Opinions filed with the rehearing denial, September 25, 2026

… 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 137 (1768) (emphasis omitted). In sum, the petition, in challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention and requesting release, sought habeas relief, which the district court provided by ordering release absent a prompt bond hearing. The dissent’s novel arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. * * * As to the sole question presented on appeal—whether Section 1225 or Section 1226 governed Petitioner’s detention—our holding was dictated by the plain text of the statute. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “applies only to a noncitizen who is both an ‘applicant for admission’ and ‘seeking admission.’” Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 74. Petitioner, who entered the United States unlawfully more than two decades ago and has resided here ever since, was not “seeking admission” because he was not “seeking to come inside [the country] from outside.” Id. at 97 (Cabranes, J., concurring). Accordingly, his detention was governed by Section 1226, which entitled him to a bond hearing. The dissent’s “attempt to muddy these textually clear waters defies the statute’s context, structure, history, and purpose[.]” Id. at 96 (majority opinion). The dissent’s novel argument about the scope of habeas fares no better. According to the dissent, the nine circuits and hundreds of district courts to grant habeas relief to individuals wrongly detained under Section 1225 did not have authority to do so. That is a drastic view that not even the government has advanced in this case. Because the district court was right on the statutory question and had authority to grant habeas relief, the panel opinion correctly affirmed the decision below and our Court correctly voted to deny rehearing en banc. --- page 8 --- 1 SCHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, joined by SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc: Although I agree with the analysis in the dissent, I support the decision to deny rehearing en banc. My “[m]ere substantive disagreement” with the panel opinion does not warrant the time and effort of full court rehearing. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 941 (2d Cir. 1996) (Feinberg, J.). Further, there is a deep and widening circuit split on the nationally important issue of whether the government may detain aliens like Petitioner under Section 1225 or Section 1226. In general, issues for “which Supreme Court resolution is inevitable should not be permitted to tarry in this Court for further intermediate action, . . . except when the views of this Court would be of real benefit to the Supreme Court.” Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see also John M. Walker, Jr., Foreword, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1, 14 (2001) (“[T]he Second Circuit’s approach to in banc review—one that holds the process in reserve for the exceptional case that is an unlikely candidate for Supreme Court resolution—is sound, and it will continue to serve this [C]ircuit well in the years to come.”). As the issue in this case has been thoroughly ventilated— both in our Circuit and in circuits across the country—en banc consideration would be unlikely to benefit the Supreme Court. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., joined by Friendly, C.J. & Feinberg, …