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Amicus brief of bipartisan current and former members of Congress
Bipartisan current and former members of Congress · 2026-09-08
No. 26A305
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL.,
Applicants,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
Respondents.
________
DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL.,
Applicants,
v.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.
Respondents.
_________
On Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and
Request for an Immediate Administrative Stay
_________
BRIEF OF BIPARTISAN CURRENT AND FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
_________
JESSICA RING AMUNSON
Counsel of Record
SAM HIRSCH
ZACHARY C. SCHAUF
ARJUN R. RAMAMURTI
LAUREL A. RAYMOND
AXEL J. HUFFORD
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave. NW,
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 639-6000
jamunson@jenner.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 5
I. THE ORDER AND FINAL RULE USURP CONGRESS’S
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AS THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY
ON FEDERAL-ELECTION ADMINISTRATION. ............................................... 5
A. The Text of the Elections Clause Confers Authority on the
States and Congress, and Nowhere Mentions the Executive ....................... 6
B. The History of the Elections Clause Confirms that the
Executive Branch Lacks Any Unilateral Authority over
Federal Elections ................................................................................................. 8
C. The Order and Final Rule Also Violate the Postal Clause .......................... 14
D. No Other Constitutional Provision Can Justify the Order or
Final Rule. ........................................................................................................... 15
II. CONGRESS HAS NOT DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO USPS
TO ISSUE THE FINAL RULE ................................................................................ 17
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 22
APPENDIX – LIST OF AMICI CURIAE ...........................................................................1a
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013) .........................3, 6, 7, 8
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) ..................................................................17
Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997) ...........................................................................................3, 7
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979) .................................................................................................................................18
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) .......................................................................................14
Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004) .......................................16
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986) ..................................17
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) ............................................................................................16
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) ........................................................15
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) ....................................................................................17
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014) ......................................................................9, 13
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) .............................................................................9
Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892) ................................................................................. 14-15
Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) ..................................................................................7
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197
(2020) ...................................................................................................................................9
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), abrogation recognized by Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 (2022) ...................................................................................3, 7
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) ......................................................................................3, 6
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) ..........................................................................................7
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868) ............................................................................................16
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) .......................................8
ii
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) .................................................17
Watson v. Republican National Committee, 146 S. Ct. 2165 (2026) ...............................8, 11
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) .......................................................................15, 17
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ............................................15
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 .........................................................................................................15
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 .........................................................................................................15
U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ...............................................................................................2, 3, 6, 7
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 .........................................................................................................15
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 .........................................................................................................14
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. ......................................................................................................14
U.S. Const. art. II .......................................................................................................................16
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4........................................................................................................16
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2........................................................................................................16
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ................................................................................................................16
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 ...............................................................................................................16
2 U.S.C. § 2c .................................................................................................................................13
39 U.S.C. § 102(5) ........................................................................................................................21
39 U.S.C. § 401(2) ....................................................................................................................5, 20
39 U.S.C. § 403(c) ........................................................................................................................21
39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)....................................................................................................................20
39 U.S.C. § 404(e)(2)....................................................................................................................21
39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) ......................................................................................................................21
52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq. .............................................................................................................14
iii
52 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. .............................................................................................................14
52 U.S.C. § 20302 .........................................................................................................................18
52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(1)................................................................................................................20
52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)................................................................................................................18
52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A) ..........................................................................................................20
52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq. .............................................................................................................14
52 U.S.C. § 20505 .........................................................................................................................18
52 U.S.C. § 20506(a) ....................................................................................................................19
52 U.S.C. § 20507(a) ....................................................................................................................19
52 U.S.C. § 20508(a)(1)..........................................................................................................19, 21
52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)................................................................................................................19
52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(2)................................................................................................................19
52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5)................................................................................................................19
52 U.S.C. § 21083(b) ....................................................................................................................18
52 U.S.C. § 21085 .........................................................................................................................19
Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13........................................................................................13
Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28 ......................................................................................13
Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733 ...................................................................................13
Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21 ....................................................................................13
Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 ....................................................................................13
Act of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470, 55 Stat. 761................................................................................13
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 .................................14
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 .......................14
iv
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100
Stat. 924 (1986) ................................................................................................................14
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 ................................................13
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
132 Cong. Rec. 20979 (1986) .......................................................................................................19
132 Cong. Rec. 21894-95 (1986) .................................................................................................19
H.R. 3295, Record Vote No. 462, 107th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2002) ..............................................18
H.R. 3295, Record Vote No. 238, 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2002) ..............................................18
EXECUTIVE MATERIALS
39 C.F.R. §§ 3020.110–3020.112 .................................................................................................21
Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 54966 (Aug. 26, 2026) .....................1, 5, 20
Exec. Order 14399, Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal
Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 17,125 (Mar. 31, 2026) ..................................1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 14,
15, 16, 17, 19
OTHER AUTHORITIES
1 Annals of Cong. 797 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ....................................................12, 13
2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) ..........................................................12
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ...........................................................10
Essay of Brutus No. IV (Nov. 29, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 382,
386 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) .................................................................................11
The Federalist No. 59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ....................10, 11
2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) ..................................................................................................................9, 10, 11, 12
v
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are current and former Members of the United States Senate and
House of Representatives who are members of both the Democratic and Republican
parties. See Appendix (listing amici). Amici submit this brief to offer their unique
perspective on why Executive Order 14399, Ensuring Citizenship Verification and
Integrity in Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 17,125 (Mar. 31, 2026) (the “Order”), and the
United States Postal Service (“USPS”) final rule, Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, 91
Fed. Reg. 54966 (Aug. 26, 2026) (the “Final Rule”), unconstitutionally and unlawfully
usurp for the Executive Branch the authority over federal elections that the Framers
granted exclusively to the States and to Congress.
As current and former legislators, amici took an oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution of the United States—including its guarantee of the separation of powers.
Amici have a particular interest in defending the institutional role of the Legislative
Branch under Article I of the Constitution and in vindicating the long-settled principle
that the Constitution commits ultimate regulatory authority over federal elections to
Congress. The Constitution does not contemplate the Executive Branch acting
unilaterally to assert power over federal elections. Yet that is what the Order and Final
Rule do. The district court correctly concluded that Respondents are likely to succeed
on the merits of their claims that USPS lacked authority to issue the Final Rule, that the
Final Rule unconstitutionally imposes mail-ballot requirements on the States, and that
1
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici curiae state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici or their counsel has made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
the Final Rule unconstitutionally bars non-compliant State and local election officials
from using USPS to mail ballots at all.
First, the Executive Branch’s directives to regulate mail-in and absentee ballots
are unconstitutional because they encroach on the States’ primary and Congress’s
paramount authority under the Constitution’s Elections Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1. The text and history of the Elections Clause categorically bar the Executive Branch
from asserting unilateral authority over federal-election administration. And because
the Order and Final Rule purport to involve USPS in States’ administration of mail-in
voting, the Order also intrudes on the Postal Clause, a second grant of legislative power
that Article I commits to Congress with no mention of any role for the Executive. No
constitutional provision supplies a legitimate basis for the Order or the Final Rule.
Second, even assuming that Congress could delegate its specified constitutional
role under the Elections Clause and the Postal Clause to USPS, the Order and Final Rule
must be struck down because they lack any clear grounding in such a delegation. To the
contrary, the Order conflicts with numerous statutes that Congress has duly—and
carefully—enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause and the Postal Clause. Amici
therefore submit this brief to urge the Court to deny Applicants’ request for emergency
relief.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici file this brief to explain why the challenged provisions of the Order and
Final Rule conflict with Congress’s longstanding and well-established authority to
2
regulate federal elections.2 The Order and Final Rule unconstitutionally infringe on
Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause and the Postal Clause and unlawfully
direct federal agencies to act beyond—and in conflict with—what Congress has clearly
authorized by law.
First, the text and history of the Constitution’s Elections Clause foreclose the
Executive Branch from unilaterally regulating federal elections. The Elections Clause
provides that the “Times, Places and Manner of holding” congressional elections “shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” but “Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. By its terms, the
Elections Clause confers default authority to State lawmakers to regulate the mechanics
of federal elections, but provides that Congress retains authority “at any time” to “make
or alter” the rules that the States establish. Id.; see, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
372 (1879), abrogation recognized by Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 (2022); Foster v.
Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 9
(2013) (ITCA). Longstanding precedent further establishes that this Clause extends to
cover the entire “manner” of holding federal elections, including the procedures for
casting ballots and the safeguards for protecting the integrity of ballot-counting. See
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (recognizing that the Clause’s “comprehensive
words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections”).
2
The Final Rule is now before the Court, and amici address the Order only as the source and the stated
justification of the Final Rule’s requirements.
3
Consistent with the Constitution, Congress has passed several laws regulating
federal elections—though it has always done so surgically, deliberately leaving the States
with considerable room to maneuver. By contrast, there is no historical basis for
unilateral executive action with respect to federal elections, as the drafting history, early
commentary, and early practice under the Elections Clause all confirm. Because nothing
in the Elections Clause, the Postal Clause, or any other constitutional provision
governing federal elections confers authority on the Executive Branch to act alone in this
arena, the Order and Final Rule are not constitutional exercises of executive authority.
Second, the Executive Branch cannot justify the Order or Final Rule under any
delegation of authority from Congress. Any such delegation would require a clear
statement given the fundamental significance of federal elections in our system of
government. The Executive Branch has not identified any such clear statement, because
none exists. Congress built the modern federal-elections regime through landmark
statutes like the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), the National Voter Registration Act
(“NVRA”), and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(“UOCAVA”). None of these statutes remotely confers the authority that the Executive
Branch has asserted here. Far from it: The Order and Final Rule in fact violate numerous
statutory provisions that Congress has enacted. And even where Congress has not acted,
the Order and Final Rule disrupt Congress’s authority—and deliberate choice—to leave
many aspects of election regulation to the States, as the Framers intended.
Because the Order and Final Rule claim power that the Constitution has assigned
to the States and Congress and that Congress has otherwise withheld from the Executive
4
Branch, the district court correctly enjoined the Final Rule’s mandatory implementation,
and this Court should deny Applicants’ request.
ARGUMENT
I. THE ORDER AND FINAL RULE USURP CONGRESS’S
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AS THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY ON
FEDERAL-ELECTION ADMINISTRATION.
The text and history of the Elections Clause unambiguously foreclose the
Executive Branch from acting unilaterally with respect to federal elections. So, too, does
the Postal Clause. And no other constitutional provision authorizes the Order or Final
Rule. The Guarantee Clause, which the Order invokes, confers authority on Congress
rather than the Executive, and the Take Care Clause imposes on the Executive a duty
rather than an affirmative grant of authority.
Applicants seek to sidestep these principles by emphasizing that the Final Rule
issued from USPS rather than from the President. That argument is unconvincing for
two reasons. First, USPS issued the Rule only after directed to do so by the President.
See Order § 3(b), (d). The Order and the Final Rule must be read together. USPS itself
acknowledges that the Order began the deliberative process that yielded the Rule. 91
Fed. Reg. at 54977. The Order remains relevant as the source and the stated justification
of the Rule’s requirements. Second, Congress did not delegate its authority over federal
elections to USPS through a general statute that nowhere mentions elections. Cf. 39
U.S.C. § 401(2). Both standard principles of statutory interpretation and history confirm
that when Congress displaces state electoral regulations, it must—and does—do so
explicitly.
5
A. The Text of the Elections Clause Confers Authority on the States and
Congress, and Nowhere Mentions the Executive.
The text of the Elections Clause is unambiguous: “The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Clause thus sets forth both what it
confers power over and who may exercise that power.
First, as to what the Elections Clause confers power over, it is the “Times, Places
and Manner” of congressional elections. Id. Because these are “comprehensive words,”
Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366, the “substantive scope is broad,” ITCA, 570 U.S. at 8. While
“Times” and “Places” cover when and where elections may occur, “Manner” adds a
sweeping residual category, capturing how elections occur. Accordingly, this Court
recognized nearly a century ago that the Elections Clause confers the “authority to
provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places,” but
also as to all the “numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which
experience shows are necessary . . . .” Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366; see also ITCA, 570 U.S.
at 8.
This “comprehensive” power to provide a “complete” code for elections necessarily
includes the authority to regulate how eligible voters may cast their ballots, as well as
how to secure elections against fraud. Thus, this Court has held that the Clause confers
specific authority with respect to “notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection
of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of
inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns,” Smiley, 285
6
U.S. at 366; procedures “necessary to guard against irregularity and error in the
tabulation of votes,” Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972); and the registration of
voters to vote by mail, see ITCA, 570 U.S. at 5, 8–9. In purporting to regulate these areas,
the Order and Rule seek to address topics squarely within the Elections Clause’s ambit.
Second, as to who may exercise that regulatory power, the Clause confirms
Congress’s paramount role. To be sure, as a “default” rule, the Elections Clause “invests
the States with responsibility” over the “mechanics” of elections to federal offices.
Foster, 522 U.S. at 69; see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting the
“comprehensive” and “complex” codes that States have developed). But by its terms, the
Clause gives Congress the power to “make or alter” state regulations at will and “at any
time.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. These broad terms express a clear intent to give
Congress expansive authority to act in relation to existing state regulation (including
authority both to “make” and “alter” regulations) and to do so in Congress’s broad
discretion (“may at any time”), id.; see Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (noting Congress’s “power
to override” certain state election regulations (citation omitted)). And to the extent
Congress declines to regulate, the structure of the Clause makes clear that such
declination is merely a choice to leave many aspects of election regulation to the States.
See generally Appl. App. 10a-11a (adopting this reading).
Thus, in case after case for nearly 150 years, this Court has recognized that
Congress holds “a general supervisory power over the whole subject” of federal elections,
Siebold, 100 U.S. at 387, and “may make regulations on the same subject, or may alter or
add to those already made,” id. at 386. States exercise power over federal elections, but
7
“only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” Foster, 522 U.S.
at 69 (internal citations omitted). And the Court has reiterated that as the “power the
Elections Clause confers is none other than the power to pre-empt,” the “States’ role in
regulating congressional elections . . . has always existed subject to the express
qualification that it ‘terminates according to federal law.”’ ITCA, 570 U.S. at 14–15
(citation omitted); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833 (1995)
(recognizing Congress’s “power to override state regulations” under the Elections
Clause). Indeed, this Court very recently reaffirmed this established proposition, taking
as given that the “Constitution’s Elections Clause empowers state legislatures to
‘prescrib[e]’ the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding’ congressional elections,” but
“Congress may ‘override’ most of these choices.” Watson v. Republican Nat’l Comm.,
146 S. Ct. 2165, 2169–70 (U.S. 2026) (citations omitted).
This “comprehensive” constitutional scheme governing the time, place, and
manner of federal elections nowhere mentions the Executive Branch. Under the
Elections Clause’s two-part scheme, congressional inaction merely leaves state
regulations in place, as the Clause intends. The Executive Branch thus encounters not a
vacuum to be filled, but a fully occupied field, entirely assigned by the Constitution to
other actors.
B. The History of the Elections Clause Confirms that the Executive
Branch Lacks Any Unilateral Authority over Federal Elections.
The history of the Elections Clause also rules out any unilateral attempt by the
Executive Branch to regulate federal elections. This Court has long looked to Founding
Era history in construing the Constitution’s structural provisions. In particular, the
8
Court has drawn on the records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification
debates, and The Federalist, which it has treated as evidence of “the original
understanding of the Constitution.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997); see
also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 523 (2014) (drawing on The Federalist for
evidence of what “the Founders intended”). In addition, early congressional enactments
furnish “contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.” Seila
Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 214 (2020) (citation omitted).
And “‘[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions’ regulating the relationship between Congress
and the President,” Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 524 (citation omitted). These historical
sources speak with one voice here.
First, the records of the Constitutional Convention make clear that the Framers
ruled out a unilateral executive role in federal-election administration. The debate was
understood from the start as involving shared power between the States and Congress,
with no role for the Executive Branch. As reported by the Committee of Detail, the first
draft of the Elections Clause read: “The times and places and [the] manner of holding the
elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each
State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time, be altered by the
Legislature of the United States.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 179
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Committee of Detail report, Aug. 6, 1787) (Art. VI, § 1).
To the extent there was debate, the question was whether to permit a
congressional override or to leave the field to the States alone. Charles Pinckney and
9
John Rutledge, for example, moved to strike the congressional-override clause,
contending that the States “could & must be relied on” to regulate federal elections
themselves. Id. at 240. But their efforts were unsuccessful: The result of the debate was
that Congress’s role in the Elections Clause was strengthened such that state regulations
“may at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the U.S.” Id. at 242 (emphasis
added). The change was “meant to give the Natl. Legislature a power not only to alter
the provisions of the States, but [also] to make regulations” of its own. Id. (statement of
James Madison).
This exclusion of the Executive Branch was deliberate. The Founding generation
had just lived through a monarch’s manipulation of representative government. The
Declaration of Independence catalogued these abuses, charging that King George III had
“dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly”; had “refused for a long time, after such
dissolutions, to cause others to be elected”; and had “called together legislative bodies at
places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant” for “the sole purpose of fatiguing them into
compliance with his measures.” The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Having fought a revolution to end executive manipulation of legislative-branch elections,
the Framers would not hand the same power to the President alone.
Second, the ratification debates confirm that all parties took as given that the
Executive would not have a role in federal-election administration. Both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike understood the power to regulate federal elections as a power held
by the States and Congress alone. In The Federalist No. 59—the most significant
treatment of the question from the period—Alexander Hamilton explained that there
10
were “only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and
disposed[:] that it must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature, or
wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former.”
The Federalist No. 59, at 397–98 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). “The
last mode,” he concluded, “has, with reason, been preferred by the convention.” Id.; see
also Watson, 146 S. Ct. at 2170.
Hamilton also explained why Congress uniquely needed to exercise the role
assigned to it in the Elections Clause, echoing the reasoning of the other Framers at the
convention. A congressional backstop was needed to protect Congress’s own institutional
interest. He warned that an “exclusive power of regulating elections for the national
government, in the hands of the State legislatures would leave the existence of the Union
entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide
for the choice of persons to administer its affairs.” The Federalist No. 59, at 398; see also,
e.g., 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 241 (observation of Gouverneur
Morris that without a grant of ultimate power to Congress, the States “might make false
returns and then make no provisions for new elections”).
Throughout the Anti-Federalists’ unsuccessful opposition to the Constitution,
they focused any attack on the Elections Clause on its grant of power to Congress, never
once mentioning the Executive Branch as an alternative. See, e.g., Essay of Brutus No.
IV (Nov. 29, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 382, 386 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981) (complaining of the amount of power the Elections Clause granted to Congress by
virtue of its authorization “at any time, by law, to make, or alter, regulations respecting
11
the time, place, and manner of holding elections”). The delegates who gathered in state
conventions likewise debated the balance of power only between the States and
Congress—leaving the President out entirely. As Caleb Strong put it at the
Massachusetts convention, the power to regulate federal elections “must be lodged
somewhere,” and he “kn[e]w of but two bodies wherein it can be lodged—the legislatures
of the several states, and the general Congress.” 2 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 24 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836). That no Framer even suggested an executive role in regulating congressional
elections stands in stark contrast with the Framers’ extensive debates about the
President’s powers in other contexts—such as the war, pardon, and treaty powers. See,
e.g., 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 318–19 (war power); id. at 626–27
(pardon power); id. at 538–39 (treaty power). That omission is telling.
Third, at its first opportunity to revisit the Clause, Congress reaffirmed the
Framers’ and ratifiers’ understanding. When the House took up what would become the
Bill of Rights, opponents of the Elections Clause’s broad congressional override made one
final effort to curtail it. On August 21, 1789, Representative Aedanus Burke of South
Carolina moved to add an amendment providing that “Congress shall not alter, modify,
or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections of Senators, or
Representatives, except when any State shall refuse or neglect, or be unable, by invasion
or rebellion, to make such election.” 1 Annals of Cong. 797 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
The House rejected Burke’s amendment. Indeed, Massachusetts Congressman Fisher
Ames defended Congress’s regulatory power as “essential to a body representing the
12
whole community[] that they should have power to regulate their own elections, in order
to secure a representation from every part, and prevent any improper regulations.” Id.
And Madison, urging the House not to delay the amendments already agreed upon,
concluded that he was “inclined to think the constitution stands very well as it is.” Id. at
798. No Member suggested that the Executive had, or should have, any role in regulating
federal elections.
Subsequent practice further confirms that the Executive Branch lacks the
unilateral authority to regulate the manner of federal elections. Cf. Noel Canning, 573
U.S. at 525. For two centuries, every federal regulation relating to federal elections has
originated with Congress, confirming that when Congress seeks to regulate elections, it
does so explicitly. Congress’s first substantive exercise of its Elections Clause authority
came with the Apportionment Act of 1842, which required that Representatives be
elected from single-member districts. See Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491,
491. Congress followed that effort with subsequent Apportionment and
Reapportionment Acts—in 1872, 1901, 1911, 1929, 1941, and 1967. See Act of Feb. 2, 1872,
ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28, 28; Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734; Act of Aug. 8,
1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13, 14; Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26; Act of Nov.
15, 1941, ch. 470, § 1, 55 Stat. 761, 761; 2 U.S.C. § 2c. Each enactment followed the
Constitution’s prescribed process for promulgating law, as provided for in the Elections
Clause. None of these enactments rested on implicit delegation or general grants of
power.
13
The pattern continues unbroken to today. The modern federal statutes governing
federal elections are products of the same legislative process. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq.);
UOCAVA, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §
20301 et seq.); NVRA, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 20501 et seq.); HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified at 52
U.S.C. § 20901 et seq.). Across more than 200 years, the President has never acted
unilaterally to regulate the manner of federal elections, and Congress has never implicitly
delegated the power to displace state regulations. These facts alone provide a powerful
reason to hold the Order and Final Rule unconstitutional.
C. The Order and Final Rule Also Violate the Postal Clause.
The Postal Clause also forecloses the Executive Branch from enlisting USPS to
implement a comprehensive program to monitor and screen mail ballots. The Final Rule’s
assertion of authority reaches a subject that Article I assigns to Congress: the power
“[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads,” together with the power to make all laws
“necessary and proper” for carrying that power into execution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls.
7, 18. Like the Elections Clause, the Postal Clause is a grant of legislative power that
nowhere mentions the Executive. And as this Court has recognized for well over a
century, the power that the Postal Clause grants is broad. The postal power “embraces
the regulation of the entire postal system of the country,” and “[t]he right to designate
what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded.”
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878). That breadth measures Congress’s authority,
14
not the President’s. It is for Congress, “in the exercise of a sound discretion, to determine
in what manner it will exercise the power it undoubtedly possesses.” Ex parte Rapier,
143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892). But that does not mean that Congress’s authority, through
either the Postal Clause or the Elections Clause, gives USPS the power to issue the Final
Rule here. The authority remains Congress’s to delegate, and given the importance of
federal elections, Congress must—and would—make such a delegation clearly and
unambiguously. See infra Part II; see also West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723–24
(2022).
D. No Other Constitutional Provision Can Justify the Order or Final Rule.
The Elections Clause and Postal Clause affirmatively foreclose the President’s
assertion of authority over mail balloting in the Order and the Final Rule and no other
constitutional provision can justify either. A basic tenet of our system is that the
Executive Branch enjoys only those powers that the People—through the Constitution—
have delegated to it. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585
(1952) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 405 (1819) (“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated
powers.”).
Here, the specific provision addressing federal-election administration—the
Elections Clause—bars the Executive Branch from acting alone, and that provision
governs the constitutional question here. In any case, no other provision confers the
required authority, either. No other provision that mentions federal elections confers
15
any authority on the Executive. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (election of House of
Representatives); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (writs of election to fill House vacancies); id. art. I, §
5, cl. 1 (each House is the judge of its members’ elections); art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (Electors
Clause); art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (Congress to set the time of choosing Electors). And this silence
runs both ways: Not only do none of the clauses in the Constitution governing federal
elections mention the President, none of the clauses delineating the President’s powers
even arguably authorize the Executive to regulate federal elections. See generally U.S.
Const. art. II; Appl. App. 12a (recognizing that the “Constitution does not grant the
President any specific powers over elections”).
To justify the Order, the Executive Branch has alluded to the Guarantee Clause
and the Take Care Clause. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4; id. art. II, § 3. But neither
provides any justification for unilateral presidential action relating to federal elections.
The Guarantee Clause cannot justify the challenged executive actions. The
Guarantee Clause does not appear in Article II and does not refer to the Executive
Branch at all. Moreover, the Guarantee Clause has canonically been understood to grant
authority to Congress, not the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1,
42–43 (1849) (“[I]t rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one
in a State . . . as well as its republican character.”); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 730–31
(1868) (“[T]he power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative
power, and resides in Congress.”). And more broadly, the Executive’s dissatisfaction
with how federal elections are presently administered does not constitute the kind of
grave threat to republican government that could trigger the Guarantee Clause. See
16
Largess v. Sup. Jud. Ct., 373 F.3d 219, 227–29 (1st Cir. 2004) (limiting federal enforcement
of the Guarantee Clause to “unusual and extreme cases”).
Nor can the Take Care Clause justify the Order or Final Rule. That Clause binds
the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 3. The Clause sets forth a duty, not a power: It obligates the President to enforce
existing laws that Congress enacted, not to enact new rules out of whole cloth. The Take
Care Clause “allows the President to execute the laws, not make them.” Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008). “There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes
the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 438 (1998). In other words, “[u]nder our system of government, Congress makes
laws and the President . . . ‘faithfully execute[s]’ them,” which “does not include” the
power to “revise clear statutory terms.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327
(2014) (citation omitted). And in fact, the Order impermissibly seeks to regulate federal
elections in ways that federal legislation prohibits. See infra Part II.
II. CONGRESS HAS NOT DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO USPS TO ISSUE
THE FINAL RULE.
Congress has not provided any authority to take the steps outlined in the Final
Rule. It is blackletter law that a federal agency “has no power to act . . . unless and until
Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374
(1986). In this context—given the fundamental importance of federal elections, the
Constitution’s specification of Congress as the relevant federal actor, and the
unprecedented nature of the Final Rule’s assertion of unilateral executive authority—
the Court should require a clear statement of congressional intent to delegate authority
17
to the Executive. After all, federal agencies cannot undertake major policy decisions
without “clear congressional authorization,” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24 (citation
omitted), and the Court has long recognized that elections are “of the most fundamental
significance under our constitutional structure,” Illinois State Board of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). Yet here the Final Rule cannot be
justified under any congressional statute, and in fact violates several statutes with
respect to federal voting requirements.
Over the years, Congress has worked on a bipartisan basis with Presidents of both
parties to address various federal election issues. President Reagan signed UOCAVA,
which requires the States to allow military and overseas voters to register and vote by
mail in federal elections. 52 U.S.C. § 20302. President Clinton signed the NVRA, which
mandates that every State accept a federal form from voters who register by mail for
federal elections. Id. § 20505. President George W. Bush signed HAVA, requiring that
first-time voters who register by mail show identification when they register or vote. Id.
§ 21083(b). And President Obama signed the Military and Overseas Empowerment Act,
which amended UOCAVA and mandated that States give absentee ballots to covered
voters at least 45 days before a federal election. Id. § 20302(a)(8). In each of these
statutes, Congress overrode state prerogatives only through narrow, targeted
commands.
As amici can personally attest, each of these statutes passed both chambers with
bipartisan majorities. HAVA, for example, was adopted by the House 357-to-48 and the
Senate 92-to-2 with sweeping bipartisan majorities. H.R. 3295, Record Vote No. 462,
18
107th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2002); H.R. 3295, Record Vote No. 238, 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2002).
UOCAVA likewise cleared both the House and the Senate by voice vote, without
recorded opposition. 132 Cong. Rec. 20979 (1986) (House); id. at 21894–95 (Senate). And
each was signed by a President in cooperation with congressional leaders of both parties.
As such, these bipartisan statutes reflect a durable national consensus that has survived
for decades.
The Order’s preamble refers to both HAVA and the NVRA to justify its assertion
of authority. But far from justifying the Order or the Final Rule, those statutes only
confirm their unlawfulness.
Begin with HAVA. In that statute, Congress directed States to create a database
of registered voters and identified standards for applicants to verify their identity upon
registration. See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1), (5). HAVA thus assigns voter-roll maintenance
to the States, not the Executive Branch, requiring “each State” to “implement” and
“maintain[]” its own centralized voter-registration list, see 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)–(2),
and expressly reserving to the States discretion over methods of implementation and
compliance, id. § 21085. HAVA does not delegate any authority to USPS to require
States to transmit voter-eligibility lists to the federal government as a precondition for
mail balloting.
The Final Rule is also in tension with provisions of the NVRA. The NVRA directs
state agencies to handle the “registration of voters in elections for Federal office,” as well
as the “administration of voter registration for elections for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C.
§§ 20506(a), 20507(a). The NVRA also limits federal authority to issue regulations to the
19
Election Assistance Commission, and only as to specified subjects. See id. § 20508(a)(1)–
(3). The NVRA does not delegate any authority to USPS to issue regulations governing
the mailing of ballots to registered voters.
When Congress legislates as to mail balloting, it does so directly and specifically.
In UOCAVA, Congress delineated specific requirements for the transmission of mail-in
ballots to overseas Americans and military personnel, including a mandate that States
transmit ballots “no[] later than 45 days before” a federal election, see 52 U.S.C.
§ 20302(a)(8)(A), and that States provide the right to register and vote by absentee ballot
not conditioned on any federal enrollment requirement, id. § 20302(a)(1). The Final Rule
exempts UOCAVA ballots from its requirements—an implicit concession that Congress’s
explicit commands governing the transmission of federal ballots remain binding. See 91
Fed. Reg. at 54990. Yet the Final Rule attempts to impose on every other federal ballot
preconditions for mailing that Congress declined to impose, barring USPS from
transmitting a ballot to any voter whom the State has not first enrolled with USPS. See
id. at 54991.
The Final Rule rests primarily on a statute, 39 U.S.C. § 401, that permits USPS to
initiate rulemaking, see 91 Fed. Reg. at 54971. But the rulemaking power of Section 401
extends only to “such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this title, as may be
necessary in the execution of [USPS’s] functions under this title.” 39 U.S.C. § 401(2).
Nothing in Title 39 gives USPS authority to take the actions set forth in the Final Rule.
Moreover, that grant of rulemaking authority must be read in its statutory context.
Congress assigned USPS the collection, transportation, and delivery of the mail, 39
20
U.S.C. § 404(a)(1). But as to elections, Congress has either left administration to the
States, assigned discrete federal functions to a specialized bipartisan body, see 52 U.S.C.
§ 20508(a) (limiting federal rulemaking under the NVRA to the Election Assistance
Commission), or legislated the requirement itself.
Far from the sweeping grant of power the Final Rule claims, Congress has in fact
cabined USPS’s regulatory authority to its core postal mission and has prohibited USPS
from taking on new non-postal services without specific review, see 39 U.S.C. § 404(e)(2);
defined “postal service” as the delivery of mail or other ancillary functions (and hence,
not voter-eligibility determinations), id. § 102(5); barred USPS from making
“unreasonable” distinctions among mail users, id. § 403(c); and required that any
proposed nationwide change to postal services be submitted to the Postal Regulatory
Commission for a 90-day advisory opinion before any rule may issue, id. § 3661(b); 39
C.F.R. §§ 3020.110–3020.112. The Final Rule overrides each of these constraints. The
Final Rule attempts to impose a nationwide mail ballot administration program that puts
USPS in charge of lists of voters enrolled to vote by mail, and gives USPS the authority
to reject and return ballots associated with voters not appearing on its lists—even if the
voter is eligible and registered to vote. These are functions for which Congress has
granted USPS no authority. Here again, the Final Rule reveals an Executive acting
alone, without any statutory basis.
***
The integrity of our constitutional system depends on each branch keeping to its
assigned role. The Framers set up a two-part system that gave States default authority
21
to regulate federal elections subject to Congress’s authority to override the States. The
Framers did not provide the President with any authority to interfere in that system, nor
has Congress imbued the Executive Branch with any such authority by statute. Because
the Final Rule ignores those limits on executive authority, the district court correctly
enjoined the Final Rule’s mandatory implementation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny emergency relief.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jessica Ring Amunson
Jessica Ring Amunson
Counsel of Record
Sam Hirsch
Zachary C. Schauf
Arjun R. Ramamurti
Laurel A. Raymond
Axel J. Hufford
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave. NW,
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 639-6000
Counsel for Amici Curiae
22
APPENDIX
APPENDIX – LIST OF AMICI CURIAE
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
1. Jamie Raskin
Representative of Maryland
2. Joseph D. Morelle
Representative of New York
3. Robert Garcia
Representative of California
4. Hakeem Jeffries
Representative of New York
5. Katherine Clark
Representative of Massachusetts
6. Pete Aguilar
Representative of California
7. Joe Neguse
Representative of Colorado
8. Gabe Amo
Representative of Rhode Island
9. Yassamin Ansari
Representative of Arizona
10. Jake Auchincloss
Representative of Massachusetts
11. Becca Balint
Representative of Vermont
12. Nanette Barragán
Representative of California
13. Joyce Beatty
Representative of Ohio
1a
14. Wesley Bell
Representative of Missouri
15. Donald S. Beyer, Jr.
Representative of Virginia
16. Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.
Representative of Georgia
17. Suzanne Bonamici
Representative of Oregon
18. Brendan F. Boyle
Representative of Pennsylvania
19. Shontel Brown
Representative of Ohio
20. Julia Brownley
Representative of California
21. Nikki Budzinski
Representative of Illinois
22. Janelle Bynum
Representative of Oregon
23. Salud O. Carbajal
Representative of California
24. André Carson
Representative of Indiana
25. Troy A. Carter, Sr.
Representative of Louisiana
26. Greg Casar
Representative of Texas
27. Ed Case
Representative of Hawaii
28. Sean Casten
Representative of Illinois
2a
29. Joaquin Castro
Representative of Texas
30. Judy Chu
Representative of California
31. Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.
Representative of California
32. Yvette Clarke
Representative of New York
33. Emanuel Cleaver, II
Representative of Missouri
34. James E. Clyburn
Representative of South Carolina
35. Steve Cohen
Representative of Tennessee
36. J. Luis Correa
Representative of California
37. Jim Costa
Representative of California
38. Joe Courtney
Representative of Connecticut
39. Angie Craig
Representative of Minnesota
40. Jasmine Crockett
Representative of Texas
41. Jason Crow
Representative of Colorado
42. Sharice Davids
Representative of Kansas
3a
43. Danny K. Davis
Representative of Illinois
44. Madeleine Dean
Representative of Pennsylvania
45. Diana DeGette
Representative of Colorado
46. Rosa L. DeLauro
Representative of Connecticut
47. Suzan K. DelBene
Representative of Washington
48. Chris Deluzio
Representative of Pennsylvania
49. Mark DeSaulnier
Representative of California
50. Maxine Dexter
Representative of Oregon
51. Debbie Dingell
Representative of Michigan
52. Lloyd Doggett
Representative of Texas
53. Sarah Elfreth
Representative of Maryland
54. Veronica Escobar
Representative of Texas
55. Adriano Espaillat
Representative of New York
56. Dwight Evans
Representative of Pennsylvania
57. Cleo Fields
Representative of Louisiana
4a
58. Lizzie Fletcher
Representative of Texas
59. Bill Foster
Representative of Illinois
60. Valerie P. Foushee
Representative of North Carolina
61. Lois Frankel
Representative of Florida
62. Laura Friedman
Representative of California
63. Maxwell Alejandro Frost
Representative of Florida
64. John Garamendi
Representative of California
65. Jesús G. “Chuy” García
Representative of Illinois
66. Sylvia Garcia
Representative of Texas
67. Laura Gillen
Representative of New York
68. Marie Gluesenkamp-Perez
Representative of Washington
69. Dan Goldman
Representative of New York
70. Jimmy Gomez
Representative of California
71. Maggie Goodlander
Representative of New Hampshire
5a
72. Josh Gottheimer
Representative of New Jersey
73. Al Green
Representative of Texas
74. Adelita Grijalva
Representative of Arizona
75. Jahana Hayes
Representative of Connecticut
76. Jim Himes
Representative of Connecticut
77. Steven Horsford
Representative of Nevada
78. Chrissy Houlahan
Representative of Pennsylvania
79. Steny H. Hoyer
Representative of Maryland
80. Val Hoyle
Representative of Oregon
81. Jared Huffman
Representative of California
82. Glenn F. Ivey
Representative of Maryland
83. Jonathan L. Jackson
Representative of Illinois
84. Sara Jacobs
Representative of California
85. Pramila Jayapal
Representative of Washington
86. Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr.
Representative of Georgia
6a
87. Julie Johnson
Representative of Texas
88. Sydney Kamlager-Dove
Representative of California
89. William Keating
Representative of Massachusetts
90. Robin L. Kelly
Representative of Illinois
91. Timothy M. Kennedy
Representative of New York
92. Ro Khanna
Representative of California
93. Raja Krishnamoorthi
Representative of Illinois
94. Greg Landsman
Representative of Ohio
95. Rick Larsen
Representative of Washington
96. John B. Larson
Representative of Connecticut
97. George Latimer
Representative of New York
98. Summer L. Lee
Representative of Pennsylvania
99. Susie Lee
Representative of Nevada
100. Teresa Leger Fernández
Representative of New Mexico
7a
101. Mike Levin
Representative of California
102. Sam T. Liccardo
Representative of California
103. Ted W. Lieu
Representative of California
104. Zoe Lofgren
Representative of California
105. Stephen F. Lynch
Representative of Massachusetts
106. Seth Magaziner
Representative of Rhode Island
107. John W. Mannion
Representative of New York
108. Doris Matsui
Representative of California
109. Lucy McBath
Representative of Georgia
110. Sarah McBride
Representative of Delaware
111. April McClain Delaney
Representative of Maryland
112. Jennifer L. McClellan
Representative of Virginia
113. Betty McCollum
Representative of Minnesota
114. Kristen McDonald Rivet
Representative of Michigan
115. Morgan McGarvey
Representative of Kentucky
8a
116. James P. McGovern
Representative of Massachusetts
117. LaMonica McIver
Representative of New Jersey
118. Gregory W. Meeks
Representative of New York
119. Analilia Mejia
Representative of New Jersey
120. Christian Menefee
Representative of Texas
121. Robert J. Menendez
Representative of New Jersey
122. Grace Meng
Representative of New York
123. Kweisi Mfume
Representative of Maryland
124. Dave Min
Representative of California
125. Gwen S. Moore
Representative of Wisconsin
126. Kelly Morrison
Representative of Minnesota
127. Jared Moskowitz
Representative of Florida
128. Seth Moulton
Representative of Massachusetts
129. Frank J. Mrvan
Representative of Indiana
9a
130. Kevin Mullin
Representative of California
131. Jerrold Nadler
Representative of New York
132. Richard E. Neal
Representative of Massachusetts
133. Donald Norcross
Representative of New Jersey
134. Eleanor Holmes Norton
Representative of the District of Columbia
135. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
Representative of New York
136. Johnny Olszewski
Representative of Maryland
137. Ilhan Omar
Representative of Minnesota
138. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Representative of New Jersey
139. Jimmy Panetta
Representative of California
140. Chris Pappas
Representative of New Hampshire
141. Nancy Pelosi
Representative of California
142. Brittany Pettersen
Representative of Colorado
143. Chellie Pingree
Representative of Maine
144. Mark Pocan
Representative of Wisconsin
10a
145. Nellie Pou
Representative of New Jersey
146. Ayanna Pressley
Representative of Massachusetts
147. Mike Quigley
Representative of Illinois
148. Delia C. Ramirez
Representative of Illinois
149. Emily Randall
Representative of Washington
150. Josh Riley
Representative of New York
151. Luz M. Rivas
Representative of California
152. Deborah K. Ross
Representative of North Carolina
153. Patrick K. Ryan
Representative of New York
154. Andrea Salinas
Representative of Oregon
155. Linda T. Sánchez
Representative of California
156. Mary Gay Scanlon
Representative of Pennsylvania
157. Jan Schakowsky
Representative of Illinois
158. Bradley Scott Schneider
Representative of Illinois
11a
159. Hillary J. Scholten
Representative of Michigan
160. Kim Schrier, M.D.
Representative of Washington
161. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott
Representative of Virginia
162. Terri A. Sewell
Representative of Alabama
163. Brad Sherman
Representative of California
164. Lateefah Simon
Representative of California
165. Adam Smith
Representative of Washington
166. Eric Sorensen
Representative of Illinois
167. Darren Soto
Representative of Florida
168. Melanie A. Stansbury
Representative of New Mexico
169. Greg Stanton
Representative of Arizona
170. Haley Stevens
Representative of Michigan
171. Marilyn Strickland
Representative of Washington
172. Suhas Subramanyam
Representative of Virginia
173. Thomas R. Suozzi
Representative of New York
12a
174. Emilia Strong Sykes
Representative of Ohio
175. Mark Takano
Representative of California
176. Shri Thanedar
Representative of Michigan
177. Bennie G. Thompson
Representative of Mississippi
178. Mike Thompson
Representative of California
179. Dina Titus
Representative of Nevada
180. Rashida Tlaib
Representative of Michigan
181. Jill Tokuda
Representative of Hawaii
182. Paul D. Tonko
Representative of New York
183. Norma J. Torres
Representative of California
184. Ritchie Torres
Representative of New York
185. Lori Trahan
Representative of Massachusetts
186. Derek T. Tran
Representative of California
187. Lauren Underwood
Representative of Illinois
13a
188. Juan Vargas
Representative of California
189. Gabe Vasquez
Representative of New Mexico
190. Marc Veasey
Representative of Texas
191. Nydia M. Velázquez
Representative of New York
192. Eugene Vindman
Representative of Virginia
193. James Walkinshaw
Representative of Virginia
194. Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Representative of Florida
195. Maxine Waters
Representative of California
196. Bonnie Watson Coleman
Representative of New Jersey
197. George T. Whitesides
Representative of California
198. Nikema Williams
Representative of Georgia
199. Frederica S. Wilson
Representative of Florida
14a
Members of the U.S. Senate
1. Alex Padilla
Senator from California
2. Charles E. Schumer
Senator from New York
3. Richard J. Durbin
Senator from Illinois
4. Gary C. Peters
Senator from Michigan
5. Angela D. Alsobrooks
Senator from Maryland
6. Tammy Baldwin
Senator from Wisconsin
7. Michael F. Bennet
Senator from Colorado
8. Richard Blumenthal
Senator from Connecticut
9. Lisa Blunt Rochester
Senator from Delaware
10. Cory A. Booker
Senator from New Jersey
11. Maria Cantwell
Senator from Washington
12. Christopher A. Coons
Senator from Delaware
13. Catherine Cortez Masto
Senator from Nevada
14. Tammy Duckworth
Senator from Illinois
15a
15. John Fetterman
Senator from Pennsylvania
16. Ruben Gallego
Senator from Arizona
17. Kirsten Gillibrand
Senator from New York
18. Margaret Wood Hassan
Senator from New Hampshire
19. Martin Heinrich
Senator from New Mexico
20. John W. Hickenlooper
Senator from Colorado
21. Mazie K. Hirono
Senator from Hawaii
22. Tim Kaine
Senator from Virginia
23. Mark Kelly
Senator from Arizona
24. Andy Kim
Senator from New Jersey
25. Angus S. King, Jr.
Senator from Maine
26. Amy Klobuchar
Senator from Minnesota
27. Ben Ray Luján
Senator from New Mexico
28. Edward J. Markey
Senator from Massachusetts
16a
29. Jeffrey A. Merkley
Senator from Oregon
30. Patty Murray
Senator from Washington
31. Chris Murphy
Senator from Connecticut
32. Jon Ossoff
Senator from Georgia
33. Jack Reed
Senator from Rhode Island
34. Jacky Rosen
Senator from Nevada
35. Bernard Sanders
Senator from Vermont
36. Brian Schatz
Senator from Hawaii
37. Adam B. Schiff
Senator from California
38. Jeanne Shaheen
Senator from New Hampshire
39. Elissa Slotkin
Senator from Michigan
40. Tina Smith
Senator from Minnesota
41. Chris Van Hollen
Senator from Maryland
42. Mark R. Warner
Senator from Virginia
17a
43. Raphael Warnock
Senator from Georgia
44. Elizabeth Warren
Senator from Massachusetts
45. Peter Welch
Senator from Vermont
46. Sheldon Whitehouse
Senator from Rhode Island
47. Ron Wyden
Senator from Oregon
Former Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
1. Charles W. Boustany, Jr.
Representative of Louisiana, 2005-2017
2. Barbara J. Comstock
Representative of Virginia, 2015-2019
3. Mickey Edwards
Representative of Oklahoma, 1977-1993
4. David F. Emery
Representative of Maine, 1975-1983
5. Wayne T. Gilchrest
Representative of Maryland, 1991-2009
6. James C. Greenwood
Representative of Pennsylvania, 1993-2005
7. Steve Gunderson
Representative of Wisconsin, 1981-1997
8. John LeBoutillier
Representative of New York, 1981-1983
18a
9. Susan Molinari
Representative of New York, 1990-1997
10. Deborah D. Pryce
Representative of Ohio, 1993-2009
11. Claudine Schneider
Representative of Rhode Island, 1981-1991
12. Christopher H. Shays
Representative of Connecticut, 1987-2009
13. Peter P. Smith
Representative of Vermont, 1989-1991
14. David A. Trott
Representative of Michigan, 2015-2019
15. James T. Walsh
Representative of New York, 1989-2009
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