Transcript: Gen. Whiting keynote at AMOS

… The third element of space control is prevention. This includes measures to preclude an opponent from taking hostile action against U.S. allied or third-party space systems and services, ranging from deterrence and diplomacy to military actions, prevention is a key aspect of space control. A combat-credible space control capability first serves as a powerful deterrent. Integrating commercial and allied partners into our core architecture is also vital to deterrence. By combining distributed commercial systems with sovereign allied capabilities, we create a highly resilient network that creates multiple dilemmas to the adversary&#39;s targeting calculus. Diplomatic efforts like the U.S.-led Artemis Accords are also building a coalition across dozens upon dozens of nations to baseline responsible space activities. These types of cooperative efforts complicate the battlefield for those who are used to executing irresponsible space operations. When prevention and awareness are not enough, we must consider negation measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an opponent&#39;s space systems or services at U.S. Space Command we take seriously our responsibilities to defend American interests in space. This includes maintaining domain awareness of the Space AOR. It includes protecting our critical satellite systems upon which the defense of our nation is so dependent, as well as preventing attacks upon those systems, but when called upon, we also are ready to negate any threat which seeks to do harm to our space systems, because the joint force retains on orbit space control weapons capable of defending the United States and its interests against hostile adversary actions. To be able to negate threats in space, we must be able to find, fix, track, and target those threats. Targeting in the space domain is maturing, but it still has a long way to go. For example, we don&#39;t yet have full, mature target folders for all space targets that we care about, like the joint force does in other domains. In addition, once a target is engaged, we need to have real-time battle space awareness in order to execute battle management. Finally, assessment will be key to understanding restrike decisions and to provide a clear risk assessment to our supported forces, and as we expand our operations into cis-lunar space and beyond, we must ensure our space domain awareness architecture is scalable. Otherwise, we risk leaving deep space unmonitored and vulnerable to exploitation by our opponents. All these elements I&#39;ve discussed need to account for operations beyond GEO. Currently, we lack PNT, SATCOM, or even a standard format for discussing positional states in cislunar space. This represents a concern, and U.S. Space Command is focused on addressing it. In looking ahead, I envision a future in which SDA is fully automated, with quantum sensors tracking hard-to-detect threats and blockchain-secured data sharing among allies. But this requires investment now in R&amp;D, training, and partnerships. Your work here at AMOS is pivotal. And as I close, let me return to where. We began shaping the future of space domain awareness here at the AMOS Conference. Remember the hope I shared of ET filing a valid orbital data request? Well, in space, the operating environment that we now find ourselves in, whether it&#39;s tracking friendly assets, debris from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test, or the next potential adversary maneuver, comprehensive SDA is our ultimate validator, ensuring we know the full picture before any action unfolds. Just as Sun Tzu reminded us to know the enemy, ourselves, the terrain, and the weather, to ensure complete victory, SDA integrates these multidisciplinary insights to turn orbital data into actionable intelligence that underpins surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation. Without it, we&#39;re navigating blind in a contested domain where threats can emerge from any orbit or angle. It&#39;s not enough to sustain the current balance, we must innovate and advance our capabilities to ensure space remains a place where the United States and our allies can continue to explore and advance scientific knowledge, where we expand our economies by leveraging the unique vantage point and resources of space, and where we can defend our way of life and national interests. I challenge each of you, innovators, engineers, and leaders in this room, to accelerate technology delivery and forge resilient architectures that scale from VLEO to cis-lunar space and beyond. At U.S. Space Command, many of our key priorities are focused on SDA and related capabilities, areas like self-defense of our high-value assets, countering adversary proliferated architectures, joint integrated command and control, and dedicated space domain awareness for space engagement are just a few of the capabilities that will be the linchpins for our future space operations. SDA generates options for our forces. Space superiority is built on SDA as the indispensable enabler of space control, empowering us to stand ready against any adversary, defend our critical assets, and prevail in the face of threats for our nation, the joint force and our allies. Thank you for all you do to ensure America remains at the leading edge of space innovation, the space economy, space defense, and space advantage. And I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you.<br /> …