Saved copy of
Postal Service final rule, Ballot Mail for Federal Elections
United States Postal Service · 2026-08-26
54966
Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 164 / Wednesday, August 26, 2026 / Rules and Regulations
cigarettes and oral vaporizers for
smokers; smokers’ articles; matches.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Services
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management, organization and
administration; office functions.
36. Financial, monetary and banking
services; insurance services; real estate
services.
37. Construction services; installation
and repair services; mining extraction,
oil and gas drilling.
38. Telecommunications services.
39. Transport; packaging and storage
of goods; travel arrangement.
40. Treatment of materials; recycling
of waste and trash; air purification and
treatment of water; printing services;
food and drink preservation.
41. Education; providing of training;
entertainment; sporting and cultural
activities.
42. Scientific and technological
services and research and design
relating thereto; industrial analysis,
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43. Services for providing food and
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John A. Squires,
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Property and Director of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.
[FR Doc. 2026–17437 Filed 8–25–26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–16–P
POSTAL SERVICE
39 CFR Part 111
Ballot Mail for Federal Elections
AGENCY: Postal Service.
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ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Postal Service is
amending the Mailing Standards of the
United States Postal Service, Domestic
Mail Manual, regarding the transmission
of mail-in or absentee ballots for federal
elections pursuant to its rulemaking
authority.
DATES: Effective August 21, 2026.
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Keith Weidner, (202) 268–2950 or Drew
Mitchum, (202) 779–2766.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On March 31, 2026, the President
issued Executive Order 14399, Ensuring
Citizenship Verification and Integrity in
Federal Elections, 91 FR 17125 (2026)
(‘‘Executive Order’’ or ‘‘Order’’). The
Executive Order stresses the federal
government’s ‘‘unavoidable duty under
Article II of the Constitution of the
United States to enforce [f]ederal law,
which includes preventing violations of
[f]ederal criminal law and maintaining
public confidence in election
outcomes.’’ Id. To these ends, the Order
points out the need for additional
measures concerning the use of the mail
in order to facilitate enforcement of
federal law, reduce the risk of fraud, and
help protect the integrity of federal
elections. Id. Following the issuance of
the Order, the Postal Service engaged in
an interagency review process through
the Office of Management and Budget
(‘‘OMB’’), and subsequently issued a
proposed rule regarding the preparation
of ballot mail for federal elections to
facilitate the enforcement of federal law
and to implement best practices for
Postal Service operations regarding
ballot mail. Ballot Mail for Federal
Elections, 91 FR 32915 (June 2, 2026).
Although exempt by 39 U.S.C. 410(a)
from the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act (‘‘APA’’) (5 U.S.C. 553)
regarding proposed rulemaking, the
Postal Service invited public comment
on the proposed revisions to Mailing
Standards of the United States Postal
Service, Domestic Mail Manual
(‘‘DMM’’), incorporated by reference in
the Code of Federal Regulations, set
forth in the proposed rule. The
comment period closed on July 2, 2026.
To ensure the faithful execution of
federal law in connection with federal
elections, this rule has an immediate
effective date. Delaying the effective
date would jeopardize implementation
of this rule in time for the 2026 general
election, which will be held on
November 3, 2026. Given injunctions
currently in place in State of California
v. Trump, No. 26–cv–11581 (D. Mass.
June 25, 2026), and League of Women
Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, No.
26–cv–11549 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2026),
the Postal Service will not take actions
to implement the rule specifically for
the 2026 election unless and until the
government obtains relief from those
injunctions. If the government obtains
timely relief from the injunctions,
implementation immediately thereafter
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will provide election officials as much
time as possible before the next election
to comply with the rule’s preparation
standards for Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes, and to prepare to submit data
to the Federal Ballot Mail Portal
(‘‘Portal’’), before the mail-in and
absentee ballots subject to this rule
aremailed (which generally occurs in
September or thereafter, as determined
by state law). The Portal will become
active (along with the verification
process that relies on Portal data) at the
time of the publication of the system of
records (‘‘SOR’’) governing the Portal.
Publication of the SOR will occur on or
after August 17, 2026 (pending the
Postal Service’s separate consideration
of the comments on that SOR proposal).
Finally, the terms ‘‘mail-in ballot’’ and
‘‘absentee ballot’’ are synonymous and
interchangeable for the purposes of this
rule. These terms include any ballot
sent through the U.S. Mail, irrespective
of state law terminology.
II. Overview of Comments
The Postal Service received more than
200,000 responses during the comment
period. These comments consisted
primarily of form letters that appeared
to be drawn from templates; brief
statements of general support for or
opposition to the proposed rule; and
individualized messages from
concerned citizens. Additionally,
organizational commenters individually
and jointly submitted over 250 letters.
This group of commenters included
postal unions; federal, state, local, and
tribal officials, including state attorneys
general, governors, and members of
Congress; election officials, including
secretaries of state and county election
administrators; voting rights
organizations; and a range of other
issue-based and political advocacy
groups.
As discussed below, some opposition
to the proposed rule reflected
misunderstandings about how the rule
will operate in practice; to these
misunderstandings the Postal Service
offers explanations in the ‘‘Operation of
the Final Rule’’ section below.
A. Comments in Support of the Rule
Supportive comments emphasized
several themes. Some discussed voter
fraud as a significant problem and
lauded the proposed rule for helping to
restore voters’ confidence in election
integrity. One letter, submitted by an
Alabama-led coalition of thirteen state
attorneys general, contended that the
proposed rule would facilitate efforts to
combat voter fraud while shoring up
public confidence in ways that states
could not achieve on their own
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initiative. That coalition further
emphasized that states retain full
control of ballots until they are
transferred to the Postal Service, and
that the proposed rule would help
mitigate weaknesses in the chain of
custody of Federal Ballot Mail.
Supporting commenters also
appraised the proposed rule as
enhancing election security by
improving the visibility of Federal
Ballot Mail in the mailstream; approved
of the ballot envelope design standards
it would normalize; emphasized the
benefits of creating reconcilable data
(through the state-specific Mail-In and
Absentee Participation Lists (‘‘Lists’’))
that offers a neutral administrative
check which strengthens confidence in
elections; and predicted that the rule
would reduce uncertainty as to whether
ballots have reached their intended
destination.
Supporting commenters further
evaluated the actions that state and local
election officials may need to take to
comply with the proposed rule’s
standards. The Alabama-led coalition of
state attorneys general, for instance,
acknowledged that the proposal would
impose certain burdens but
characterized them as ‘‘plainly justified
by the security and accountability
benefits of the proposed rule,’’
concluding that the rule ‘‘addresses real
vulnerabilities inherent in mail-in
voting, responds to legitimate and
widespread public concerns about
federal election integrity, and equips
States with tools that strengthen their
own oversight capabilities without
displacing their authority.’’
Finally, many supporting commenters
affirmed the Postal Service’s statutory
and constitutional authority to enact the
rule. Some cited Article II, Section 3 of
the U.S. Constitution (requiring the
President to ‘‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed’’) as legal grounds
for the rule, while also endorsing the
analysis of authorities set out in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. There,
the Postal Service cited authority to
regulate the mail as embodied in 39
U.S.C. 401 and 404 and described the
proposed regulations as setting forth
‘‘mailpiece preparation and data
reporting standards that can provide
information regarding the sending of
ballots through the mail that would be
available for use by law enforcement,
and are consistent with title 39 of the
U.S. Code.’’ The Postal Service
addresses the legal authority to
promulgate the final rule at greater
length in the ‘‘Legal Authority’’ section
below.
Finally, some commenters urged the
Postal Service to adopt additional
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measures, including citizenshipverification requirements, as part of a
final rule.
B. Comments in Opposition to the Rule
Comments received in opposition to
the proposed rule generally urged the
Postal Service to withdraw the rule or
to delay its implementation until after
the November 3, 2026, general election.
Several commenters argued that the rule
should be withdrawn in light of an
injunction entered by the United States
District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (California v. Trump,
2026 WL 1826490 (D. Mass. June 25,
2026)) and a now-stayed injunction
issued by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, in
litigation arising out of a 2021
settlement with the National
Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (‘‘NAACP’’) in the
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (NAACP v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 2026 WL 1893762 (D.D.C.
July 1, 2026)).
Concerns raised by opposing
commenters largely fell into three broad
categories, each of which is addressed
in greater detail below:
• The alleged legal deficiencies of the
proposed rule;
• Concerns regarding the purported
practical implementation challenges;
• Concerns about the proposed rule’s
alleged broader political and social
impact.
With respect to legal objections,
opposing commenters argued that the
Postal Service lacks legal authority to
adopt or implement the proposed rule.
Commenters further argued that, even if
the Postal Service possesses the
requisite authority, adoption of the
proposed rule would be arbitrary and
capricious. These legal objections are
addressed at length in the ‘‘Legal
Authority’’ and ‘‘Impact of the Final
Rule’’ sections below.
With respect to the substance of the
proposed rule, opposing commenters
frequently focused on the Portal, the
acceptance (or verification) provisions,
and the fact that the Postal Service
would refuse to accept certain ballots
for federal elections that states tender
without satisfying the data-entry
obligations that the rule would impose.
Although these provisions were
uniformly opposed by commenters not
otherwise supportive of the rule, some
expressed greater openness to the
envelope-design requirements, asserting
that such requirements would fall more
squarely within the Postal Service’s
sphere of authority. Thus, in the
opinion of some commenters, the
envelope design provisions for
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Outbound and Return Federal Ballot
Mail in DMM 705.24.3 could be retained
while the verification, Portal, and
optional notice provisions should be
removed. In a similar vein, at least one
commenter signaled conditional support
for the proposed rule so long as all
mandatory provisions were made
voluntary. Comments raising specific
implementation concerns—arising from
asserted costs and burdens associated
with implementation before the 2026
general election, as well as those costs
and burdens that would purportedly be
incurred on an ongoing basis; the
potential risk of administrative or data
errors leading to ballot rejection; and the
Postal Service’s perceived lack of
readiness—are addressed at length in
the sections below.
A number of commenters urged the
Postal Service to publish a system of
records notice (‘‘SORN’’) under the
Privacy Act and raised questions
addressable through the SORN,
including whether personally
identifiable information will be
collected and stored, how long such
information will be retained, which
entities and personnel will have access
to it, whether it will be shared with
other federal entities or contractors,
what cybersecurity safeguards will be
implemented, and what remedies will
be available in the event of improper
disclosure. The Postal Service published
a SORN on July 17, 2026. 91 FR 44880.
The public was invited to submit
comments relevant to the SORN and
related Privacy Act considerations in
that proceeding.
C. Comments Outside the Scope of This
Rulemaking
The Postal Service also received a
significant number of comments that fall
outside the scope of this proceeding.
First, many commenters described
voting by mail as an effective means of
exercising their franchise due to their
individual circumstances. Other
commenters, by contrast, criticized
mail-in voting as a general practice and
urged the Postal Service to cease
delivering ballot mail altogether. The
Postal Service takes no position on
whether, or the extent to which, states
should utilize the mail as part of the
administration of their elections.
Indeed, the Postal Service does not
advocate for or against voting by mail.
Instead, the Postal Service collects,
processes, transports, and delivers mail
and packages, and remains fully
committed to transporting all types of
mail, including Federal Ballot Mail that
conforms with the Postal Service’s mail
preparation, data reporting, acceptance,
and entry standards. As discussed
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further below, under the proposed rule,
and as retained in the final rule, the
states retain full authority to decide
whether to utilize the U.S. Mail as part
of their electoral systems, and to
determine who should be eligible to
vote by mail.
Second, comments that
comprehensively address state and local
election administration or the Postal
Service’s election mail procedures fall
outside the scope of this proceeding. By
way of example, one commenter raised
concerns regarding the accuracy of voter
registration rolls, recounted their
experience of observing purported
irregularities during the 2020 election
cycle, and urged the Postal Service to
undertake a comprehensive review of all
mail-in ballot procedures. Comments in
this vein, which concern the entire
system of election mail administration,
rather than the DMM provisions set
forth in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, will not be addressed
below.
Third, numerous comments raised
concerns influenced by partisan
political speculation. This included
conjecture about the underlying intent
of the Order and the impact it may have
on voter turnout or election outcomes.
Such remarks are speculative and
exceed the scope of this proceeding. In
any event, as explained further below,
this rule does not—nor is it intended
to—facilitate any form of voter
suppression, affect election outcomes,
or target particular demographics,
districts, or states.
Fourth, a number of comments raised
issues that fall outside both the scope of
this proceeding and the Postal Service’s
authority generally, extending the rule’s
logic beyond election mail and/or
invoking executive branch entities not
involved in Postal Service operations.
Some, for example, proposed that
ballots be accepted only if they arrive by
election day; demanded that mail-in
voting be discontinued; urged Congress
to enact the Safeguard American Voter
Eligibility (SAVE) Act; and weighed in
on sections of Executive Order 14399
that do not concern the Postal Service.
Comments addressing election
deadlines, the policy of mail-in voting,
other election administration changes,
pending legislation, and other entities’
law enforcement priorities are not
relevant to this proceeding.
Fifth, some commenters raised broad
issues of service performance and
operational decision-making. Such
issues include which facilities process
particular mail classes; postmarking
practices; service performance
complaints; the scope of Postal Police
Officers’ authority; operational changes
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or service commitments for ballots
mailed to and from military and
overseas voters; and collateral
consequences to the Postal Service’s
brand reputation or revenue if a final
rule is issued. Such comments are
beyond the scope of this proceeding and
will not be addressed below.
Sixth, the Postal Service received
numerous comments addressing matters
unrelated to election mail or to the
matters discussed in this proceeding.
These included comments expressing
personal opinions of the President;
remarks concerning nominees to the
Postal Service Board of Governors and
criticisms of the Board’s leadership;
objections to postage and stamp prices;
requests for congressional action;
appraisals of judges who have issued
decisions concerning election mail;
appraisals of the current and former
Postmaster General; comments aimed at
postal management and staff; comments
on postal reform and privatization;
comments on voter intimidation;
comments regarding the role of public
election auditors and observers;
opinions about the impact of the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions
dealing with the Voting Rights Act;
comments regarding the Federal
Election Commission’s Clearinghouse
on Election Administration; and
feedback on other administrative
proceedings, including a Department of
Justice (‘‘DOJ’’) rulemaking concerning
the review of state bar complaints and
allegations against DOJ attorneys and a
separate Postal Service rulemaking
concerning the mailability of firearms.
Such comments are also beyond the
scope of this proceeding and will not be
addressed below.
D. Conclusion
The Postal Service has carefully
considered all comments received. The
summary above is intended to broadly
cover the issues they raise. Substantive
legal objections, operational issues,
requests for additional study, suggested
revisions to the proposed rule, and
additional topics related to the proposed
rule are addressed in the dedicated
subsections that follow.
III. Legal Authority
Numerous commenters asserted, on
varying grounds, that the Postal Service
lacks the legal authority to implement
the proposed rule. This section recites
the specific arguments advanced by
commenters, followed in each case by a
response affirming the legal basis of the
DMM changes.
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A. General Remarks
Ballot mail presents unique
considerations, given the role it plays in
the electoral process. This role has also
grown in importance in recent years, as
many states have expanded eligibility
for mail-in voting, with some states
moving to universal mail-in voting. The
number of voters using the mail to
receive and cast their ballots has
commensurately increased. The Postal
Service’s policies regarding election
mail in general, and ballot mail in
particular, have evolved to reflect these
unique considerations. From an
operational standpoint, the Postal
Service deploys special practices on a
nationwide basis for the processing and
delivery of ballot mail to ensure that
such mail is prioritized across the postal
network and timely delivered. These
practices include the use of
extraordinary measures during the
period surrounding federal general
elections to accelerate the delivery of
return ballot mail beyond the Postal
Service’s typical operations when its
employees are able to identify a
mailpiece as a ballot. In recognition of
the importance of ballot mail, the Postal
Service regularly issues nationwide
guidance documents in federal election
cycles, has dedicated points of contact
to coordinate with election officials, and
has created a dedicated election mail
group tasked with overseeing the Postal
Service’s election mail procedures
nationwide. The Postal Service also
amended DMM 703.8.0 in 2022 to add
its longstanding best-practices
recommendations concerning ballot
mail to facilitate efficient handling and
prompt delivery and to
improvemailpiece visibility. Some
jurisdictions have adopted those
recommendations.
The use of the U.S. Mail to vote also
implicates federal interests regarding
whether the postal system is being used
in a manner that is consistent with
federal law, including those laws
governing who is allowed to vote in
federal elections. Executive Order 14399
emphasizes the constitutional obligation
of the Executive Branch to take care that
these laws are faithfully executed, and
discusses the importance of applying
additional measures concerning the use
of the mail to vote in federal elections,
in order to facilitate enforcement of
federal law, reduce the risk of fraud, and
help protect the integrity of federal
elections—a point subsequently echoed
by some comments supporting the rule.
It is fully appropriate for the Postal
Service, as an establishment of the
Executive Branch, to take actions
deemed necessary to ensure the faithful
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execution of federal law and enhance
the efficiency of postal operations. As
discussed below, the Postal Service has
the statutory and constitutional
authority to take such actions.
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B. Election Integrity
The Postal Service received many
comments expressing differing views on
the incidence of voter fraud and its
impact on election integrity. Some
commenters, in voicing support for the
proposed rule, portrayed voter fraud as
a significant problem, while
commenters opposing the rule argued
that it is not a problem, and disputed
the Postal Service’s legal authority and
rationale to impose preparation
requirements for Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail.
While the Postal Service
acknowledges the range of disagreement
on this point, the incidence of voter
fraud does not impact the proposed
rule’s legal grounding. As discussed in
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
in further detail below, the rule will
afford significantly enhanced visibility
into the sending of Federal Ballot Mail,
and this will in turn facilitate law
enforcement efforts by enabling law
enforcement to better detect potential
issues meriting further investigation.
Such enhanced visibility will help
identify potential issues that would
have otherwise gone undetected; at the
very least, it will provide increased
assurance that any potential issues are
more capable of being effectively
identified and investigated. Cf.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181, 196–97 (2008) (noting the
propriety of taking steps designed to
detect and deter potential electoral
fraud, which also has the benefit of
‘‘safeguarding voter confidence’’ in
elections). Whether or not voter fraud is
common or uncommon, the Postal
Service has the legal authority to take
the measures in this rule to facilitate
enforcement of federal law, reduce the
risk of fraud, and help protect the
integrity of federal elections.
C. The Constitution’s Elections Clause
and the 10th Amendment
Numerous commenters argued that
the Postal Service, through the proposed
DMM provisions, would supplant the
states’ authority to administer elections.
Some of these comments characterized
the proposed rule as inconsistent with
the Elections Clause of the Constitution,
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 (vesting
authority over the ‘‘manner of elections’’
with the States and Congress), and with
the 10th Amendment (reserving all nonenumerated powers to the states).
According to many of these comments,
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the proposed rule would allegedly
recast the Postal Service as an ‘‘auditor
of state voter rolls and an arbiter of
ballot validity,’’ a ‘‘gatekeeper of who
can vote by mail,’’ or a ‘‘checkpoint for
voting.’’ In a similar vein, commenters
asserted that the proposed rule
contravenes the separation of powers by
arrogating powers that lie with
Congress. Finally, at least one
commenter argued that, by requiring
that states expend resources to comply
with the standards mandated by the
Postal Service, the proposed rule would
unconstitutionally commandeer State
resources.
These comments are fundamentally
erroneous. The rule does not recast the
Postal Service as an election
administrator, nor dictate the manner of
elections in the states. On the contrary,
it sets forth mailpiece design and data
reporting standards tied to the use of the
mail. States maintain complete control
over their own voter registration rolls,
deciding who within their jurisdiction
is eligible to vote by mail. States also
retain complete autonomy to determine
the extent to which they utilize the
postal system as an aspect of their
elections. The rule is plainly consistent
with the Elections Clause, the 10th
Amendment, and the separation of
powers, as well as the Postal Service’s
statutory and regulatory authority.
Some commenters acknowledged the
Postal Service’s authority to impose
general standards governing the
dispatch of election mail, including
ballot mail. For instance, election mail
must today conform with the DMM
provisions that apply to the class of mail
in which it is entered, and users of such
mail must pay the required postage. The
requirement to follow federal mail
regulations if states choose to use the
federal postal system, then, cannot
inherently violate the Elections Clause,
nor would it in any way ‘‘commandeer’’
state resources. The Postal Service is not
constitutionally obliged to defer to a
given state’s Outbound Federal Ballot
Mail design preferences or accept a
given state’s decision not to use
barcodes. On the contrary, establishing
a standardized set of mailpiece design
requirements for Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail—requirements that, being
tailored to enable more efficient
handling of Outbound Federal Ballot
Mail, improve such mail’s visibility in
the mailstream, and Postal Service
operations—lies within the Postal
Service’s authority. These requirements
do not amount to election
administration, nor do they usurp state
resources; rather, they regulate the use
of the mail to improve operational
efficiency and support the faithful
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execution of federal law. In this regard,
as a general matter, states do not have
to use the U.S. mail to conduct their
elections, and the Postal Service can
take steps to ensure that if states do use
the mail, that use occurs in a manner
that achieves these legitimate purposes.
Similarly, the requirement to report
mail piece-level data into the Portal is
not tantamount to election
administration. States retain full control
over who within their jurisdictions is
(or is not) eligible to vote by mail in
federal elections; they would, moreover,
determine who is enrolled in their
respective Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists. DMM 705.24.4 only
requires that states provide to the Postal
Service certain information inscribed on
the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes that they mail to voters,
prior to or at the time of the outbound
mailing. This information, which
necessarily lies in the states’ possession,
would not be subject to revision by the
Postal Service. Eligible voters will
therefore be listed by and at the
discretion of election officials, and the
Postal Service will not second-guess the
states’ submissions. State election
officials will thus retain full control
over who is permitted to vote in federal
elections in their state by U.S. mail.
Finally, the verification process aims
only to ensure that states adhere to the
mailpiece design and data reporting
standards. By checking the outbound
barcode, the Postal Service will be able
to verify that the state or political
subdivision thereof has satisfied the
Portal data entry requirements (e.g.,
certifying that Outbound and Return
Federal Ballot Mail envelopes have been
submitted for Mailpiece Design Analyst
(‘‘MDA’’) review and that feedback has
been received, all required data fields
have been entered). Again, the Postal
Service will exercise no discretion or
authority over whether an individual
should or should not be on the list a
state provides.
This rule does not involve or
authorize inspection of a mail-in ballot’s
contents, review of individual voter’s
eligibility, or auditing of state voter
rolls. It instead focuses exclusively on
exterior mailpiece criteria and barcode
scan data. As DMM 704.24.6 explains,
‘‘[t]his rule relates only to the use of the
U.S. Mail,’’ leaving states ‘‘fully
responsible for the contents of [their]
Mail-In and Absentee Participation
List.’’ 91 FR 32929. Specifically, DMM
705.24.1.b limits enrollment in the
Portal to users authorized by a state’s
chief election official; accordingly, and
as detailed in DMM 705.24.4.3, the
Postal Service will compile and return
to each state only the information that
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the state itself has submitted, thus
preserving the states’ control over who
is (and is not) able to vote by mail. It
further bears emphasizing that the
verification process delineated in DMM
705.24.5 would not involve voter
eligibility determinations in any way; it
will not entail scrutiny into, or any
attempt to evaluate, individual voters.
Finally, as plainly stated in DMM
705.24.5.2, ‘‘Postal Service personnel
are not authorized to open mail sealed
against inspection.’’ In short, the rule
adds a layer of security and
accountability while leaving the
administration of elections firmly in the
hands of the states.
D. First Amendment and Privacy Act
Concerns
Some commenters raised First
Amendment concerns, noting that the
Supreme Court has long recognized that
voting is a protected form of political
participation and that compelled
disclosure of political participation can
chill the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. Though some commenters
correctly acknowledged that the Postal
Service does not propose to disclose
voting choices, numerous commenters
nevertheless alleged that the rule would
compel the creation and maintenance of
records identifying citizens who engage
in mail-in or absentee voting; speculated
that such records may be subject to
future disclosure, misuse, breach, or
political targeting; and advised against
collecting personally identifiable
election-participation information
absent a compelling need and robust
safeguards.
Other commenters invoked the
Privacy Act, and 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7) in
particular, as a statutory bar on the
maintenance of records ‘‘describing how
any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment
unless expressly authorized by statute
or by the individual about whom the
record is maintained or unless pertinent
to and within the scope of an authorized
law enforcement activity[.]’’.
These First Amendment concerns are
misplaced. First, the Postal Service
reiterates that it will not collect or
record party affiliation and will not
inspect ballot contents. Postal Service
personnel are not authorized to open
mail sealed against inspection. Instead,
through the Portal the Postal Service
will maintain data of the sort that is
routinely generated for mail from the
exterior of the mailpiece, including
addressing and barcode information.
The rule’s enactment will not entail
‘‘compelled disclosure of political
participation.’’ Supreme Court cases on
‘‘compelled disclosure’’ in the electoral
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context address compelled public
disclosure of personally identifiable
election participation information, such
as a public records law making the
signatures on a referendum petition
publicly available upon request. John
Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 192
(2010). The rule, by contrast, neither
directs nor contemplates the public
disclosure of Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists or the underlying
Portal data.
The Postal Service recognizes the
importance of ensuring that the Lists are
protected from ‘‘future disclosure,
misuse, breach, or political targeting.’’
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
indicated that ‘‘steps necessary for the
creation of a new SORN in accordance
with the Privacy Act’’ would be
initiated. 91 FR 32971. On July 17, 2026,
the SORN was published in the Federal
Register. The SORN provides details
regarding retention periods, access,
disclosure, notification, and contest
procedures under 39 CFR 266.5. 91 FR
44880. The notice specifies the
categories of records covered, a five-year
retention period, encryption of online
data transmissions, and badge- and logon-controlled access limited to
personnel whose duties require it. The
Postal Service can therefore confirm that
no data will be collected through the
Portal until a system of record (SOR) is
in effect, and that records will be
disclosed and maintained consistently
with any final SOR, which does not
allow public disclosure of the Lists.
The proposed rule is also consistent
with 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7), which applies
only to records revealing ‘‘how any
individual exercises rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment.’’ Courts have
interpreted this ‘‘how’’ to mean
gathering and recording the ‘‘content’’ of
expressive activity under the First
Amendment. E.g., Reuber v. United
States, 829 F.2d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that a letter
reprimanding an employee for privately
published essays did not depict ‘‘how’’
he had exercised First Amendment
rights under the Privacy Act because it
did not discuss ‘‘the content’’ of his
privately published essays and made
‘‘only vague allusions to the manner in
which he expressed his views’’).
This section of the Privacy Act could
only be invoked here if the Postal
Service were gathering and maintaining
records indicating the ‘‘content’’ of an
individual’s exercise of their First
Amendment rights (i.e., the content of
an individual’s ballot, and thus the
candidate for which an individual
voted). That is not the type of
information being collected under the
rule. The state-specific Mail-In and
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Absentee Participation Lists indicate
whether a state planned to mail a blank
ballot to any given individual. This
information does not describe ‘‘the
content’’ of expressive activity under
the First Amendment, but simply
indicates the specific means by which
an individual may have chosen to
receive or return their ballot.
Furthermore, Section 552a(e)(7)’s
prohibitions are operative ‘‘unless
pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity’’—
and as stated above, this rule is enacted
to assist in the faithful execution and
enforcement of federal law. See Jabara
v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 280 (6th Cir.
1982) (Section 552a(e)(7) ‘‘does not bar
the maintenance of records describing
how a person exercises First
Amendment rights if there is a direct
nexus to an authorized criminal, civil or
administrative law enforcement
activity’’). The applicability of Section
552a(e)(7)’s law enforcement exception
to DMM 705.24.4 is further confirmed
by the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel’s
recent memorandum opinion,
‘‘Authority to Obtain and Share
Statewide Voter Roll Data.’’ 50 Op. OLC
l(May 12, 2026), Slip. Op. at 25–29
(explaining that Section 552a(e)(7)’s law
enforcement exception permits
retention of statewide voter-registration
lists when a SORN is published).
E. Fourth Amendment Concerns
Some commenters argued that the
proposed rule would violate the Fourth
Amendment by allegedly:
• Allowing unreasonable search of
voter information encoded on the
outside of Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes;
• Permitting unreasonable seizure of
Federal Ballot Mail encoded with voter
information; and
• Requiring voter information to be
encoded on the outside of Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes and allowing
suspicionless searches (also known as
‘‘administrative’’ or ‘‘special needs’’
searches) of that information for general
law-enforcement purposes that fall
outside of the Postal Service’s lawful
mission of mail delivery.
The Postal Service notes that courts
have long held that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in
information displayed on the exterior of
a mailpiece because it is exposed to
anyone’s view, including postal
employees who must rely upon it in the
performance of their duties. E.g., United
States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 175–77
(9th Cir. 1978). Thus, the Postal
Service’s creation of ‘‘mail covers’’—
images of the outside cover of envelopes
or packages in its custody—for general
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law enforcement purposes do not
constitute a ‘‘search’’ under the Fourth
Amendment. See generally 39 CFR
233.3. Likewise, the government’s use of
voter information displayed or encoded
on Federal Ballot Mail envelopes would
not constitute a Fourth Amendment
‘‘search’’—administrative or
otherwise—because it invades no
reasonable expectation of privacy.
F. Due Process Concerns
Some commenters argued that once a
state provides for absentee voting, the
state has enabled a qualified individual
to exercise their fundamental right to
vote in a way that was previously
unavailable; and that, as a result, the
state must afford appropriate due
process protections, including notice
and a hearing, before rejecting an
absentee ballot. Commenters analogized
this principle (which applies via the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states) to
the Fifth Amendment, which, in their
view, requires the federal government to
provide adequate due process before
restricting voters’ use of otherwise
permissible voting methods.
The Postal Service reiterates that the
rule adopted herein does not determine
any individual’s eligibility to vote and
thus does not raise the specter of a due
process violation. The verification
procedures set forth in DMM 705.24.5
are instead designed to ensure that
states sending Federal Ballot Mail have
transmitted to the Federal Ballot Mail
Portal the information required for each
state-specific Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List. Such information lies
with the states, which already fully
control who is, and who is not, included
on the Lists; voters themselves cannot
provide all of that information (e.g.,
unique Intelligent Mail barcode (‘‘IMb’’)
on the outbound and return envelope),
and the Postal Service cannot correct or
amend it. While the verification process
may identify missing data or other
errors between Outbound Federal Ballot
mailings and the Portal data, the states
themselves control the information that
they transmit (as they do already, even
in the absence of this rule), and any
procedural protections attaching to such
information must accordingly be
provided by the states. Ultimately, with
or without this rule, states are
responsible for managing their own
voter rolls, and deciding who is or is not
eligible to vote by mail.
G. Equal Protection Concerns
Some commenters raised concerns
regarding the guarantee of equal
protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment (and subsequently
incorporated into the Fifth Amendment
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by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954)). For example, at least one
commenter asserted that the exemption
for ballots covered by the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting
Act (‘‘UOCAVA’’) affords unequal legal
protection (on the mistaken grounds
that UOCAVA covers military personnel
but not overseas civilians). Moreover, at
least one commenter argued that by
creating the possibility of
noncompliance, the rule’s envelopedesign standards and verification
process might restrict some voters’
ability to vote by mail, thus withholding
equal protection under the law.
However, another commenter
reasoned that uniform national
standards—far from raising equalprotection issues—resolve these
constitutional concerns. Relying on
Jones v. U.S. Postal Service, 488 F.
Supp. 3d 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), the
commenter explained that Fifth
Amendment equal-protection claims
were likely to succeed where there were
no standards or uniformity for handling
election mail; this inconsistency can
result in intrastate and interstate
disparities in citizens’ voting power.
The proposed rule, the commenter
argued, eliminates such concerns by
setting a single, nationwide standard for
Federal Ballot Mail.
The Postal Service agrees with this
commenter that the rule safeguards,
rather than abrogates, equal protection.
The rule is neutral on its face and
uniform in application: DMM 705.24.3
applies objective requirements to all
Outbound and Return Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes without distinction, and
the data entry and verification processes
delineated by DMM 705.24.4 and
705.24.5, respectively, likewise apply to
all states equally. Furthermore, as noted,
the rule promotes multiple rational
objectives through nationwide standards
and implementation, including the
enhancement of Federal Ballot Mail
visibility in the mailstream, Postal
Service operations, and the facilitation
of law enforcement objectives. Cf.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
734 (1987) (holding that facial
challenges to statutes ‘‘must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid’’); Reno
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993)
(extending the Salerno standard to
federal agency regulations). The rule’s
exemptions also rest on a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis. Congress, for
example, created in UOCAVA a separate
federal statutory scheme with its own
requirements, including different timing
constraints and deadlines. McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S.
802, 809 (1969) (allowing exceptions
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within an absentee ballot voting scheme
provided ‘‘some rational relationship to
a legitimate state end’’). Furthermore, as
indicated, UOCAVA coverage does in
fact extend to non-military U.S. citizens
who reside outside the United States. 52
U.S.C. 20310(5)(B)–(C).
H. Statutory Grounding in Title 39
Multiple commenters argued that, as
a general matter, the Postal Service lacks
the statutory authority to implement the
proposed rule. Along similar lines, some
commenters alleged specifically that,
because no provisions in title 39
explicitly contemplate mandatory
standards regarding Federal Ballot Mail,
title 39 impliedly bars the Postal Service
from implementing such standards.
These statutory arguments are
unavailing. As explained in the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 U.S.C.
401(2) authorizes the Postal Service ‘‘to
adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with this
title, as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions under this
title and such other functions as may be
assigned to the Postal Service under any
provisions of law outside of this title,’’
and further grants the Postal Service ‘‘all
other powers incidental, necessary, or
appropriate to the carrying on of its
functions or the exercise of its specific
powers.’’ Id. § 401(10). Furthermore,
Section 404 grants the Postal Service
specific powers, including the power
‘‘to provide for the collection, handling,
transportation, delivery, forwarding,
returning, and holding of mail, and for
the disposition of undeliverable mail.’’
Id. § 404(a)(1).
Setting preparation and data-reporting
standards for a defined category of mail
falls squarely within that statutory
authority. Supreme Court precedent
confirms the Postal Service’s expansive
rulemaking authority. As noted by one
commenter, in U.S. Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh, the Court
explained that under 39 U.S.C. 401 ‘‘the
Postal Service is broadly empowered to
adopt rules and regulations.’’ 453 U.S.
114, 122 (1981). This commenter further
argued that the Postal Service has long
managed election mail as a distinct
category under its authority. In Rider v.
United States, the commenter
explained, the Claims Court recognized
that the Postal Service issues ‘‘detailed
regulations and management
instructions concerning the various
classes of mail and types of postal
services in its Domestic Mail Manual’’
pursuant to Section 404(a), and that its
Postal Operations Manual establishes
‘‘special operating procedures’’ to
ensure that election and campaign
mailings ‘‘are processed properly,
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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 164 / Wednesday, August 26, 2026 / Rules and Regulations
delivered with equitable care and
attention and that proper records are
maintained.’’ 7 Cl. Ct. 770 (1985). Courts
have recognized the Postal Service’s
broad regulatory authority in other
contexts as well. See Grover City v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 391 F. Supp. 982, 986 (C.D.
Cal.1975) (finding postal regulations
setting mail receptacle standards to be
valid exercises of § 404(a)(1) delivery
power and § 401(2) rulemaking
authority); Rockville Reminder v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 480 F.2d 4, 7 (2nd Cir.
1973) (upholding postal regulations
prohibiting mailbox installations
facilitating private delivery of
advertising circulars under the Postal
Service’s broad rulemaking authority);
Egger v. U.S. Postal Serv., 436 F. Supp.
138, 142 (W.D. Va. 1977) (upholding the
Postal Service’s interpretation of its
regulations governing mail addressed to
people at school).
The Postal Service has the statutory
authority to set forth mail preparation,
acceptance, and entry standards that are
necessary to achieve the functions
assigned to it by law—functions that
include investigation into the potential
misuse of the mail and coordination
with other federal law enforcement
entities. See 39 U.S.C. 401(2); cf. 18
U.S.C. 3061(b) (authorizing the Postal
Service to investigate crimes regarding
‘‘the use of the mails’’ and other
appropriate crimes as determined by
agreement with the Attorney General);
52 U.S.C. 10307, 20511. The rule sets
forth tailored requirements regarding
the use of the mail—the design of
Federal Ballot Mail envelopes and the
provision of mailpiece-level data
concerning such ballot mailings—to
help ensure the faithful execution of
federal law; and the information yielded
by these requirements would be
available for use by law enforcement.
Additionally, the rule would implement
the Postal Service’s longstanding best
practices for ballot mail, thereby
advancing execution of a key Postal
Service function: processing and
delivery of the Nation’s mail. Contrary
to commenters’ arguments, achieving
such purposes is within the scope of the
Postal Service’s authority to take
‘‘necessary’’ action to regulate the use of
the mail and achieve its assigned
functions.
There is also no basis to conclude that
the Postal Service’s broad statutory
authority regarding the postal system
encompasses all types of mail except
ballot mail, and specifically Federal
Ballot Mail. On the contrary, the Postal
Service has acted pursuant to its
existing authority to take many actions
regarding ballot mail, reflective of the
unique considerations raised by such
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mail, including by establishing special
operational procedures and issuing best
practice recommendations. While the
Postal Service is now taking additional
action to make some of these
recommendations mandatory, and to
add a requirement that states provide
mailpiece-level detail about their
mailings, such additional steps equally
fall within the Postal Service’s authority
to execute on functions as assigned.
I. Grounding in Law Enforcement
Statutes
Multiple commenters contested the
state-specific Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists’ grounding in law
enforcement objectives, on the theory
that the Lists, and the purposes to
which they will allegedly be put, exceed
the Postal Service’s authority to
investigate crimes involving election
fraud. In general, these comments assert
that the criminal statutes cited by the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking either
have nothing to do with voting or are
related to voting but are not enforceable
by the Postal Service. Specific
arguments include:
• The U.S. Code does not confer on
the Postal Service authority to enforce
election statutes. Commenters asserted
that 52 U.S.C. 10307 and 20511 do not
expressly name the Postal Service, and
as such cannot be taken to confer
enforcement or investigative authority
on the Postal Service with respect to
voter intimidation and fraudulent
registration or voting. Conversely, 39
U.S.C. 404(a)(6) confers on the Postal
Service the power ‘‘to investigate postal
offenses and civil matters relating to the
Postal Service,’’ not election law per se.
• The investigatory and enforcement
powers conferred by statute on Postal
Inspectors are limited. Some
commenters averred that 18 U.S.C.
3061(b) grants only limited law
enforcement powers to Postal
Inspectors, which are confined to ‘‘the
enforcement of laws regarding property
in the custody of the Postal Service,
property of the Postal Service, the use
of the mails, and other postal offenses,’’
and to any offenses subject to
interagency agreement with the
Attorney General. This grant of
authority, some asserted, does not
authorize the Postal Service to collect
data on voters. Similarly, the regulations
in 39 CFR 233.1(b) do not expressly
grant Postal Inspectors authority to
administer elections, determine voter
eligibility, maintain voter registration
databases, or conduct election fraud
investigations unrelated to postal
offenses.
• The proposed rule lacks a factual
predicate. To initiate an investigation,
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the Postal Service requires either direct,
visible evidence of a crime or reasonable
grounds to suspect that a crime is or has
been committed. Some commenters
characterized voter fraud, including
through use of the mail, as rare.
Commenters contended that the
proposed rule nevertheless assumes that
every mail-in voter may cast a
fraudulent vote and must be placed
under surveillance.
• Lack of a clear statement conferring
investigative or enforcement authority.
Commenters argued that if Congress had
intended to deputize the Postal Service
as an adjunct of federal election law
enforcement, it would have said so
clearly.
Each of the above arguments is
unpersuasive. The proposed rule
establishes mailpiece preparation and
data reporting standards that will
significantly enhance the visibility of
Federal Ballot Mail. The information
generated by the implementation of
those standards would be available for
use by appropriately authorized law
enforcement entities to help ensure the
faithful execution of federal law. The
determination of whether to investigate,
refer, charge, or prosecute any matter
relating to illegal voting, voter fraud or
voter intimidation rests, and will
continue to rest, with the entities to
which Congress has assigned such
functions. Moreover, as noted above, the
rule does not dictate the administration
of elections, the determination of voter
eligibility, or the maintenance of voter
registration databases—all of which is
controlled by the states–nor does the
rule authorize the Postal Service to
conduct investigations unrelated to
postal offenses.
Concerning the proposed rule’s
factual predicate (or alleged lack
thereof), claims regarding the empirical
incidence of voter fraud do not, as
explained above, affect the Postal
Service’s authority to adopt these
regulations. The Postal Service further
emphasizes that, under the rule, it will
not surveil mail-in or absentee voters.
Under the rule’s plain terms,
information generated at acceptance is
embedded in exterior mailpiece indicia
and barcode scan data; Postal Service
personnel are not authorized to open
mail sealed against inspection; and no
provision in DMM 705.24 authorizes
review of any ballot’s contents.
Concerning the implied clear
statement rule discerned by some
commenters, the Postal Service does not
purport to discover ‘‘transformative
power’’ in a ‘‘long-extant’’ statute.
Rather, the envelope design,
automation, barcoding and design
review standards set forth by DMM
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705.24.3 are similar to mail preparation
requirements routinely applied across
other mail categories. The rule,
therefore, does not introduce new and
unsettled ‘‘major questions’’—a point
explained in greater depth below.
J. The Major Questions Doctrine
Some commenters asserted that the
proposed rule would violate the ‘‘major
questions doctrine,’’ which applies to
agency actions purporting to ‘‘discover
in a long-extant statute an unheralded
power representing a transformative
expansion in its regulatory authority.’’
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 724
(2022). Such comments theorized that as
the right to vote is a fundamental
political right, and as the Postal Service
has no authority to adopt rules
regulating voting in federal elections
without express congressional
authorization, the proposed rule would
derive from its stated sources of
statutory authority just such
‘‘transformative’’ powers.
As an initial matter, it bears repeating
that this rule does not regulate the right
or eligibility to vote, voter registration,
or the manner by which states
administer elections. States will retain
full autonomy to decide whether (and to
what extent) they utilize the U.S. Mail
as part of their electoral systems and
who can use ballot mail to cast a vote.
The rule instead imposes modest data
and mail preparation requirements on
Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. The
preparation requirements have for years
been issued as best-practice guidance—
and are substantively similar to the
standards already employed to varying
extents by some election officials. And
the data standards require that states
provide information regarding the
exterior of Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes that they will already have
available as part of their ballot mailings.
The verification procedures simply help
to ensure these standards have been met
prior to accepting an Outbound Federal
Ballot mailing. Furthermore, the Postal
Service is authorized to regulate certain
mail preparation requirements in
furtherance of federal law enforcement
and to advance its ability to efficiently
handle the mail. On its face, then, the
rule does not represent any
‘‘transformative expansion’’ of
regulatory authority, rendering the
‘‘major questions’’ doctrine
inapplicable.
By way of further explanation, major
questions arise when agencies claim to
‘‘discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power representing a
transformative expansion in its
regulatory authority.’’ West Virginia,
597 U.S. at 724. Per West Virginia, ‘‘the
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history and breadth of the authority that
[the agency] has asserted’’ distinguishes
‘‘extraordinary cases’’ from ordinary
ones. Such cases, which ‘‘provide a
reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress meant to confer such
authority,’’ typically involve an agency
reaching beyond its area of expertise. Id.
at 721; see also, e.g., Alabama Ass’n of
Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 764
(2021) (the Centers for Disease Control
regulating landlord-tenant relations);
NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, (2022)
(OSHA regulating a public health risk
rather than workplace hazards). By
contrast, in United States v. White, 97
F.4th 532, 540 (7th Cir. 2024), the
Seventh Circuit refused to apply the
major questions doctrine in a case
plainly lacking ‘‘the hallmarks of the
truly extraordinary cases,’’ with no
claim to ‘‘unheralded power.’’ In
Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1 (9th Cir.
2024), the Ninth Circuit likewise held
the major questions doctrine not to
apply to a federal contractor minimum
wage mandate which, following a
history of presidents setting federal
contractor rules, constituted neither a
‘‘transformative’’ nor an ‘‘unheralded’’
expansion of regulatory power. Id. at 14.
Similar to the facts in White and Su,
envelope preparation and data
transmission and verification
requirements of the sort contemplated
here fall well short of an ‘‘unheralded
transformation’’ of regulatory authority,
lack ‘‘the hallmarks of the truly
extraordinary cases,’’ and do not derive
‘‘unheralded power’’ from a ‘‘longextant statute.’’ Indeed, the Postal
Service has for years conditioned
eligibility for certain rate levels on
specific requirements, including
barcodes and Mailer IDs, and has done
so under the same statutory authority
that underlies this rule. For example,
the Full-Service Intelligent Mail
program, described in DMM 705.23,
offers automation discounts for
commercial mailers in exchange for
end-to-end mail tracking, electronic
documentation, and address corrections.
Participation in this program is
mandatory for automation pricing. See
78 FR 23,137 (Apr. 18, 2013) (requiring
the use of ‘‘full-service’’ Intelligent Mail
‘‘to qualify for automation prices for
postcards (First-Class Mail® only),
letters, and flats when mailed using the
following services: First-Class Mail,
Standard Mail and Periodicals; and for
flats mailed at Bound Printed Matter
prices’’). If the Full-Service IMb regime
is lawful under Sections 401 and 404,
and it is, then the proposed rule cannot
be said to effect an ‘‘unheralded
transformation’’ of the regulatory
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54973
prerogatives embedded in those statutes.
Barcode, logo, automationcompatibility, design review, and
electronic documentation conditions on
defined mail categories constitute
normal exercises of Postal Service
authority; they have, moreover, in large
part, long been included in the Postal
Service’s guidance to state Boards of
Elections.
Other major-questions cases focus on
the ‘‘economic and political
significance’’ of the authority at issue.
Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S.
229, 246 (2026); see also, e.g., Biden v.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 502 (2023).
Here, the economic significance of the
rule is slight as compared to prior
major-questions cases. See Learning
Resources, 607 U.S. at 246 (‘‘could be
worth $15 trillion’’); Nebraska, 600 U.S.
at 502 (‘‘between $496 billion and $519
billion’’). And although actual changes
to eligibility of voters to vote by mail
might fairly be described as having
political significance in some sense, this
rule makes no such changes—it instead
leaves voter-eligibility unchanged,
requiring only certain modest envelopedesign and data reporting standards,
most of which have long been
recommended by the Postal Service
(and are voluntarily complied with by
some jurisdictions already). It follows
that the rule’s incorporation of these
practices does not raise any ‘‘major
question’’ in the relevant sense.
K. Ultra Vires Creation of ‘‘Nonmailable
Matter’’ Categories
Some commenters noted that, in 39
U.S.C. 3001–3018, Congress specified
categories of nonmailable materials with
robust protections for all forms of mail
not included. These commenters then
argued that the rule effectively creates a
new category of ‘‘nonmailable matter,’’
and thereby exceeds title 39’s statutory
scheme. On this basis, they contended
that the rule and the verification process
that it establishes is ultra vires.
The rule does not create a new
category of ‘‘nonmailable matter’’ into
which Federal Ballot Mail as a class
may generally fall. Rather, it is designed
to ensure that Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes meet certain preparation
standards consistent with operational
best practices and to condition
acceptance on the provision of certain
mailpiece-level data regarding those
ballot envelopes—both of which
support the execution of federal law.
The rule does not prohibit federal
ballots from being mailed altogether.
While it is true that outbound mail-in
ballots may be rejected from the
mailstream as a consequence of
noncompliance with the rule’s
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requirements, conditions on the
acceptance of mailable matter are
distinct from a determination that the
matter is nonmailable. Moreover,
compliance is straightforward: states
need only provide information that is
inscribed on the outside of Federal
Ballot Mail envelopes, which will
necessarily be in their possession. And
ample resources are available to assist
states with ballot mail envelope design,
should such assistance be required.
Compliance is verified by checking a
single data point (IMb) on Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail prior to acceptance.
Although Outbound Federal Ballot
mailings that fail the verification
process may be temporarily rejected
(and thus not permitted to enter the
mailstream), any errors may be
corrected and the mailpieces will
thereafter be accepted for mailing.
Rather than usurp Congress’s
authority to create new categories of
‘‘nonmailable matter,’’ then, the Postal
Service will impose mailpiece design
and reporting standards to promote a
rational and legitimate objective. As
discussed below, to support this
proposal, the Postal Service has
reasonably determined that the
mailpiece design requirements will help
ensure proper handling, efficient
processing, and timely delivery of such
ballots to and from voters. See 90 FR at
9843 (special conditions are appropriate
for ‘‘sensitive matter’’ where such
conditions ‘‘will improve visibility and
enhance handling methods’’). Moreover,
requiring the submission of a
consolidated list of data concerning
Federal Ballot Mail will assist law
enforcement authorities in investigating
crimes, including those involving the
mails, as is consistent with the Postal
Service’s regulatory authorities. See 39
U.S.C. 401(b) (noting that the Postal
Service can issue regulations to support
functions assigned to it by law); 18
U.S.C. 3061(b) (authorizing Postal
Service to investigate crimes ‘‘regarding
the use of the mails’’ and other
appropriate crimes as determined by
agreement with the Attorney General).
The Postal Service has previously
relied on its authority under 39 U.S.C.
401(2) to establish standards applicable
to the acceptance and transmission of
certain unique articles in furtherance of
specific Postal Service operational
interests where those articles raise
special handling concerns, even where
the articles are not dangerous. For
example, cremated human and animal
remains must be transported through
specific types of USPS-provided boxes,
and must be trackable via barcode. See
Cremated Remains Packaging
Requirements, 90 FR 9843 (Feb 19,
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2025) (implementing rules concerning
the sending of cremated remains in
specific types of USPS-provided boxes
because the Postal Service understands
such remains are ‘‘sensitive matter and
believes this will improve visibility and
enhance handling methods throughout
processing and transportation’’).
Similarly, replica explosives—which,
although not dangerous, also require
special handling to prevent operational
disruptions—rather than being
prohibited from the mail altogether
must be mailed in certain ways,
including in-person presentation to a
retail counter and shipment via
Registered Mail. Restricting the Mailing
of Replica or Inert Explosives, 75 FR 282
(Jan. 5, 2010) (noting that ‘‘[t]his process
will ensure that packages containing
these items remain separate and easily
identifiable during the mailing
process’’).
Although ballot mail does not present
precisely the same operational issues as
cremated remains or replica explosives,
it is unquestionably sensitive mail that
raises unique operational
considerations, as discussed above, and
the Postal Service’s authority under
Section 401(2) is sufficiently expansive
to encompass mail-entry conditions that
further the effective execution of federal
law and advance operational best
practices. 39 U.S.C. 401(2) (noting that
the Postal Service can issue regulations
to support functions assigned to it by
law). And incidental to the ability to
impose standards in furtherance of such
legitimate objectives is the ability to
restrict mailings that do not meet those
conditions from being accepted. Cf. id.
§ 401(10) (Postal Service is granted
‘‘incidental’’ and ‘‘necessary’’ powers to
effectuate its responsibilities).
L. Consistency With 39 U.S.C. 101(a),
403(c), 404(e), 412, and 3661
Commenters also argued that the
proposed rule is inconsistent with
various title 39 provisions, i.e., 39
U.S.C. 101(a), 403(c), 404(e), and 412.
Other commenters averred that, prior to
implementing these provisions, the
Postal Service must request an advisory
opinion from the Postal Regulatory
Commission (‘‘PRC’’) under 39 U.S.C.
3661(b).
The Postal Service disagrees with
these assessments and addresses each of
the above-cited title 39 provisions in
turn.
Section 101(a) establishes the Postal
Service’s foundational legal mandate to
bind the nation together by providing
reliable, efficient, and regular mail
services to all communities. This
obligation coexists with federal laws
determining what is mailable, and the
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Postal Service abides by several
statutory and regulatory directives
regarding items that are not mailable,
such as hazardous substances or
explosives, or (as here) mailable with
conditions imposed on preparation and
data reporting. The existence of these
directives does not negate the
foundational legal mandate, and neither
would Federal Ballot Mail envelope
design standards and electronic
documentation requirements that align
with preexisting guidance. Furthermore,
the Postal Service will continue to
coordinate with state election officials
and other officials regarding the
transmittal of election mail and will
maintain its longstanding election mail
practices concerning the processing and
delivery of ballots that enter the
mailstream, including completed ballots
mailed by voters to election officials.
Indeed, consistent implementation of
longstanding best practices
recommendations will enhance, rather
than hinder, these efforts.
Section 403(c) mandates that, in
providing services, ‘‘the Postal Service
shall not . . . make any undue or
unreasonable discrimination among
users of the mails, nor shall it grant any
undue or unreasonable preferences to
any such user.’’ The PRC has noted that
a violation of section 403(c) requires
that (1) a user of the mail is receiving
less favorable services than those
provided to one or more other postal
customers, (2) the user is similarly
situated to those postal customers
receiving more favorable service, and (3)
there is no rational or legitimate basis
for denying the user the more favorable
service currently being provided to
those similarly situated postal
customers. PRC Order No. 718, Advisory
Opinion (AO) on Service Changes
Associated with First-Class Mail and
Periodicals, July 20, 2021, Docket No.
N2021–1 at 170.
The rule adopted herein sets forth
neutral, uniform, and nondiscriminatory mailpiece design and
data reporting standards that apply
uniformly to all Federal Ballot Mail;
thus, no ‘‘preferential mail service’’ is
granted to one class of mail-in voters
over another. Nor does the Postal
Service violate Section 403(c) by
requiring that Federal Ballot Mail meet
these uniform standards, since given the
unique considerations raised by such
mail, Federal Ballot Mail is not
‘‘similarly situated’’ to other types of
mail. Indeed, the Postal Service already
accords to election mail special
operational treatment that is unavailable
for other mail matter sent as First-Class
Mail or Marketing Mail (the postal
products typically used to send ballot
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mail), and there is no basis to conclude
that this special operational treatment
constitutes undue discrimination
against any users of the mail. Finally,
Section 403(c) does not prohibit all
distinctions among mail users, but only
preferences that are ‘‘undue’’ or
‘‘unreasonable.’’ Given the reasonable
and legitimate objectives of the new
standards, they are neither ‘‘undue’’ nor
‘‘unreasonable’’—even assuming
arguendo that users of Federal Ballot
Mail are ‘‘similarly situated’’ to users of
other mail classes not covered by those
standards, and even if those standards
were conceded to somehow provide
‘‘less favorable’’ terms (and they do not).
The Postal Service also notes an issue
flagged by several commenters: namely,
that not all states can implement the
rule’s requirements with the same
facility. By way of example, one
comment noted that states with
universal mail-in voting can more
readily implement the new electronic
documentation requirements than can
states that do not mail absentee ballots
unless requested by the voter—since the
states in the former category can submit
their entire list of enrollees in one
session through the ballot portal, while
states in the latter category must submit
names in a more piecemeal fashion and
only for those individuals requesting to
receive a ballot through the mail. The
Postal Service acknowledges the
existing variations in state mail-in
voting practices, which may require
different levels of process changes in
order to comply with the rule; however,
as noted, the rule itself sets forth
neutral, uniform, and nondiscriminatory mailpiece design and
data reporting standards that apply
equally to all Federal Ballot Mail.
Compliance with these standards is
straightforward and facilitated by
existing resources (in some cases, free of
charge). Furthermore, the nature and
degree of states’ prospective compliance
efforts reflect the states’ own policies,
not the uniform standards adopted by
the Postal Service. Such discrepancies,
therefore, do not implicate Section
403(c).
Section 404(e) generally prohibits the
Postal Service from providing any new
‘‘nonpostal service.’’ The term ‘‘service’’
is not defined in title 39; the statute
directed the PRC to review the
‘‘nonpostal services’’ offered by the
Postal Service as of January 1, 2006, to
determine whether each such service
may continue. Id. § 404(e)(1). In carrying
out that responsibility, the PRC defined
the term ‘‘service’’ by regulation as ‘‘any
ongoing, commercial activity offered to
the public for the purpose of financial
gain.’’ PRC Order 154, Review of
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Nonpostal Services Under the Postal
Accountability and Enhancement Act,
Dec. 19, 2008, Docket No. MC2008–1 at
14. Because the creation and
distribution of the Mail-in and Absentee
Participation Lists are not ‘‘commercial’’
in nature, are not offered to the public,
and are not offered ‘‘for the purpose of
financial gain,’’ it would not qualify as
a ‘‘service’’ for the purposes of Section
404(e).
In any event, the creation of such lists
is ‘‘postal’’ in nature, as it would
involve ‘‘delivery of letters, printed
matter, or mailable packages, including
acceptance, collection, sorting,
transportation, or other functions
ancillary thereto.’’ 39 U.S.C. 102(5); see
also id. § 404(e)(1) (‘‘the term ‘nonpostal
service’ means any service that is not a
postal service defined under section
102(5)’’). As noted above, these
provisions set forth preparation and
data standards that are tailored to the
sending of ballots, and hence to the use
of the mail.
Section 412 provides in part that ‘‘no
officer or employee of the Postal Service
shall make available to the public by
any means or for any purpose any
mailing or other list of names or
addresses (past or present) of postal
patrons or other persons.’’ Some
commenters theorized that unless state
law shields postal-provided statespecific Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists from disclosure,
furnishing the state’s chief election
official with a list containing the names
and addresses of those receiving a mailin ballot likely violates this section.
However, 39 U.S.C. 412(a) addresses
lists of ‘‘postal patrons’’ or ‘‘other
persons’’ compiled from postal data,
and provides that the Postal Service
shall not make such a postal list
available to the public. The information
on which the Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists will be based is
provided by the states themselves, and
specifically the states’ records of
individuals to whom they (or their
authorized election officials) plan to
mail blank ballots. Because the lists
involve information furnished by the
states, 39 U.S.C. 412(a) is not applicable;
and in any event, the Postal Service will
not make the lists public.
Certain commenters nevertheless
argued that the exception structure
created by Section 412(a) (allowing
disclosure of information ‘‘as
specifically provided by subsection (b)
or other law’’) in tandem with Section
412(b) (stating that ‘‘[t]he Postal service
shall provide to the Secretary of
Commerce for use by the Bureau of the
Census such address information,
address-related information, and point
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54975
of postal delivery information . . . as
may be determined by the Secretary to
be appropriate for any census or
survey’’), impliedly excludes the
provision of Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists to state officials. It
therefore bears emphasizing that even if
Section 412(a) were applicable to MailIn and Absentee Participation Lists, it
would not bar the provision of such lists
to state elections officials.
First and foremost, the provisions of
these lists to state election officials does
not constitute such disclosure of
protected information ‘‘to the public.’’
(Emphasis added.) Indeed, at least one
court has interpreted disclosure to state
law enforcement officials under 39
U.S.C. 412 as not being tantamount to
an impermissible disclosure to the
public. See, e.g., People v. Pearson, 169
Cal. App. 3d 319, 323 (1985) (holding
that an individual ‘‘had no reasonable
expectation of privacy of his name and
residential address given to the United
States Postal Service when applying for
a post office box’’; noting that ‘‘the
information was not made available to
the public’’ under 39 U.S.C. 412 ‘‘but
rather to a law enforcement officer
conducting an official investigation’’).
Second, Section 412(a) allows
disclosure of information ‘‘as
specifically provided by subsection (b)
or other law.’’ (Emphasis added.) Postal
Service regulations accordingly make
clear that disclosure of information
under Section 412 to the Secretary of
Commerce for census-related purposes
is not exclusive, countenancing such
disclosure pursuant to certain contracts
and interagency agreements, by written
request and with the prior consent of
the individuals, or as ‘‘otherwise
expressly authorized by federal law’’
See 39 CFR 266.3(b)(3). As noted, the
rule’s Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List disclosure provisions
are adopted pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 401
and 404 with the aim of supporting the
faithful execution of federal law, and
disclosure would occur in accordance
with an established SOR.
Third, federal legislation serves as
both a precedent and a template for the
sharing of information by the Postal
Service with state election officials, in
the context of voting. Specifically, the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993
(‘‘NVRA’’) requires each state to manage
a voter list maintenance program, and to
make reasonable efforts to remove
ineligible voters from voting rolls. 52
U.S.C. 20507(a)(4). The NVRA includes
a safe harbor provision, whereby a state
can comply with its obligation to have
a voter list maintenance program if
‘‘change-of-address information
supplied by the Postal Service through
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its licensees is used to identify
registrants whose addresses may have
changed.’’ 52 U.S.C. 20507(c)(1)(A). In
2018, the Supreme Court determined
that it was ‘‘undisputedly lawful’’ for a
state to utilize the Postal Service
national change-of-address data for
voter list maintenance purposes, as
described in the NVRA. See Husted v.
A. Philip Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756,
765 (2018) (citing 52 U.S.C. 20507(c)(1)
and referring to the NVRA safe harbor
as ‘‘the Postal Service option’’). As a
general matter, then, the Postal Service’s
sharing of information with government
officials is not exclusively limited to
providing information to the Secretary
of Commerce under Section 412(b).
Section 3661(b) provides that, when
the Postal Service ‘‘determines that
there should be a change in the nature
of postal services which will generally
affect service on a nationwide or
substantially nationwide basis,’’ it must
request an advisory opinion from the
PRC before implementing the change.
Some commenters reasoned that a
change touching Federal Ballot Mail is
a nationwide change in postal services
within the meaning of Section 3661—
one requiring pre-filing conferences
with affected stakeholders and a formal
request filed with the PRC at least 90
days before implementation (39 CFR
3020.110–3020.112).
As an initial matter, 39 CFR
3020.110–3020.112 are regulations
binding the PRC, not the Postal Service.
It is therefore incorrect to suggest (as
some commenters did) that the Postal
Service’s adoption of this proposed rule
would violate its own regulations.
More importantly, the changes
contemplated by the proposed rule do
not trigger any obligations under
Section 3661. As noted, the obligations
attendant to Section 3661 arise in the
event of ‘‘a change in the nature of
postal services which will generally
affect service on a nationwide or
substantially nationwide basis.’’
Implementation of this rule does not
constitute such a nationwide change in
postal services. As the leading case on
this issue explains, Section 3661 must
be read within the context of the overall
statutory scheme of title 39, which is
designed to give the Postal Service
‘‘broad authority in postal management’’
to ensure that management is not
‘‘unjustly hampered in its efforts to
administer the Department in a
businesslike way.’’ Buchanan v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 259, 262–63 (5th
Cir. 1975). Section 3661(b) therefore
comes into play only in limited
circumstances, if (1) there is a change
that has a ‘‘meaningful impact on
service,’’ (2) the change is ‘‘in the nature
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of postal service,’’ and (3) the change
affects service ‘‘on a nationwide or
substantially nationwide basis.’’ Id.
‘‘These three factors combine to
demonstrate that Congress intended the
safeguards of 3661 to apply only when
changes of significance were
contemplated.’’ Id. at 263.
As to the first Buchanan factor, a
proposed change triggers the Section
3661 advisory opinion requirement
when that change is ‘‘meaningful’’
rather than ‘‘minor’’ from a quantitative
perspective. See Buchanan, 508 F.2d at
262. Alterations that have a minimal
effect on the general class of postal users
therefore do not fall within the scope of
Section 3661. Id. Here, the rule’s
requirements apply only to Federal
Ballot Mail—a subset of election mail—
and only in connection with federal
general, special, or runoff elections (and
not state elections or primary elections).
To put this in context, in 2020 the
Postal Service delivered roughly 400
million pieces of mail per day, and
election mail in the 2020 general
election accounted for only a small
fraction of a percentage (roughly 0.1%)
of that total mail volume. The standards
being imposed on this exceedingly
small subset of overall mail volume do
not constitute a change of sufficient
scale and scope to implicate Section
3661, but will instead have only a de
minimis effect on the nature of postal
services available to ordinary Postal
Service users.
Moreover, whether a proposed action
constitutes a change in the ‘‘nature of
postal services’’ within the meaning of
Section 3661(b) ‘‘involves a qualitative
examination of the manner in which
postal services available to the users
will be altered.’’ Buchanan, 508 F.2d at
263. In that regard, the PRC has held
that ‘‘in determining whether an
initiative involves a change in the
nature of postal services ‘[i]t is the
experience of the individual postal
consumer, the recipient of the complex
of services provided by the Postal
Service and the intended beneficiary of
the policies incorporated by § 3661, that
must be assayed.’ ’’ Pennsylvania v.
DeJoy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 833, 885 (E.D.
Pa. 2020). Here, the changes
contemplated by this rule do not
directly affect the provision of postal
services; rather, they encompass
preparation and documentation
requirements that are within the control
of the states and, if adhered to, will not
disturb the acceptance, processing,
transmission or delivery of Federal
Ballot Mail. The rule contemplates no
changes to how the Postal Service
processes and delivers election mail. In
other words, as long as the rule’s
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conditions are met, Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail will enter the mailstream as
usual, will transit as usual to its
intended destination, and will in the
usual manner be delivered: no
discernible difference in the nature of
postal services will arise. Indeed, as
explained more fully below, the Postal
Service will work closely with Boards of
Elections to facilitate that very outcome.
And, once the Outbound Federal Ballot
Mail reaches a voter, the voter will
experience no change. Voters may
complete and return their ballot as they
do now. It further bears noting that even
if a state declined to submit the
information required by the rule, the
resulting acceptance refusal would not
implicate Section 3661 any more than
would a large-scalemailer’s decision to
opt out of the mail system: the
nationwide availability of postal
services would remain unchanged.
Finally, some commenters argued that
it was unlawful for the President to
issue an Executive Order directing
action by the Postmaster General. To be
sure, Executive Order 14399 was
relevant to the Postal Service’s
consideration of this subject and began
the deliberative process that is now
resulting in this rule. While the
Executive Order did not mandate a final
rule, the Postal Service has determined
that, to help achieve the goals
articulated by the Order as necessary to
faithfully execute federal law and also
to advance the Postal Service’s
operational interests, it is appropriate to
exercise its statutory authority to
promulgate these provisions.
Considerations of Postal Service
independence are not relevant to this
rulemaking.
M. 2021 Settlement With the NAACP
In a 2021 settlement with the NAACP,
the Postal Service agreed to take certain
actions regarding mail-in voting in
future federal elections, including
prioritizing monitoring and timely
delivery of election mail through 2028.
Some commenters argued that the
enactment of new mail preparation and
electronic documentation requirements,
particularly immediately, would
deprioritize the timely delivery of
election mail and, thus, violate that
settlement agreement. In doing so, some
commenters pointed to a recent
judgment by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia granting
NAACP’s motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, and enjoining the
proposed rule’s implementation. See
NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 1:20–
cv–2295 (D.D.C.).
On July 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stayed the
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district court’s injunction, concluding
that ‘‘even if adopted, that proposed
rule likely would not violate . . . the
parties’ settlement agreement.’’ NAACP
v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 26–5257 (D.C.
Cir. July 17, 2026). As the government
has explained in that litigation,
implementation of this proposed rule is
not inconsistent with the terms of the
settlement agreement: nothing in the
rule adopted herein deprioritizes the
timely delivery of election mail. To the
contrary, implementation of these
standards will, in fact, facilitate the
Postal Service’s efforts to deliver
Federal Ballot Mail in a timely manner.
Furthermore, the Postal Service will
continue to work closely with
stakeholders, and will deploy an array
of special operational procedures
(including so-called ‘‘extraordinary
measures’’) to ensure the timely delivery
of election mail, as it has done in prior
election cycles.
N. NVRA, the Help America Vote Act
and the Voting Rights Act
Some commenters argued that NVRA
(intended primarily to facilitate the
registration of voters) and the Help
America Vote Act (‘‘HAVA’’)
(establishing a funding program to
support state administration of
elections) neither grant the President
authority to identify the additional
measures outlined in Executive Order
14399, nor authorize the Postal Service
to adopt the rule as proposed.
Commenters further argued that
implementation of the proposed rule,
and in particular the refusal to accept
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail mailings
that do not comply with the acceptance
standards embodied in DMM 705.24,
would violate the Voting Rights Act. As
background, Congress enacted the
Voting Rights Act to protect citizens’
constitutional right to vote and to move
freely across state lines, providing that
no U.S. citizen shall ‘‘be denied the
right to vote’’ in federal elections
‘‘because of the failure of such citizen to
be physically present in such State or
political subdivision at the time of such
election,’’ so long as the citizen has
‘‘complied with the requirements
prescribed by the law of such State or
political subdivision’’ concerning
absentee ballots. 52 U.S.C. 10502. The
enforcement provisions of the Voting
Rights Act, id. § 10307(a), further
establish that ‘‘[n]o person acting under
color of law shall fail or refuse to permit
any person to vote who is entitled to
vote under any provision of chapters
103 to 107 of this title or is otherwise
qualified to vote[.]’’ In these
commenters’ view, the rule as proposed
would violate these statutes by adding
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a new enrollment requirement as a
necessary precondition to the delivery
of absentee ballots. Other commenters
argued that the Election Assistance
Commission (‘‘EAC’’), not the Postal
Service, is the federal entity tasked to
act as a national clearinghouse and
resource for the compilation of
information with respect to
administration of Federal elections; if
the EAC cannot impose any requirement
on any state or local unit of government,
the Postal Service cannot do so through
its proposed rule either.
As discussed above, under the rule,
states retain full control over how to
utilize the mail in their electoral
systems, including by determining who
is registered to vote and who is eligible
to receive and send a mail-in ballot. The
rule requires only that Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes meet certain mail
preparation requirements and that states
provide mailpiece-level data regarding
their Outbound and Return Federal
Ballot mailings. As such, this rule
simply regulates the use of the mail, and
does not interfere with or supplant the
schemes established under NVRA,
HAVA, or the Voting Rights Act. The
Postal Service’s rule complements,
rather than replaces, these statutory
responsibilities by supporting the
accurate distribution of ballots after
states have determined who is eligible
to receive them. Similarly, the Postal
Service is not usurping the authority
vested in the EAC. This rule concerns
the mail, not election administration;
voting systems and other election
administration tasks remain squarely
within EAC’s scope. The Postal Service
will continue (as before) to provide
change of address information to state
and local officials; and state and local
officials will continue (as before) to
maintain their official voter registration
lists. Mail-In and Absentee Participation
Lists will be based entirely on data in
the possession of, and provided by, the
states, and the Postal Service will not
change the content of those lists. In this
regard, it bears repeating that the Portal
is not in any way a federal voting
database; instead, it establishes a
mechanism whereby states can provide
data, which is fully within their
possession and control, regarding
Federal Ballot mailings.
O. The Paperwork Reduction Act
Some commenters faulted the
proposed rule for its alleged failure to
address the obligations under the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq., which requires that federal
agencies obtain approval from OMB
before imposing a new information
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collection requirement on persons,
including state governments.
The Postal Service notes that it is
outside the Paperwork Reduction Act’s
scope. See Kuzma v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
798 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1986); Shane v.
Buck, 658 F. Supp. 908, 915 (D. Utah
1985), aff’d, 817 F.2d 87 (10th Cir.
1987).
P. Administrative Procedure Act
Requirements
Some commenters took issue with the
length of the notice and comment
period, with some alleging that the time
allotted for comments was insufficient
under the APA, and others remarking
that for a rule of such scope and
consequence, a 60-day comment period
would be more fitting and appropriate.
Although the Postal Service is part of
the executive branch, it is not subject to
many of the laws and guidance that
govern the rulemaking processes used
by other executive branch entities—
including the APA (except in
proceedings concerning mailability,
which as explained above and in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
instant proceeding is not). 39 U.S.C.
410(a), 3001(m). The Postal Service also
notes that the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking prompted more than
200,000 comments covering a wide
range of topics and opinions. There is
thus no indication that the public had
inadequate time to share its views, or
that 30 additional days would have
resulted in material additional
comments. The Postal Service has
considered and taken seriously all
significant comments.
IV. Operation of the Final Rule
The proposed rule, and the final rule
on which it is based, was designed to be
flexible enough to accommodate the
variation in state election laws and
election administration practices.
However, some commenters interpreted
this flexibility as vague, expressing
frustration about the lack of concrete
compliance steps or confusion over the
responsibilities of Authorized Ballot
Mailers and Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users. Commenters also misconstrued
the proposed rule’s provisions as
covering the most expansive scope of
ballot mail possible while also operating
in the most restrictive manner possible.
This led to a substantial volume of
comments that were premised on
inaccurate factual assumptions, with the
underlying basis for the expressed
opposition being based, either in full or
in part, on these inaccurate
assumptions. These inaccuracies led to
many exaggerated claims about the
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impact of the proposed rule as well as
the Postal Service’s role under the rule.
The Postal Service does not expressly
recount each inaccuracy here, in an
effort to avoid further confusion.
Instead, to respond to the multitude of
factual misunderstandings represented
in the comments, and in an effort to
supply additional details, the Postal
Service offers the following explanation
of how the final rule is intended to be
implemented.
A. Overview
To begin, the Postal Service is
continuing to accept and deliver ballot
mail, including Federal Ballot Mail,
from election officials and voters. The
proposed rule does not end or prevent
mail-in or absentee voting, contrary to
the mistaken claims raised in
comments. As explained above, the
Postal Service is continuing to carry out
its core statutory mission in a uniform,
neutral, and nondiscriminatory manner.
Nothing in this rule need prevent that
outcome, as states will retain full
control over who is (or is not) permitted
to vote by mail in their jurisdiction.
The rule introduces new mailpiece
preparation requirements and data
reporting standards for Federal Ballot
Mail that must be satisfied prior to
presenting Outbound Federal Ballot
Mail for acceptance into the mailstream.
Thus, the final rule regulates Federal
Ballot Mail, consistent with the Postal
Service’s core statutory function, not the
franchise. Eligibility for mail-in and
absentee voting will continue to be
governed by state law; state and local
election officials will still determine
which individuals are eligible under
these laws; and state and local election
officials will determine whether
completed ballots are eligible to be
counted. To repeat, the Postal Service
will not play any role in determining
voter eligibility, maintaining voter rolls,
or counting ballots. The Postal Service
will not open ballot mail, including
Federal Ballot Mail; will not know the
contents of a ballot; will not know how
an individual voted; and will not know
an individual’s political party
affiliation.
However, as many commenters
acknowledged, and consistent with the
stated authority above, the Postal
Service will generally not accept
Outbound Federal Ballot mailings
unless compliance with the rule’s new
standards has been verified, as further
detailed below and in the final rule.
B. Optional 90-Day Pre-Mailing Notice
Section 705.24.2 of the rule creates an
optional process through which a state’s
chief election official (including those
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representing DC and U.S. territories)
may alert the Postal Service of the
state’s intent to allow mail-in or
absentee ballots to be transmitted by the
Postal Service. This notice may be given
90 days prior to a federal election. This
provision does not require a response
from the state official, and also does not
require preparation of a list of
individuals to whom a ballot will be
mailed or coordination with local
officials (although the state official may
choose to do so).
Some commenters misunderstood the
purpose of this optional notice. For
instance, one comment from a former
election official stated that the Postal
Service is already well aware of whether
a state intends to use its services. The
purpose of this provision, however, is to
facilitate pre-election planning, as some
commenters accurately recognized.
When the Postal Service knows that a
state plans to send ballots for a federal
election using the mail, it can conduct
outreach on mail preparation, provide
resources related to IMbs, and offer
guidance on how to access and use the
Federal Ballot Mail Portal. While the
process to enroll in the Portal is
straightforward, beginning this process
sooner—as the 90-day notice would
allow—will be logistically beneficial.
Alternatively, the chief state election
official can provide no notice at all. This
does not preclude the state from using
the Postal Service to transmit mail-in
and absentee ballots for federal
elections. Ballots for federal elections
may still be sent through the mail so
long as the chief state election official,
and any other Federal Ballot Mail Portal
User, creates a Portal account, satisfies
the rule’s mail preparation
requirements, enters the required
information into the Portal, and
successfully completes verification prior
to their Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
being accepting for mailing.
The chief state election official may
also provide notice that they do not
intend to transmit ballots using the mail
or that they do not intend to use the
Portal. This also provides the Postal
Service with valuable information to
plan its resources and may inform
internal training.
It should also be emphasized that
these notices are not binding. For
example, if the chief state election
official initially informs the Postal
Service that they do not intend to use
the Portal, they may later change their
mind and send ballots using the mail by
following the steps outlined above.
C. Envelope Design
The rule makes several of the Postal
Service’s longstanding mailpiece design
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preparation recommendations required
elements for Federal Ballot Mail. As
many commenters recognized, these
elements—the Official Election Mail
logo, automation-compatible envelope
design, uniquely serialized IMbs on
outbound and return envelopes, and
mailpiece design review—are not novel.
Each of these design elements is already
recommended in the Postal Service’s
Official Election Mail Guide (‘‘Kit 600’’)
and included as a best practice in DMM
703.8.0. Some jurisdictions have, on
their own initiative, already opted to
implement these recommendations to
varying degrees. However, nothing in
the rule prevents or discourages election
officials from including envelope design
elements required by state law, such as
printed affidavits. Nor does anything in
the rule prevent states from complying
with accessibility laws or including
unique envelope design elements
intended to accommodate voters
covered by these laws. The rule will not
create a single, uniform ballot envelope
design across all states; variation will
remain. Rather, as one commenter
explained, what the rule adds is
uniformity: it makes these proven
measures a consistent baseline for every
jurisdiction that mails federal ballots,
closing the patchwork that today
inhibits mailpiece visibility and can
make it more difficult to process and
deliver ballot mail.
The rule’s design requirements help
to ensure timely processing and delivery
of Federal Ballot Mail. As explained in
the proposed rule and as echoed by
many commenters, envelopes built for
automation move through processing
with less manual intervention and fewer
chances for error. A consistent,
recognizable election mail logo helps
postal employees distinguish ballot mail
from other mailpieces and facilitates
proper handling, in accordance with
existing Postal Service policy. And
unique IMb data helps facilitate the
tracking of individual pieces of Federal
Ballot Mail to and from individual
voters as the barcodes are scanned on
the Postal Service’s mail processing
equipment.
Some commenters, including election
officials and election-related
organizations, appeared confused about
how to generate IMbs. Unique IMbs can
be generated for any type of address,
including P.O. Boxes and nontraditional
addresses. Generating and printing
unique IMbs does not require
specialized equipment or expensive
software. It can be done by election
officials of any level of technical
sophistication, including those
jurisdictions that manually print and
stuff their own ballot envelopes, using
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free tools and common office
equipment.
The Postal Service offers a number of
tools and resources to make generating
unique IMbs simple, quick, and costeffective. For example, the Postal
Service’s Intelligent Mail for Small
Business Tool (‘‘IMsb Tool’’) is a free
(voluntary) online tool specifically
designed for small-volume mailers that
do not use Business Reply Mail,
allowing such mailers to generate
unique IMbs for printing on address
labels or envelopes. The IMsb Tool is a
web-based program that does not
require any software or downloads. It
allows small mailers to create mailings
and documentation without making the
investment of engaging software
providers. Customers can upload their
mailing list into the Tool to create and
print address labels, envelopes, inserts
or card stock and also generate the
associated postage statements. The
printing can be done from a regular
printer. Some in the election
community have printed the IMbs
themselves using this tool for several
years. More information about getting
started in the IMsb Tool is available on
PostalPro: https://postalpro.usps.com/
node/2266.
The Postal Service also anticipates
making modifications to the IMsb Tool
to further enhance its functionality for
Federal Ballot Mail. For instance, the
Tool will be able to create lists for Portal
submissions that contain a file with the
name, address, and unique outbound
and return IMb of individuals on the
election official’s mailing list. This file
can be uploaded directly to the Portal by
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users.
Another change for Federal Ballot Mail
in the IMsb Tool will allow election
officials to generate a unique IMb even
where the address cannot be verified
using Delivery Point Verification
(‘‘DPV’’). Although DPV helps to
identify issues that may hinder delivery,
this modification will reduce the chance
of an administrative or technical issue
that could prevent an election official
from generating a unique IMb.
Alternatively, if an election official
prefers to work with a vendor, as many
do, the Postal Service provides a list of
certified vendors and Mail Service
Providers (‘‘MSPs’’) at https://
postalpro.usps.com/certifiedmsps/. It is
a basic function of MSPs to print
mailings with unique IMbs. To the
extent they arise, printing issues,
including jams, are surmountable and
do not prevent proper implementation
of the rule.
The Postal Service’s Managers of
Customer Relations (‘‘MCRs’’) are also
available to provide guidance and
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support on mailpiece design as election
officials work to comply with the rule.
MCRs serve as dedicated points of
contact for each election jurisdiction,
including territories. They regularly
educate election officials on the benefits
of using unique IMbs and can direct
election officials to available postal
resources to help them get started.
Election officials can contact their local
MCR directly or by following this link:
https://electionmail.usps.com/s/contactlocal-mcr. Election Officials can also
contact the Mailing & Shipping
Solutions Center (‘‘MSSC’’) for support
regarding IMbs by email at MSSC@
usps.gov or by phone at 1–877–672–
0007 (Monday–Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m. CT).
D. Mailpiece Design Analyst Review
Once election officials or their
vendors have designed the Outbound
and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope
to include the required elements, as set
forth in DMM 705.24.3, the mailpiece
must be submitted to the Postal Service
for review by one of its MDAs. The
envelope design must be reviewed each
election cycle. If a state uses a single
design, each political subdivision
thereof does not need to separately
submit the envelope for review.
Mailpieces do not need to be reviewed
prior to each separate mailing.
The mailpiece design review
referenced in 705.24.3 is the existing
MDA review process that many in the
election community already utilize.
MDAs are specially trained postal
employees who can answer questions
about mailpiece design, including IMbs
and automation compatibility.
Consulting with Postal Service MDAs
will help ensure election officials have
a well-designed Federal Ballot Mail
envelope that is compatible with Postal
Service guidelines and regulations,
including the provisions of this rule.
Although MDAs are already trained to
assess the design elements included in
this rule, the Postal Service will provide
supplemental training to MDAs on
Federal Ballot Mail and will offer
additional resources as necessary to
ensure customers receive consistent,
accurate advice.
The rule does not change the process
for submitting a mailpiece for review,
receiving feedback, or contesting an
MDA’s advice. Customers can receive
assistance from an MDA by submitting
a design review request to MDA@
usps.gov, through the Postal Service’s
Election Mail website at https://
electionmail.usps.com/s/election-mailreview, or by calling 877–672–0007
(select option 3 for mailpiece design)
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(Monday–Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.
CT).
MDA review is generally a quick
process. MDAs typically aim to provide
feedback to mailers within 2 business
days after receiving the mailer’s request
and necessary information and samples.
More information about the MDA
review process is available in Kit 600 or
at https://postalpro.usps.com/node/773.
E. Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Under 705.24.4, Federal Ballot Mail
Portal Users, including state and local
election officials and other authorized
users, such as MSPs, must submit
certain data into the Federal Ballot Mail
Portal prior to presenting an Outbound
Federal Ballot mailing for acceptance.
Chief state election officials are not
required to enter this data themselves or
to consolidate data for all political
subdivisions within their state before
data can be entered into the Portal. The
chief state election official of each state
does, however, authorize access for
other Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users
within their state. The rule also allows
other individuals to enter information
into the Portal if authorized, such as
staff members, MSPs, or other vendors,
thereby minimizing any potential
administrative burden on election
officials.
The Postal Service recognizes that
many states have decentralized election
administration. It is important that the
state, through the chief state election
official, maintain ultimate control over
access to the Portal because they will
have more visibility into their own
election structures than will the Postal
Service.
Voters themselves will not enroll with
the Postal Service, and are not
responsible for verifying Portal
information or correcting information
provided by Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users. In part, this is because voters do
not design ballot mail envelopes and,
consequently, do not have the relevant
data elements for the Portal. Instead,
that responsibility lies exclusively with
election officials and their authorized
MSPs.
Once Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users
have set up a Portal account, they will
be prompted to certify that their
Outbound and Return Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes have been submitted for
MDA review and that they have
received feedback. Federal Ballot Mail
Portal Users will not be able to upload
any data into the Portal until the
certification is complete. This will
ensure compliance with DMM
705.24.3.1 and 705.24.3.2 and reduces
the information that is verified prior to
acceptance of an Outbound Federal
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Ballot mailing. Business Mail Entry Unit
(‘‘BMEU’’) technicians and Retail clerks
will not perform a separate review of
this information.
After completing the certification,
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users must
provide: the name and address of the
voter as found on Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail envelope; the issuing state;
and the IMbs on the Outbound and
Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes.
This information must be uploaded to
the Portal prior to presenting Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail for acceptance.
These data help to ensure that the rule’s
preparation standards have been
satisfied, can provide valuable insight to
election officials and law enforcement,
and facilitate the verification process.
This type of information is regularly
collected by the Postal Service,
including on mailing manifests. No
other voter information, such as
birthdate, social security number, or
other voter registration details, will be
uploaded to the Portal. As described
further below, the Postal Service is
developing this Portal with appropriate
cybersecurity and privacy safeguards to
protect Portal data, consistent with
applicable law.
The required information can be
uploaded into the Portal using an Excel
template specifically formatted for
Portal submission. Uploading and
generating the necessary information is
similar to submitting a manifest for bulk
mailings, which larger election offices
and their MSPs routinely complete. For
smaller jurisdictions, the (free and
optional) IMsb Tool can be used to
generate a file that can be uploaded
directly into the Portal. This will help
minimize any data entry burden. The
Postal Service does not anticipate that
providing Portal data should require any
change to statewide systems or
databases. States must necessarily
already maintain lists or databases with
the relevant name and address
information, otherwise it would never
have been possible to mail those ballots
in the first place. These systems are
intended to remain separate, and do not
need to be interconnected with the
Portal. One commenter mentioned that
states may wish to update their
databases to include IMb data. States are
free to undertake such actions, but it is
not required by the rule.
Under the proposed rule, there is a
flexible timeline for uploading data into
the Portal. Initial mailing lists should be
entered into the Portal at least 30 days
before the election, if possible, or by the
date on which ballots must begin being
mailed under state law. This 30-day
timeline, retained without modification
in the final rule, is not a rigid deadline
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for completing Portal data entry.
Although Executive Order 14399
contemplated a proposal in which states
would submit such lists ‘‘no fewer than
60 days before the election,’’ the flexible
30-day timeline accommodates
variations in state law.
The Postal Service does not expect
these initial lists to be complete or final.
States may continue to add, amend, or
remove data from the Portal to account
for new voters, new mail-in or absentee
ballot requests, replacement ballots,
addressing administrative errors, and
other changes consistent with their
state’s law. These changes can be made
as a new separate entry or by updating
prior entries. This flexibility is intended
to facilitate—not constrain—voters’
ability to access mail-in or absentee
voting as permitted by their own state’s
voting law, none of which are altered by
this rule.
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users can
update the information submitted
through the Portal as frequently as
needed, consistent with state law. This
process is designed to be flexible to
account for variation in state law. For
example, as one commenter explained,
California Elections Code Section
3000.5(a) dictates when county election
officials are to mail ballots to registered
voters. Section 3005.5(a) provides, in
part: ‘‘for each election, the elections
official shall, no later than 29 days
before the day of the election, begin
mailing the materials specified in
Section 3010 to every registered voter.
The elections official shall have five
days to mail a ballot to each person who
is registered to vote on the 29th day
before the day of the election and five
days to mail a ballot to each person who
is subsequently registered to vote.’’
Under California law, a voter may also
register as late as 15 days before an
election and will subsequently be sent
a ballot via mail. Even after the 15th day
before an election, voters may request a
replacement mail ballot upon request to
their county election official. This state
statutory scheme is consistent with the
rule. California election officials could
submit initial mailing lists into the
Portal 30 days (or sooner) before the
election and present Outbound Federal
Mailings for acceptance ‘‘no later than
29 days before the day of the election,’’
consistent with state law. California
election officials may continue to add
Portal entries for Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail destined for voters who
register after that time and until the 15th
day before the election, and even after
the 15th day before the election may
continue to make supplemental entries
for any replacement requests.
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The ability to add and amend lists
also allows Authorized Ballot Mailers to
enter Outbound Federal Ballot Mail in
batches, consistent with the current
practice for many in the election
community. Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users may continue to supplement the
Portal data as permitted by state law,
potentially up until Election Day. The
only constraint imposed by the rule in
this regard is that the information for a
particular mailing must be uploaded
into the Portal prior to the Outbound
Federal Ballot mailing being presented
to the Postal Service for acceptance.
Thus, the Portal and verification process
accommodate election officials who (for
example) may do one large mailing and
multiple smaller mailings. It also
accommodates election officials who
prepare many ballots for mailing at once
but enter them into the mailstream in
multiple installments.
Portal data will be updated as soon as
it is submitted by the Federal Ballot
Mail Portal User, and there should be
minimal to no delay between Portal
upload and a mailer’s ability to present
the mailing for acceptance. Portal data
will also be available for verification
purposes on a nationwide basis. If an
Outbound Federal Ballot mailing is
presented for acceptance outside of the
issuing state, Postal Service employees
would still have access to the necessary
Portal data to perform verification under
DMM 705.24.5.
Within the Portal, the Postal Service
plans to confirm that the required data
fields are completed (i.e., they may not
be left blank) prior to Outbound Federal
Ballot mailings being presented for
acceptance. This includes verifying the
unique IMb on Return Federal Ballot
Mail has been uploaded into the Portal.
Aside from confirming that the required
data has been uploaded, however, the
Postal Service will not otherwise verify,
correct, or amend any data entered into
the Portal. It will not determine whether
an individual’s name is accurate; so, for
example, married women changing their
names or potential mismatches for
misspellings will not prevent a ballot
from reaching a voter under the rule.
Likewise, the Postal Service will not
assess the accuracy of the address
entered, such as to determine whether
there is a Change of Address or whether
the address is otherwise invalid.
Moreover, the address uploaded into the
Portal should be the address used on the
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope.
Nontraditional addresses, such as tribal
addresses, college dormitories, and
long-term care facilities, can and should
be entered into the Portal if that is the
address on the Outbound Federal Ballot
envelope. Voters who may move often,
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like students, the homeless, the elderly,
renters, or people whose mailing
addresses do not match identically with
government records, should not
experience delivery issues under the
rule so long as their state or local
election official has their current
mailing address.
The Postal Service will not be
comparing any data entered into the
Portal against state voter rolls as part of
the verification process or otherwise.
This means that state election officials
will maintain full control over managing
their own voter rolls and determining
voter eligibility without any interference
or involvement from the Postal Service.
All data or changes submitted by
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be
accepted. The possibility that the Portal
may, therefore, be overinclusive does
not undermine the purposes of the rule
as the State Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List, which compiles all
Portal data for a state and is not
intended to serve as a replacement for
official voter rolls.
Finally, shortly after the effective date
of the final rule, the Postal Service will
make additional guidance documents
available, including a User Guide for the
Portal and Technical Specifications for
the Portal. These resources will explain
how to create a Portal account, how to
assign and approve Federal Ballot Mail
Portal Users, the file format for Portal
uploads, and how to resolve errors and
make new submissions; these
documents will be available in
accessible formats. The Postal Service
has an established process for
communicating new or updated
technical requirements that it will
deploy to inform election officials,
MSPs, and others in the mailing
community about the Portal and these
resources. This process includes
familiar communications channels,
including Industry Alerts and Mailers
Technical Advisory Committee User
Group notifications, which help to
ensure that the information reaches the
appropriate audience. MCRs are also
available to assist individual customers
by email and phone. The Postal Service
will also directly engage with election
officials, MSPs, and other stakeholders
to answer questions and provide
guidance related to implementation of
the rule.
F. Outbound Federal Ballot Mail Entry
When preparing Outbound Federal
Ballot mailings, Authorized Ballot
Mailers must segregate Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail from other types of
ballot mail, such as primary ballots,
UOCAVA ballots, or ballots for state or
local elections only. Comingling non-
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federal ballot mail with Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail may impact the
verification process and could prevent
or delay proper acceptance of mailings.
For ballots that have both federal and
state issues on the ballot, the mailing
will be treated as Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail and will be subject to the
rule. At entry, mailers should inform the
BMEU technician or Retail clerk if a
ballot mailing contains non-federal
ballots. Timing differences (between
primaries and general elections or
between federal and state elections) and
external indicia may also help alert
postal employees to the presence of
non-Federal Ballot Mail.
The Postal Service is also working on
establishing Federal Election Mail and
Non-Federal Election Mail Service Type
Identifiers (‘‘STIDs’’). Specifically, the
Postal Service is planning to convert the
current Election Mail STIDs to Federal
Election Mail STIDs. New STIDs will be
developed for non-Federal elections.
This approach will assist jurisdictions
that may have already finalized the
printing process for their 2026 general
election envelopes relying on the
existing STID table, and will support
their ability to comply with the final
rule. Having unique STIDs for Federal
and non-Federal elections will help to
further distinguish Federal Ballot Mail
from other ballot mail. Prior to
finalizing and releasing the new STIDs,
the Postal Service will publish a notice
in the Federal Register.
As stated in the proposed rule,
Outbound Federal Ballot mailings must
be entered at a Post Office retail counter,
including manual post offices, or a
BMEU. A locator tool for Postal Service
locations is available here: https://
tools.usps.com/locations/. These
mailings may not be entered into blue
collection boxes, collection boxes in
retail lobbies, or through other means.
While the rule makes this restriction
mandatory, it is also consistent with the
Postal Service’s general guidance for
outbound ballot mailings. Commercial
mailings must meet applicable DMM
requirements. Mailings paid at singlepiece First Class Mail rates are not
required to meet commercial mailing
standards.
Verification under 705.24.5 will be
performed at a BMEU or Post Office
retail counter when an Outbound
Federal Ballot mailing is presented for
acceptance. Conducting verification
prior to acceptance is intended to
obviate confusion and provide a clear,
immediate identification of potential
issues. Either a BMEU technician, if the
mailing is presented at a BMEU, or
Retail clerk, if the mailing is presented
at a Post Office or other Postal Service
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retail location, will perform the
verification. Both BMEU technicians
and Retail clerks will receive training on
this process.
The verification process is
straightforward. The Outbound Federal
Ballot mailings will be verified using
the IMb on the outside of the Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Relying
on existing scanning technology and
devices, the Postal Service will confirm
the presence of scanned barcodes in the
Federal Ballot Mail Portal. Portal data
will be available for verification
purposes on a nationwide basis.
Therefore, if a state uses an MSP located
in a state different than the issuing state
of the ballot, the Postal Service will still
be able to conduct verification.
This process can be completed
promptly. Scanning a barcode generally
takes less than a minute per mailpiece.
Depending on how many barcodes are
scanned, the verification process should
take no more than a few hours for larger
mailings, and potentially only a few
minutes for smaller mailings.
Authorized Ballot Mailers should
remain at the BMEU or postal retail
location during the verification process.
If the Outbound Federal Ballot
mailing meets the verification
standards, it will be accepted by the
Postal Service. No further action is
needed by election officials or voters
under the rule.
Authorized Ballot Mailers will be
informed of the escalation procedures
should they decide to challenge a
rejection; relevant Postal Service
employees will also receive training
about these procedures. The ability to
cure rests not with the voter, as the
franchise itself is not impacted, but with
the officials responsible for preparing
the envelope and entering Portal data.
This approach is consistent with how
election mail works now, where election
officials and mailers are responsible for
preparing the ballot mail, addressing the
mailpieces properly, ensuring that they
are going to the proper individual, and
correcting any error that may occur or
prevent delivery to the intended
recipient. Thus, the Postal Service will
continue to resolve issues consistent
with our current approach, rather than
creating a new ‘‘appeal’’ process for
voters, as many commenters urged, that
would impose a direct burden on voters
and increase the risk of confusion and
concern.
Once Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is
accepted by the Postal Service, it will
enter and move through the mailstream
as it has in prior elections. It will not
be intercepted, returned, or delayed due
to the rule.
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The verification process does not
entail scrutiny into, or any attempt to
evaluate, individual voters. The Postal
Service is not verifying addresses,
names, voter eligibility, or citizenship
status as part of this verification
process. As noted above, Portal data will
be regularly refreshed to minimize the
risk that the verification process
incorrectly flags, delays, or disrupts
lawful federal ballot materials.
Verification under DMM 705.24.5 is
done only for Outbound Federal Ballot
mailings. If a voter chooses to return
their completed ballot by mail, they
should use the Federal Return Ballot
Mail envelope provided by their state;
and they may continue to mail from a
residential mailbox, a blue collection
box, or any retail counter. Once the
Federal Return Ballot Mail enters the
mailstream, it will be processed and
delivered consistently with current
operational practices. This includes
generating scan data from the unique
IMb on the outer return envelope when
the mailpiece is processed on the Postal
Service’s automated equipment subject
to certain limitations, including
extraordinary measures that may
remove ballots from normal operational
processes to expedite delivery.
The Postal Service also wishes to
clarify two provisions of the proposed
rule, which are adopted without change
in the final rule. First, the Postal Service
would like to clarify the meaning of
Section 705.24.5.2, which provides in
part that ‘‘[t]he Postal Service’s
acceptance of Outbound Federal Ballot
Mail does not constitute verified
compliance.’’ This provision was
included in recognition of the fact that,
despite the Postal Service’s best efforts,
some Outbound Federal Mail may enter
the mailstream that does not meet the
preparation or data standards set forth
in the rule. For that reason, DMM
705.24.5.2 is intended to acknowledge
that acceptance (and ultimately
delivery) of an outbound federal ballot
does not, in and of itself, evidence
compliance with the rule’s provisions.
Second, commenters expressed
concern over 705.24.5.3.d, which states
that ‘‘[t]he Postal Service assumes no
responsibility for any outbound ballot
mailing presented until it is accepted
into the mail. The Postal Service is not
responsible for service delays when the
Ballot Portal User or Authorized Ballot
Mailer does not meet the applicable
preparation or entry standards.’’ The
Postal Service notes that comparable
statements appear throughout the DMM,
and that the provision reflects the
longstanding principle that the Postal
Service is not responsible for a mailing
until the mailing is in its custody—that
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is, until it has been accepted. For
example, DMM 608.11.3 (Postmarks and
Postal Possession) describes the point at
which the ‘‘Postal Service accept[s]
custody of a mailpiece,’’ and the PlantVerified Drop Shipment provisions of
DMM 705 provide that such shipments
‘‘are freight until deposited and
accepted as mail at the destination
facility.’’ The specific language in
705.24.5.3.d is similar to a provision
discussing the effects on service for
Metered Mail Drop Shipments, which
also must satisfy specific preparation
conditions to be accepted for mailing.
DMM 705.19.1. That provision states:
‘‘The USPS assumes no responsibility
for the material presented until it is
accepted into the mail. The USPS is not
responsible for service delays when the
mailer does not meet the applicable
preparation or entry requirements.’’
This language is included in the rule to
ensure that mailers know that they must
remain in control of an Outbound
Federal Ballot mailing until it has been
accepted by the Postal Service.
G. State-Specific Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List
On or about Election Day, the Postal
Service will generate a state-specific
Mail-In and Absentee Participation List,
which compiles all Federal Ballot Mail
Portal entries submitted for the
originating state. This list will be
securely transmitted to the chief
election official of each state. The Postal
Service will not disclose the Lists to the
public. The List is in effect a manifest,
and is primarily intended to assist
election officials and law enforcement
to understand who may have been
mailed a ballot, in order to identify
potentially anomalous incidents that
may merit further investigation.
Providing the list on or after Election
Day is consistent with this purpose.
To be clear, the state-specific Lists are
not intended to substitute for or
supplant state voter rolls. It simply
offers another data point at the chief
state election official’s disposal based
on their own Portal data. The chief state
election official is free to choose
whether and how to use the statespecific list. Those decisions are not
dictated by the Postal Service or this
rule. States have sole responsibility for
ensuring the accuracy of their voter rolls
and counting ballots as permitted under
state law.
The Portal data is the sole data source
used to generate the Lists. These data
are provided directly by election
officials (and other Federal Ballot Mail
Portal Users) based on the mailings they
actually made or planned to make. The
List will not be based on external
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sources of information, such as federal
databases made available by the
Department of Homeland Security or the
Social Security Administration. Nor will
the Postal Service compare Portal data
to any other internal or external source
(e.g., National Change of Address data,
federal data lists), filter the information,
or otherwise alter the Portal data on its
own when compiling the state-specific
List. The Lists will also not contain any
scan data. As one commenter correctly
stated, the rule ‘‘require[s] USPS to
provide the state with the List that
contained the same information that the
state provided to USPS.’’
In light of the above, some
commenters questioned the purpose of
the Lists. Other commenters recognized
that the value of the List lies in the
creation of reconcilable data that offer a
neutral administrative check that
strengthens confidence in elections.
These commenters argued that credible
post-election audits can rise or fall on
the quality of the underlying data. The
state-specific List would meaningfully
sharpen that data by providing
significantly enhanced visibility
regarding the sending of mail-in ballots,
as it will provide federal law
enforcement with a list of individuals to
whom states planned to mail a ballot
(and who may potentially use the mail
to vote), along with the associated
barcode data, which the Postal Service
understands will help to facilitate
enforcement of federal law. Currently,
law enforcement lacks such information
regarding the use of the mail. The List
is not intended to substitute for official
election records or state mandated
reconciliation procedures. In assessing
the List for areas of potential further
investigation, it should also be noted
that some variation may exist between
the List and the (separate) scan data for
a variety of reasons, for example not all
voters who receive a mail-in ballot will
return it by mail, and as noted above the
Portal data may be over-inclusive. The
benefits of the rule are still achieved
notwithstanding these variations.
V. Impact of the Final Rule
Consistent with the operation of the
rule set forth above, the Postal Service
also clarifies the impact of the rule on
voters and election officials, particularly
as weighed against the rule’s purpose
and benefits. As provided by the
comments, this section discusses
commenters’ claims regarding the
benefits and burdens of the rule, and
how the Postal Service is striking an
appropriate balance in the final rule.
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A. Benefits of the Rule
Those commenters who supported the
rule believed that the benefits to the rule
are aligned with the rule’s intended
purpose and that the rule’s policy goals
are properly weighed against the
potential burdens, harms, and costs.
They urged the Postal Service to swiftly
adopt the proposed rule, so that all
federal elections could benefit from its
stated improvements, including
mailpiece visibility and the enforcement
of federal law.
As an initial matter, these comments
acknowledged that mail ballots play an
important role for many voters, but also
had concerns related to voter fraud.
These commenters noted that even the
possibility that elections are taking
place in an unsecure manner due to lack
of necessary visibility can undermine
public confidence in the electoral
process, even if no fraud is ultimately
discovered. These commenters asserted
that given the prevalence of mail-in
voting, it would be both appropriate and
beneficial for the government entity
tasked with delivering ballots to and
from the voter and the election office to
put safeguards in place. Many of these
commenters argued that by making the
mailstream more reliable and more
transparent on a nationwide basis, the
rule would provide states with a means
to combat potential voter fraud in ways
they could not do acting alone.
Commenters note that this would
strengthen public confidence in the
election system without altering any
state election laws, voter registration, or
eligibility requirements; or changing
how ballots are issued, collected, or
counted. As one comment explained:
public confidence in elections is best
sustained by procedures that can be
verified, documented, and consistently
applied.
Moreover, these commenters
recognized that the rule offers efficiency
and security benefits for voters and
election officials, and promotes secure
elections that the public can be
confident in. Commenters note that a set
of minimum envelope-design standards
would help election officials, the Postal
Service, and the public better account
for Federal Ballot Mail moving through
the mailstream. As several commenters
explained, a ballot that can be tracked
is far harder to misplace, stall, or
counterfeit. Improved tracking may also
help identify discrepancies between
ballots mailed and ballots received,
some commenters added, making it
easier to detect and deter potential fraud
or irregularities while protecting the
integrity of mail-in voting. Even parties
opposing the rule recognized that
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unique IMbs can provide unmatched
visibility into the mailpiece’s progress
in the mailstream. Commenters also
reiterated the importance of the Official
Election Mail logo as a means for voters
to recognize election mail as important
and distinct from other mailings and to
help Postal Service employees identify
official election mail among the millions
of mailpieces processed daily.
Commenters further explained that
advance review of ballot envelope
designs would reduce operational
errors, delays, and delivery issues that
have sometimes affected voters and
delayed delivery of their ballots. As
examples, commenters pointed out that
non-automation compatible ballot mail
is more likely to encounter avoidable
processing complications or delays, and
other mailpiece design defects could
prevent barcodes from being read or
increase the need for manual handling.
Commenters concluded that requiring
design review before ballot envelopes
are printed and mailed is a low-cost,
high-value step that can prevent serious
problems during the compressed period
before an election.
Furthermore, these commenters state
that the rule’s other preparation and
data entry requirements, particularly
those involving the Portal, would
support stronger coordination between
state election officials and the Postal
Service. For example, the rule would
improve pre-election planning by
allowing states to notify the Postal
Service before using the postal system
for ballot delivery. States would still
retain full control over who receives a
ballot, and the Postal Service would
have better information to plan
resources. Many election officials who
submitted comments, including those
who opposed the rule, expressed
appreciation for the Postal Service’s
ongoing efforts to support election
officials. The rule, some commenters
noted, provides another avenue to
strengthen those relationships. Many
commenters concluded that by
improving coordination between
election officials and the Postal Service,
the proposed rule has the potential to
reduce undeliverable election mail,
strengthen ballot accountability, and
reinforce public confidence that election
mail is being sent to the correct
recipients.
These commenters further contend
that applying reasonable verification
procedures to federal election ballots is
consistent with the Postal Service’s
longstanding mission of delivering mail
accurately, securely, and reliably.
Commenters noted that verification, as
contemplated in the rule, does not alter
the states’ authority to determine voter
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eligibility or administer elections.
Rather, it provides an additional
administrative safeguard to help ensure
that ballots approved by election
officials are delivered accurately to the
intended recipient. Commenters
opposing and supporting the rule noted
the extensive efforts election officials
undertake to maintain accurate voter
rolls. Those in favor of the proposed
rule argue that rather than duplicating,
undermining, or usurping these efforts,
the rule strengthens ballot distribution
procedures as a logical complement to
states’ election administration
responsibilities.
Ultimately, these commenters
reasoned that while the rule would
place some administrative burdens on
states, as they take advantage of the new
Portal registration, barcode generation,
and list submission provisions, these
burdens are plainly justified by the
rule’s security and accountability
benefits. Overall, in their view, the
rule’s standards would improve
accountability without displacing the
role of states in deciding who is eligible
to vote or how elections are
administered. The operational
improvements that the rule mandates
would benefit voters of every political
affiliation because they promote
accuracy, efficiency, and transparency
in the administration of federal
elections. These commenters explained
that public confidence in elections is
strengthened when every stage of ballot
distribution is transparent. They also
opined that the rule would help
facilitate the appropriate direction of
resources to law enforcement efforts.
B. Burdens and Costs of the Rule
Separate from arguments, discussed
above, about the legal authority for the
rule, numerous commenters opposing
the rule also criticized it for purportedly
failing to account for the potential
burdens and other alleged harms it
would impose on voters and election
officials, not addressing associated
reliance interests, and not adequately
demonstrating a connection between the
proposed rule’s provisions and its stated
goal. These commenters asserted that a
rule of this nature should be based on
detailed study, should be gradually
rolled out, and should move forward
only after election officials and the
Postal Service are fully prepared for
implementation. In particular, these
commenters argued that a rule of this
nature should not be issued roughly
three months before an election. These
commenters contended that the Postal
Service should not finalize this rule
without a reasoned explanation, a full
implementation analysis, and an
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assessment of foreseeable civil rights
impacts. Commenters strongly urged the
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Voters
Those opposed to the rule expressed
concern about the possibility of
disenfranchisement. They contended
that voters may be omitted from the
Portal with no recourse, that an
administrative or technical error may
result in an otherwise lawful ballot
being rejected by the Postal Service, or
that voters may not receive a ballot at
all if their state government chooses not
to provide data in the Portal. Any of
these scenarios, commenters argued,
could result in voters having their mailin or absentee ballots withheld or
delayed, without any recourse or viable
alternative to cast a ballot. Commenters
asserted that some voters may be
especially impacted should their ability
to vote by mail be altered in any way,
including those who are disabled, are
elderly, have limited English
proficiency, live in rural-dwelling, or
are financially distressed. According to
commenters, voters would bear the
practical consequence of any delivery
delay, even if the delay was caused by
an administrative process outside the
voter’s control. Commenters asserted
that the rule would discourage
individuals from voting by mail. Other
commenters argued that any policy that
could result in the delay, rejection,
segregation, or differential treatment of
mail ballots raises concerns regarding
voter access, election administration,
and public confidence in the democratic
process.
Commenters also discussed the risks
of confusion that the rule would
purportedly create, particularly because
voters may not know if their state has
complied with or will be able to comply
with the rule. These commenters
claimed that the potential for voter
confusion due to the rule is a harm in
and of itself.
Others expressed concerns for their
privacy and did not want voter
information included in a Portal run by
the federal government or their identity
linked to uniquely serialized IMbs on
Outbound and Return Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes.
Election Officials
Among the most frequently raised
concerns from commenters opposing the
rule was the purported burden imposed
on election officials, specifically if the
rule were implemented immediately.
Commenters, particularly election
officials, secretaries of state,
governmental officials, and voting
organizations, stated that it would be
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difficult if not impossible to implement
the rule in time for the 2026 general
election. Election officials asserted that
their preparations for the 2026 election
are already underway and that they lack
the time, funding, and staff to
implement the proposed rule. Some
commenters asserted that they have
already purchased envelopes for the
2026 election cycle, and that generating
unique barcodes for both outbound and
return ballot mailings in some cases
would require significant changes to
their ballot envelope design, as well as
procurement of those redesigned
envelopes on an expedited timeline,
which they assert would not be
possible. Other commenters explained
that in some cases, legislative action,
Attorney General guidance, or state
board approval are needed before such
changes could be made. Some
commenters posited that smaller and
more rural counties with limited
technology would be disproportionately
affected, while others thought
complying with the rule would be more
onerous for election officials in states
that have universal mail-in voting
compared to states that do not mail
absentee ballots unless requested by the
voter.
Commenters also argued that the rule
would impose new and recurring costs
and administrative burdens for future
elections cycles that do not currently
exist. In this regard, commenters note
that election systems are designed
around state law, existing technology
systems, vendor contracts, staffing
structures, election calendars, and
operational procedures that have been
developed over time, and introducing
new reporting, certification, and
verification processes for Federal Ballot
Mail would, in their view, require
significant modifications to existing
workflows and systems. Having
previously relied on current procedures
in structuring their budgets, staffing,
and election timelines, commenters note
that states would have to absorb any
new costs, which those plans never
contemplated.
Complying with the mail preparation
and data-reporting standards,
commenters asserted, would require
them to divert resources away from
processing voter registration
applications and mail-in or absentee
ballot applications, and in some
instances the staffing necessary to
implement the proposed rule may not
be available at all. Election officials also
asserted that there will be additional
costs for direct voter contact, and other
voter education efforts required to
explain the rule to voters and to respond
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to related inquiries, including an
increase in support calls.
Reliance Interests
Other commenters argued that, when
a federal entity issues new standards, it
must assess whether there were reliance
interests, determine whether these
interests were significant, and weigh
any such interests against competing
policy concerns, and alleged that the
Postal Service has failed to do so.
Commenters argued that the rule would
create a ‘‘one size fits all’’ federal policy
that would displace established state
and local practices driven by the needs
of different localities and grounded in
reliance on the Postal Service’s
dependable transmission of mail-in and
absentee ballots. As noted above,
commenters further focused on reliance
interests related to preparations for the
2026 election cycle.
Relationship of the Rule to Its Intended
Purpose
Commenters argued that the proposed
rule was not sufficiently tied to its
stated purpose—namely to help ensure
election integrity, fraud prevention, and
facilitation of federal law enforcement.
In their view, the proposed rule
provides no empirical evidence or other
explanation to articulate why existing
election mail procedures are deficient,
what operational problem would be
solved by the Portal, or how IMb data
would help mitigate or investigate
election crimes. Numerous commenters
also argued that, the proposed rule
would not provide any material new
information to law enforcement.
Some commenters who opposed
705.24.4 and 705.24.5 were supportive
of the mailpiece envelope design
provisions of 705.24.3. However, those
commenters noted that many of the
envelope design best practices the rule
would mandate are already available
and used voluntarily. Commenters
argued that converting these
recommendations into federal
requirements adds cost and operational
risk for election officials without
counterbalancing benefits.
Evaluating Less Restrictive Alternatives
Several commenters also argued that
the Postal Service should evaluate less
restrictive alternatives. For example
commenters suggested: voluntary pilot
programs, phased implementation after
the 2026 election cycle or a capacityadjusted implementation timeline,
aggregate or post-mailing reconciliation,
data minimization, hashed or non-voteridentifying records, safe harbors for
minor or correctable defects, mandatory
acceptance during Portal outages,
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making the data entry standards
optional, and emergency escalation
procedures for replacement ballots, lateadded voters, court-ordered ballots, and
small-volume local mailings. Other
commenters argued that rejection of
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail for failure
to satisfy preparation and data entry
standards is a disproportionate
consequence compared to the monetary
penalties imposed elsewhere in the
DMM for failing to meet other
preparation or eligibility standards after
an administrative review. See DMM
607.
C. Balancing Interests
After careful consideration of these
various viewpoints, and the comments
discussing these issues, the Postal
Service is moving to finalize the
proposed rule, subject to certain
modifications explained in ‘‘Revisions
Adopted in the Final Rule.’’
The Postal Service has thoroughly
explained the rationale for imposing
mail preparation and data reporting
requirements as set forth in the
proposed rule, which are necessary to
help promote the faithful execution of
federal law and advance the Postal
Service’s ability to efficiently handle
Federal Ballot Mail. While the Postal
Service’s existing processes are
designed to support the timely delivery
and smooth processing of ballot mail, it
has long recognized that across-theboard compliance with its longstanding
recommendations would further
improve efficient handling, processing,
and delivery. This would benefit the
Postal Service, election officials, and
voters alike. Moreover, while the Postal
Service currently does obtain scan data
for some ballot mail that could be useful
for law-enforcement purposes,
mandating compliance with the data
reporting and mail-preparation
requirements for all Federal Ballot Mail
would significantly improve the quality
of that data. This visibility will, in turn,
put law enforcement in a better position
to identify any potential issues
regarding compliance with federal law
that may merit further investigation.
Weighing these benefits and the
operational needs of the Postal Service,
the rule is intended to minimize the
burden and impact on voters and
election officials, while still achieving
the rule’s purposes. Under this rule,
states will retain complete autonomy to
determine voter eligibility to use the
mail to vote, as they do today. If their
state complies with the rule’s relatively
modest mail preparation and data entry
standards, voters should not experience
any difference from the status quo. The
Postal Service anticipates that all states
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will make a good faith effort to comply
with the rule, consistent with the belief
expressed by some commenters, thereby
enabling eligible voters to continue to
use the mail to vote. Overall, the rule
imposes requirements that are rationally
and carefully tailored to the underlying
purposes of the rule. The Postal Service
would also reiterate that the rule does
not mandate that states administer
elections in a ‘‘one size fits all’’ manner;
on the contrary, state election laws and
practices will continue to vary in
accordance with state law, as states will
retain control over the manner of their
elections, unaltered by the rule. The
rule requires merely that states that
choose to use the U.S. mail as part of
their elections adhere to certain
standard mailpiece design and data
reporting standards when sending
Federal Ballot Mail.
The Postal Service also notes that
some commenters narrowly focused
their concerns on the purportedly
substantial costs and practical
challenges that election officials would
presently face in attempting to comply
with the rule for the November 2026
general election. The Postal Service
recognizes that the rule would require
states to adjust their processes and
adapt to the changes imposed by the
rule, potentially incurring new costs.
While the Postal Service has weighed
these considerations, including the
possibility that some jurisdictions
would need to order new ballot
envelopes and devote resources to
complying with the new envelopedesign standards and reporting
requirements, those considerations have
to be balanced against the benefits of the
rule, and in particular the fact that these
standards are necessary to ensure the
faithful execution of federal law. Given
that mail-in ballots subject to this rule
are generally mailed in September or
thereafter, an immediate effective date
ensures the maximum possible time for
election officials to adjust their ballot
mail envelopes to meet the new
preparation standards if necessary, and
to prepare to submit data to the Portal
once it becomes active. This promotes
states’ and political subdivisions’ ability
to successfully implement the rule prior
to the 2026 general election with good
faith efforts and the available postal
resources, notwithstanding the
comments that described this task as
‘‘impossible.’’ And despite any logistical
or financial difficulties states may face
complying with the rule, including
some claims that immediate
implementation would prove
impossible, the visibility and lawenforcement benefits of the rule,
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including for this election cycle, are
such that there is no compelling reason
for any delay. In recognition of the
potential burdens on election officials
and the timeline involved, the Postal
Service will make available
considerable educational and other
support resources discussed above to
assist election officials with
implementation and help facilitate
timely compliance with the rule.
The Postal Service has also
considered alternatives to the proposed
rule, including both more and less
restrictive options. The Postal Service
received comments proposing a number
of alternatives including: using
registered mail to transmit ballots;
performing verification of additional
forms of data (including name, address,
or Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope
IMb); expanding the rule to cover
primaries or all voters; making all of the
rule’s provisions optional; eliminating
verification and rejection procedures;
and not requiring a unique IMb on
return ballot envelopes.
As explained above, the Postal
Service believes the proposed rule, as
modified in the final rule, is appropriate
in scale and scope. A more restrictive
approach is unnecessary to achieve the
goals of the rule and realize the related
benefits. At the same time, the
sensitivity of Outbound Federal Ballot
Mail, the importance of voter
confidence and election security, and
the ability to support law enforcement
purposes that are necessary to ensure
the faithful execution of federal law
require the inclusion of the verification
and rejection procedures as set forth in
704.24.5 in order to fulfill the purposes
of the rule. A less restrictive approach
would not achieve all of the rule’s
benefits. For example, scans from
unique IMbs provide a level of visibility
into individual mailpieces that is not
possible using non-serialized IMbs. The
Postal Service agrees with commenters
that this visibility is dependent on the
mailpieces being scanned, and believes
that the potential for improved visibility
made possible by the use of unique
IMbs on both Outbound and Return
Federal Ballot Mail better serves the
intended goals of the rule than if a
unique IMb were only on Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail. Moreover, if the
rule were not applied in a consistent,
nationwide fashion (e.g., if its
provisions only applied to some ballot
mail, were optional, or if there were a
phased roll-out), it may prevent the full
benefits of the rule from being realized,
prove unadministrable, and could
potentially cause confusion and delays.
The final rule creates an appropriate
balance of the purported burdens
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imposed by the rule against its intended
benefits. As one commenter explained,
election integrity and voter access are
complementary goals. Any regulatory
changes should strengthen public
confidence while avoiding unnecessary
obstacles to the timely and reliable
delivery of election mail. This rule
properly balances those considerations.
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VI. Other Considerations
A. Postal Service Readiness
Numerous commenters expressed
concern over the Postal Service’s ability
to successfully implement this rule.
They expressed concern over whether
the Postal Service had the necessary
financial resources and staffing capacity
and conjectured that proposed rule
would saddle the Postal Service with
election administration functions;
require additional clerks, mailpiece
design personnel, information
technology support staff, and other
human resources; and impose new
obligations on retail offices and field
operations.
Other commenters sought clarification
about the training that postal employees
would need to perform the new
processes set forth in the rule. Other
commenters, including some postal
employees, questioned whether postal
employees could satisfy their
obligations under the Hatch Act and to
the public under the rule.
The Postal Service is prepared to
implement the rule, consistent with its
legal obligations and available
resources. The Postal Service already
possesses the necessary staffing capacity
at BMEUs and retail locations as well as
mail acceptance infrastructure necessary
to administer the rule: wholly new
institutional capacity does not need to
be built from scratch. The Postal Service
currently operates nationwide digital
systems through the Business Customer
Gateway and PostalOne!, and business
mailers must already submit mailing
documentation electronically. The
Postal Service also maintains
centralized support channels, including
the MDA help desk. Furthermore, as
stated in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Postal Service has
available or will soon publish resources
to assist election officials with
compliance, including technical
instructions on barcode creation, service
type identifiers, acceptance processes,
file preparation, documentation
submission, and entry of data into the
proposed portal. The addition of a new
compliance review for a small subset of
overall mail volume is not expected to
require additional staff or be a
significant burden on employees. Since
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the rule builds on processes already in
place for election mail, its
implementation should not prove
inordinately costly. The Postal Service
is able to balance the cost of
implementing the rule, including
developing the Portal, with the costs
required to fulfill its other core
operational responsibilities.
As explained above, there are only a
few categories of employees who will be
directly responsible for verifying
compliance with the rule under
705.24.5, namely BMEU technicians,
Retail clerks, and discrete support
functions like employees in the PCSC.
For employees in direct operational
roles, the new pre-acceptance
verification measures are similar to, and
are no more onerous than, other mailing
manifest reviews. With respect to other
provisions in the rule, the Postal Service
also recognizes that MDAs will see an
increase in mailpiece design review
requests under the rule. The Postal
Service is committed to ensuring this
process is completed in a timely
manner, consistent with current
customer expectations.
The Postal Service agrees that proper
training to ensure nationwide
consistency is important. The Postal
Service is developing specific training
for employees who will be directly
responsible for conducting verification
under the rule. Retail clerks and BMEU
technicians will be trained on how to
identify Federal Outbound Ballot Mail
and what the scanning verification
process requires. The training will be
rolled out and conducted consistently
with the Postal Service’s usual
processes. Additionally, MDAs will
receive training on the rule’s design
requirements and recordkeeping
requirements.
It is important to remember that the
vast majority of employees will not
experience a change in their
responsibilities as a result of the rule.
For example, letter carriers and
employees in delivery and processing
functions will not have any new
responsibilities. These employees will
continue to process and deliver ballot
mail, including Federal Ballot Mail, and
all other election mail, consistent with
existing Postal Service processes,
procedures, and guidance. Letter
carriers and employees in processing
and delivery functions will not validate,
withhold, delay, or remove ballots in
the mailstream.
The rule’s requirements should not
impact how the Postal Service processes
and delivers Federal Ballot Mail.
Longstanding processing and delivery
practices for completed ballots that
enter the mainstream will remain
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unchanged. As noted, designing
automation compatible mailpieces,
inclusion of the Official Election Mail
logo, serialized IMbs on both the
outbound and return ballots, and MDA
mailpiece review have long been key
components of the Postal Service’s best
practices guidance for ballot mail.
Ensuring compliance with these
longstanding recommendations,
together with verification processes for
IMbs on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail,
lie within the Postal Service’s zone of
competence, and can therefore be
incorporated into the Postal Service’s
normal course of operations.
The Postal Service would also note
that the rule does not implicate the
Hatch Act, as it neither directs nor
authorizes any partisan political activity
as defined by that Act by Postal Service
employees.
B. Portal Security
The Postal Service received a number
of comments concerned that creating a
centralized data repository with voter
information would make elections less
secure. These comments argued that
creating a centralized Portal establishes
a high-value target for state-sponsored
cyberattacks, other data breaches, and
election disruption, and that the recent
rise of AI-enhanced hacking technology
increases these risks. For these
commenters, the value of the Portal is
minimal because it is, they argue,
largely duplicative of existing state
systems, and, in their view, does not
justify the risk. Commenters contend
that decentralized election systems
improve election security.
Some commenters were concerned
about the Postal Service’s ability to
maintain and protect data in complex,
public-facing systems, with a few
commenters suggesting technology,
services, and other resources that the
Postal Service could use to create the
Portal. Commenters noted that system
outages, technical malfunction or
cyberattacks impacting the Portal could
impact, or potentially halt, Outbound
Federal Ballot mailings across multiple
states simultaneously. Others
emphasized that neither the Portal nor
any related technical specifications are
currently available; as a result, these
commenters questioned whether
election offices (especially those in
small or under-resourced jurisdictions)
would have the time and technical
capacity to build the required data files
immediately.
The Postal Service has extensive
experience in developing, maintaining,
and safeguarding public-facing data
systems. The Postal Service faces
ongoing cyberthreats and challenges
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that could directly impact customers,
partners, and employees, and it is well
prepared to defend against these threats.
The Postal Service’s Corporate
Information Security Office (CISO)
protects its critical stakeholders by
safeguarding the postal network,
monitoring threats, and responding to
incidents. As with comparable
organizations in the government and
private-sector, cybersecurity is a top
priority for the Postal Service.
Against this backdrop, the Postal
Service maintains a vast commercial
public-facing website and has a number
of existing systems for mailers to enter
data to satisfy other mail preparation
standards. It also has experience in
quickly developing and deploying
public-facing websites, like the website
created to facilitate ordering and
distribution of COVID–19 test kits.
These are high-volume systems that
maintain sensitive data. The Postal
Service has specific guidelines and
protocols in place for protecting and
handling the sensitive and critical data
contained within these systems. In
short, contrary to commenters’ claims
and concerns, the Postal Service has
meaningful experience developing and
operating a system like the Portal.
The Portal will contain multi-layered
security controls, including encrypted
data transmission and storage, strict
access management with multi-factor
authentication, and role-based
permissions. The system will be
protected by enterprise-grade network
defenses, real-time monitoring, and
comprehensive audit logging, ensuring
that sensitive data is accessible only to
authorized officials and is retained
securely.
As discussed above in ‘‘Operation of
the Final Rule,’’ there are free, optional
tools available that can assist election
officials and Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users in generating the data files
necessary to satisfy the rule’s data
reporting requirements and ensure that
the necessary information for Outbound
Federal Ballot mailings is available to
satisfy verification and be accepted into
the mailstream. Jurisdictions using a
vendor may already have such data files
prepared as part of other mailing
documentation. In either case, the
burdens are modest and can be timely
satisfied.
C. Other State Law Concerns
Commenters, including election
officials, raised concerns about the
ability of election officials to satisfy the
requirements of the rule while also
complying with various state laws. For
example, some comments argued that
the obligation to provide Portal data for
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inclusion on a state-specific List could
require election officials to choose
between complying with state privacy
laws or the rule. Other commenters
questioned election officials’ ability to
satisfy the rule’s requirements while
also complying with state statutory
timing requirements for requesting,
processing, and issuing ballots. And
others argued that the rule would
impact state and local elections where
consolidated ballots are used.
The decision of how to arrange ballots
is a matter for the states. Ballots that
contain both federal and state or local
elections are covered by the rule. States
can easily avoid any effects on their
state elections by either complying with
the rule’s requirements or by separating
their federal ballots to exclude any nonfederal elections. Either is permissible
under the rule and would eliminate any
impact on exclusively state or local
elections.
The rule is also not facially
incompatible with the various timing
provisions in state election law. The
envelope design review, data entry, and
verification processes set forth in the
rule should be relatively quick to
complete and should not significantly
alter the timeline for election officials.
The rule’s requirements will permit an
election official to prepare and send
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail near
election day, as they do now. And, once
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is
accepted into the postal network, the
Postal Service has a strong track record
of promptly delivering ballots to and
from voters.
The rule also does not require that
sensitive voter information be made
public, like birthdates or social security
numbers that may be protected from
disclosure by state law. For one thing,
the Portal and the Lists will not contain
this kind of sensitive information; they
include information that appears on the
outside of the ballot mail envelopes. For
another, the Lists and the underlying
Portal data will not be made publicly
available. There are existing statutory
and regulatory protections against the
disclosure of customer addresses and
other sensitive information. For
example, while 39 U.S.C. 410 provides
that the Postal Service is subject to the
Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act, it limits the scope of access
to certain kinds of postal records. In
particular, Section 410(c)(1) provides
that neither law requires the Postal
Service to release ‘‘the name or address,
past or present, of any postal patron.’’
Similarly, postal regulations provide
that disclosures of address information
may be made to state and local
governments and law enforcement
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54987
agencies, but generally prohibit
disclosure of an individual person’s
mailing address to a non-government
individual except in limited,
enumerated circumstances. 39 CFR
265.14(d)(2)-(5), (9). Furthermore, as
discussed above and reiterated below,
many of these privacy concerns may be
resolved by the information contained
in the SOR for the Portal, which was
published in the Federal Register on
July 17, 2026.
D. Tribal Issues
The Postal Service received a small
number of comments arguing that the
proposed rule did not meaningfully
address how the rule’s requirements
would affect tribal communities.
Commenters were concerned about the
ability of election officials to generate
unique IMbs for nontraditional mailing
addresses used by many Native
American households, and about the
impact of the rule more broadly given
the unique mail delivery challenges that
can impact these communities. Other
commenters advocated for tribal
consultation prior issuance of a final
rule. In particular, one commenter
argued that the rule should not be
finalized until the Postal Service
conducted formal consultation with
federally recognized tribes pursuant to
Executive Order 13175.
As the Postal Service has explained,
the rule does not require any change to
existing addressing practices. It only
requires that the address uploaded into
the Portal be the address used on the
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope.
Election officials may continue to
address ballots to nontraditional
addresses and may generate unique
IMbs for these addresses to comply with
the rule. As discussed above, election
officials may be able to use the free IMsb
tool to generate a unique IMb even if
these addresses cannot be validated
through DPV.
With respect to consultation, the
Postal Service will continue to work
with tribal stakeholders as part of its
broader outreach, education, and
implementation efforts. However,
Executive Order 13175 does not require
the Postal Service to engage in such
consultations. Only agencies covered by
the Paperwork Reduction Act are
subject to that Executive Order and, as
noted above, the Postal Service is
outside the Paperwork Reduction Act’s
scope. Shane, 658 F. Supp. at 915;
accord Kuzma, 798 F.2d at 32.
Therefore, consultation under Executive
Order 13175 is not required prior to
finalizing the rule.
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E. Requests for More Information
The Postal Service received several
comments requesting detailed analysis
about the potential impact of the
proposed rule and recommending that
the results of any such analysis be
published before issuing a final rule. For
example, requests were made for a stateby-state analysis of the rule’s impact;
impact assessments for Tribal
communities and UOCAVA voters
(despite the express exclusion of
UOCAVA ballots from the rule’s scope);
detailed information about the
development of this rule and the Portal;
an evaluation of any differential
administrative burdens based on the
size or resources of election
jurisdictions; an assessment of the
anticipated ballot-rejection rate under
DMM 705.24.5; and a formal disability
accessibility impact assessment before
finalizing any changes to ballot mail
procedures.
The Postal Service declines to
conduct, publish, or otherwise disclose
any additional analysis or information
concerning the rule or Portal. The Postal
Service has received sufficient
information through public comments
to assess the impact of the proposed rule
and issue this final rule. Each state and
political subdivision thereof may choose
different means to satisfy the rule’s mail
preparation and data entry requirements
based on their own capabilities and
resources. As a result, the impact on
states may vary but these decisions are
not dictated by the Postal Service.
Similarly, the Postal Service anticipates
that the rejection rate of Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail will be low, as states
need only comply with the final rule’s
relatively modest mail preparation and
data entry standards.
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F. System of Records Notice
The Postal Service received numerous
comments urging it to publish a new
SORN for the Federal Ballot Mail Portal
in accordance with the Privacy Act.
Commenters sought information about
retention periods for Portal data, access
to that data, and limits on disclosure,
among other things. While these
comments are outside the scope of this
rulemaking, the Postal Service
separately took steps necessary for the
creation of a SORN, as stated in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. On July
17, 2026, the SORN was published in
the Federal Register. 91 FR 44880. As
explained in the SORN, a SOR will need
to be in place to implement this final
rule, because no data will be collected
through the Portal or disclosed until a
SOR is in place. The SORN provides
details regarding retention periods,
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access, disclosure, and the other matters
raised by commenters. Comments will
be accepted on the SORN for 30 days.
Interested parties were invited to submit
comments.
VII. Suggested Revisions to the
Proposed Rule
A. UOCAVA
In the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Postal Service
specifically invited comments on the
exemption in the proposed rule for
UOCAVA voters. Many commenters
supported this exemption. Other
commenters, while supporting the
exemption, believed that the rule’s
express exclusion of UOCAVA ballots
was insufficient to exclude or protect
UOCAVA voters. These commenters
asked for more assurances and
safeguards to ensure UOCAVA ballots
would not be impacted by the rule, as
errors could occur that would
accidentally apply the rule’s standards
to UOCAVA ballots.
Some commenters opposed the
exemption for UOCAVA ballots. These
commenters argued that ‘‘[a]pplying the
E.O. 14399 framework’’—such as
enhanced tracking and participation
lists—to UOCAVA ballots would
strengthen integrity without
undermining access, while aligning
with existing Postal Service special
handling for election mail to and from
military and overseas voters. Excluding
them, in the opinion of some
commenters, leaves a significant portion
of ballot mail for federal elections
outside the new security measures, and
including UOCAVA ballots would
create a more comprehensive, uniform
system that better serves all eligible
voters while deterring unlawful use of
the mail.
The Postal Service finds that the
proposed rule provides sufficient
safeguards for UOCAVA voters as
drafted and declines to make additional
changes. Further safeguards and
assurances are unnecessary because
these voters will experience no change
as a result of proper implementation of
the rule given its exemption of
UOCAVA ballots. At the same time, the
exemption does not create an anomaly
or otherwise undermine the stated
purpose of the rule. Rather, it reflects
the unique logistical circumstances that
overseas and military voters and their
family members face, consistent with
the statutory scheme enacted by
Congress.
Separately, other comments sought
clarification on how the Postal Service
would distinguish between ballots sent
pursuant to UOCAVA and other mail-in
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or absentee ballots. Existing postal
regulations require that ballots sent to
and from UOCAVA voters include
unique identifiers on the exterior of the
envelope that are not present on the
ballot envelopes for non-UOCAVA
voters. Specifically, DMM 703.8.8.5
requires that envelopes for mailing and
receiving absentee ballots under
UOCAVA must contain the following
words: ‘‘No Postage Necessary in the
U.S. Mail—DMM 703.8.0.’’
Additionally, balloting envelopes for
UOCAVA voters contain the statement:
‘‘U.S. Postage Paid 39 U.S.C. 3406.’’
These indicia enable the Postal Service
to distinguish between UOCAVA ballots
and ballots that fall within the scope of
the rule. As explained above, UOCAVA
ballots should be segregated from
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail when
presented for mailing. This will help
ensure that both UOCAVA ballots and
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail covered
by the rule are properly accepted under
applicable rules. Therefore, revisions to
the proposed rule are unnecessary to
ensure that UOCAVA ballots are
distinguishable from Federal Ballot
Mail.
B. Primaries
The Postal Service received several
comments about primary elections
specifically. Describing primaries as
gateways to federal general elections,
and further noting that in
noncompetitive districts, primaries may
effectively determine the outcomes of
federal races, commenters argued that
the rule’s exclusion of primary elections
creates inconsistencies in tracking,
verification, and security standards.
Commenters contended that the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking inadequately
explained why fraud prevention and
law enforcement rationales for ballots
for general, special, and runoff federal
elections would not apply equally to
primaries. These commenters opined
that voters and election officials would
benefit from uniform Postal Service
requirements throughout the election
cycle.
The Postal Service reaffirms that,
consistent with the framework for the
proposed rule set forth in Executive
Order 14399, the rule will not apply to
primaries. Primary elections involve the
selection of political party nominees
through procedures chosen by the
parties themselves, not the election of
federal officials; as such, they fall
outside the rule’s scope and reach.
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C. Address Confidentiality Protection
and Other Voter Confidentiality
Programs
As some commenters pointed out,
survivors of domestic and sexual
violence and/or stalking may experience
significant privacy concerns related to
the voter registration process. The fear
of being located may deter such victims
from voting in person, and even from
registering to vote. Furthermore, as
commenters noted, survivors of
domestic violence, sexual violence, and/
or stalking often relocate multiple times
and/or postpone updating public
records until adequate safety measures
are in place. For these reasons,
commenters concluded, many survivors
rely crucially on the ability to vote by
mail.
According to commenters, to assist
such survivors, forty-seven states have
instituted Address Confidentiality
Protection programs (‘‘ACPs’’)—
confidential mail forwarding services
available to survivors of domestic
violence, stalking, sexual violence, child
abduction and/or human trafficking
who have recently relocated to a
location unknown to their abuser or
stalker. To ensure participant safety,
commenters explained, ACPs typically
shield participants from appearing in
public voter files, usually by
substituting alternative addresses or
keeping records entirely offline. Often,
ACP registration is entered manually in
a locked file and not entered into the
state’s typical voter registration system.
The ballot is then mailed to the state’s
substitute address, which, by design,
differs from the voter’s confidential
actual address. In some instances, even
an individual’s name is protected under
ACPs. Some commenters also noted that
other states have additional privacy
protections in place for participants.
Some commenters voiced concern
that including information about these
voters in the Portal and the
contemplated exchange of this
information through the state-specific
Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists
would compromise ACP and other
confidentiality programs and may call
into question compliance with certain
state requirements. One commenter
noted a lack of guidance as to whether
states would be required to upload
survivors’ actual physical addresses to
the Portal, or whether the Postal Service
(or other entities within the federal
government) would question mailing
ballots to a potentially large number of
voters registered to a single alternative
mailing address. Other commenters
criticized the proposed rule for
allegedly increasing risks to survivor
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safety. One commenter cited recent
large-scale privacy breaches affecting
government agencies and suggested that
Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists
in the Postal Service’s custody
(including, presumably, the private
information of voters protected under
ACPs) could fall prey to such a breach.
The Postal Service clarifies that the
rule requires that the name and address
used on the outside of a ballot envelope
be submitted to the Portal; it would not
require that confidential information
known only to the state be provided.
The information in the Portal would
also not be publicly disclosed, and the
Postal Service has taken appropriate
cybersecurity measures with respect to
the Portal cybersecurity as discussed
above. For these reasons, the proposed
rule is compatible with state ACP
programs.
D. Alternative Operational Approaches
A small number of commenters
recommended that the rule be
accompanied by ambitious operational
changes, including a dedicated postalrun ‘‘state ballot box’’ into which only
ballots would be placed, the
establishment of a separate processing
and delivery system for ballots, and
fundamental Mailer ID redesign (a key
component of IMbs).
The Postal Service declines to adopt
these proposals. Such large-scale (and
costly) operational changes are not
necessary to accomplish the rule’s
objectives.
VIII. Revisions Adopted in the Final
Rule
Very few comments included
recommended changes to the rule itself.
The Postal Service received several
suggestions that would result in a more
expansive final rule ; however, these
suggestions fall outside the scope of this
rulemaking and the Postal Service’s
authority. For instance, a few
commenters encouraged the Postal
Service to add provisions into the rule
to verify a voter’s citizenship status as
a condition of mail acceptance. Other
commenters advocated for exclusively
in-person voting, and still others
proposed only accepting ballots that are
received by Election Day. The Postal
Service also received comments
recommending a narrower final rule that
would retain the proposed rule’s
provisions concerning ballot envelope
design for Federal Ballot Mail, in
705.24.3, and eliminate the rule’s other
substantive provisions, namely 705.24.4
and 705.24.5. Within the scope of this
rulemaking, the Postal Service is making
several changes in response to the
concerns discussed above.
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First, the Postal Service makes clear
that the verification process set forth in
705.24.5 (i.e., mail sent by authorized
ballot mailers) does not apply to Return
Federal Ballot Mail. Many comments
demonstrated a factual
misunderstanding about the
inapplicability of these verification
procedures to return ballots. Given the
widespread confusion, the Postal
Service believes that clarifying the final
rule will reduce voter confusion and
help ensure consistent implementation
of the rule. However, as noted above, for
individuals transmitting Return Federal
Ballot mail to be in compliance with
this rule, Return Federal Ballot Mail
must be mailed in an envelope that
meets the requirements of 705.24.3.2. As
under existing law, voters may use their
residential mailbox, any retail counter,
or other authorized means to transmit
their compliant Return Federal Ballot
Mail.
In the event a voter loses or misplaces
the Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope
provided by the Authorized Ballot
Mailer, or if the Authorized Ballot
Mailer fails to provide the voter with a
compliant Return Federal Ballot Mail
envelope, the voter should request a
replacement envelope from the
Authorized Ballot Mailer that conforms
to 705.24.3.2. The Postal Service may
also provide such other means as
reasonably determined by the Postal
Service for transmitting Return Federal
Ballot Mail consistent with the
requirements of this rule. This will
provide visibility and scan data for
these ballot envelopes when processed
on the Postal Service’s automated
equipment.
Second, there was confusion over
how the MDA review requirements
would be verified and enforced, and the
circumstances under which the MDA
review requirements could lead to an
Outbound Federal Ballot mailing being
rejected. As set forth above, certification
of MDA review will not be verified
when an Outbound Federal Ballot
mailing is presented for acceptance.
Instead, prior to uploading data into the
Portal, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users
will be prompted to certify that their
ballot envelope design has been
submitted for review by an MDA and
that the MDA has provided feedback. If
they do not provide such certification,
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be
unable to upload data into the Portal. To
reduce confusion and clarify the
responsibilities of Federal Ballot Mail
Portal Users, the Postal Service is
amending the language in 705.24.3.1,
705.24.3.2, and 705.24.4.2.f, and striking
705.24.5.3.b from the final rule.
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Third, the Postal Service is amending
the language in 705.24.3.1.c and
705.23.3.2.c to make clear that
Authorized Ballot Mailers are
responsible for creating IMbs. The
Postal Service is also amending the
language in 705.24.4.2.b.3 and
705.24.4.2.b.4 to clarify that the unique
IMb submitted into the Portal is the IMb
printed on the Outbound and Return
Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. These
clarifications are intended to reduce
confusion and provide clarity for
Federal Ballot Mail Portal users; they do
not substantively change the rule’s data
reporting requirements.
Fourth, the Postal Service is
amending the language in 705.24.5.2 to
clarify that only commercial mailings
are subject to commercial mailing
standards and regulations. There was
confusion over whether non-commercial
mailings must be entered at BMEUs or
otherwise meet commercial mailing
standards. The Postal Service has
simplified the language in 705.24.5.2 to
help avoid confusion.
Finally, the Postal Service is changing
the term ‘‘Ballot Portal User’’ to
‘‘Federal Ballot Mail Portal User’’ to
clarify the relationship between Federal
Ballot Mail, the rule’s data standards,
and the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. The
Postal Service’s hope is that this reduces
confusion about the application of rule’s
data-entry requirements to other ballot
mail as well as confusion about data
entry that needs to be performed at the
state-level.
IX. Explanation of Final Rule
After evaluating the comments, the
Postal Service is adopting the new DMM
Section 705.24. The final text of DMM
Section 705.24 incorporates the
revisions noted above. Accordingly, the
Postal Service adopts the described
changes to Mailing Standards of the
United States Postal Service, Domestic
Mail Manual (DMM), incorporated by
reference in the Code of Federal
Regulations. We will publish an
appropriate amendment to 39 CFR part
111 to reflect these changes.
List of Subjects in 39 CFR Part 111
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Administrative practice and
procedure, Postal Service.
Accordingly, the Postal Service
amends Mailing Standards of the United
States Postal Service, Domestic Mail
Manual (DMM), incorporated by
reference in the Code of Federal
Regulations as follows (see 39 CFR
111.1):
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PART 111—[AMENDED]
■ 1. The authority citation for 39 CFR
Part 111 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(a); 13 U.S.C. 301–
307; 18 U.S.C. 1692–1737; 39 U.S.C. 101,
401–404, 414, 416, 3001–3018, 3201–3220,
3401–3406, 3621, 3622, 3626, 3629, 3631–
3633, 3641, 3681–3685, and 5001.
■ 2. Revise Mailing Standards of the
United States Postal Service, Domestic
Mail Manual (DMM) as follows:
Mailing Standards of the United States
Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual
(DMM)
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700
Special Standards
*
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*
*
*
*
*
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705 Advanced Preparation and
Special Postage Payment Systems
*
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[Insert after 705.23 the following:]
24.0
Ballot Mail for Federal Elections
24.1
Definitions
For the purposes of Section 705.24,
the following definitions apply:
a. Authorized ballot mailer means an
election official of a state or a political
subdivision thereof who is responsible
for sending mail-in or absentee ballots
to eligible voters of that state or political
subdivision; or an individual or entity,
such as a mail service provider, that an
election official has authorized to send
mail-in or absentee ballots by mail on
the election official’s behalf.
b. Federal Ballot Mail Portal User
means the chief election official of each
state and any individual or entity, such
as a mail service provider or an election
official of that state or a political
subdivision thereof, authorized by the
chief election official to provide
information through the Postal Service
Federal Ballot Mail Portal as described
in 24.4.2.b.
c. Mail-in or absentee ballot means a
physical ballot, other than a ballot
provided at a designated polling place,
that may be used to cast a vote in a
federal election. For the purposes of
Section 705.24, a mail-in or absentee
ballot does not include a ballot mailed
under 703.8.8 or 703.8.9.
d. Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
means any mailpiece containing a mailin or absentee ballot for a federal
election sent from an authorized ballot
mailer to an individual voter.
e. Return Federal Ballot Mail means
any mailpiece containing a mail-in or
absentee ballot for a federal election
sent from an individual voter to an
election office, or an authorized
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recipient of ballot mail, of a state or a
political subdivision thereof.
f. Federal election means any general,
special, or runoff election for the office
of President or Vice President; or of
Senator or Representative in, or Delegate
or Resident Commissioner to, the
Congress. This definition does not
include primary elections.
g. State includes all 50 states, as well
as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Northern Mariana
Islands.
h. Intelligent Mail barcode (IMb) has
the meaning provided in 204.1.2.1.
i. Official Election Mail logo is a
unique registered trademark designed
exclusively for inclusion in the design
of Official Election Mail. The conditions
of use are provided in Publication 631,
Official Election Mail—Graphic
Guidelines and Logos.
24.2 Optional 90-Day Pre-Mailing
Notice
A state’s chief election official may
notify the Postal Service, no fewer than
90 days prior to a federal election, of its
intent to allow for mail-in or absentee
ballots in the federal election to be
transmitted by the Postal Service. This
notification should indicate whether the
state intends to submit to the Postal
Service the information described in
24.4.2.b to the Postal Service Federal
Ballot Mail Portal as set forth in
24.4.2.d.
A state’s failure to provide the
optional 90-day notice to the Postal
Service under 24.2 will not prevent
enrollment under 24.4.
24.3
Federal Ballot Mail
24.3.1 Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
Envelope Standards
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail must be
mailed in an envelope that:
a. Includes the official Election Mail
logo;
b. Is automation compatible; and
c. Bears the voter’s unique IMb, as
created by the Authorized Ballot Mailer,
with the Delivery Point ZIP Code
embedded and a Federal Ballot Mail
Service Type Identifier (STID).
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes must be submitted to the
Postal Service for mailpiece design
review and feedback.
24.3.2 Return Federal Ballot Mail
Envelope Standards
Return Federal Ballot Mail must be
mailed in an envelope that:
a. Includes the official Election Mail
logo;
b. Is automation compatible; and
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c. Bears the voter’s unique IMb, as
created by the Authorized Ballot Mailer,
with the Delivery Point ZIP Code
embedded and a Federal Ballot Mail
STID.
Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes
must be submitted to the Postal Service
for mailpiece design review and
feedback.
24.3.3 Authorized Ballot Mailer
Responsibility
Authorized ballot mailers are
responsible for barcode creation under
24.3.1 and 24.3.2 as well as envelope
design and printing for all ballot mail.
24.3.4 Additional Recommendations
For additional information on the
Postal Service’s recommendations for all
ballot mail, see DMM 703.8.4.
24.4 State-Specific Mail-In and
Absentee Participation Lists
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24.4.1 Postal Service Federal Ballot
Mail Portal User Registration
To access the Postal Service Federal
Ballot Mail Portal, each Federal Ballot
Mail Portal User must have a registered
account. Registration must be completed
no later than two business days before
an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing.
The chief election official of each state
is responsible for authorizing the
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users for their
state including political subdivisions
thereof.
24.4.2 Enrollment
a. Any state that intends to receive
mail-in or absentee ballots from
individual voters through the Postal
Service must ensure that such
individuals have been enrolled with the
Postal Service for inclusion on the
state’s Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List.
b. In order for an individual to be
enrolled with the Postal Service for
inclusion on a state’s Mail-In and
Absentee Participation List, a Federal
Ballot Mail Portal User in that state
must provide the following information
through the Postal Service Federal
Ballot Mail Portal:
1. Name of individual receiving a
mail-in or absentee ballot;
2. Address of individual receiving a
mail-in or absentee ballot;
3. Unique IMb applied on the
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope
pursuant to 24.3.1;
4. Unique IMb applied on the Return
Federal Ballot Mail envelope pursuant
to 24.3.2; and
5. Originating election office state.
c. An individual will be deemed
enrolled with the Postal Service for
inclusion on a state’s Mail-In and
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16:10 Aug 25, 2026
Jkt 268001
Absentee Participation List as of the
date that the information in 24.4.2.b is
provided.
d. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users
must provide the information in 24.4.2.b
at least 30 days before the date of the
federal election, to the extent
practicable, or by the date on which
mail-in or absentee ballots may begin to
be mailed under state law. Federal
Ballot Mail Portal Users may make
supplemental submissions to enroll
additional individuals or modify prior
submissions until the last day that
ballots may be mailed out to individuals
under state law. A separate submission
is required in connection with each
Outbound Federal Ballot mailing,
regardless of the number of mailpieces
in the mailing.
e. The information provided in
24.4.2.b must meet the Postal Service’s
technical specifications for the Federal
Ballot Mail Portal.
f. Before providing the information in
24.4.2.b, Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users must certify in the Federal Ballot
Mail Portal that any mail-in or absentee
ballots their state’s authorized ballot
mailers provide to the Postal Service for
mailing have been submitted for review
and that they have received feedback
consistent with 24.3.1 and 24.3.2
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will not
be able to enter the information in
24.4.2.b into the Federal Ballot Mail
Portal if the certification is incomplete.
24.4.3
Provision of State-Specific Lists
On or about the date of the federal
election, the Postal Service will provide
a state-specific Mail-In and Absentee
Participant List to each state’s chief
election official that contains the name
and address of each individual in that
state who was enrolled through the
process set forth in 24.4.2, along with
the unique IMb associated with the
Outbound and Return Federal Ballot
Mail sent to each such individual.
24.5.2
54991
Authorized Verification
Mailings identified as Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail are verified by
Postal Service employees when
presented for acceptance. Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail must be entered at
a facility that performs business mail
acceptance functions or at a Postal
Service retail counter. Commercial
mailings must comply with applicable
requirements. Postal Service personnel
are not authorized to open mail sealed
against inspection, except under
circumstances described in ASM 274.
The Postal Service’s acceptance of
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail does not
constitute verified compliance.
24.5.3
Noncompliance
a. Mailings that do not comply with
24.5.1 and 24.5.2 will not be accepted
and will be returned to the authorized
ballot mailer. The authorized ballot
mailer or Federal Ballot Mail Portal User
must address the error(s) before
resubmitting the mailing.
b. An authorized ballot mailer may
request further review by the Postal
Service if Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
is not accepted.
c. The Postal Service assumes no
responsibility for any outbound ballot
mailing presented until it is accepted
into the mail. The Postal Service is not
responsible for service delays when the
Federal Ballot Mail Portal User or
authorized ballot mailer does not meet
the applicable preparation or entry
standards.
d. Authorized ballot mailers must
comply with all applicable postal laws
and regulations governing mailability
and preparation for mailing, as well as
nonpostal laws and regulations on the
possession, treatment, transmission, or
transfer of particular matter.
24.5.4
Return Federal Ballot Mail
24.5 Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
Verification
705.24.5 does not apply to Return
Federal Ballot Mail.
24.5.1
24.6 Non-Interference With State or
Federal Election Laws
Procedure
Using the information provided in
24.4.2, the Postal Service will review
mailings identified as Outbound Federal
Ballot Mail prior to acceptance to
evaluate whether the mailing meets the
standards in 24.3.1 and is being sent to
individuals who have been enrolled
with the Postal Service for inclusion on
the state’s Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List, consistent with the
technical specifications for the Federal
Ballot Mail Portal.
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This rule relates only to the use of the
U.S. Mail. The Postal Service does not
purport to alter the eligibility of any
individual to vote under state or federal
law. The Postal Service does not have
any legal responsibility for management
of state voter rolls or administration of
federal elections within each state.
States are fully responsible for the
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Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 164 / Wednesday, August 26, 2026 / Rules and Regulations
contents of each State’s Mail-In and
Absentee Participation List.
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Colleen Hibbert-Kapler,
Attorney, Ethics and Legal Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2026–17238 Filed 8–21–26; 9:00 pm]
BILLING CODE 7710–12–P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 721
[EPA–HQ–OPPT–2024–0281; FRL–12742–
02–OCSPP]
RIN 2070–AB27
Significant New Use Rules on Certain
Chemical Substances (24–5.5e)
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: EPA is issuing significant new
use rules (SNURs) under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) for
certain chemical substances that were
the subject of premanufacture notices
(PMNs) and are also subject to an Order
issued by EPA pursuant to TSCA. The
SNURs require persons to notify EPA at
least 90 days before commencing the
manufacture (defined by statute to
include import) or processing of any of
these chemical substances for an
activity that is designated as a
significant new use in the SNUR. The
required notification initiates EPA’s
evaluation of the conditions of that use
for that chemical substance. In addition,
the manufacture or processing for the
significant new use may not commence
until EPA has conducted a review of the
required notification; made an
appropriate determination regarding
that notification; and taken such actions
as required by that determination.
DATES: This rule is effective on October
26, 2026. For purposes of judicial
review, this rule shall be promulgated at
1 p.m. (EST) on September 9, 2026.
ADDRESSES: The docket for this action,
identified under docket identification
(ID) number EPA–HQ–OPPT–2024–
0281, is available online at https://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the
Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxics Docket (OPPT Docket) in the
Environmental Protection Agency
Docket Center (EPA/DC). Please review
the visitor instructions and additional
information about the docket available
at https://www.epa.gov/dockets.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For technical information: Andrew
Sullivan, New Chemicals Division
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16:10 Aug 25, 2026
Jkt 268001
(7405M), Office of Pollution Prevention
and Toxics, Environmental Protection
Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20460–0001; telephone
number: (202) 564–0605; email address:
sullivan.andrew@epa.gov.
For general information on SNURs:
Iliriana Mushkolaj, New Chemicals
Division (7405M), Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics, Environmental
Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania
Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20460–0001;
telephone number: (202) 564–6877;
email address: mushkolaj.iliriana@
epa.gov.
For general information on TSCA: The
TSCA Assistance Information Service
Hotline, Goodwill of the Finger Lakes,
422 South Clinton Ave., Rochester, NY
14620; telephone number: (800) 471–
7127 or (202) 554–1404; email address:
TSCA-Hotline@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary
A. What is the Agency’s authority for
taking this action?
TSCA section 5(a)(2) (15 U.S.C.
2604(a)(2)) authorizes EPA to determine
that a use of a chemical substance is a
‘‘significant new use.’’ EPA must make
this determination by rule after
considering all relevant factors,
including the factors in TSCA section
5(a)(2).
B. What action is the Agency taking?
EPA is finalizing SNURs under TSCA
section 5(a)(2) for the chemical
substances identified in this document.
These chemical substances were the
subject of PMNs and are also subject to
an Order issued by EPA pursuant to
TSCA section 5(e)(1)(A), as required by
the determinations made under TSCA
section 5(a)(3)(B). The SNURs identify
as significant new uses any
manufacturing, processing, use,
distribution in commerce, or disposal
that does not conform to the restrictions
imposed by the underlying TSCA
Orders, consistent with TSCA section
5(f)(4). The SNURs require persons who
intend to manufacture or process any of
these chemical substances for an
activity that is designated as a
significant new use in the SNURs to
notify EPA at least 90 days before
commencing that activity.
Previously, EPA proposed SNURs for
these chemical substances in the
Federal Register of November 3, 2025
(90 FR 49148 (FRL–12742–01–OCSPP)).
The docket includes information
considered by the Agency in developing
the proposed and final rules, including
public comments and EPA’s responses
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to the comments received as discussed
in Unit II.D.
C. Does this action apply to me?
1. General Applicability
This action applies to you if you
manufacture, process, or use the
chemical substances identified in this
document. The following list of North
American Industrial Classification
System (NAICS) codes is not intended
to be exhaustive, but rather provides a
guide to help readers determine whether
this document applies to them.
Potentially affected entities may
include:
• Manufacturers or processors of one
or more subject chemical substances
(NAICS codes 325 and 324110), e.g.,
chemical manufacturing and petroleum
refineries.
2. Applicability to Importers and
Exporters
This action may also apply to certain
entities through pre-existing import
certification and export notification
requirements under TSCA (https://
www.epa.gov/tsca-import-exportrequirements).
Chemical importers are subject to
TSCA section 13 (15 U.S.C. 2612), the
requirements in 19 CFR 12.118 through
12.127, 19 CFR 127.28, and 40 CFR part
707, subpart B. Importers of chemical
substances in bulk form, as part of a
mixture, or as part of an article (if
required by rule) must certify that the
shipment of the chemical substance
complies with all applicable rules and
orders under TSCA, including
regulations issued under TSCA sections
5, 6, 7 and Title IV.
Pursuant to 40 CFR 721.20, any
persons who export or intend to export
a chemical substance identified in this
document are subject to the export
notification provisions of TSCA section
12(b) (15 U.S.C. 2611(b)) and must
comply with the export notification
requirements in 40 CFR part 707,
subpart D.
D. What are the incremental economic
impacts of this action?
EPA has evaluated the potential costs
of establishing SNUN reporting
requirements for potential
manufacturers and processors of the
chemical substances identified in this
document. This analysis, which is
available in the docket, is briefly
summarized here.
1. Estimated Costs for SNUN
Submissions
A SNUR requires that any person who
intends to engage in such activity in the
future must first notify EPA by
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