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League of Women Voters respondents opposition to 26A305

League of Women Voters of Massachusetts et al. · 2026-09-09

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No. 26A305

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL.,
Applicants,
––– V.–––

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,
Respondents.

TO THE HONORABLE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR A STAY

Jessie J. Rossman Sophia Lin Lakin
Suzanne Schlossberg Counsel of Record
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Theresa J. Lee
FOUNDATION OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC. Davin Rosborough
One Center Plaza, Suite 850 Ethan Herenstein
Boston, MA 02108 Ming Cheung
William Hughes
Cecillia D. Wang
Clayton Pierce
Evelyn Danforth-Scott
Jonathan Topaz
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Priyanka Menon*
FOUNDATION
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
425 California Street, Suite 700
San Francisco, CA 94104 FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
Eliza Sweren-Becker New York, NY 10004
Wendy Weiser (212) 549-2500
Andrew B. Garber slakin@aclu.org
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU
SCHOOL OF LAW Sarah Brannon
120 Broadway, Suite 1750 Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux
New York, NY 10271 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
915 15th Street NW
Washington, DC 20005
Additional Counsel for Respondents listed on next page

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Justin Lam Janai Nelson
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU Samuel Spital
SCHOOL OF LAW Leah C. Aden
777 6th Street NW, Suite 1100 Brenda Wright
Washington, DC 20001 John S. Cusick
Niyati Shah NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
Noah Baron FUND, INC.
Ejaz Baluch, Jr. 40 Rector Street, 5th Floor
ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE- New York, NY 10006
AAJC Anuja Thatte
1620 L Street NW, Suite 1050 I. Sara Rohani
Washington, DC 20036 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
Miranda Galindo FUND, INC.
LATINO JUSTICE PRLDEF 700 14th Street NW, Suite 600
475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1901 Washington, DC 20005
New York, NY 10115
*admitted only in Maryland
Counsel for Respondents

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

In accordance with United States Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Respondents

League of Women Voters of Massachusetts, League of Women Voters of the United

States, League of Women Voters Lotte E. Scharfman Memorial Education Fund,

League of Women Voters Education Fund, Association of Americans Resident

Overseas, U.S. Vote Foundation, OCA-Asian Pacific American Advocates, and Delta

Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc. have no parent corporations, nor have they issued any

stock owned by a publicly held company.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ................................................................ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 5

A. Constitutional and Statutory Background ........................................ 5

B. Executive Order and USPS Rule........................................................ 8

C. Plaintiff Organizations ..................................................................... 10

D. Proceedings Below ............................................................................ 11

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 12

I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING. .............................................................. 13

II. DEFENDANTS ARE UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF
THEIR APPEAL. ......................................................................................... 17

A. Plaintiffs May Sue in Equity to Enjoin the Rule’s Enforcement. ... 17

B. The Rule Is Unlawful. ....................................................................... 18

C. The Rule Is Unconstitutional. .......................................................... 29

III.THE REMAINING FACTORS WEIGH AGAINST A STAY. .................... 31

A. The Equities and Public Interest Strongly Counsel Against a Stay...
.......................................................................................................... 31

B. USPS Has Not Established Irreparable Harm. ............................... 38

IV. THE SCOPE OF RELIEF IS PROPER. ..................................................... 40

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 41

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens,
146 S. Ct. 418 (2025) .............................................................................................. 32

Abbott v. Perez,
585 U.S. 57 (2018) .................................................................................................. 38

Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services,
594 U.S. 758 (2021) ................................................................................................ 30

Allen v. Milligan,
146 S. Ct. 1377 (2026) ............................................................................................ 32

American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U.S. 94 (1902) ........................................................................................ 2, 17, 19

Associated Third Class Mail Users v. United States Postal Service,
600 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ................................................................................ 26

Biden v. Texas,
142 S. Ct. 926 (2021) .............................................................................................. 38

Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) .................................................................................................. 41

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
568 U.S. 398 (2013) ................................................................................................ 15

Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,
316 U.S. 407 (1942) ................................................................................................ 21

Dalton v. Specter,
511 U.S. 462 (1994) ................................................................................................ 30

Danco Laboratories, LLC v. Louisiana,
146 S. Ct. 1192 (2026) ............................................................................................ 38

Dart v. United States,
848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ................................................................................ 18

Department of Commerce v. New York,
588 U.S. 752 (2019) ................................................................................................ 15

iii

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Esteras v. United States,
606 U.S. 185 (2025) ................................................................................................ 20

Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1877) .................................................................................................. 19

Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine,
602 U.S. 367 (2024) ................................................................................................ 16

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) ................................................................................................ 17

Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester,
171 F.4th 1058 (8th Cir. 2026) ............................................................................... 16

Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146 (1946) ................................................................................................ 27

Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183 (2010) ................................................................................................ 31

League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby,
838 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................... 16

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump,
607 U.S. 229 (2026) ................................................................................ 2, 18, 27, 28

Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,
370 U.S. 478 (1962) ................................................................................................ 29

Natational Republican Congressional Committee v. Brown,
No. 26A274, 2026 WL 2618462 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2026) ............................................. 31

Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) .................................................................................... 32, 38, 40

Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas,
605 U.S. 665 (2025) ................................................................................................ 17

Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974) ................................................................................................ 13

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
566 U.S. 639 (2012) ................................................................................................ 21

Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,
589 U.S. 423 (2020) ................................................................................................ 40

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Republican National Committee v. North Carolina State Board of Elections,
120 F.4th 390 (4th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................. 16

Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
555 U.S. 488 (2009) ................................................................................................ 14

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
573 U.S. 149 (2014) ................................................................................................ 13

Texas v. Biden,
10 F.4th 538 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................................................................... 38

Trump v. California,
No. 26A124, 2026 WL 2473573 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2026) ................................ 11, 31, 38

Trump v. CASA, Inc.,
606 U.S. 831 (2025) ................................................................................................ 41

Trump v. Cook,
146 S. Ct. 2234 (2026) ................................................................................ 17, 18, 31

Trump v. Illinois,
146 S. Ct. 432 (2025) .............................................................................................. 18

United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921) ................................................................................................ 29

United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,
453 U.S. 114 (1981) .......................................................................................... 18, 26

United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17 (1960) .................................................................................................. 32

United States v. Texas,
144 S. Ct. 797 (2024) .............................................................................................. 40

Watson v. Republican National Committee,
146 S. Ct. 2165 (2026) ............................................................................ 7, 27, 29, 30

West Virginia v. Enviromental Protection Agency,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) .................................................................................... 18, 19, 27

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1716 ....................................................................................................... 3, 22

18 U.S.C. § 39A ............................................................................................................ 20

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39 U.S.C. § 101 ........................................................................................................... 2, 6

39 U.S.C. § 201 (note) .................................................................................................... 6

39 U.S.C. § 401 ..................................................................................................... passim

39 U.S.C. § 403 ............................................................................................... 2, 6, 19, 25

39 U.S.C. § 404 ..................................................................................................... passim

39 U.S.C. § 410 ............................................................................................................. 17

39 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. ........................................................................................ passim

39 U.S.C. § 3406 ....................................................................................................... 8, 28

42 U.S.C. § 7412 ........................................................................................................... 20

52 U.S.C. § 20304 ........................................................................................................... 8

Act of June 8, 1872,
17 Stat. 283 (1872) ................................................................................................... 6

Act of March 3, 1797
1 Stat. 509 (1797) ................................................................................................... 22

Act of March 3, 1797,
1 Stat. 509 (1797) ..................................................................................................... 6

An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within the United States,
1 Stat. 232 (1792) ..................................................................................................... 6

California Election Code § 2166 .................................................................................... 9

Help America Vote Act of 2002,
Pub. L. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).................................................................. 29

New Mexico Stat. § 1-6C-1, et seq. (2019) ..................................................................... 9

New York Election Law § 5-508 .................................................................................... 9

National Voter Registration Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) ............................................................. 3, 29

Rhode Island General Law § 17-20-19 .......................................................................... 8

Rhode Island General Law § 17-20-21 .......................................................................... 8

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Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act,
52 U.S.C. § 20302 ..................................................................................................... 8

Virginia Code § 24.2-706(A) .......................................................................................... 9

Other Authorities

Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal Elections,
91 Fed. Reg. 17125 (Mar. 31, 2026) ............................................................... 1, 8, 31

United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual,
235 Mail Preparation, https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/235.htm .................. 9, 24

United States Postal Service, Office of Inspector General,
No. 23-018-R23, Cremated Remains, Audit Report (July 5, 2023) ...................... 23

William Goddard,
The Plan for Establishing a New American Post-Office (1774) ....................... 5, 19

Regulations

39 C.F.R. § 211.2 .......................................................................................................... 22

Ballot Mail for Federal Elections,
91 Fed. Reg. 32915 (June 2, 2026) ........................................................................... 8

Ballot Mail for Federal Elections,
91 Fed. Reg. 54966 (Aug. 26, 2026) ............................................................... passim

Restricting the Mailing of Replica or Inert Explosive Devices,
75 Fed. Reg. 282 (Jan. 5, 2010) .............................................................................. 23

United States Postal Service, Publication 52 (2026) .............................................. 3, 22

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Constitution Article I, § 4 ............................................................................ 3, 7, 27

U.S. Constitution Article I, § 8 ............................................................................ 1, 5, 27

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV .............................................................................. 7

U.S. Constitution Amendment XV ................................................................................ 7

vii

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INTRODUCTION

The United States Postal Service (USPS) seeks to impose unprecedented

eleventh-hour requirements on mail ballots that dictate how states administer mail

voting. If states do not or cannot comply, USPS will refuse to deliver their ballots—

even though states are required by their own laws to mail those ballots to millions of

voters now and in the coming days. No federal statute gives USPS that power, and

the Constitution assigns the Executive Branch no role in prescribing the manner of

federal elections. Yet, at the President’s direction, USPS rushed to adopt these

requirements just days before the start of mail voting for the November 3, 2026

elections. See Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 54966 at 54990–91 (Aug.

26, 2026) (§§ 705.24.3, 705.24.5) (Rule); Ensuring Citizenship Verification and

Integrity in Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 17125 (Mar. 31, 2026) (Executive Order

or Order). USPS’s Rule gives states mere weeks to implement sweeping changes to

their election systems—even though USPS has not yet established the necessary

infrastructure to administer its new requirements. The Rule would disrupt the

administration of mail voting mid-election and disenfranchise eligible voters

nationwide, including voters in all-mail states like Colorado and Utah and elderly,

rural, and disabled voters who must vote by mail.

Despite the Rule’s sweeping effect on election administration—and the ballots

of millions of voters—USPS does not claim to act on any authority delegated under

the Elections Clause. Instead, it relies solely on Congress’s Postal Clause power. U.S.

Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. But Congress charged the Postal Service with delivering the

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mail nationwide, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101, 403(a), subject to a scheme of narrow exceptions

for specified categories of material that Congress itself—not USPS—has deemed

“nonmailable,” id. §§ 3001–3018, and subject to rules of general application such as

sufficient postage, id. § 404(a)(2). Mail ballots fall outside those congressionally

prescribed exceptions. USPS’s assertion of “general rulemaking authority” over the

mail cannot override Congress’s specific judgments and reservation of power about

what matter is mailable. This Court foreclosed that theory long ago: The Postal

Service “cannot exclude or refuse to deliver” mail unless “some law of Congress”

authorizes it. Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109 (1902).

USPS’s failure to identify statutory authority for its Rule is especially

egregious given the extraordinary power it claims. The Rule would allow USPS to

preempt state election administration and to withhold delivery of valid ballots to

millions of eligible voters nationwide—a claim of authority over a matter of “political

significance” for which this Court requires “clear congressional authorization.”

Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 246–48 (2026). The “lack of historical

precedent” for such authority makes the case clearer still. Id. at 231. USPS cannot

identify a single example of the Postal Service deeming otherwise mailable matter

nonmailable absent express congressional authorization. Rather, it relies primarily

on special packing requirements for cremated remains and replica explosives, but

these were adopted not using “general rulemaking authority,” Appl. 17–18, but under

a statute that specifically authorizes USPS to prescribe rules for the “preparation and

packing” of matter that could, if improperly handled, injure the mails or property. 18

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U.S.C. § 1716(a)–(b); 39 U.S.C. § 3001(a); see USPS, Publication 52 §§ 211, 434, 451.2.

This has no bearing on paper ballots.

Nor did Congress delegate to USPS authority to alter the manner of federal

elections—much less on such an expedited timeframe. The Constitution entrusts

states with the responsibility to regulate federal elections, while empowering

Congress to alter those state rules. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Congress gives states

years—not weeks—to comply with major federal election mandates. E.g. National

Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 13, 107 Stat. 77, 89 (1993)

(giving states two years for implementation). It did not silently confer authority on

USPS to impose sweeping election mandates on merely a few weeks’ notice.

Because no law authorizes USPS’s Rule, no stay should issue. But even were

the merits debatable, it is far too late for this Court to intervene now. By rushing to

issue the Rule just weeks before states began mailing general election ballots, USPS

has left itself, much less the states, virtually no time to overhaul long-standing

election-mail systems. Predictably, USPS’s timing has made the Rule’s requirements

logistically impossible to meet before the midterms, as the district court found based

on the Rule’s text itself, USPS’s own statements, and unrebutted declarations from

elections officials in nearly two dozen states. App.32a–43a. The undisputed record

shows that attempting to impose the Rule now would result in catastrophic failure.

The Rule conditions delivery of a state’s mail ballots to voters on (1) USPS’s

approval of each state and local jurisdiction’s ballot-envelope design under new

standards, (2) enrollment of every expected mail-ballot recipient in a new Federal

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Mail Ballot Portal (Portal), and (3) an exact match between several fields of voter

information on the mailing and the voter’s information in the Portal. See 91 Fed. Reg.

at 54990–91 (§§ 705.24.3, 705.24.5). Yet there is not enough time to allow state and

local officials across the country to redesign their envelopes to meet these

requirements, let alone time for USPS to review and approve them, which has

historically taken weeks or months. App.36a–37a. There is not enough time for

election officials in 10,000 jurisdictions to enter every voter’s information into the

Portal, particularly because the Portal still does not exist. App.38a–40a, 44a; Decl. of

Steven Monteith (Monteith Decl.) ¶ 3, Dkt. 280-1. 1 And there is not enough time for

USPS to scan each envelope prior to mailing, especially in states with tens of millions

of ballots. App.41a–42a. Despite these unavoidable facts, USPS offers no contingency

plan for the inevitable technical failures of any new system of this scale. App.41a. To

the contrary, USPS will enforce these requirements under a punishing zero-tolerance

regime: If a single envelope barcode fails to scan for any reason, USPS must reject all

ballots submitted in the same mailing, even when that means refusing to deliver

thousands or millions of Rule-compliant ballots in the same mailing. 91 Fed. Reg. at

54990–91 (§§ 705.24.1, 705.24.3.1–2, 705.24.5.3).

Based on this unrefuted record, the district court found that implementing the

Rule for the November elections would “nearly guarantee[] significant

disenfranchisement for eligible voters.” App.32a–35a. The court therefore entered a

narrow injunction to preserve the longstanding status quo for only the November

1 “Dkt.” refers to the district court docket in Plaintiffs’ case unless otherwise noted.

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2026 election and prevent the chaos that USPS’s rushed implementation of the Rule

would cause. The court did not prevent states from voluntarily complying with the

Rule’s envelope-design and Portal-registration provisions where consistent with state

law. It simply prohibited USPS from refusing to deliver Rule-noncompliant ballots.

The balance of equities is not close. Staying the injunction would throw the

upcoming elections into utter chaos, potentially disenfranchising millions of voters,

including Plaintiffs’ members and the voters Plaintiffs serve, many of whom must

vote by mail due to age, disabilities, language-assistance needs, college attendance,

residence in rural areas, and other reasons. By contrast, maintaining the injunction

imposes no comparable harm on USPS, where the agency concedes that, despite its

asserted interest in “election integrity,” it has no role in verifying whether mail voters

are eligible. Appl. 6, 29. The Constitution, Congress, and centuries of practice have

left that task to the states. On the eve of a national election, this Court should

maintain that status quo and deny USPS’s application for a stay.

STATEMENT

A. Constitutional and Statutory Background

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “establish Post Offices and post

Roads,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. This reflects the Founding generation’s distrust

of Executive control of the post; they understood the Crown’s discretionary control

over the mail was “dangerous in the extreme.” William Goddard, The Plan for

Establishing a New American Post-Office (1774). When Congress formalized the Post

Office in 1792, it prohibited postal officials from “unlawfully detain[ing], delay[ing],

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or open[ing]” the mail. An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within the

United States, §§ 3, 16, 1 Stat. 232, 234, 236 (1792).

Over time, Congress authorized certain exceptions and conditions on mailable

material. For example, in 1797, Congress declared that newspapers were

nonmailable unless dried and wrapped, Act of March 3, 1797, § 6, 1 Stat. 509, 512

(1797), and in 1872, Congress deemed “poisons,” “explosive materials,” and other

hazardous items nonmailable, Act of June 8, 1872, § 133, 17 Stat. 283, 300–01 (1872).

The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 (PRA), 39 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.,

transferred “the functions, powers, and duties of the Post Office Department” to the

newly created USPS. See 39 U.S.C. § 201 (note). The PRA mandates that USPS must

“operate[] as a basic and fundamental service,” “provide postal services to bind the

Nation together,” “provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all

areas,” and “render postal services to all communities.” Id. § 101(a). USPS must

“receive, transmit, and deliver” “written and printed matter, parcels, and like

materials” “throughout the United States” and “throughout the world” and “serve as

nearly as practicable the entire population of the United States.” Id. § 403(a).

To achieve these goals, Congress delegated to USPS specific powers to “provide

for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and

holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail,” “prescribe, in

accordance with this title, the amount of postage and the manner in which it is to be

paid,” and “investigate postal offenses and civil matters relating to the Postal

Service.” Id. § 404(a)(1), (2), (6). USPS may also promulgate “rules and regulations”

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that are “necessary in the execution of its functions” and “not inconsistent with this

title,” id. § 401(2), and exercise “other powers incidental, necessary, or appropriate to

the carrying on of its functions or the exercise of its specific powers,” id. § 401(10).

Congress also enacted a detailed statutory scheme that preserves the same division

of authority as at the Founding: Congress specifies the situations in which matter is

“nonmailable,” see id. §§ 3001–18, and USPS carries out that determination—

including, where Congress has expressly authorized it to do so, by issuing regulations

that establish standards for determining whether matter falls within a statutory

category of nonmailable matter. See, e.g., id. § 3001(g)(2) (directing USPS to issue

standards that fragrance samples must satisfy to avoid being deemed nonmailable).

The Constitution vests authority to regulate federal elections in the states and

Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. States exercise this power, subject to congressional

laws concerning the time, place, and manner of federal elections. 2 Watson v. RNC,

146 S. Ct. 2165, 2169–70 (2026). The Executive Branch has no authority in this

scheme, except to the extent specifically delegated by Congress.

States have exercised this authority to permit at least some residents to cast

their ballots by mail since the Civil War. Watson, 146 S. Ct. at 2171. Today, every

state permits at least some residents to vote by mail. Id. Congress has largely left the

regulation of mail voting to the states, but it requires states to permit absent

uniformed-services voters and overseas voters to vote by mail in federal elections.

2 Congress may also legislate to enforce voting-related constitutional amendments,

see, e.g., U.S. Const. amends. XIV, XV.

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Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 52 U.S.C.

§ 20302(a)(1). And Congress has specifically directed USPS to deliver those ballots

“expeditiously and free of postage.” 39 U.S.C. § 3406; see also 52 U.S.C. § 20304(b)(4).

B. Executive Order and USPS Rule

On March 31, 2026, President Trump issued the Executive Order. Section 3

directs the Postmaster General “to initiate a proposed rulemaking pursuant to 39

U.S.C. [§] 401 and other applicable authority within 60 days of the date of this order,”

and details the “minimum” requirements that the rule “shall include.” 91 Fed. Reg.

at 17126 (§ 3(b)). On June 2, USPS issued a proposed rule complying with the Order’s

directives. Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 32915 (June 2, 2026).

On August 26, USPS issued the Rule, effective August 21, which confirms that

USPS will not deliver mail ballots unless (1) the envelope meets USPS’s new design

standards, (2) election officials upload voters’ information into the Portal, and (3) the

voter’s address, unique barcode, and originating state are the same on the envelope

and in the Portal. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54990–91 (§§ 705.24.3, 705.24.5).

Complying with each of these requirements necessitates several steps across

10,000 different election jurisdictions. Local election officials must, among other

things: ensure that ballot envelopes conform to USPS’s new design standards (which

many jurisdictions have not previously used and which may conflict with state law); 3

submit them to USPS for approval (which historically has taken weeks or months,

3 See App.34a–36a & n.43; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 17-20-19, 17-20-21.

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and for which USPS intends to hire no new staff); 4 proceed with printing (which

typically requires four to sixteen weeks); 5 learn how to upload voter information into

the Portal (which is not yet functional and on which the local officials have not been

trained); 6 upload information for each eligible mail ballot voter (which may number

in the millions and conflict with state law); 7 and be physically present while USPS

scans each mailing. Id. (§§ 705.24.3.1–3); App.33a–45a; Expert Decl. of Tammy

Patrick (Patrick Decl.) ¶¶ 21–122, Dkt. 264-1 (detailing “extraordinary complexity of

election administration” and logistical challenges that render compliance with the

Rule “effectively impossible” for the November election).

For its part, before mailing the ballots to voters, USPS “will review” each batch

of ballots (also known as a “mailing,” which is “a group of pieces . . . . that may be

sorted together,” while a “piece” or “mailpiece” refers to an “individually addressed”

item) 8 to determine whether the envelopes meet the new design standards and

whether the information on each envelope matches the information in the Portal. 91

Fed. Reg. at 54990–91 (§§ 705.24.3, 705.24.5). If even a single envelope within a

4 91 Fed. Reg. at 54986.

5 Patrick Decl. ¶ 86, Dkt. 264-1.

6 Monteith Decl. ¶ 3; e.g., Decl. of Kristen Stavisky (Stavisky Decl.) ¶ 36, California,

No. 26-cv-13917, Dkt. No. 4-17.
7 See App.38a–39a & n.49; Cal. Elec. Code § 2166; N.M. Stat. § 1-6C-1, et seq. (2019);

N.Y. Election Law § 5-508; Va. Code § 24.2-706(A).
8 USPS, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), 235 Mail Preparation, §§ 1.2(a), 1.4(a)
https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/235.htm (defining a “mailing” as “a group of pieces
within the same class of mail and same processing category that may be sorted
together” and “pieces” as “individually addressed mailpieces”).

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mailing fails to properly scan or match, the entire mailing (no matter the size) will be

rejected. Id. (§§ 705.24.4.2(d), 705.24.5.1, 705.24.5.3); see also Br. of Amicus Curiae

Whistleblower Aid in Opp. to Appl. for Stay at 15–16 (Whistleblower Br.). This zero-

tolerance approach threatens to delay “tens of thousands of ballots” without any

“clear process by which state election officials or voters themselves can challenge the

rejection.” Whistleblower Br. 6 (citation omitted).

According to testimony from an election-administration expert and leader of a

national association of election officials the district court properly considered, the

Rule’s requirements have no prior precedent. See App.44a n.61, see also

Whistleblower Br. 8, 17. USPS has never rejected ballots based on envelope design,

refused entire ballot mailings because of a defect in a single mail piece, subjected

ballot mail to requirements inapplicable to other mail, or required voter lists from

election officials. Patrick Decl. ¶¶ 17, 71, 94, 113.

C. Plaintiff Organizations

Plaintiffs—League of Women Voters of Massachusetts, League of Women

Voters Lotte E. Scharfman Memorial Education Fund, League of Women Voters of

the United States, League of Women Voters Education Fund, Association of

Americans Resident Overseas, U.S. Vote Foundation, OCA-Asian Pacific American

Advocates, and Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc.—are civic organizations who, as a

core part of their work, educate and assist Americans with exercising their

fundamental right to vote, including mail voting. App.3a, 21a–24a. Their members

reside in D.C., all 50 states, and several overseas territories; many rely on mail voting

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due to disabilities, college attendance, rural residence, and other reasons. App.21a.

D. Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs challenged the Executive Order on April 2, 2026, Dkt. 1, and obtained

a preliminary injunction on August 11, Dkt. 183. A group of states intervened to

defend the Executive Order and Rule (Intervenor States). Dkt. 106. After this Court

stayed the injunction entered in a parallel suit brought by a group of states and D.C.

(Plaintiff States) on ripeness grounds—while explaining that if “the Postal Service’s

final rule harms the States, they may challenge that rule,” Trump v. California, No.

26A124, 2026 WL 2473573, at *4 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2026)—the district court vacated

Plaintiffs’ initial preliminary injunction. Dkt. 204.

On August 26, the day the Rule was published, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental

Complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a new preliminary

injunction. Dkt. 205, 206. Plaintiff States likewise filed a new action and moved for

the same. California v. USPS, No. 26-cv-13917 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2026), Dkt. 1, 3.

On August 27, the district court issued a 14-day TRO partially enjoining the Rule

while it considered Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Dkt. 218 at 10–11. 9

On September 4, the district court entered the narrow preliminary injunction

at issue. It found that compliance with the Rule for this November’s election is

“virtually impossible” which “nearly guarantee[d] significant disenfranchisement for

eligible voters.” App.43a–44a, 32a–34a. It further held the Rule unconstitutionally

9 USPS appealed the TRO and sought a stay from the First Circuit and this Court,

but withdrew the latter stay request on September 6. See Letter, USPS v. California,
No. 26A297 (U.S. Sept. 6, 2026).

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intrudes on Congress’s and states’ powers under the Elections Clause, exceeds

USPS’s delegated power, and contradicts Congress’s enactments regarding

nonmailable material. App.31a. It thus partially enjoined the Rule for the November

elections, prohibiting USPS from rejecting Rule-noncompliant ballots, but preserving

states’ ability to voluntarily comply with the Rule’s envelope standards and Portal-

enrollment process. App.31a, 47a–48a.

USPS appealed and filed stay applications with the First Circuit and this

Court. As of this filing, the First Circuit has not ruled on the stay application.

ARGUMENT

With less than two months until the midterms, USPS asks this Court to upend

the longstanding status quo and allow USPS—a federal entity with absolutely no

authority to make the rules that govern federal elections—to unleash pandemonium

upon the electoral process. USPS has not made the strong showing required for a

stay. The district court found based on extensive evidence (including from USPS

itself) that Plaintiffs’ members, who reside in every state and rely on mail voting, face

an imminent, substantial threat of disenfranchisement and that the Rule directly

impedes Plaintiffs’ core voter-assistance activities. App.21a–24a, 44a. USPS rebuts

none of this with facts. On the merits, the court correctly held the Rule both ultra

vires and unconstitutional: It creates a new category of nonmailable matter—without

any statutory authority—exceeds the constraints on USPS’s general rulemaking

authority—especially as a major question—and makes USPS the unconstitutional

arbiter of who may receive mail ballots. App.25a–31a. And the equities run entirely

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one way: Staying the preliminary injunction would upend the status quo at the

expense of voters and election officials—risking the disenfranchisement of millions of

eligible voters—while USPS faces no irreparable harm from a time-limited, narrow

injunction solely for the November elections. This Court should deny the stay.

I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING.

The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs have standing based on its well-

supported factual findings that the Rule directly harms both their members and their

core voter-engagement activities. 10 App.21a–24a.

First, Plaintiffs have established associational standing through unrebutted

testimony identifying members who need to vote by mail in the upcoming election

and are now at “substantial risk” of disenfranchisement. Susan B. Anthony List v.

Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). Just as Plaintiff States unquestionably have

standing because the Rule interferes with their ability to send ballots, the Rule

interferes with Plaintiffs’ members’ ability to receive them. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez,

416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott,

490 U.S. 401 (1989) (a party’s injury stemming from mailing restrictions “does not

depend on whether the . . . correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a

particular letter” because “the interests of both parties are inextricably meshed”).

Plaintiffs are nationwide organizations whose members reside in all fifty states

and D.C., who “need to vote by mail because of physical disabilities, mobility

10 USPS contests Plaintiffs’ standing but makes no separate argument contesting that

if Plaintiffs have standing, those injuries are also sufficient to show irreparable harm.

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impairments or other health issues, limited English proficiency, residence in rural

areas, service as poll workers on election day, or [their being] college students away

from their resident home.” App.21a. 11 For example, Plaintiffs’ members include

registered voters in states where voting by mail is the primary method of election,

with ballots sent to all voters: California, Colorado, Hawai’i, Oregon, Utah, and

Washington. 12 They also include members in places such as Arkansas, Louisiana,

Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, and Texas who are rural, elderly, disabled, or

Indigenous voters who lack access to transportation; out-of-state college students who

cannot return home to vote at the polls; and people who are serving as poll workers

on election day—who intend to request a mail ballot for the November midterms. 13

This record is dispositively different from Summers v. Earth Island Institute,

555 U.S. 488 (2009). Contra Appl. 34. There, the Court rejected standing based on

members’ generalized desire to visit forests that might someday be affected by a

11 See, e.g., 3d Decl. of Thu Nguyen (3d Nguyen Decl.) ¶¶ 3–7, 13, 35–36, Dkt. 208-3

(identifying “Member A” as “an OCA youth member and qualified voter residing in
Colorado who needs to vote by mail while at college in Massachusetts” and “Member
B” as “an OCA youth member and qualified voter residing in Hawai’i who needs to
vote by mail while at college in California”); 3d Decl. of Celia Canavan (3d Canavan
Decl.) ¶¶ 24–25, 59, Dkt. 208-4 (discussing 93-year-old member who votes by mail
because of health and transportation challenges and a member whose cancer and
autoimmune disease require mail voting, among other members).
12 4th Decl. of Celina Stewart (4th Stewart Decl.) ¶¶ 7–8, Dkt. 251-1; 3d Nguyen Decl.

¶ 35.
13 3d Decl. of Celina Stewart (3d Stewart Decl.) ¶¶ 41–43, 45–46, Dkt. 208-1; 4th

Stewart Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 9–10; 3d Nguyen Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13, 35–36; 3d Decl. of Dorcas
Washington (3d Washington Decl.) ¶¶ 31–33, 36, 71, Dkt. 208-5; 3d Canavan Decl.
¶¶ 24–25, 59; see also 3d Nguyen Decl. ¶¶ 3–7, 13, 35–36.

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challenged regulation. Id. at 495–96. Here, Plaintiffs have identified members across

the country who need to vote by mail for specific reasons, intend to do so in November,

and face concrete risks that the Rule will prevent their ballots from being delivered.

Nor, contrary to USPS’s reliance (at 34) on Clapper v. Amnesty International

USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), is this risk “speculative.” As the district court found,

compliance with the Rule for the midterm elections is “virtually impossible” given the

compressed timeframe. App.34a–40a, 43a–44a. And even if compliance were possible,

the members would still face substantial risk of disenfranchisement, given the high

likelihood that millions of ballots will be rejected from the Rule’s rushed

implementation and zero-tolerance verification regime. Disenfranchisement is not

only “predictable,” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019), it is

“unavoidable.” App.43a–44a; see also Whistleblower Br. 7–8.

Second, Plaintiffs also have standing because the Rule directly impairs their

core voter-engagement activities. Relying on extensive, unrebutted testimony, the

district court found “[t]he chaos engendered by the Final Rule’s immediate deadlines

is significantly interfering with Plaintiff Organizations’ mission to provide its

members with accurate and reliable information about how to vote, including by

mail,” leading to confusion about “whether to advise their members to vote by mail,

despite legal entitlement, due to the high risk of disenfranchisement.” App.21a–22a

& nn.27–28. Contrary to USPS’s assertions (at 34), this is a concrete organizational

injury. An organization is materially harmed where, as here, government action

directly interferes with that organization’s core work of helping voters participate in

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democracy. See RNC v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 120 F.4th 390, 397 (4th Cir. 2024)

(political party had standing to challenge policy that “affected and interfered with”

core mission of “counseling . . . voters”); see also Get Loud Ark. v. Jester, 171 F.4th

1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2026) (voter-engagement organization had standing to challenge

rule that “directly interfered with [its] voter registration activities”); League of

Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024) (AHM), does not

alter this conclusion. Cf. Appl. 33–34. AHM rejected standing based on a “setback to

the organization’s abstract social interests” and expenditures on advocacy

undertaken in opposition to government policy. 602 U.S. at 394–95. Plaintiffs’

standing depends on neither. The Rule directly interferes with core voter-assistance

activities that have long been central to Plaintiffs’ operations. App.21a–24a. 14

Plaintiffs are forced to spend resources countering the inevitable, predictable

disruption of their civic work, not advocating against the Rule. App.21a–24a.

14 See also, e.g., 3d Nguyen Decl. ¶¶ 21–22, 28 (the Rule would significantly disrupt

OCA’s creation, translation, and distribution of state-specific voter guides in time for
the election); 3d Stewart Decl. ¶¶ 13, 20, 26, 29–33, 40, 44, 47 (the League’s
VOTE411.org page—which provides nonpartisan voter education to millions across
the country—would have to be overhauled in the short time prior to the election
absent an injunction); 3d Washington Decl. ¶¶ 42, 52–53, 70 (the Rule renders Delta
Sigma Theta “unable” to educate members and other voters with specificity, and
would make already printed materials useless); 3d Decl. of Susan Dzieduszycka-
Suinat ¶¶ 12–15 33, 35, Dkt. 208-6 (U.S. Vote’s Civic Data product—which provides
state- and territory-specific information on voting requirements—is “essential to U.S.
Vote’s survival” and relied on by many thousands of voters; the Rule would require
taking the tool offline entirely); 3d Canavan Decl. ¶¶ 34–41, 48, 51.

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II. DEFENDANTS ARE UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF
THEIR APPEAL.

A. Plaintiffs May Sue in Equity to Enjoin the Rule’s Enforcement.

Everyone agrees that Plaintiffs may challenge the Rule in equity “without a

congressionally provided cause of action to prevent an ‘injurious act by a public

officer.’” Trump v. Cook, 146 S. Ct. 2234, 2251 n.2 (2026) (quoting Armstrong v.

Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015)); see also McAnnulty, 187 U.S.

at 109.

USPS incorrectly contends (at 14–15) that Plaintiffs must satisfy the

heightened standard described in Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas, 605 U.S.

665 (2025) (NRC). That standard never applies to constitutional claims. E.g., Free

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010). And it

applies to statutory claims only when the plaintiff invokes equitable review to “end-

run” a statutory scheme governing judicial review. NRC, 605 U.S. at 680–81. In NRC,

for example, Congress had provided a specific avenue for judicial review of agency

action but limited that review to parties to the underlying agency proceeding. Id. at

674–75. The Court applied the heightened standard because the plaintiffs, who were

not parties to that proceeding, nevertheless sought judicial review in equity. Id.

NRC has no bearing here. Congress did not limit judicial review of USPS

regulations; it simply exempted certain USPS actions from the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA). 39 U.S.C. § 410(a). That exemption merely “take[s] away what

the APA has otherwise given—namely, the APA’s own guarantee of judicial review,”

but it “does not repeal the review of ultra vires actions that was recognized long

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before, in McAnnulty.” Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Because there is no “end-run,” the heightened standard does not apply. E.g., Cook,

146 S. Ct. at 2251 n.2; Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 240; Trump v. Illinois, 146 S. Ct.

432, 434 (2025). In any event, Plaintiffs would easily satisfy the heightened standard

because the Rule plainly contravenes the clear and specific statutory commands

discussed below.

B. The Rule Is Unlawful.

The Rule is unlawful for three reasons. First, it creates a new category of

nonmailable matter without congressional authorization. Second, apart from

nonmailability, it imposes unauthorized mailing restrictions that interfere with state

election administration. Third, its unprecedented assertion of authority over federal

elections requires clear congressional authorization—which USPS plainly lacks.

1. The Rule Exceeds USPS’s Authority Because USPS May Not Create New
Categories of Nonmailable Matter.

Congress, not USPS, decides what matter may be excluded from the mails.

That principle is deeply rooted in the federal postal system’s history and preserved

in the PRA, where “Congress has established a detailed statutory and regulatory

scheme to govern this country’s vast postal system.” USPS v. Council of Greenburgh

Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 122 (1981). This holds especially true where, as here, the

question concerns whether a statute “confers authority upon an administrative

agency”—a question shaped by “whether Congress in fact meant to confer the power

the agency has asserted.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022).

This Court has long recognized that the Postal Service must deliver the mail

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unless Congress permits otherwise. As the Founding generation recognized, the

power to withhold mail was “dangerous.” Goddard, supra at 5. Thus, while “[t]he

validity of legislation prescribing what should be carried . . . has never been

questioned,” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877), the Postal Service “cannot

exclude or refuse to deliver” mail unless “some law of Congress” authorizes it,

McAnnulty, 187 U.S. at 109. That allocation of authority dates to the postal system’s

founding. From the very first postal laws, Congress itself has prescribed what matter

could not be carried, while the Post Office has been tasked with administering and

enforcing those congressional judgments. See supra Statement § A.

The PRA thus requires that USPS “receive, transmit, and deliver” the mail

“throughout the United States.” 39 U.S.C. § 403(a). It delegates to USPS authority

“to provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding,

returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail,” id.

§ 404(a)(1)—and to promulgate rules and exercise other powers in service of that

task, id. § 401(2), (10). But Congress did not grant USPS general power to declare

categories of matter nonmailable. Instead, it enacted a comprehensive statutory

scheme specifying what matter is “nonmailable” and the circumstances in which

USPS may refuse to carry it. Id. §§ 3001–3018. When Congress intends USPS to

regulate nonmailable matter, it expressly delegates that authority. See, e.g., id.

§ 3001(g)(2). The PRA thus preserves the historical allocation of authority: USPS

administers the postal system; Congress determines what may be excluded from it.

The “overall statutory scheme” confirms the point. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at

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721 (citation omitted). Congress repeatedly specified when matter may not be carried

yet nowhere gave USPS a comparable “specific power” to add categories of

nonmailable matter by regulation. See 39 U.S.C. § 404(a). Congress’s enactment of a

series of provisions identifying certain categories of nonmailable matter therefore

“necessarily bespeaks a negative implication” that there are no other categories.

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 195 (2025) (citation modified). 15 USPS seeks

to add them anyway.

The Rule squarely violates the basic statutory precept that Congress

determines what materials are nonmailable. It makes mail ballots nonmailable

unless states comply with USPS’s unprecedented voter-data demands and data- and

barcode-matching requirements. See 91 Fed. Reg. 54991 (§ 705.24.5.3). In doing so,

the Rule does not merely regulate how USPS handles or delivers mail; it creates new

conditions under which an entire category of mail may not be delivered. It thus

creates a new condition of nonmailability that Congress never enacted.

USPS fails to locate any statutory authority for the Rule. First, USPS suggests

(at 23) that the PRA’s nonmailability provisions are not “exclusive” and that it may

therefore use its “general rulemaking powers” to create its own categories of

nonmailable matter. But USPS offers no support for this proposition, which flouts the

text and structure of the PRA and the history of the postal laws. Congress authorized

15 Congress knows how to authorize an agency to add exceptions or conditions to a

statutory scheme. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 39A(d) (authorizing agency to create
additional exceptions to general prohibition against pointing lasers at aircraft); 42
U.S.C. § 7412(c)(5) (delegating authority to agency to create additional categories of
regulated air pollutants). Congress enacted no comparable provision here.

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USPS to issue regulations only when “necessary in the execution of its functions”

under law, 39 U.S.C. § 401(2); it did not delegate to USPS the function of designating

new categories of mail as “nonmailable.” While USPS points to its general,

undisputed authority to provide for the handling of mail, see id. § 404(a)(1), Congress

clearly did not intend to allow USPS to deem new categories of matter “nonmailable”

under this provision. If it had, it would not have enacted a detailed scheme of

provisions for “nonmailable” matter, under which USPS does have the authority to

create regulations for nonmailable items as specific as “fragrance advertising

sample[s].” Id. § 3001(g)(2). USPS’s reading would render those specific delegations

“superfluous” by allowing USPS to accomplish under its general rulemaking

authority what Congress has long authorized only through specific provisions.

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645–47 (2012).

Second, USPS argues (at 22) that the Rule does not render mail ballots

nonmailable matter but merely imposes “conditions on [their] acceptance.” That is a

distinction without a difference. Regardless of how USPS characterizes the Rule, “it

is the substance of what the [agency] has purported to do and has done which is

decisive.” Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942). And the

substance here is unmistakable: The Rule makes otherwise mailable ballots

nonmailable unless specified conditions are satisfied.

The PRA itself demonstrates why. The PRA lists many types of “nonmailable

matter.” 39 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3018. Some of them are outright bans, e.g., id. § 3001(a),

but others render otherwise mailable matter nonmailable unless specified conditions

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are met. For example, a fragrance sample is “nonmailable matter” unless the sample

is sealed, wrapped, treated, or otherwise prepared to prevent involuntary exposure.

Id. § 3001(g)(1); see also id. §§ 3001(d), (g), (h), (i), (n), 3002, 3014, 3018. This

approach is not new. In 1797, Congress deemed newspapers nonmailable unless,

among other things, they were “sufficiently dried and enclosed in proper wrappers.”

Act of March 3, 1797 § 6, 1 Stat. 509, 512 (1797). The Rule works the same: It treats

otherwise mailable ballots as nonmailable unless states submit voter data and satisfy

the Rule’s other requirements. That is a nonmailability provision, regardless of

USPS’s convenient label for it.

USPS’s own examples confirm this. USPS repeatedly analogizes (at 16–17, 19,

21–22) to special packaging rules for cremated remains and replica explosives that,

it claims, demonstrate its authority to impose content-specific conditions short of

rendering the matter nonmailable. But those regulations do not rest on USPS’s

“general rulemaking authority”; rather, USPS issues those regulations—which

govern hazardous, restricted, and perishable mail—based explicitly on 18 U.S.C.

§ 1716. See USPS, Pub. No. 52, Hazardous, Restricted, and Perishable Mail (2026),

at §§ 434, 451.22; see also 39 C.F.R. § 211.2(a)(2). Section 1716(a) categorically deems

nonmailable “material which may kill or injure another, or injure the mails or other

property.” For potentially dangerous materials that are not “outwardly or of their own

force dangerous or injurious to life, health, or property;” § 1716(b) authorizes USPS

to prescribe rules governing their “preparation and packing” for safe mailing. See also

39 U.S.C. § 3001(a).

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USPS now tries (at 16) to disclaim § 1716 as the basis for those regulations

because, it says, replica explosives and cremated remains are not inherently

dangerous. But this ignores that § 1716(b) authorizes USPS to regulate the

transmission of otherwise-covered material in that exact circumstance. Consistent

with that statutory authority, USPS explained, when adopting the replica-explosives

restriction, that unmarked replicas had prompted evacuations, requiring “emergency

first responder[]” intervention. 75 Fed. Reg. 282, 283 (Jan. 5, 2010). Its Inspector

General has likewise noted that other couriers refuse to even ship cremated remains

because they are hazardous material. USPS, Off. of Inspector Gen., No. 23-018-R23,

Cremated Remains, Audit Report (July 5, 2023), at 2 n.1.

USPS’s hypothetical about elder-abuse solicitations (at 18) fares no better.

USPS suggests that to deal with elder-abuse mail scams, it could impose “special

design and registration rules” on solicitations to retirement communities even though

such rules “are not authorized by any of Congress’s specific regulations addressing

fraudulent use of mails.” But such rules could in fact be authorized by statute. If a

scam solicits payment, for example, USPS may regulate the envelope’s design or

deem the matter nonmailable under several existing provisions. E.g., 39 U.S.C.

§ 3001(d), (h)–(j). What USPS may not do is create new nonmailability requirements

untethered to any statutory authorization. If Congress believes additional

restrictions are warranted, it can enact them. All of these examples only reinforce the

bedrock principle that Congress sets the general categories around nonmailability

and, when it chooses to do so, may provide USPS the leeway to implement those

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statutorily specified restrictions.

Finally, USPS suggests (at 19–20) that Plaintiffs’ theory would deny USPS any

legal authority to make election-specific rules. But USPS surely may make rules

specific to election-related mail when Congress has authorized it to do so. See, e.g.,

Mailing Standards of USPS, DMM (§ 703.8.2.1–2) (specifying the class of outbound

and return ballot mail); 39 U.S.C. § 404(b) (authorizing USPS to “establish

reasonable and equitable classes of mail”). But USPS may not reject election-related

mail based on category-specific requirements absent congressional authorization.

USPS’s examples (at 9, 19–20) of “election-specific mail-preparation policies” are

especially inapposite because they are all voluntary. USPS does not reject ballots that

fail to follow them, consistent with its statutory mandate to deliver the mail.

2. The Rule Exceeds USPS’s Authority Even If It Does Not Create a New
Category of Nonmailable Matter.

Even if the Rule was not an unauthorized nonmailability provision, it would

still be ultra vires because no provision of federal law grants USPS the authority to

enact it.

USPS contends (at 20) that the Rule is authorized as a “simpl[e] exercise[] of

the Postal Service’s general rulemaking power to regulate the efficient handling and

timely delivery of mail.” Specifically, USPS points (at 15–16) to its power to provide

for the “delivery . . . of mail,” 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1), and to promulgate rules in service

of its statutory functions, id. § 401(2). But those provisions do not authorize the Rule.

Under § 401(2), any rules USPS issues under its general rulemaking authority must

not be “inconsistent with” the PRA and must be “necessary in the execution of its

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functions under this title.” Id. The Rule bulldozes past both limitations by coercing

states to comply with onerous mail ballot and data requirements and then granting

USPS itself the authority to reject and return noncompliant ballots. 91 Fed. Reg. at

54991 (§§ 705.24.4.2–24.5.3). This is both inconsistent with USPS’s mandate to

provide “adequate and efficient postal services . . . throughout the United States,” 39

U.S.C. § 403(a), and unnecessary for USPS’s core mission of delivering the mail, see

id. § 404(a)(1).

USPS tries (at 16) to cast the Rule as a mere attempt to “impose reasonable

requirements for envelope design and addressee information with respect to

particularly sensitive items.” Of course, this Rule does not merely regulate what must

appear on a ballot envelope or its size or weight—it reaches into state election

systems, demanding voter data in advance and then designating itself the arbiter of

which ballot mail may be sent to eligible voters. Moreover, this Rule is hardly

consistent with the PRA as is required for rulemaking, 39 U.S.C. § 401(2), because it

impedes rather than furthers USPS’s responsibility to “maintain an efficient system

of . . . delivery of the mail nationwide,” id. § 403(b)(1).

USPS’s reliance (at 21–22) on regulations concerning insufficient postage and

illegible addresses only underscores the problem. Those are broadly applicable mail

regulations, not restrictions targeting a particular category of mail. And they are not,

as USPS claims (at 21), exercises of “USPS’s general rulemaking powers.” Rather

they implement specific statutory powers authorizing USPS to prescribe “the amount

of postage and the manner in which it is to be paid,” 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2), establish

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classes of mail, rates, and fees, id. § 404(b), and provide for the “delivery . . . of mail,”

and the “disposition of undeliverable mail,” id. § 404(a)(1).

USPS’s cited cases are not to the contrary. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 123, and

Associated Third Class Mail Users v. USPS, 600 F.2d 824, 826 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1979),

generally recognize USPS’s rulemaking authority; neither holds that USPS may use

that rulemaking authority to create new categories of nonmailable matter or

prescribe the manner of federal elections. And Associated Third Class Mail Users

makes clear that USPS rules must “further the objectives of [the PRA].” 600 F.2d at

826 n.5. A rule that adds a new categorical exception to USPS’s duty to deliver ballot

mail does the opposite.

Nor can USPS justify this sweeping Rule with passing references to mail

“frauds that undermine public confidence in federal elections.” Appl. 17. USPS

identifies no statutory basis for that proposition, and the Rule itself cites only 18

U.S.C. § 3061(b) in support. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54974. But § 3061(a) grants postal

inspectors authority to investigate “criminal matters related to the Postal Service and

the mails” using warrants, arrests, and property seizures. It does not authorize USPS

to condition delivery of otherwise mailable matter. At most, § 3061(b) supports

regulations governing postal criminal investigations—not a rule dictating whether

ballot mail may be carried and delivered.

3. The Rule Exceeds USPS’s Authority Because Congress Did Not Clearly
Authorize This Extraordinary Power.

The Rule would still be unlawful even if USPS had a plausible statutory basis

for the Rule. Where, as here, the Executive Branch claims an extraordinary power of

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great political significance, it must “identify clear congressional authorization” for

that power. Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 255. USPS’s claimed authority to interfere

with the states’ distribution of election ballots, indeed, to withhold those ballots if its

conditions are not met, is extraordinary in both its breadth and its unprecedented

intrusion into state election administration. USPS cannot identify any provision that

clearly authorizes it to exercise that power.

The scale and significance of that asserted power are difficult to overstate. As

is their sovereign prerogative, every state authorizes at least some residents to vote

by mail. Watson, 146 S. Ct. at 2169–71. Plaintiff States anticipate mailing over 50

million ballots between now and Election Day. App.32a–34a & n.37. But USPS now

claims it is empowered to condition its delivery of election mail on generic grants of

authority having nothing to do with elections. This assertion of federal power over

state election processes lacks the explicit, unambiguous congressional authorization

needed before an executive agency “claims the power to resolve a matter of great

political significance.” E.g., West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 743 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)

(citation modified); accord Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 246.

Here, USPS’s Rule intrudes on two “core congressional power[s],” Learning

Res., 607 U.S. at 243—the regulation of federal elections, U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1,

and the federal postal system, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Indeed, Congress has

“zealously watched and strictly confined” its “power” over nonmailable matter.

Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 n.18 (1946). But the Rule would permit

USPS to determine whether an entire category of election mail may enter the federal

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postal system, thereby overriding a sovereign state’s choice to conduct its elections by

mail. Contrary to USPS’s arguments (at 23), that asserted power has vast political

significance—it affects millions of ballots, thus triggering the “major-questions

doctrine,” independent of its sizable compliance costs. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 743

(Gorsuch, J., concurring).

USPS repeatedly characterizes the Rule as a “modest” regulation of the mail.

Appl. 2, 7, 13, 17, 22–25, 27. It is anything but. The Rule dictates conditions under

which states may send ballots to their eligible voters, directly affecting how millions

exercise the franchise. And the general grants of authority on which USPS relies

supply no limiting principle. USPS does not explain what election-related conditions

it may impose, what standards govern those conditions, how close to an election they

may take effect, or how much compliance burden USPS may impose. The Pandora’s

box of unfettered interference in federal election regulation by USPS, if opened here,

will not soon be closed.

The Rule’s total “lack of historical precedent” further supports the conclusion

that it is ultra vires. Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 245–46. Congress has never delegated

USPS authority to restrict the delivery of election ballots. The one time Congress has

addressed USPS’s treatment of mail ballots—in UOCAVA—it directed the Postal

Service to carry qualifying ballots “expeditiously and free of postage.” 39 U.S.C.

§ 3406(a)(1). Thus, when Congress has spoken specifically about USPS and mail

ballots, it has done so to facilitate, rather than impede, their delivery. Moreover, it is

especially implausible that Congress would have authorized USPS to impose

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sweeping changes to election administration with immediate effect, on the eve of an

election, when Congress itself has delayed the effective date of federal election

legislation to give states time to comply. See, e.g., National Voter Registration Act of

1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 13, 107 Stat. 77, 89 (1993) (two-year delay); Help America

Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-252, § 302, 116 Stat. 1666, 1708 (2002) (same).

Nor has USPS ever previously understood its general statutory authority to

permit it to create new categories of nonmailable matter. There are many examples

of USPS invoking specific statutory authority—even if odious or constitutionally

suspect for other reasons—to justify past attempts to exclude mail. E.g., U.S. ex rel.

Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921) (defending

exclusion under Espionage Act of 1917); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478

(1962) (defending exclusion under Comstock Act of 1873). But USPS identifies no

precedent in which it relied on its general rulemaking authority to declare an

otherwise mailable category of matter nonmailable, see supra at 22–23—let alone to

condition delivery of ballots on compliance with its preferred election-administration

practices, even though mail voting dates back to the Civil War, Watson, 146 S. Ct. at

2171; see Patrick Decl. ¶¶ 17, 71, 94.

The combination of the Rule’s extraordinary breadth, its intrusion into state

election administration, and the absence of historical precedent confirms what the

statutory text makes clear: Congress did not authorize USPS to wield this power.

C. The Rule Is Unconstitutional.

The Rule is also unconstitutional because USPS intrudes on states’ sovereign

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authority to administer elections by refusing to deliver mail ballots sent by states to

their citizens unless states follow USPS’s preferred mail-ballot practices. The

Elections Clause empowers states to prescribe the manner of federal elections absent

a conflict with federal law. E.g., Watson, 146 S. Ct. at 2181. But the power claimed

by USPS upsets the federalism that the Elections Clause honors, intruding deep into

the process of election administration, “an area that is the particular domain of state

law.” See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021).

USPS argues (at 25–26) that the constitutional challenge collapses into the

statutory one because, if Congress authorized the Rule, there is no Elections Clause

violation. But statutory and constitutional limits are distinct: An agency action may

exceed its statutory authority without violating the Constitution, but an action that

also transgresses an independent constitutional limit is unlawful on both grounds.

See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994). Here, the Rule does more than

regulate the mail generally; it targets the ballots states use to conduct their elections

and declares them nonmailable. By doing so, USPS has not merely exceeded its

statutory authority; it has unconstitutionally exercised control over the manner in

which states conduct elections.

USPS also claims (at 19) that the Rule “does not regulate elections,” only the

mail. That characterization cannot be reconciled with the text of the Rule or the

Executive Order that spawned it. The Rule expressly invokes the Executive Order

and “the need . . . [to] help protect the integrity of federal elections.” 91 Fed. Reg. at

54966. And the Order, entitled “Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in

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Federal Elections,” likewise states that its purpose is to “enhance election integrity

via the United States Mail.” 91 Fed. Reg. at 17125. By invoking purported election

integrity rationales (at 5, 9, 13, 17, 18), USPS further reveals how this Rule targets

election administration rather than postal administration.

Nor is USPS’s characterization of the Rule consistent with its practical effect.

The Rule expressly provides that ballot mailings that do not comply with the voter-

specific enrollment requirement “will not be accepted and will be returned to the

authorized ballot mailer.” 91 Fed. Reg. at 54991 (§ 705.24.5.3(a)) (emphasis added).

USPS is imposing conditions on states’ ability to conduct elections by mail, requiring

them to provide detailed information about each voter or forgo USPS’s delivery of

their ballots altogether. USPS’s expansion of the power to prescribe the manner of

federal elections and its supplanting of longstanding state laws around voting by mail

is unconstitutional as well as ultra vires.

III. THE REMAINING FACTORS WEIGH AGAINST A STAY.

A. The Equities and Public Interest Strongly Counsel Against a Stay.

The balance of equities is stark. 16 USPS evades (at 31–32) the undeniable

16 USPS argues this Court need not balance the equities because this is not a “close

case.” See Appl. 6, 12, 28, 31 (citing Nat’l Republican Cong. Comm. v. Brown, No.
26A274, 2026 WL 2618462 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2026) (per curiam)). But Brown, and its cited
predecessor Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010), involved stays pending
certiorari after appellate merits review. See Brown, 2026 WL 2618462, at *1;
Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 188–89. Neither changed this Court’s “well established”
standard for stays pending appeal, which includes balancing the equities. Cook, 146
S. Ct. at 2246. Indeed, this Court just applied that test in the Plaintiff States’ case.
California, 2026 WL 2473573, at *2. And even under Brown, this is not a “close case,”
because the merits and harm are entirely against the government. See supra § II.

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consequences of implementing the Rule now, baldly suggesting that such “overblown”

concerns are based on “speculation,” “mischaracterization,” and at most amount to

the assertion that “compliance with the Rule may be challenging for the upcoming

elections.” But the harms here are far more than “ordinary compliance costs.” Appl.

31. Unrebutted declarations from dozens of state election officials, the Rule’s own

provisions, and USPS’s own admissions, all prove that rushing into this

unprecedented mail-ballot regime on the eve of an election without the systems,

training, or contingency plans needed to administer it will throw election

administration into chaos and “nearly guarantee[] significant disenfranchisement” of

eligible voters. App.32a–33a. In the face of this record, the government cannot show

that a stay will not “substantially injure” the other parties and the public interest,

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009), which strongly favors protecting

“constitutional guarantees,” United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960).

This Court has repeatedly cautioned against eleventh-hour disruptions of

election administration, which cause “much confusion” and “upset[] the delicate

federal-state balance in elections.” Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 146

S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025). That caution sounds primarily in federalism concerns. “States

are free to decide for themselves whether last-minute changes to an election are in

their best interests,” but the changes here are imposed by a federal agency, without

any congressional authorization. Allen v. Milligan, 146 S. Ct. 1377, 1381 (2026) (per

curiam). The Court should decline USPS’s invitation to unsettle every state’s ballot-

mailing process on the eve of those mailings.

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The district court’s conclusion that the Rule will upend election administration

and risk mass disenfranchisement is inescapable, because all facts point to multiple

independent points of failure. App.30a–43a.

First, the record contains “overwhelming evidence” laid out in “granular detail”

that “it is likely impossible” for states “to comply with the Final Rule for the

midterms.” App.23a & n.29. 17 Unrebutted testimony across dozens of states shows

how the Rule’s envelope-design requirements cannot be implemented in a manner

that enables states to comply for November: States inter alia do not yet have barcodes

on their envelopes, cannot print the envelopes themselves, and/or have been told by

vendors that rush-printing new envelopes in time is impossible. App.34a–35a. 18

Separately, the mandatory process of enrolling tens of millions of voters via USPS’s

Portal imposes an “overwhelming expenditure of time by election officials,” across

10,000 election jurisdictions, all of whom would be required to constantly update the

Portal as new registrations and requests occur up to Election Day. App.38a–40a &

n.48, 44a. Because election administration is typically decentralized, state officials

must deputize and train “thousands of Portal users” to submit voter information,

17USPS cannot wave away hundreds of pages of sworn declarations from dozens of
government officials, providing extensive state-by-state detail regarding election
administration—and all pointing to the same conclusion—merely by labelling them
“self-serving,” Appl. 31, particularly as these declarations went entirely unrebutted.
18 USPS faults states for failing to prepare “to comply months ago,” Appl. 31–32, but

in late July, USPS said it was “still deliberating over how (if at all) to implement the
Order.” Stay Appl., at 2, Trump v. California, No. 26A124 (July 27, 2026). USPS
cannot tell this Court in July that these mandates might never exist and tell it in
September that states were dilatory for not preparing to meet them months earlier.

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none of which has occurred yet. App.39a. 19 For that reason, Plaintiff States “all

characterize[d] uploading voter data to the Portal for the midterms as a massive

undertaking and seriously doubt their ability to do so.” App.40a. And under the Rule’s

clear dictates, any Rule-noncompliance—including failure to meet the envelope

design or improper Portal submission of voter information—triggers the non-delivery

of ballots to eligible voters. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54991 (§ 705.24.5.3).

The district court did not unduly “discount[]”states that “contend that they will

be able to comply.” Appl. 31. There was, and remains, no such contention. Missouri’s

Secretary of State submitted the lone declaration of all the Intervenor States, and

even then, he averred only that his “staff [are] still figuring out some details,” but he

“believe[s] it is possible to implement this rule for the 2026 General Election.” Decl.

of Denny Hoskins Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. 234-1. No state has affirmatively and unequivocally

stated that it can comply with the Rule’s requirements.

Second, even if the states could comply—though they cannot—the record

shows that USPS itself cannot implement the Rule in a manner or on a timeline to

enable them to do so for the midterms. This conclusion stems not from “speculation

by state officials who lack direct knowledge of the Postal Service’s implementation

plans,” Appl. 32, but from the words (and silence) of USPS and the Rule.

The Portal is still not operational. As of September 3, USPS said only that it

“anticipate[s] being in a position to make the Portal available to users for voluntary

19 E.g., Stavisky Decl. ¶ 36, California, No. 26-cv-13917, Dkt. No. 4-17 (noting that

USPS has not committed to training election officials or providing a timeline for
access to the Portal for officials to learn to use it).

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use by sometime next week,” Monteith Decl. ¶ 3. Even if the Portal were ready, USPS

has not trained its employees on the Portal’s use, or even finalized the training

materials those employees will need. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Postal Workers

Union at 12–14. 20 Nor has USPS explained how it will simultaneously complete the

required envelope-design review for thousands of jurisdictions before the midterms,

even though the Rule directs that review must precede any data uploads to the Portal,

91 Fed. Reg. at 54989. It was therefore proper for the district court to determine that

the “aspirational two-day turnaround set forth in the Final Rule is belied by the

record,” App.37a; cf. Appl. 32, where the “only” evidence is that USPS historically

takes “weeks or months” to review such designs, and USPS provided zero evidence

that it could more quickly conduct the unprecedented “simultaneous review of

hundreds or thousands of ballot envelopes.” App.36a–38a. That is particularly so

where the Rule itself indicates that USPS does not intend to hire any additional staff.

91 Fed. Reg. at 54986.

Finally, the requirement that USPS scan each ballot envelope in the presence

of the election official before sending is also likely to cause severe delays and prevent

timely delivery of ballots for the general election. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54981; App.41a–

42a. 21 The Rule’s text itself estimates the scanning “generally takes less than a

20 While USPS attempts to shift blame for its lack of internal training, see Appl. at 6,

12, 30, 32, nothing in the preliminary injunction prevents USPS from providing
training to states who want to participate voluntarily in the Portal, nor from training
its own employees to facilitate this voluntary participation. Their failure to do either
means that a stay now will undoubtedly lead to delays, confusion, and chaos.
21 USPS’s assertion that the district court “mischaracterized the record” by

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minute,” 91 Fed. Reg. at 59481, and even if it were only a few seconds, it is

indisputable that scanning will “compound[] to substantial time for States with large

mailings,” such as California’s 23 million ballots. App.42a; Patrick Decl. ¶¶ 115–19

(detailing scanning delays); Suppl. Decl. of Tammy Patrick (Suppl. Patrick Decl.)

¶¶ 10–11, Dkt. 264-2.

Third, the new USPS systems implementing the Rule face potential

“catastrophic problems” from the “rushed, secretive, and chaotic development

process” based on “oral instruction, without written requirements.” Whistleblower

Br. 1, 3, 9. An amicus brief on behalf of an anonymous federal official with direct

knowledge of USPS’s new procedures explains that a project of the scope and

complexity the Rule contemplates typically takes nine months to a year, yet USPS

began building the necessary IT infrastructure in June 2026, less than three months

before election officials were expected to use it. Id. at 9. The systems USPS produced

“are largely untested,” as of September 3 “still inoperable,” and thus “will almost

certainly fail.” Id. at 3; see Monteith Decl. ¶ 3.

Fourth, these disenfranchisement threats are compounded by the Rule’s zero-

tolerance regime, under which a single mis-scanned or otherwise Rule-noncompliant

envelope causes entire batches of ballots to be rejected. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54991; see

Whistleblower Br. 5–8; Monteith Decl. ¶ 2 (describing “operational steps being taken

to implement the final rule” without disclaiming that USPS will implement it as-

“credit[ing] a claim that the verification process could take years for States with tens
of millions of ballots,” Appl. 32, is itself a mischaracterization. The court nowhere
credited or referenced any such claim.

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written). That is particularly consequential for large ballot mailings, which are likely

to be rejected as a matter of probability. Patrick Decl. ¶ 114. USPS is therefore wrong

that “[a]ll outbound federal-election ballot mail that meets the Rule’s requirements

will be accepted, processed, and delivered as before.” Appl. 22. Instead, even ballots

with Rule-compliant envelopes, addressed to eligible voters successfully enrolled with

USPS under the Rule, will be rejected if they are mailed in the same batch as a mis-

scanned or noncompliant ballot. See 91 Fed. Reg. at 54991; Whistleblower Br. 7–8.

Collectively, these obstacles create an extraordinary risk to voters and election

administration if the injunction is stayed. Voting by mail is a critical feature of U.S.

elections. Yet despite all the ways that the Rule’s implementation could go awry and

the fact that “any minor malfunction will result in the denial of mail ballots,” USPS

disturbingly has not issued any “contingency plan[s].” App.41a, 45a; Suppl. Patrick

Decl. ¶11.

In contrast to the harms that would flow from a stay, keeping the injunction in

place serves the public interest in several ways. It comports with federalism and the

Elections Clause by preserving longstanding mail-voting regimes, while leaving

states free to participate voluntarily in the Rule’s envelope-design and Portal

procedures. See supra § II. It prevents disenfranchisement of eligible voters

nationwide who cannot vote except by mail and who are authorized to do so by the

law of their states. See supra § I. And it protects the ability of nonpartisan voter-

service organizations like Plaintiffs to conduct their core activities. See id. Parties do

not have an entitlement “to avoid any harms associated with complying with a lawful

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regulation,” Appl. 31, but here, the district court properly concluded that the Rule is

not lawful, see supra § II, and “[t]here is generally no public interest in the

perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” Texas v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 559–60 (5th

Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

B. USPS Has Not Established Irreparable Harm.

USPS has not shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm, let alone an

injury that merits emergency relief. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.

First, USPS cannot be “irreparably harm[ed]” by an order restraining unlawful

or unconstitutional conduct. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 602 (2018). USPS

misplaces its reliance (at 29–30) on this Court’s prior stay, where the injunction

restricted the Executive’s internal communications and efforts, see California, 2026

WL 2473573, at *1, *5. Here, the asserted harm is the inability to externally enforce

an unlawful policy against scores of election officials and voters across the country.

Frustration of policy implementation does not warrant a stay absent likely success

on the merits. E.g., Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 926, 926 (2021) (mem.); see also Danco

Lab’ys, LLC v. Louisiana, 146 S. Ct. 1192, 1196 (2026) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting

that “inability to engage in [unlawful] conduct” cannot constitute irreparable harm).

Second, USPS has not made the requisite factual showing of harm. USPS notes

(at 29–30) that two states will likely begin mailing ballots this week, with over a

dozen more soon to follow, claiming irreparable harm from the lost opportunity to

mandate compliance with the Rule. USPS claims (at 5) that the injunction “nullif[ies]

the Postal Service’s efforts to address the risk . . . of voter fraud,” but concedes (at 8)

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that “[t]he Postal Service will not perform any verification of voter eligibility,” and

otherwise does not provide a single piece of “evidence relating to fraudulent mail

voting to support the rushed implementation of the Final Rule.” App.45a–46a. And

USPS has never explained how the Rule would actually facilitate supposed law

enforcement investigations. What is more, USPS fails to explain how a federal agency

with no role in election administration is irreparably harmed when a state’s ballot

mail is sent out by state election officials pursuant to the state’s election laws.

More still, a stay is not the “best way to address [states’] fears about [their]

inability to comply with the Rule.” Appl. 7. USPS’s “reverse Purcell” label, see Appl.

7, 9–10, 33–34, gets it backwards. The district court did not invoke election proximity

to alter settled rules. It prevented a new federal regime from displacing state election

rules on the eve of an election. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Rule is unlawful just

because USPS issued it close to an election. The point is a practical and equitable

one: A stay would require states, with the election underway, to abandon their

longstanding mail-voting procedures and immediately implement a new federal

regime, unmoored from any statute, that the court rightly found cannot be

implemented without widespread disruption. Plaintiffs challenged the Rule the day

it was published, immediately seeking a TRO and preliminary injunction. Dkt. 205,

206. The status quo ante is USPS’s longstanding practice of delivering all mail

ballots. And the preliminary injunction here preserved that status quo. Mindful that

“lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an

election,” RNC v. DNC, 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020), the district court issued a carefully

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tailored remedy that preserved a decades-long norm for elections that were, at the

time, just 60 days away. Far from “suspend[ing] judicial alteration of the status quo,”

Nken, 556 U.S. at 429 (citation omitted), a stay of the injunction by this Court now

would upend the status quo, and unleash pandemonium on voters. See United States

v. Texas, 144 S. Ct. 797, 798 n.2 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring) (mem.) (“[T]his

Court[] ha[s] . . . described stays as devices meant to maintain the status quo.”). 22

IV. THE SCOPE OF RELIEF IS PROPER.

The preliminary injunction here is carefully limited to address the harms that

would result from the chaotic, last-minute implementation of the Rule for the

November election. The district court expressly declined to order relief “that

precludes States from voluntarily complying with the Final Rule, consistent with

their state laws.” App.46a. The preliminary injunction does not prevent voluntary

compliance with mail ballot envelope design and Portal participation. App.47a–48a.

Nor does it apply to elections beyond November 3, 2026. App.48a. Instead, it only

prohibits USPS from rejecting mailings that do not comply with the Rule’s

requirements for the November 3, 2026, election. Id.

That relief is appropriately tailored to offer “complete relief to the plaintiffs

before the court.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 852 (2025). Collectively,

Plaintiffs educate voters and help eligible voters vote by mail in all 50 states, D.C.,

22 Finally, USPS cannot insist that judicial review was premature before the Rule

issued, Dkt. 128, then invoke (at 16) the resulting election proximity as an injury.
USPS controlled the timing of the Rule’s publication yet issued it less than 70 days
before the election, over states’ warnings about a lack of implementation time.

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and from abroad, and their millions of members—many of whom rely on mail voting—

similarly live in all those locations. See supra at 13–16. “As assessed by an expert in

election administration, as to all States, none of the Rule’s requirements can feasibly

be implemented before the November 3, 2026 General Election.” App.44a (citation

modified). Based on the unrebutted record, the court “conclude[d] that

disenfranchisement for Plaintiff Organizations members, regardless of residence, is

practically inevitable.” App.45a.

Geographically narrower relief therefore could not protect Plaintiffs. Their

members vote by mail everywhere—through a single national mail stream—and they

need to assist their members in every state to exercise that right. It is thus impossible

to afford Plaintiffs the requisite “complete relief” through narrower relief. CASA, Inc.,

831 U.S. at 851–52 & n.12. That is particularly true when the remedy affects the

rules for voting and elections, which must be uniform to ensure that all voters have

an equal opportunity to participate. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–06 (2000)

(holding that voters and ballots must be subjected to “uniform” rules rather than

“arbitrary and disparate” treatment); see also CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. at 852 n.12 (noting

that “it is all but impossible for courts to craft relief that is complete and benefits only

the named plaintiffs” in districting case brought by voters).

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the stay application.

Respectfully Submitted,

Jessie J. Rossman Sophia Lin Lakin
Suzanne Schlossberg Counsel of Record

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AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Theresa J. Lee
FOUNDATION OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC. Davin Rosborough
One Center Plaza, Suite 850 Ethan Herenstein
Boston, MA 02108 Ming Cheung
William Hughes
Cecillia D. Wang Clayton Pierce
Evelyn Danforth-Scott Jonathan Topaz
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Priyanka Menon*
FOUNDATION AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
425 California Street, Suite 700 FOUNDATION
San Francisco, CA 94104 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
Eliza Sweren-Becker New York, NY 10004
Wendy Weiser (212) 549-2500
Andrew B. Garber slakin@aclu.org
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU *admitted only in Maryland
SCHOOL OF LAW
Sarah Brannon
120 Broadway, Suite 1750
Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux
New York, NY 10271
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Justin Lam FOUNDATION
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU 915 15th Street NW
SCHOOL OF LAW Washington, DC 20005
777 6th Street NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20001 Janai Nelson
Samuel Spital
Niyati Shah Leah C. Aden
Noah Baron Brenda Wright
Ejaz Baluch, Jr. John S. Cusick
ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE- NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
FUND, INC.
AAJC
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor
1620 L Street NW, Suite 1050
New York, NY 10006
Washington, DC 20036
Anuja Thatte
Miranda Galindo
I. Sara Rohani
LATINO JUSTICE PRLDEF
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1901
New York, NY 10115 FUND, INC.
700 14th Street NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005

Counsel for Respondents
Dated: September 9, 2026