that USPS ex-
ceeded its statutory authority because the Rule “regulates elections” and “Title 39
excludes any reference to elections.” App., infra, at 29a-30a. Under the Rule, States
can continue to mail ballots to whomever they wish; the rule does not regulate the
form or content of the ballots themselves, the timeline for transmission of ballots,
voter eligibility, vote-by-mail eligibility, or anything similar. It regulates only how
States must prepare, design, and present the envelopes they send via U.S. mail
(should they elect to use the U.S. mail to send ballots). As the Rule itself makes clear,
“[t]he Postal Service does not purport to alter the eligibility of any individual to vote
under state or federal law.” 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,991. Both before and after this Rule,
“[t]he Postal Service does not have any legal responsibility for management of state
19
voter rolls or administration of federal elections within each state.” Ibid. In other
words, the Final Rule regulates the U.S. mail—it does not regulate elections.
It is immaterial that Title 39 does not expressly include a reference to elections
when granting the Postal Service authority to adopt mail-preparation requirements.
The rulemaking provisions clearly grant the Postal Service the authority to adopt
envelope-design and addressee-information requirements for mailing, see pp. 15-16,
supra, and the Postal Service has adopted such requirements for cremated remains
and replica explosives even though Title 39 does not expressly include a reference to
those specific materials either. Lacking any response to that glaring flaw in its stat-
utory interpretation, the district court simply ignored the existence of those analo-
gous policies. See App., infra, 25a-31a.
Accordingly, the district court and respondents are effectively claiming that
election-related mail is an implied exception to Congress’s broad grants of statutory
authority to USPS to carry out “the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, for-
warding, returning, and holding of mail,” 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(1), and to adopt “rules and
regulations” in service of those functions, 39 U.S.C. 401(2). But there is no textual
basis for such a carveout—the provisions’ text unambiguously authorizes USPS to
adopt mailing-specific rules for envelope design and addressee information, without
regard to the specific category of mail at issue. Indeed, election mail implicates the
same postal-related concerns that lie at the heartland of any such rules. There is
thus no basis to read the statute to contain some indeterminate, implied exception
for election mail.
Indeed, it is undisputed that the Postal Service can exercise its general rule-
making authority to adopt election-specific mail-preparation policies, as it has long
20
done—including at the urging of entities like respondents. In particular, the Postal
Service employs ballot-mail envelope design elements (like the Election Mail logo) to
prioritize delivery of ballot mail. See Kit 600, at 4 (noting that USPS prioritizes “Bal-
lot Mail that is entered as Marketing Mail” by delivering it on timelines similar to
First Class Mail). The Postal Operations Manual further provides that, even if a
mailer does not affix the necessary postage, “absentee balloting materials must not
be detained or treated as unpaid mail,” and must instead “be promptly dispatched
and delivered to the addressees.” U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Operations Manual POM
Issue 9 § 171.3 (July 2022), https://perma.cc/HY9N-TJ6Q. Indeed, many of the re-
spondent States previously sued to demand that USPS treat election mail differently
by delivering it as First Class Mail regardless of the service paid for. See Washington
v. Trump, 487 F. Supp. 3d 976, 980, 984 (E.D. Wash. 2020). Respondents’ co-counsel
and co-Plaintiffs have likewise long advocated for and benefited from specific ballot-
mail envelope design elements (like the Election Mail logo) and the prioritization of
such mail. See NAACP v. USPS, No. 20-cv-2295, 2026 WL 1893762, at *1 (D.D.C.
July 1, 2026), appeal pending, No. 26-5257 (D.C. Cir. filed July 9, 2026); see also Kit
600, at 4. Notably, none of these policies is based on any election-specific statutory
authority; instead, they are all simply exercises of the Postal Service’s general rule-
making power to regulate the efficient handling and timely delivery of mail. If the
Postal Service has no legal authority to make any rules specific to election-related
mail—as seems to be respondents’ theory—it is hard to understand how those
longstanding policies would be lawful.
The district court dismissed the significance of these longstanding election-
specific mail policies in a single sentence, trying to distinguish them as “providing
21
only non-binding guidance.” App., infra, 29a. But again, there is no textual basis for
that distinction in the relevant statutes—and such a distinction makes no sense.
Congress does not typically grant agencies the authority to make rules if, but only if,
they are toothless. It is therefore unsurprising that neither the court nor respondents
proffered any actual support for such a distinction. And further refuting the distinc-
tion, the Postal Service’s exercises of authority over cremated remains and replica
explosives impose mandatory rules, not permissive options. See pp. 16-17, supra. A
rule aimed at protecting residents of senior centers, see pp. 17-18, supra, could of
course be mandatory as well. Indeed, apart from USPS’s general rulemaking powers,
there does not appear to be any specific statutory authority for the mandatory re-
quirement that mailpieces “must have the address of the intended recipient, visible
and legible, only on the side of the piece bearing postage,” Domestic Mail Manual
602.1.2, https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/602.htm#1_0, yet this venerable require-
ment is obviously well within the Postal Service’s authority to adopt. Likewise, the
election-specific policy of not treating certain ballot mail lacking postage as unpaid,
see p. 20, supra, is a policy that Postal Service employees must follow.
Respondents below tried to distinguish between rules that facilitate voting and
rules that burden voting, but that argument fares no better. Most fundamentally,
that is a policy distinction that has no basis in the text of the Postal Service’s rule-
making powers. Moreover, it is an illusory distinction that does not even apply co-
herently here. For starters, the Rule does facilitate voting, by improving USPS’s abil-
ity to more efficiently process and deliver ballot mail. See 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,974.
And regardless, protecting against voter fraud does prevent effective disenfranchise-
ment of legitimate voters, by preventing the cancelling out of their votes by ineligible
22
voters. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647, 672 (2021) (“Fraud
can affect the outcome of a close election, and fraudulent votes dilute the right of
citizens to cast ballots that carry appropriate weight.”).
For similar reasons, the district court erred in concluding that “the Final Rule
impermissibly establishes a new category of nonmailable material” that “is incon-
sistent with * * * Congress’s scheme to define categories of ‘nonmailable’ material.”
App., infra, 30a-31a. The Rule does not render anything “nonmailable.” Ballot mail
remains deliverable; in fact, USPS intends to process and deliver as many lawful bal-
lots as the States wish to send, no more and no less, and the Rule need not prohibit
any ballots from being mailed. All outbound federal-election ballot mail that meets
the Rule’s requirements will be accepted, processed, and delivered as before. The
Rule’s modest conditions on acceptance of federal-election ballot mailings do not ren-
der ballot mail nonmailable—just as the conditions placed on cremated-remains
packages do not render cremated remains nonmailable. After all, the Postal Service
could refuse to mail a heavy package if the customer failed to pay sufficient postage,
but that does not mean that such packages are nonmailable. Likewise, if the Postal
Service refused to deliver unstamped election mail from States to voters, that would
not render unstamped election mail “nonmailable” or otherwise violate the statutory
rules governing nonmailable matter.
The district court rejoined that some of the nonmailability provisions adopted
by Congress “similarly impose conditions on acceptance” rather than imposing out-
right bans. App., infra, 31a. But that is a basic logical fallacy. The mere fact that
Congress allowed some mailpieces that it deemed “nonmailable” to be mailed on cer-
tain conditions does not imply that any additional condition imposed on any mailable
23
material somehow violates the nonmailability provisions. It would be absurd to con-
clude that any of the conditions on mailing particular items discussed in the preced-
ing paragraph are inconsistent with the nonmailability provisions. Relatedly, and
more fundamentally, the provisions where Congress itself has deemed certain mate-
rials nonmailable do not even purport to be exclusive. See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. 3001, 3002,
3002a, and 3015. Yet the district court provided no explanation whatsoever why the
Postal Service is impliedly barred from using its general rulemaking powers to im-
pose conditions for mailing particular sensitive items even if that were deemed anal-
ogous to a “nonmailability” rule. In short, the USPS has both specific and general
authority to adopt rules for the delivery of the mail, and the Postal Service can refuse
to deliver mail that fails to comply with those otherwise-valid rules without somehow
violating the statutes that make other types of mail nonmailable.
Finally, the foregoing points also foreclose the district court’s invocation of the
major-questions doctrine. See App., infra, 28a-29a. The Postal Service’s authority to
impose modest requirements for delivery of particular types of mail, which is a core
exercise of its power to operate the mails, lacks the sort of “economic and political
significance’’ that triggers the doctrine. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S.
229, 246 (2026) (plurality opinion). “[A]lthough actual changes to eligibility of voters
to vote by mail might fairly be described as having political significance in some
sense, this rule makes no such changes—it instead leaves voter-eligibility unchanged,
requiring only certain modest envelope-design and data reporting standards.” 91
Fed. Reg. at 54,973. And the “economic significance” of the rule is not remotely com-
parable to any prior major-questions case. See, e.g., Learning Resources, 607 U.S. at
246 (“could be worth $15 trillion”); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 502 (2023) (“be-
24
tween $496 billion and $519 billion”). Ultimately, requiring mailers to abide by mod-
est conditions on the sending of certain types of mail that raise particular sensitivities
or operational concerns is hardly some “unheralded power representing a transform-
ative expansion [of USPS’s] regulatory authority.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S.
697, 724 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, it is a routine application
of the Postal Service’s regulatory authority—authority invoked in the past to accom-
plish similar goals—which lies squarely within the Postal Service’s wheelhouse. See
pp. 15-18, supra; 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,974 (discussing prior exercises of this authority).
The district court’s suggestion that Congress has not delegated authority to the Postal
Service to regulate election mail because “Title 39 excludes any reference to elec-
tions,” App., infra, 29a, thus gets things exactly backwards. The major-questions
doctrine does not authorize States to exempt their election mail from the Postal Ser-
vice’s regulation of mail delivery.
4. The district court’s holding that the Rule “is unconstitutional” because
it “is an election rule” that “purports to regulate the time, place, and manner of elec-
tions,” App., infra, 28a, suffers from the same basic flaws. Under the Elections
Clause, “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Rep-
resentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, Cl. 1; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (per curiam) (presidential elections). Respondents contend that the
Rule encroaches on authority that belongs to the States and Congress, but that con-
tention cannot be squared with the Rule’s operation.
The Final Rule “leav[es] the administration of elections firmly in the hands of
25
the [S]tates.” 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,970. “Eligibility for mail-in and absentee voting will
continue to be governed by state law; state and local election officials will still deter-
mine which individuals are eligible under these laws; and state and local election
officials will determine whether completed ballots are eligible to be counted.” Id. at
54,978. “[T]he Postal Service will not play any role in determining voter eligibility,
maintaining voter rolls, or counting ballots.” Ibid. The Final Rule is thus a modest
exercise of the Postal Service’s own judgment about how “to exercise its statutory
authority”—granted by Congress—“to faithfully execute federal law and also to ad-
vance the Postal Service’s operational interests[.]” Id. at 54,976 (emphasis added).
The respondent States nonetheless contend that the Rule supplants their rules
governing mail-in voting. By its terms, it does not. Critically, while States are enti-
tled to regulate the manner of elections—and the Final Rule does nothing to displace
that authority—they are not entitled to set their own rules for use of a federal instru-
mentality like the U.S. Mail. That authority belongs instead to Congress, U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, Cl. 7, and the Postal Service, 39 U.S.C. 401.
For similar reasons, respondents’ suggestion that the President lacks constitu-
tional authority to directly regulate elections on his own is beside the point. To begin,
the Rule was issued by the Postal Service, not the President. And it is undisputed
that Congress does have the authority to regulate ballot mail—whether the Rule is
correctly conceived as a regulation of the U.S. Mail, or even if improperly deemed a
regulation of elections. After all, however one might characterize this Rule, all par-
ties agree that Congress can directly regulate the manner of elections, U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 4, Cl. 1 (Elections Clause), as well as the U.S. Mail, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8,
Cl. 7 (the Postal Clause). Respondents’ constitutional arguments thus add nothing
26
to this case; if the Postal Service’s rule is authorized by Congress, then that neces-
sarily means there is no Elections Clause (or Postal Clause) problem.
Respondents’ view of the relevant constitutional authority—seemingly, that
anytime the Postal Service refuses to deliver ballot mail, regardless of the reason, it
is “regulating elections”—would have radical consequences. Under that approach,
the rule requiring envelopes to be properly addressed (see p. 21, supra) likewise would
be an invalid regulation of elections, because ballot mail will not be delivered if it fails
to comply with that requirement.
Trying to avoid that absurdity, the district court emphasized that this Rule
does not apply across all categories of mail, but rather “explicitly and exclusively reg-
ulates election mail.” App., infra, 27a. But with respect to USPS’s rulemaking au-
thority, there is no statutory or constitutional basis to distinguish between generally
applicable requirements and election-specific requirements. This Rule no more
usurps the States’ elections power to regulate ballots than the Postal Service’s cre-
mated-remains rule usurps the States’ police power to regulate corpses. When a
party chooses to use the federal mails to mail an item—even an item that otherwise
is subject only to state regulation—it necessarily subjects itself to the Postal Service’s
delegated authority from Congress to regulate the use of the mails. Moreover, as
explained above, the Postal Service has long applied election-specific rules and prac-
tices, including choosing to deliver at least some ballot mail that lacks postage. See
pp. 19-21, supra. If any election-specific regulation of the U.S. Mail violates the Con-
stitution, all of those practices would be equally unconstitutional—an implausible
result that illustrates the untenable nature of respondents’ theory. And again, those
practices cannot be dismissed as merely involving non-binding guidance: some of the
27
policies excuse noncompliance with mandatory rules; and more fundamentally, the
Elections Clause provides no role for USPS to regulate federal elections through per-
missive policies any more than through mandatory rules. See pp. 20-21, supra. The
Clause is no obstacle, however, to USPS exercising its delegated authority from Con-
gress to regulate the use of the mails by any States that choose to use that federal
instrumentality to conduct their federal elections.
The district court particularly objected to the Rule’s requirement that States
submit their proposed envelope designs so that the Postal Service may confirm that
they adhere to the Rule’s design specifications. See App., infra, 25a-28a. But this
requirement simply provides States with flexibility in designing their envelopes (in
part due to variations in state-law requirements) and uses a front-end mechanism to
ensure that States’ envelopes actually meet the Rule’s specifications, thus reducing
the risk of back-end rejection of non-compliant envelopes. See 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,978
(emphasizing that “nothing in the rule prevents or discourages election officials from
including envelope design elements required by state law” or “including unique enve-
lope design elements intended to accommodate voters covered by [accessibility]
laws”). Rather than requiring every State to use a “single, uniform ballot envelope,”
ibid.—similar to the standardized packaging approach the Postal Service took with
cremated remains—the Postal Service chose a framework that would allow States
more latitude to meet all the relevant requirements. The straightforward preap-
proval process operates to ensure that compliant envelopes are not delayed and that
noncompliance is promptly and clearly identified. The Postal Service’s broad rule-
making authority plainly authorizes ancillary steps to facilitate compliance with the
Rule’s modest design requirements.
28
Finally, the district court went far afield in holding (App., infra, 26a) that the
Rule is unconstitutional because it purportedly conflicts with a provision in the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) requiring that States must maintain “the single system for
storing and managing the official list of registered voters throughout the State,” 52
U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A)(i). To begin, of course, whether the Rule violates that statute
has nothing to do with whether it violates the Constitution. See Dalton v. Specter,
511 U.S. 462, 471-474 (1994). Moreover, the Rule is entirely consistent with HAVA.
It does not alter the States’ creation or maintenance of its centralized list of registered
voters or create a distinct system for that purpose. It simply requires that each State
provide USPS a list of voters to whom they choose to mail ballots. That list is not
“the official list of registered voters throughout the State” that will govern who can
actually cast a ballot on Election Day. In fact, the obviousness of this conclusion
perhaps explains why respondents themselves never even raised a claim under
HAVA, despite advancing a host of other (meritless) statutory claims that the district
court did not adopt. See App., infra, 31a n. 36. That the district court committed the
summarily-reversible error of “violat[ing] the principle of party presentation,” Mar-
golin v. National Association of Immigration Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1286 (2026) (per
curiam), vividly illustrates the government’s strong likelihood of success on appeal.
B. THE REMAINING FACTORS FAVOR A STAY
In considering whether to grant emergency relief, this Court further considers
whether the underlying issues warrant review and whether the applicant likely faces
irreparable harm; in close cases, it also considers whether the balance of equities
supports relief. See pp. 12-13, supra. Those factors heavily favor a stay in this case.
29
1. If affirmed by the First Circuit, the district court’s decision barring man-
datory implementation of the Rule would warrant this Court’s review. As explained
in Part A, supra, the decision cannot be squared with the text of the applicable stat-
utory and constitutional provisions. And as this Court recognized in granting a stay
of the district court’s earlier injunction restricting implementation of Executive Order
14,399, an injunction hindering a federal agency’s efforts to promote election integrity
warrants this Court’s intervention. See California, 2026 WL 2473573, at *4. Indeed,
this Court frequently grants plenary review when a lower-court decision blocks a sig-
nificant Executive Branch policy. E.g., Trump v. Miot, 146 S. Ct. 1802 (2026) (grant-
ing a writ of certiorari before judgment to consider termination of Temporary Pro-
tected Status designation); Noem v. Doe, 146 S. Ct. 1803 (2026) (same); Trump v.
Slaughter, 146 S. Ct. 18 (2025) (granting a writ of certiorari before judgment to review
the President’s removal of Executive Branch officer); Trump v. Barbara, 146 S. Ct.
879 (2025) (granting a writ of certiorari before judgment to consider the President’s
birthright citizenship Executive Order); Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., 146 S. Ct.
73 (2025) (granting a writ of certiorari to review the President’s imposition of tariffs).
2. A stay—along with an immediate administrative stay—is also war-
ranted because the district court’s order imposes irreparable harm on the federal gov-
ernment. As noted, this Court has already recognized earlier in this case that “[t]he
Government is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a stay” “[b]ecause reversal
of the District Court’s judgment” against implementation of the final Rule “would
come too late for the 2026 midterms.” California, 2026 WL, 2473573, at *4.
North Carolina presumably has already begun mailing ballots on September
30
4, and Alabama will begin mailing ballots this week, on September 9.2 At least five
more States will begin mailing ballots the following week, and more than a dozen
others will begin by the end of this month.3 Because the district court’s injunction
prohibits the government from verifying compliance with the Rule’s requirements, it
will permanently bar the Rule’s operation with respect to any ballots mailed before a
stay issues. In fact, because the injunction bars USPS from training its employees to
conduct the verification process, see p. 12, supra, it will effectively continue to delay
implementation of the Rule for a brief period even after a stay is issued, underscoring
both the irreparable harm on the government and the need for an immediate stay.
The injunction is “deal[ing] a ‘serious setback’ to the Executive’s ‘goals’ while this
litigation unfolds.” California, 2026 WL 2473573, at *4. Both the irreparable-harm
factor and the public interest thus favor the government. See Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (noting that factors of harm to the government and public inter-
est “merge” when the government is a party).
3. While the district court stressed the purported harms to respondents if
the Rule takes effect for this year’s elections, see App., infra, 32a-46a, that alone can-
not overcome the government’s showing of why a stay is warranted here. As this
2 See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-227.10(a) and 163-230.2(d) (2026); Ala. Code
§§ 17-11-5(a) and 17-11-12 (2026).
3 See Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-407(a)(1) and (2) (2026); Fla. Stat.
§ 101.62(3)(b) (2026); Idaho Code § 34-1003(3) (Lexis 2026); Ind. Code §§ 3-11-4-15
and 3-11-4-18(c) (2026); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9-306(c)(1) (Lexis 2026); Mich.
Const., Art. II, § 4(1)(h); Minn. Stat. § 203B.06(3)(a) (2026); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§
115.281(1) and 115.287(1) (2026); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-808(1) (2026); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 293.269911(5) (2026); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63-9(a) (West 2026); N.D. Cent. Code §§
16.1-07-04 and 16.1-07-08(1) (2026); 26 Okla. Stat. § 14-118(A)(2) (2026); S.D. Codi-
fied Laws §§ 12-19-1.2 and 12-19-2 (2026); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17, § 2537a(a)(1) (2026);
Va. Code Ann. §§ 24.2-612 and 24.2-706(C) (2026); W. Va. Code § 3-3-5(e)(1) (2026);
Wis. Stat. § 7.15 (2026).
31
Court reaffirmed just last Friday, when it considers a stay application, “balanc[ing]
the equities” matters only “[i]n close cases.” Brown, 2026 WL 2618462, at *1 (citing
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam)). That makes sense,
because “the most critical” stay factors are whether the stay applicant “has made a
strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits” and that it “will be irrepa-
rably injured absent a stay.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. After all, given that this is not
a close case on those factors—the Rule is clearly lawful, and the district court’s in-
junction is imposing serious irreparable injury on the government—there is no legit-
imate basis to deny a stay merely because compliance with the Rule may harm re-
spondents. Respondents have no legal entitlement to avoid any harms associated
with complying with a lawful regulation, and they have no equitable entitlement to
invoke the protections of an unlawful injunction just because compliance with the
Rule may be challenging for the upcoming elections.
All the more so because the purported difficulties are overblown. As for the
States’ purported inability to comply with the Rule, the district court relied in part
on the fact that doing so would cost money and take time, see, e.g., App., infra, at 39a-
40a, 42a-43a, but those types of ordinary compliance costs cannot outweigh the gov-
ernment’s entitlement to enforce a lawful regulation. Moreover, the court credited
the self-serving assertions of impossibility by States opposed to the Rule, while dis-
counting that there are States who support the Rule and contend that they will be
able to comply, see, e.g., id. at 44a—notwithstanding that the position of the latter
States is inherently more credible since they have no evident incentive to disenfran-
chise their own voters. And in all events, the court failed to give sufficient weight to
the fact that States could have started making at least some preparations to comply
32
months ago (e.g., by providing advance notice to ballot-mailing vendors that they
likely would need to print new envelopes soon after a final rule was promulgated),
rather than waiting until the last minute in hopes that a baseless injunction would
be entered to obviate the need to comply.
Similarly, as for USPS’s purported inability to perform its functions under the
Rule, the district court relied heavily on speculation by state officials who lack direct
knowledge of the Postal Service’s implementation plans. For example, relying on past
timelines for envelope review, the court rejected the anticipated two-day turnaround
that the Postal Service itself provided in the Rule. See App., infra, 37a & n.46. Even
worse, the court at times mischaracterized the record. For instance, the court cred-
ited a claim that the verification process could take years for States with tens of mil-
lions of ballots, merely because the Rule says that “ ‘scanning a barcode generally
takes less than a minute per mailpiece,’ ” see id. at 42a (brackets omitted); but it dis-
regarded that the same paragraph of the Rule expressly noted that “the verification
process should take no more than a few hours for larger mailings” “[d]epending on
how many barcodes are scanned,” 91 Fed. Reg. at 54,981. And of course, the court’s
own improper orders are partly to blame, such as by gratuitously enjoining the Postal
Service from even training employees to conduct the verification process in anticipa-
tion of the injunction being lifted. See p. 12, supra.
In all events, it warrants emphasis that the district court did not and could not
hold that any purported difficulty in complying with the Rule for this year’s elections
itself rendered the Rule unlawful as applied to those elections. There is no basis in
either the statutes governing the Postal Service or the Elections Clause to hold that
an otherwise-valid rule regulating envelope design and addressee information for
33
election mail somehow becomes invalid simply because it is adopted sufficiently close
to an election that it may be difficult to comply. Instead, that sort of objection would
normally be raised in an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge under the APA, but Con-
gress expressly exempted the Postal Service’s regulations from such claims. See pp.
13-14, supra. Accordingly, any purported difficulties in complying with the Rule do
not justify denying a stay, and the best way to address such difficulties is to grant an
immediate stay so that all will know that immediate efforts to comply must proceed.
4. Finally, a stay at minimum is warranted with respect to the injunction’s
extension beyond respondent States. The LWVMA respondents do not have sufficient
Article III injury even to obtain an injunction, let alone to oppose a stay. And the
California respondents alone are not entitled to universal relief against the Rule.
“At the preliminary injunction stage,” plaintiffs “must make a ‘clear showing’
that” they are “ ‘likely’ to establish each element of standing.” Murthy v. Missouri,
603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
22 (2008)). Because Article III standing is plaintiff-specific, the Court must deter-
mine whether each particular plaintiff has clearly established Article III standing to
be entitled to relief. See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025). The LWVMA
respondents have not done so.
The district court found that the LWVMA respondents had standing based on
“interference with their core missions to educate voters” and “the likely disenfran-
chisement” of their members. App., infra, 24a. Neither suffices. With respect to the
organizations’ educational efforts, “[a] plaintiff must show far more than simply a
setback to the organization’s abstract social interests,” “no matter how longstanding
the interest and no matter how qualified the organization” or the strength of its “op-
34
position to the government’s conduct.” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
367, 394 (2024) (citation omitted); accord ibid. (“[A]n organization that has not suf-
fered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into
standing simply by expending money to gather information and advocate against the
defendant’s action.”). And with respect to the organizations’ ability to “assert the
standing of their members,” they must “make specific allegations establishing that at
least one identified member * * * would suffer harm.” Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494, 498 (2009). All but one of the LWVMA respondents fail that
requirement; they claim only generic harm to unknown and unidentified members.
See, e.g., D. Ct. Doc. 208-1 ¶ 36 (Aug. 26, 2026); D. Ct. Doc. 208-3 ¶ 14 (Aug. 26, 2026);
D. Ct. Doc. 208-5 ¶ 64 (Aug. 26, 2026). The League of Women Voters of Massachu-
setts, which does claim that particular members face a “risk of not being [able] to vote
at all,” D. Ct. Doc. 208-4 ¶ 59, nonetheless lacks Article III standing, because its “po-
tential future” injury rests on a “speculative chain of possibilities” regarding the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts’ inability to facilitate mail-in voting in accordance with
the Final Rule. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013). In any event,
any injunctive relief for the League of Women Voters of Massachusetts would be co-
extensive with relief given to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a plaintiff State,
and could not justify broader relief.
Nor can the California respondents alone obtain universal relief. The district
court granted injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, App., infra,
47a, but those State respondents will suffer no cognizable injury from application of
the Rule to ballots mailed by or to other States, and thus they cannot obtain relief
nationwide. CASA, 606 U.S. at 837. Insofar as the district court suggested it was
35
instead “stay[ing]” the Rule under 5 U.S.C. 705, App., infra, 47a, that too was error.
Most fundamentally, the Postal Service’s rule is expressly exempt from Section 705
relief. See pp. 13-14, supra. Regardless, any stay granted under Section 705 must
be limited “to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury” to the plaintiff, 5
U.S.C. 705, which again precludes the California respondents from obtaining relief
nationwide. See Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (explaining
that “absent a clear command” to the contrary, statutes adhere to “established prin-
ciples” of equity); CASA, 606 U.S. at 844 (noting that “party-specific principles * * *
permeate our understanding of equity”).
CONCLUSION
This Court should stay the preliminary injunction of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, pending the resolution of the government’s
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any proceedings
in this Court, and grant an immediate administrative stay.
Respectfully submitted.
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
SEPTEMBER 2026