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Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners
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SPACE WARFIGHTING
A Framework for Planners
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United States Space Force Space Warfighting
A Framework for Planners
Table of Contents
Foreword���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2
Executive Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3
Space Warfighting �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4
Space Superiority�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5
Space Control�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7
Counterspace Operations�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8
Offensive Actions�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8
Defensive Actions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10
Integrated Counterspace Operations and Joint Operations�������������������������������������������������������������������������12
Integrated Cyberspace Operations�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12
Space Segments����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
Lines of Communication��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
Movement and Maneuver�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14
Space Domain Awareness, Intelligence, and Attribution���������������������������������������������������������������������������������14
Command and Control������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 15
Planning Considerations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16
Targeting������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17
Indicators, Measures of Performance, and Measures of Effectiveness����������������������������������������������������� 17
Execution Considerations �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18
Sustainment �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19
Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20
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United States Space Force Space Warfighting
A Framework for Planners
March 2025
Foreword
Since the first satellite launched into orbit in 1957, space has increasingly become
the foundation of modern life. Accordingly, military space operations have become
the backbone of the Joint Force enabling long-range kill chains and global power
projection. However, in the face of growing threats in, from, and to space, access to
the domain can no longer be taken for granted. For this reason, it is the formative
purpose of the Space Force to achieve space superiority—to ensure freedom of
movement in space for our forces while denying the same to our adversaries.
This document, Space Warfighting, establishes basic principles for the use of
military power in pursuit of this objective. It defines a common strategic framework
to execute the activities that constitute Competitive Endurance. It provides
foundational insights into Service responsibilities, missions, and core competencies
as an integral component of the Joint and Combined Force. In short, Space
Warfighting operationalizes two core Space Force truths: we must defend U.S.
space capabilities, and we must protect our forces from space-enabled attack.
Space superiority is not only a necessary precondition for Joint Force success but
also something for which we must be prepared to fight. Gained and maintained,
it unlocks superiority in other domains, fuels Coalition lethality, and fortifies troop
survivability. It is therefore the basis from which the Joint Force projects power,
deters aggression, and secures the homeland.
To that end, our nation depends on us to organize, train, and equip space forces
ready and able to conduct space warfighting operations. We must be prepared to
employ capabilities for offensive and defensive purposes to deter and, if necessary,
defeat aggressors that threaten our vital national interests. We must deliver space
superiority for the nation, and Space Warfighting provides the Service-level
framework required to do so.
Informed by history, this framework focuses on the future to build readiness for the
challenges to come. Properly planned and executed, responsible counterspace
operations are critical to achieving Combatant Commander objectives through
competition, crisis, and conflict. Guardians at every level must be educated and
trained to carry out these operations in accordance with commander’s intent, the
principles of mission command, and the tenets of Competitive Endurance.
Semper Supra!
B. Chance Saltzman
General, USSF
Chief of Space Operations
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United States Space Force Space Warfighting
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Executive Summary
• Provides a structured approach to analyze and organize space superiority
• Describes space superiority as a necessary precondition for Joint Force success
• Contextualizes space superiority with space control and counterspace operations
• Explains types of operations nested under offensive and defensive actions
• Describes how the United States Space Force gains and maintains space superiority
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• Command and control
• Information
• Intelligence
• Joint fires
• Movement and maneuver
• Protection
• Sustainment
Joint Functions (JP 3-0)
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United States Space Force Space Warfighting
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Space Warfighting
It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a
half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent,
for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the
importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture,
or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the
future because the use of space in war has become vital.
—Colin S. Gray
Access to and the ability to operate freely in space are vital to U.S. national interests.
This framework presents the United States Space Force (USSF) current body of
knowledge pertaining to space warfighting. It provides the Guardian’s perspective
on the best way to approach warfare in the space domain throughout the
competition continuum.
This framework is informed by Chief of Space Operations Notes, USSF doctrine, joint
doctrine, and USSF Commercial Space Strategy (2024).
Space superiority is a joint force priority. This
is especially important whenever the enemy
is capable of threatening friendly forces in
the space domain or inhibiting a Joint Force
Commander’s (JFC’s) ability to conduct
operations. Whether directly in the space
domain, or through advances in space superiority
capabilities, peer and near-peer competitors are
capable of challenging or denying control of the
space domain. These capabilities, supported by
cyberspace and space advancements, present
growing challenges to the Joint Force’s ability to
exercise space superiority. Not only are space
operations global, they are also multi-domain. A
successful attack against the terrestrial, link, or
orbital segment can neutralize a space capability;
therefore, space domain access, maneuver, and
utilization require deliberate and synchronized
offensive and defensive operations across all
segments.
Space superiority may shift from defense to
offense and be conducted within the vicinity
of enemy, friendly, and commercial spacecraft,
or along shared lines of communication in both
space and cyberspace. Space superiority may
involve seeking out and destroying an enemy’s
spacecraft, systems, and networks through measures designed to minimize the
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effectiveness of those systems, or countering enemy efforts in the other
warfighting domains (land, maritime, air, and cyberspace).
Because warfare serves political aims, warfare is fundamentally a human activity.
The same holds true for space warfare. Credible-combat space forces support
U.S. deterrence efforts, which seek to affect the decision calculus of would-be
aggressors. The USSF organizes, trains, equips forces, and is ready to conduct the
operations that provide offensive and defensive actions that deny, degrade, or
disrupt an adversary’s decision-making cycle and ability to observe, orient, decide,
and act.
While space warfare—like all warfare—is a human activity, the character of warfare
in the space domain features highly automated systems that filter or reduce human
decision making. These systems are necessary for space vehicles to operate in
the domain featuring high speeds, long distances, and congested orbital regimes.
Detailed analysis must help us characterize how and when humans interact with
these systems.
Space Superiority
Space superiority allows military forces in all
domains to operate at a time and place of
their choosing without prohibitive interference
from space or counterspace threats, while
also denying the same to an adversary.
Space superiority extends beyond protecting
friendly space capabilities from attack, it also
encompasses protection of friendly forces
in all domains from space-enabled attack.
Adversary exploitation of the space domain
enables adversaries to communicate and to find,
engage, and conduct post-attack assessments
against joint forces and partners; space superiority enables the denial of these key
adversary advantages. The ability to establish space superiority at the time and
place of our choosing enables joint lethality in all domains.
Figure 1 highlights space superiority options for the United States against a potential
adversary. The condition where both have full capability is undesirable and results
in prohibitive interference to the Joint Force during conflict. The condition where
neither have full capability is undesirable because the Joint Force relies heavily on
space to achieve joint effects. The desired condition is to maximize U.S. advantage
while minimizing that of a potential adversary. Importantly, actions taken to achieve
space superiority should not completely jeopardize the long-term safety, security,
stability, or sustainability of the space domain.
In some situations, an actor may not be able to control the domain by operating how
it wishes but may have the power to deny use of the domain to others. This is known
as a denial. A situation of mutual denial may exist as shown in the bottom left corner
of Figure 1. The most striking example of this would be a region of debris that denies
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any use of an orbital regime, but denial could also be achieved with reversible,
temporary effects. Denial, like other aspects of space superiority, may be bounded in
temporal and spatial dimensions.
Figure 1. Contested Space Superiority for a Pacing Threat
Seizing space superiority at the time and place of our choosing can offer advantages
to military forces. By concentrating effects to control celestial lines of communication,
United States space forces can achieve space superiority and enable joint lethality. In
many ways, the modern use of various orbital regimes in the space domain provides
similar advantages to military forces that control key terrain and positions in other
domains.
Figure 2. Dimensions of Space Superiority
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Space superiority has both spatial and temporal dimensions (see Figure 2). Because
of the expansiveness of the space domain, which includes the orbital, link, and
terrestrial segments, various Earth orbits, and cislunar space, the attainment of
space superiority at all places and all times will likely prove elusive. This means
space superiority can be either general or local and either persistent or temporary.
General superiority of space is achieved when the enemy is no longer able to act
in a meaningful or dangerous way against friendly celestial lines of communication,
and it also means that the enemy is unable to adequately defend or control its own
assets or deliver space effects in support of its own operations. Local superiority is
where control is gained or exercised and is less than the total region where one’s
interests in space lie. Persistent superiority means that despite the adversary’s
attempts, the element of time is no longer a significant strategic factor in the
execution of warfare in, from, and to space. Temporary superiority means that either
general or local control is gained for a specific period to achieve either military or
non-military objectives.
When superiority is both general and persistent, it does not mean the enemy
cannot act, but that the adversary is severely weakened to such a point where its
efforts are unlikely to affect the war’s outcome in a significant and lasting way, and
this condition aligns most with space supremacy. When superiority is both local
and persistent, it signifies that significant space capabilities and celestial lines of
communication are protected within a specified region for the foreseeable future,
yet the military outcome is still not assured. Achieving space superiority involves
both offensive and defensive operations. During the pursuit for space superiority, it
is critical to heed the timeless advice of maritime strategist Julian Corbett:
To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of trying to be superior
everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the essential for fear of risking the
unessential, to base our plans on an assumption that war may be waged
without loss, that it is, in short, something that it never has been and never
can be.
Space Control
Space control is a core function of the USSF
to achieve space superiority. Space control
comprises the activities required to contest
and control the space domain. The desired
outcome of space control operations is space
superiority, a degree of control that allows forces
to operate at a time and place of their choosing
without prohibitive interference from space or
counterspace threats, while also denying the
same to an adversary.
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Counterspace Operations
Space control consists of offensive and defensive actions, referred to collectively
as counterspace operations. Counterspace operations are conducted across the
orbital, link, and terrestrial segments of the
space architecture.
Counterspace operations are illustrated
in Figure 3, which shows offensive
and defensive actions taken to create
effects in support of space superiority.
It lists and categorizes numerous
distinct tasks or missions conducted
within the larger framework. Note
that in many cases the distinctions
between the categories may
blur and not fit in tidy categories For
example, an attack on an enemy
antisatellite capability (whether
ground or space-based) may be
considered at times as either an
offensive action (i.e., orbital strike) or
defensive action (i.e., counterattack).
Figure 3. Counterspace Operations
Offensive Actions
Offensive action is an important space component mission when the enemy has
the capability to threaten friendly forces, or provide significant support to adversary
terrestrial forces, using space capabilities. Given finite resources, the allocation of
forces and capabilities to meet the supported Commanders’ objectives should be
judiciously planned and allocated. Successful offensive actions result in greater
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freedom from attack, by disrupting, degrading, denying, or destroying enemy
counterspace capabilities before they are used against friendly forces, enabling
increased freedom of action. This, in turn, may free up assets for other operations
against the enemy. Successful offensive actions also result in the ability to mitigate
the adversary’s use of space capabilities to support their fielded forces in all
domains. In other words, the initial investment in offensive operations contributing
to the achievement of the desired level of control of space may pay significant
dividends toward overall military objectives.
Determining which enemy capabilities to target and the level of degradation
required is fundamental to successful offensive operations. For instance, it may not
be necessary to destroy or degrade a given capability, but only temporarily disrupt
or deny it in order to achieve desired effects. This type of intelligence analysis varies
from one operation to another, but results in an effective set of target priorities and
more efficient use of assets to achieve desired effects.
Offensive actions seek to achieve space superiority and prevent the launch of
threats, resulting in greater freedom from attack and increased freedom of action.
It includes three activities used to achieve specific space superiority effects:
orbital strike, space link interdiction, and terrestrial strike. Tasked units normally
have decentralized execution authority and are given significant latitude to plan
and coordinate tasks. Offensive actions should be properly planned for, directed,
and integrated with other offensive operations. Offensive actions directly enable
achieving space superiority, which is a priority objective for the Joint Force.
• Orbital Strike. Actions taken to destroy, disrupt, or degrade adversary
space platforms in the space domain. Orbital strike operations may be
accomplished through kinetic or non-kinetic, reversible or nonreversible
actions. These operations can be conducted by any part of the Joint Force.
The goal of orbital strike is to constrain an enemy’s ability to access, control,
or exploit space capabilities, and orbital strike operations may target
adversary space or counterspace platforms. Orbital strike operations may be
conducted by pursuit operations (i.e., forces that must rendezvous with an
adversary spacecraft before weapons employment) or standoff operations
(i.e., space- or terrestrial-based long-range fires that can attack without first
conducting an orbital rendezvous).
• Space Link Interdiction. Actions taken to disrupt, deny, or degrade an
enemy’s critical space links. These missions are accomplished through
non-kinetic attack vectors. The goal of space link interdiction activities
is to constrain an enemy’s ability to access, control, or exploit space or
counterspace capabilities by interfering with the flow of information
and data across a space architecture. Space link interdiction includes
electromagnetic attack or cybernetwork attack.
• Terrestrial Strike. Actions taken by any part of the Joint Force intended to
destroy, disrupt, or degrade adversary launch vehicles, space systems,
and architectures in the terrestrial domains (land, maritime, and air).
Terrestrial strike operations may be accomplished through kinetic or non-
kinetic, reversible or nonreversible actions. These offensive actions may be
directed against enemy spacecraft before or just after launch, terrestrial
counterspace forces, launch infrastructure, command and control facilities,
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antennas, terrestrial space domain awareness sensors, and mission networks.
The goal of terrestrial strike operations is to constrain an enemy’s ability to
access, control, or exploit space or counterspace capabilities. Terrestrial
strike operations can be conducted by air-based fires, ground-based fires,
maritime-based fires, and space-based fires.
Defensive Actions
Defensive actions protect friendly space capabilities from attack, interference, and
unintentional hazards to preserve the U.S. and friendly ability to exploit space for
military advantage. Conducting effective offensive actions prior to the threat coming
to bear may reduce the defensive action requirement, freeing assets for more
offensive operations, but some degree of defensive action is normally necessary
in every phase of military operations. Defensive actions defend friendly lines of
communication, restrict the ability of the enemy to carry out offensive attacks in
all domains against friendly space forces and assets, and provide access to space
capabilities for all elements of the Joint Force.
Just as in offensive operations, defensive action planners identify enemy targets and
capabilities to defend against, while matching available forces against the threat. They
use many of the same offensive planning considerations. Planners determine which
mission-critical assets and capabilities to protect, which will vary from operation
to operation. Defensive actions are conducted in conjunction with or independent
of offensive actions and generally fall into one of two categories: active or passive
defense.
Active Space Defense. Active space defense consists of direct actions taken to
disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy ongoing or imminent attacks against friendly space
forces, assets, and capabilities. Active space defense operations are conducted using
a mix of weapon and sensor systems, supported by secure and highly responsive
C2 systems, to find, fix, track, target, and destroy or reduce the effectiveness of
space threats. Upon a determination of a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent,
defensive actions authorized by an appropriate authority may act in self-defense,
including the use of force, consistent with mission objectives and orders. Active
space defense is predicated on near-real-time threat identification and attack
characterization. Active space defense includes three operations used to achieve
specific space superiority effects: escort, counterattack, and suppression of
adversary counterspace targeting.
• Escort. Dedicated protection for friendly spacecraft using space-to-space
capabilities. Escort operations can be further divided into area defense or
point defense.
• Counterattack. Reactive measures taken to disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy space forces that have demonstrated hostile action or hostile intent.
Counterattack operations are divided into terrestrial counterattack, orbital
counterattack, and space link counterattack.
• Suppression of Adversary Counterspace Targeting. Reactive measures taken
to deny the adversary’s ability to collect or disseminate weapons-quality
targeting data during an orbital engagement.
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Passive Space Defense. Passive space defense consists of measures inherent in the
design of space assets and the implementation of space operations that minimize
the effectiveness of threats to friendly space forces and capabilities. Unlike active
space defense measures, passive space defense does not involve direct action in
response to adversary, unintentional, or environmental threats. Passive defenses
enhance the survivability of space systems by providing a layered defense to ensure
space systems continue to operate both during and after attack. Known survivability
measures may dissuade an adversary from attempting to attack friendly space
systems. These passive measures can be employed not only in the space domain
but also in cyberspace and terrestrial domains. Passive space defense includes
seven operations used to achieve specific space superiority effects:
• Threat warning. Timelines for indications and warning of enemy space or
space-enabled attacks are generally compressed. Threat warning is the
urgent communication and acknowledgement of time-critical information
essential for the preservation of life and/or vital resources.
• Military Deception. Military deception in space may be employed to deny
accuracy in locating friendly spacecraft, systems, and capabilities.
• Hardening. Valuable spacecraft and space architectures are hardened to
protect against hostile attacks: physical, electromagnetic pulse, and transient
radiation. Hardening actions are usually accomplished during peacetime but
may continue throughout operations.
• Dispersal. Dispersal complicates the enemy’s ability to locate and target
friendly assets. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases
uncertainty as to whether an orbital location or region is occupied or will
remain occupied. It forces the enemy to search more locations, requiring more
resources and time.
• Disaggregation. The separation of dissimilar capabilities into separate
platforms or payloads mitigates the threat posed by enemy attack. An
example of this would be separating tactical and strategic protected satellite
communications.
• Mobility. Mobility is the capability to move from one location and incorporates
the principle of movement and maneuver. Frequent movement of spacecraft,
signals, ground nodes, and other systems occurring within the enemy’s
decision cycle can be of critical importance to joint operations. Mobility
reduces vulnerability and increases survivability of friendly assets by
complicating enemy surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.
• Redundancy. Duplication of critical capabilities keeps vital systems functioning
even when critical nodes are destroyed or damaged. Redundancy includes
dual, contingency, or back-up capabilities that can assume primary mission
functions, in whole or in part, when the primary system is degraded or fails.
Redundancy includes the distribution, diversification, and proliferation of
spacecraft and space architectures. An example might be using a proliferated
constellation of small spacecraft rather than one large, unique asset.
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Integrated Counterspace Operations and Joint Operations
Counterspace operations, which include offensive and defensive actions,
counter space and space-enabled threats to enable space superiority. As such,
counterspace operations are a subset of the joint functions, as described in joint
doctrine. This linkage is portrayed in the Executive Summary. The coordination of
space superiority and joint operations ensures the integration of combat capabilities
and overlapping military operations to defend the homeland and national interests,
protect the Joint Force, and enable freedom of action by disrupting, degrading,
denying, or destroying an adversary’s ability to create adverse effects in, from, and
to space. Importantly, the USSF is the lead for fires, intelligence, movement and
maneuver, protection, and sustainment in, from, and to space, and it is purposely
trained to deliver space superiority for the Joint Force.
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Integrated Cyberspace Operations
The USSF’s ability to project spacepower relies on its ability to maneuver to, from, and
through cyberspace. The USSF must not only work to ensure the cyber survivability
of its space systems during development but must actively defend its critical cyber
terrain across all three space segments—terrestrial, link, and orbital. Ensuring the
delivery of spacepower is critical to Joint and Combined Forces, while enabling
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of space capabilities for the United States, its
allies, and mission partners is a mission imperative.
Space and cyberspace domains overlap and are inextricable due to their
interconnectedness and interdependence (see Figure 4). Space and cyberspace
domains share strategic elements like lines of communication, informational
environment, network dimension, and link segment.
Figure 4. Intersection of Space and Cyberspace Domains
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Space is almost entirely reliant on
the network dimension of space
operations—launch, command and
control, communications, and ground-
based sensors and space-mission
data at some point must traverse
cyberspace. As space doctrine,
Spacepower points out, cyberspace
operations within the network
dimension of space operations
represent the primary linkage to
all other warfighting domains. This
dependence means that achieving
cyberspace superiority is critical to ensuring space superiority at the time and place
necessary for space forces to prevail in conflict.
Guardians must be ready to deny adversary operational advantage against our
space capabilities and provide options to hold hostile forces at risk to dissuade our
adversaries from aggressive and irresponsible actions in space and cyberspace.
Space Segments
Space operations conducted across the competition continuum enable freedom
of action for the Joint Force. Space forces consist of orbital and terrestrial systems,
equipment, personnel, and support necessary to directly or indirectly impact joint
operations. Space systems consist of three interdependent segments: orbital, link,
and terrestrial.
Guardians employ space systems to conduct activities and create effects in, from,
and to the space domain. Space systems include components in three segments
operating across all operational environments. The orbital segment includes space
systems operating in the environment of the space domain. Terrestrial segment systems
operate in the land, air, and maritime domains. Link segment components of space
systems operate in the information operations environment (cyberspace is part of the
information operations environment) and the electromagnetic operations environment.
These characteristics of these segments and their operational environments play
important roles in determining capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities for space
operations.
Lines of Communication
Celestial lines of communication are those physical and electromagnetic routes in,
from, and to space used for the movement of trade, materiel, supplies, personnel,
spacecraft, information, and military effects. Access to lines of communication within
the orbital segment enables the timely repositioning, on-orbit maintenance, and
reconstitution of assets. In the orbital segment, lines of communication include but
are not limited to launch trajectories, orbits, and communications links to and from
terrestrial nodes (in the terrestrial segment) and between spacecraft in the
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orbital segment. Intelligence plays a critical role in understanding and assessing lines
of communication to drive mission planning for space operations. Understanding
lines of communication in conjunction with key orbital trajectories is essential for
Guardians planning, executing, and assessing space operations.
Movement and Maneuver
The expansiveness of lines of communication and distributed space architectures
results in a celestial maneuver space. Movement and maneuver is an enduring
principle of war and is one of the joint functions as detailed in joint doctrine. The
concept of movement and maneuver encompasses the disposition of joint forces
to conduct operations by securing positional advantages before or during combat
operations and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic
objectives. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through
movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to
the enemy.
The movement and maneuver of spacecraft
includes the deployment, repositioning, or
re-orientation of joint space forces. These
movements may support service optimization,
protection from environmental hazards,
passive defense from threats, or the
positioning of assets to enable active
defensive or offensive measures. For example,
a rendezvous and proximity operation may
include purposeful positioning of a spacecraft
near or in contact with another spacecraft.
This can be conducted for the purposes of
defense, offense, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, collection, sustainment,
training, research and development, or to fulfill
other missions.
The concept of movement and maneuver in the space domain includes rapid
and sustained maneuver; moving satellites into different Earth orbits; changing a
spacecraft’s location between lunar and geostationary orbits; changing trajectory
within cislunar space; layering various non-kinetic effects, whether cyberspace
attacks, jamming, or lasing; changing radio frequencies used for satellite
communications; shifting commercial or military customers from one satellite to
another; frequency hopping; dispersing space capabilities and services across space
architectures and other domains, while being able to focus military effects when and
where needed.
Space Domain Awareness, Intelligence, and Attribution
To counter the exploitation of the space domain by potential adversaries, robust
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space domain awareness (SDA), intelligence, and attribution capabilities are
needed. SDA encompasses activities that detect, characterize, attribute, predict,
and target activities in the space domain to inform decision making. Intelligence
is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation,
analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations,
hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential
operations. Ultimately, a credible, known, and trusted attribution process underpins
a successful deterrence strategy.
SDA is a mission and an enabling function—it is not inherently an enterprise,
architecture, or system. SDA is built from information gleaned from capabilities
across the range of Space Force, joint, coalition, and other systems, which can
either be dedicated sensors and activities or sensors and activities that contribute
to SDA.
Command and Control
Mission command is the backbone of our C2. In a contested, degraded, and
operationally limited environment, the most effective form of C2 is mission command.
It builds a shared understanding among echelons and allows combat formations to
act independently to meet Commander’s intent. C2 is the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces
in the accomplishment of the mission. Effective C2 is essential to the application
of spacepower. Consistent with joint and USSF doctrine, C2 includes three basic
functions: gaining and maintaining situational awareness; enabling operational
decision making; and directing forces.
Command includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources to
accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels requires motivating and
directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. Timely and relevant
intelligence enables commanders to make decisions and execute those decisions
more rapidly and effectively than the enemy.
Control is inherent in command. It allows commanders to manage and direct forces
and functions consistent with their authority. Control of forces and functions helps
commanders and staff compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts.
Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify
variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. This
permits commanders to acquire and apply means to support the mission and develop
specific instructions from general guidance.
C2 and battle management are different. C2 are the activities used by the chain of
command to provide forces the direction needed to accomplish an overall objective.
Battle management does not require command authority but supports the control
of forces in a dynamic operating environment to optimally achieve mission objectives
established by the chain of command.
Guardians are purposely developed to lead Joint Force space superiority missions for
the Department of Defense and are steeped in the integrated by design strategy.
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Senior Guardians are best suited to command joint and coalition space forces.
Effective operations require the establishment and promulgation of easily
understood Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE are established to convey national
leadership and senior military commander intent and guidance regarding the use of
force. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue
combat engagement with other forces encountered. Effective ROE should align
with commander’s intent and balance restrictions with risk and the imperative for
success. When establishing the ROE, commanders and planners should obtain the
legal advice of the supporting judge advocate. Furthermore, where supplemental
measures restrict Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approved ROE, notification must
be given to SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS).
Overly restrictive ROE can be contrary to decentralized execution and may lead
Guardians to rely on ever-increasing levels of oversight and approval, potentially
leading to situations where Guardians hesitate to act. Such a scenario may
increase risk, both to the mission and to the Joint Force. As such, commanders
should be careful not to create ROE so restrictive that they place friendly forces at
unnecessary risk or at an operational disadvantage. This could be a pitfall in a peer
or near-peer, contested environment.
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Planning Considerations
In early planning stages, operational staff determine objectives, desired effects, and
relative priorities. Planners in the strategy, combat plans, and intelligence focused
divisions identify enemy systems, capabilities, and assets capable of contesting
control of the space domain. Combat plans and combat operations personnel use
this information to match desired effects to targets and create tactical tasks by
matching targets to available assets and capabilities that can achieve those effects.
To facilitate operations, a list of validated targets is developed before hostilities
begin and continually updated based on current intelligence and progress of the
operation. The following are general planning considerations for offensive and
defensive actions in the space domain or involving space architectures.
• Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Highly detailed and
accurate intelligence regarding enemy threats is necessary to properly plan,
position, and sequence (timing) offensive actions.
• ROE. These directives are authoritative and may critically affect how missions
are performed. All levels, from the Combined Joint Force Space Component
Commander (CJFSCC) down to individual Guardians, should understand the
ROE that apply to the accomplishment of their missions and include ROE in
mission planning.
• Weaponeering. Effective target and weapon pairing is critical to achieve
desired effects.
• Deconfliction. Orbital mechanics, trajectory, effects, timing, and numerous
other aspects of offensive and defensive actions require deconfliction. The
theater and other operational guidance provide the primary means for doing
so. However, deconfliction equally applies to individual missions and force
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packages. Thorough planning is key. However, procedures and C2 structures
and mechanisms should be established to enable real-time deconfliction
of all planned missions, including terrestrial, cyberspace, and information
warfare.
• Threat Warning. Timely detection and warning of space threats provide
reaction time for friendly forces to take appropriate action. Reliable and
redundant connectivity for communications and sensor systems is vital
for accurate and timely warning. To be effective, warning methods and
procedures should be established, disseminated, and rehearsed down to the
unit level.
• Reduction of Enemy Targeting Effectiveness. Certain measures can be taken
to reduce the effectiveness of enemy targeting and attacks, to include
mobility, deception, EW, and operations security.
• Reducing Vulnerability. Four measures that may enable friendly assets
to survive enemy attacks by reducing their vulnerability are hardening,
redundancy, dispersal, and defense.
• Recovery and Reconstitution. Following an attack, prior planning should aid
the restoration of space operations capability to a desired level of combat
effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available
resources.
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Targeting
Targeting is a joint process. Space warfighters must be knowledgeable of this
process and prepared to engage in order to ensure that counterspace targets
receive the necessary priority and effects to achieve the JFC’s intent. Due to the
nature of the space domain, targeting is often enabled by target development,
modeling and simulation which can have long lead times and must occur prior
to conflict to reduce risk during conflict. Targeting is often a federated process,
and targeting resources are usually high demand/low density. Order of battle
maintenance is a key enabler for targeting, especially dynamic targeting. Unless
delegated, the Defense Intelligence Agency maintains authoritative order of battle
data. For a detailed discussion of targeting, refer to Joint Publication 3-60, Joint
Targeting, and accompany CJCS instructions.
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Indicators, Measures of Performance, and Measures of Effectiveness
Assessing the degree of friendly space superiority is challenging. Similarly, the
inherent characteristics of spacepower—reach, persistence, endurance, and
responsiveness —apply to enemy counterspace threats as well, making assessment
of adversary actions and intent more difficult. However, assessment should be
guided by space superiority objectives—ensuring freedom to maneuver, freedom
to attack, and freedom from attack. Achieving space superiority should be logically
tied to these three items. For effective assessment, indicators should be developed
at the same time as the objectives, effects, and tasks they measure—not after the
fact. Indicators should be either directly observable or be reliably inferred from
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other data. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be identified during
planning according to the nature of tasks and desired effects. Planners should
choose criteria that describe or establish when actions have been accomplished,
desired effects have been created, and objectives have been achieved. Indicators
are generally classified as either measures of performance (MOPs) or measures of
effectiveness (MOEs).
• Measures of performance. MOPs are indicators used to measure a friendly
action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Operational level
tasks and MOPs are typically broader and system-based (e.g., the number of
enemy counterspace threats neutralized versus number of enemy threats
still operational).
• Measures of effectiveness. MOEs are indicators used to measure a current
system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations
over time. MOEs help answer the question, “Are we generating the effects
necessary to meet objectives?”
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Execution Considerations
During the ongoing battle rhythm, weapon systems are matched to specific targets
or missions based on their ability to achieve desired effects. There are numerous
systems and capabilities available to achieve space superiority. Each may be more
or less capable than the next for a given mission or task. Similarly, employment
methods may differ between offensive and defensive actions. Matching capable
assets with intended tasks is critical to overall mission success.
The following are some of the planning and execution considerations for conducting
offensive and defensive actions:
• Key Topology. Planners identify key topology in the physical domain,
necessary to seize, exploit, and protect these physical regions. This
methodology simplifies the regions of concern, allowing creation of control
measures such as area of operations.Key topology includes both celestial
lines of communications for the movement and sustainment of space forces
and the key orbital trajectories upon which they rely.
• Barriers to Access, Movement, and Recovery. Orbital mechanics,
atmospheric drag, solar radiation, space weather, availability of in-theater
ground equipment, and access to logistics are examples of the shifting
nature of the environment. Planners should also account for adversaries,
which also influence the various domains and may have the ability to restrict
access to, movement, or recovery of assets in orbit, on the ground, or in the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).
• Hazards of Orbital Flight. Planners should consider physical hazards to orbital
flight prior to developing courses of action. Identifying physical hazards
that threaten friendly assets may levy significant operational limitations on
planners. For example, the congested environment may preclude the use
of certain capabilities but also expose potential adversary vulnerabilities for
exploitation.
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• Electromagnetic Spectrum. The EMS is crucial to all space operations,
incredibly complex in the operational environment, and utilized across the
commercial enterprise and governmental organizations of each nation.
With each nation potentially imposing different domestic laws, rules, and
authorities, and interpreting international law and norms differently, it is
imperative to understand and operate effectively within this ecosystem.
Additionally, planners should prepare for an adversary’s attempts to deny
friendly access to the EMS and develop primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency plans for all critical operations.
• Terrestrial Sites. Space capabilities often rely on terrestrial equipment
(terrestrial segment), which is not all based in US territory. Planners should
recognize this limitation and plan for potential limited or loss of access to
capabilities in these locations and identify suitable workarounds or solutions.
In some cases, terrestrial access required for line-of-sight transmission
may become limited due to adversary intervention, weather, maintenance,
or other factors. Planners should account for these possibilities and take
actions to maximize continuity of space capabilities. Conversely, planners
should recognize that adversaries are subject to the same constraints and
seek opportunities to create advantages as a result.
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Sustainment
Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain operations
until mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. It is identified as one
of seven joint functions—related capabilities and activities grouped together to help
JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations—and includes the provision
of logistics, financial management, physical infrastructure, personnel services, and
health service support necessary to maintain operations. Sustainment activities occur
in a complex environment spanning the globe and multiple domains. Sustainment
capabilities can come from a variety of military forces, other governmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or multinational forces.
The essential challenge is to support increasing demand with constrained resources
in a potentially contested environment. Understanding the global environment
is essential to plan, execute, synchronize, assess, and coordinate sustainment
operations. Sustainment facilitates uninterrupted operations through means of
adequate logistics support. Services accomplish this through supply systems,
maintenance, and other services, which ensure continuing support through the
lifecycle of the weapon system.
There are nine principles of sustainment: integration, anticipation, responsiveness,
simplicity, economy, survivability, continuity, improvisation, and interoperability. The
USSF drives to meet these principles through four pillars of mission sustainment: the
natural environment, the built environment, human capital, and mission systems. By
identifying and defining these pillars, we begin to articulate both the ways and the
means of achieving the strategic goals outlined earlier, acknowledging that each
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echelon may have specific methods for achieving short-, mid-, or long-term
objectives.
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Conclusion
Space Warfighting illuminates why and how the USSF will shift its institutional
mindset toward achieving space superiority: the Service’s cornerstone
responsibility. It establishes a common counterspace framework and associated
lexicon to best plan for and employ Space Force forces as part of a broader Joint
Force. Counterspace operations are essential to joint operations as achieving space
superiority can provide a decisive advantage to those who secure it.
Space Warfighting offers the counterspace framework necessary to execute the
tenets of Competitive Endurance, the USSF’s theory of success to achieve U.S.
space superiority while safeguarding the safety, security, stability, and long-term
sustainability of the space domain. The ideas in Space Warfighting should shape
Guardians’ planning and activities to avoid operational surprise, deny first-mover
advantage, and undertake responsible counterspace campaigning.
Moreover, this framework operationalizes two core Space Force truths: that the
USSF must defend U.S. space capabilities and that the USSF must protect Joint
and Coalition forces from space-enabled attack. Space Warfighting, Competitive
Endurance, and the Space Force truths all serve as complementary guides in
preparing space forces to engage in measured and principled action throughout
the competition continuum.
All Guardians—the Service’s warfighters—should be well-versed with the terminology
and concepts detailed in this framework. USSF Field Commands and Direct
Reporting Units will act on this framework when formulating plans, operational
concepts, lines of effort, military objectives, and specified tasks. The foundational
concepts detailed here also will inform resourcing and programming efforts across
the Service.
As with many strategic and operational concepts, definitions and categories rarely
fit into neat, tidy boxes—this is the nature of warfighting. In the end there are no set
answers, no textbook solutions, and no guarantees of success. The Guardian must
understand the principles and, when necessary, break the rules to uncover the
military genius in spacepower.
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